

H. OTTO DAHLKE

*Virginia Commonwealth University*

## The Significance, Interrelationships, and Ordering of Value Systems

As we look around the world today, we readily see in what an educational turmoil it is. There is hardly a country in which university students have not revolted against established procedures and values. In the United States the issue has spread into the high school systems. We find, in short, a revolt of the consumer of educational fare. What he is getting, he doesn't like. One can look at this as a generation struggle, youth versus intellectually atrophied elders, or as a struggle against de-humanized educational bureaucratic structures, i.e. against the style of life foisted upon the student by such social systems, or as a power struggle by contending groups for the direction and administration of educational institutions, or what is perhaps more decisive and underlying all the foregoing, a value conflict which includes not only the universities and lower schools but extends to the society at large. To put the issue in value terms, there is the claim that the establishment is a phony, a set of fraudulent platitudes, a life-negating system; so one cops out, on the one hand, or attacks the system on the other — hence, hippies in the interstices of our cities, student revolts, and attempts at communal living in both city and country. Whether one cops out, revolts, or tries group living, new definitions of the situation are attempted, and these are implicitly or explicitly based upon values. For some this process may essentially involve more or less inchoate feelings that something isn't right — a restless, ill-defined discontent. For others it may consist of the creation of a rather sophisticated, polemical literature, but all are involved in different or new modes of behavior, behavior that is anathema from the point of view of those enconced in the establishment.

The educator is in a rather difficult spot as he becomes entangled in this value and behavioral turmoil. What is to be done? The term "educate" is etymologically derived from *educare*, that is to lead, to draw, or to bring out. To do this involves a sense of direction and a sense of what is to be brought out. This is another way of saying that it is better to go in this direction rather than another or better to bring

this out than that. In short, the issue is one of values, but it is also relative to the extent that education as an institutional and social system is autonomous or functions as a service system to the demands, requirements, and values of other institutional systems.

Whether we look at education from the point of view of the consumer or from that of the practitioner, there appears to be a value malaise. The malaise is not just a discontent about what it is that is worthwhile to pursue in life, a matter of one's world view, of one's being in the world, but it also includes the problem of the appropriate forms of our institutional orders, i.e. of the quality of the design of the various intentional systems which compose a culture and a society. This would involve, in other words, an empirical determination of what is and a speculative venture to transcend the given into a new form. The current student unrest is an index of dissatisfaction with the appropriateness of our present educational institutional form and the intent to bring about change in this form so that educational purposes as they see them can be more readily realized. Presumably this is also the task of schools of education, to study, to reflect upon, and to envision new potentialities in the learning process and in organization of the educational experience, i.e. its institutional structure organization, but the task is difficult because of the divergent value emphases in our contemporary society and because we seem to lack a strong sense of an axiology or a value hierarchy in this age of scepticism, relativism, and nihilism. In such a period there is a flattening of values, and this constitutes part of the malaise. Indeed, there is a school of thought which holds that values are simply emotive cries and shouts, unverifiable, and so are without logical status.

#### THE FIRST TYPOLOGY OF SOCIAL SYSTEMS AND VALUES

The issues are not new, and other ages have contended with similar issues. It is for this reason that some of these writings have such a contemporary quality to them. In the history of reflective thought man began with thoughts about nature and in short time came to the issue of thoughts about man, the nature of society, the good life, etc. Such early reflection about man took place in times of great social change, great secularization, scepticism, dubious military and imperialistic ventures, civil disorders, factionalism or stasis, individual self-aggrandizement: times filled with informers, spies, double dealings and the double cross, instructions on how to be popular, make friends, be an effective demagogue, a youth problem, impieties, and a conservative, traditionalistic backlash leading to ostracism or death of those accused. It is a time that Aristophanes characterizes as "whirl is king, Zeus having been dethroned." In this time of trouble, the problem was as to the form of the polis, the nature of social order — in different words, the constitutional principles of social life.

One effort to deal with it is the Platonic typology of social systems. It is the first typology which attempts to work with the variables of value, power, and authority. It also represents a typology in which the various systems are arranged in terms of comparative worth, i.e. from best to worst. To recapitulate the types rather briefly: the top or best system is aristocracy, a term which has no connection with our contemporary notions of nobility as consisting of power, prestige, landed property, social theatrical culture patterns. Persons are assigned their position in the social structure relative to their capacity and training. Governing is carried out by those who have knowledge and wisdom. The principle or value that structures the system is justice. The second form is called a timocracy. The guiding values are honor and glory. Governing is in the hands of the warrior class. The third type rests upon the high valuation of property and riches. Riches and rich men are honored. The rich have power, the poor do not. Property qualifications for citizenship are established. The resultant form is oligarchic. The fourth form is democratic, the valuation is placed upon freedom and equality. Freedom and power are equally shared. Power is in the hands of the demos or male population at large. The last type is tyranny. The focus is on power exclusively as carried out by the arbitrary, unpredictable wilfulness of the tyrant.

The arrangement of the typology may be thought of as a scale in which there is increasing social instability or social disorder or an increase in civil strife and dissension. A general principle is suggested to account for this, i.e. "dissimilarity, inequality, and irregularities . . . are the causes of hatred and war."<sup>1</sup> These sensed differences are relative to values affirmed and supported, so that in this typology as the constitutive values change, these factors increase in amount and type as the scale changes from best to worst. Each social system has to cope in some manner with such internal discord and division. When this reaches a certain point, on the assumption that "an excessive increase of anything often causes a reaction in the opposite direction,"<sup>2</sup> a social system transmutes into another. Each change amounts to an internal revolution in which a new set of values is emphasized and in which there is a new allocation of power. The power is increasingly diffuse in a population except in the last form in which the tyrant arrogates power for himself absolutely, and the population may be said to be "enslaved." In fact, from the point of view under consideration, it may be inappropriate to apply the label "social order" to the tyrannical state.

The implementation of the values as constitutive of a social order manifests itself through power and authority as these are involved in

<sup>1</sup>Plato, *The Republic*, trans. B. Jowett. (New York: n.d.). Tudor Publishing Co., p. 310.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 336.

the construction of the society through public policies. These two facets of social living are construed and function differently in each system of the typology.

The power concept involves a relationship of unwilling superordination-subordination to differentiate this from a relationship of authority where the relationship is one of willing subordination in which those subordinate recognize that the basis of the directives or commands is based upon knowledge about nature and man and directed to their well-being (Plato's famous "pilot" metaphor). The power concept essentially involves force and coercion — one faction forcing another into a relationship of unwilling domination-submission and securing its ends in the process. It also follows that when the unwilling subordinated or submitting ones detect some diminution in the power control, then they are very likely to move in and restructure the relationship. In fact, as one traces the shift from one social system to another, there is, to use a phrase of MacIver's, a dynamic assessment of the situation and especially of those who hold power. When the chances of success seem good, then the underlings move into action to affirm and support new values and reallocate power. If the typology is scaled on the variables of authority and power, they stand in an inverse relationship so that as each system changes, there is a diminution in authority and an increase in power. Thus, the best of the social systems is based upon authority with power minimal and the worst is based upon power with authority minimal. In passing, I may point out that private property takes on increasing significance in each of the social systems.

From an educational point of view, there is another interesting aspect of this typology, i.e. that there is a correlative person system, a modal personality type, that is associated with each social system. The person system is principled isomorphically with the social system. This raises an interesting problem in socialization as to what is involved in the change from one modal personality type to another. Each person system type is also graded as to worth, and the rating follows that of the social system. However, the person system is relative to an underlying concept of the person, *viz.* there are three elements or components, the rational, the passionate or spirited, and the appetitive in this order of worth. A person is fully a person when the three components are in a harmonious, working relationship. As the rational element lessens, and the other elements come to the fore, the person himself increasingly undergoes his own civil war, an idea rediscovered in psychoanalysis.

The principle that underlies both typologies, i.e. of the person system and the social system, is the concept of the whole, a whole which may be described as Apollonian, that is, the proportionate, the measured, the orderly, the related and interconnected, a system with well defined parameter values so that it functions not merely in terms of self-maintenance but also in terms of self-transcendence, with the possibility of an

emergent social system which, though different, is still Apollonian in principle. At the other end of the scale is the Dionysian with its spontaneous, irruptive, uncorrelated impulsivity: a system, in modern language, full of noise and in a state of oscillation based on positive feedback. The typology had its roots in Greek culture, but a theory in a time of troubles is concerned with reconstruction, defining what is and attempting to move into new directions. This would be its value thrust. That the Platonic efforts at political intervention failed and the external proletariat in form of the Macedonians took over is history, but the viability of the concepts and of the theoretical formulation is attested by its continuous re-examination throughout the ages.

#### SOME LATTER-DAY FORMULATIONS

Every age is confronted with the problem of order and change. This also includes some evaluation of the two terms, such that order receives a high value and change less or *vice versa*. Thus, conservatives are most likely to emphasize the high value of order and social stability and to deprecate change.<sup>3</sup> Utopian thinkers are more likely to be social critics and stress change, the creation of a new social order.<sup>4</sup> One resolution of value malaise in the late 18th and 19th century was to place values in the historical process. The thrust of history was thought to be from a rather primitive set of values and modes of behavior to civilized or enlightened values and modes of behavior. This was a straight line evolution on the one hand or a sort of epicycle spiral on the other. Vico, Comte, Spencer were, for example, exponents of this idea of progress. Thus, we find the stages of human progress as the "military-theological," the "critical-metaphysical," and the "industrial-scientific" or the intellectual stages of the theological, metaphysical, and scientific. This scheme of necessary and progressive stages through which mankind passes to reach its fulfilment has interesting continuities with the proponents of dialectical materialism who also equate values and the historical process so that there is a progressive movement via changes in the means of production, class conflicts and revolutions, ideological haggling to the end of "an association in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all."<sup>5</sup> In each point of view the historical process as a value scale begins with low or inferior values and moves to better or superior values.

<sup>3</sup>Mannheim, Karl. *Ideology and Utopia*. (New York: 1936), Harcourt, Brace and Co., pp. 173-236; White, R. J., ed. *The Conservative Tradition*. (New York: 1957), New York University Press, De. Maistre, Joseph. *On God and Society*. (Chicago: 1959), Henry Regnery Co., on the opposite side, the Marxian tradition, for example.

<sup>4</sup>Mannheim, Karl, *ibid.*; *Daedalus*, Utopia, "Spring, 1965. However, cf. Barner, Harry Elmer and Becker, Howard. *Social Thought from Lore to Science*. (New York: 1938), D. C. Heath, and Co., pp. 310-319, where early utopia writers, despite their social criticisms, are characterized as writing "utopias of escape."

<sup>5</sup>Eastman, Max., ed. *Capital and Other Writings by Karl Marx*. (New York: 1932), The Modern Library, Random House, p. 343.

Today, few would take stock in a concept of this type, for wherever there have been those who imagine themselves as the wave of the future, or representing manifest destiny, or being the chosen ones, there has been also a quite ruthless stomping over those who stood in the way. Caught in the wave, they are expendable as we have seen in the imperialistic ventures in the presumed peaceful industrial-scientific age by those assuming, without asking the others, the so-called white man's burden and as we saw in the millions liquidated and crushed by the fascist and other totalitarian juggernauts.<sup>6</sup> A wave of history or, a history-is-on-our-side school of thought may solve the value malaise for some, but it signifies doomsday for others.

While 19th century European capitalism and nationalism was triumphant in the restructuring of European society and in the conquest of non-European societies, with its apologists and eulogists for what was taking place, there was also an undercurrent of criticism.<sup>7</sup> On the one hand, there is the extreme of a Nietzsche with an attempted transvaluation of all values. On the other hand, there are critiques by the syndicalists, anarchists, and other socialists, and there were practical attempts to establish communes and other cooperative ventures. The criticism was directed towards three major institutions: the church as the repository of superstitions and as a means of controlling the masses, the nation-state as the instrument of coercion and wars, and private property. All three institutions undergird a presumed useless hereditary nobility. These institutions perverted man's inherent goodness, and if they could be abolished, then this goodness would be released. A new era of peaceful, creative living for mankind would be ushered in. This Rousseauian thesis is quite pertinent today, and the problem of what is better or worse in social relations, cultural values, and social organization continues. Thus, we need to look at value systems or value orientation as of the present.

#### A VALUE TYPOLOGY BASED UPON INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES

Ours is a secondary group organization of society, i.e. of groups that are not limited in ecological and social space as are primary and familial groups. The variety of these groups is immense. Their range may be from the regional to the international. My focus, however, will be on those institutional associations<sup>8</sup> which provide the more enduring forms for our society. Such secondary groups or institutional associations express value systems which define what is important, desirable,

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<sup>6</sup>Gross, Feliks, ed. *European Ideologies*. (New York: 1948), Philosophical Library, pp. 675-736, 763-804; Kogon, Eugen. *The Theory and Practice of Hell*. (New York: (1958) (1960)), Berkeley Publishing Co.

<sup>7</sup>Gross, Feliks, *ibid.*, pp. 101,196, 325-390; Taft, Phillip. *Movements for Economic Reform*. (New York: 1950), Rinehart and Co.

<sup>8</sup>Cf. E. T. Hiller, *Social Relations and Structures*. (New York: 1947), Harper and Brother, Ch. 25, 17-19.

proper, worth-while, etc. These value systems have historic roots and eventuate into specific goals and standards of action. One problem is to identify the value; a second, to discover their interrelation; a third, to discover their social manifestation. For matters of analysis I will sketch in rather broad strokes five general value systems and at the same time indicate their social anchorage. The five general types, which also contain subtypes, are labeled: the religious, the nativist, the market, the common man, and the humanistic.<sup>9</sup>

As far as the Western World is concerned, and perhaps I should confine this to the United States, religion as a value system can be reduced to three biblical emphases or their combinations: Old Testament (God of power and of wrath), New Testament (God as love), and Pauline Christolatry. This does not deny the significance of the Judaic tradition, except that it is contained within a minority group and its institutional organization. This essentially Christian definition also excludes theosophists, followers of oriental religions, and other esoteric groups such as Black Muslims, for example, in the United States. Groups orient themselves in different ways to this religious value system, differentiating themselves into churches or ecclesia, sects, denominations,<sup>10</sup> and also in church-controlled schools and a variety of associated lay organizations. For those who aspired to lead the religious life in its fullness, in effect becoming religious virtuosi, convents and monasteries furnished the social base for their values-in-action. The church type and the denomination are most likely to accommodate themselves to the world in contrast to sectarian groups of which there are two major forms, the quietistic, withdrawing sect and the fighting sect. The former, primarily New Testament Four Gospel oriented, attempt to fulfill the affirmation of the religious values by withdrawing from the world into relatively small

<sup>9</sup>Dahlke, H. Otto. *Values in Culture and Classroom*. (New York: 1958), Harper and Brothers. For somewhat different emphases and less linked with institutional structure, cf. the essays in McGifferet, Michael. *The Character of Americans*. (Homewood: 1964), The Dorsey Press. It is doubtful that the values claimed to be American are really exclusively American. Doubtlessly, many are Euro-American. Williams compendium is as follows: 1. achievement and success; 2. activity and work; 3. moral orientation; 4. humanitarian mores; 5. efficiency and practicality; 6. progress; 7. material comfort; 8. equality; 9. freedom; 10. external conformity; 11. science and secular rationality; 12. nationalism-patriotism; 13. democracy; 14. individual personality; 15. Racism and related group-superiority themes, *ibid.*, pages 173-216. All of this can be subsummed under my typology. Vagts, Alfred. *A History of Militarism*. (Glencoe: 1959), Free Press, is as good an account of one aspect of nativism as a way of life. Racist literature is still plentiful in the United States and continues to appear in "letters to the editor." The following is attributed to a municipal judge in one of the larger cities in Virginia referring to a first offender he had convicted; "a nigger bastard who should be taken out of the City dog pound and gassed. We should treat them like the Germans did the Jews," in *The Observer*. Virginia Council on Human Relations, Vol. 1, No. 6, (December, 1968), p. 1.

<sup>10</sup>Troltsch, Ernst. *Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen*. JC. B. Mohr, Tubingen, 1912, Vol. 1 and 2. Tawney, R. H. *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*, Pelican Books edition, 1947, "The Puritan Movement," 164-226. Yinger, Milton. *Religion, Society and the Individual*. (New York: 1957), Mac-Millan and Co.

groups practicing a form of Christian communalism or Christian communism. Since they are in their way anti-Establishment, their history has been essentially one of persecution as well as of prosecution and other expressions of antagonism by the dominant in-groups. These sectarian groups include, for example, the Old Order Amish, the Mennonites, the Hutterites who still have difficulties in the United States, and also, I understand, in some sections in Canada where one group's novel method of social protest arouses considerable annoyance and hostility especially among those who have incorporated modesty norms rather strongly. The prime example of the fighting sect is Cromwell's Puritans who were going to bring this wicked world to terms by force of arms. The Puritans were essentially Old Testament oriented. In general, church-sect relations, sect-sect and sect-world relations tend to be antagonistic with varying expressions of social strife and conflict.

A second value system is nativism. The end values stressed are power, prestige, honor, greatness, traditions. The social expression of this system is most explicit in the nation-state, military schools, patriotic, paramilitary, and other nationalistic groups. Any form of ethnocentrism and xenophobia expresses the nativistic value system, i.e. the presumed superiority of the values and culture of the in-group as against any out-group. Hence, minority and color groups which express ethnocentrism affirm a nativist point of view. When nativism is interpreted in pseudo-biological terms, the subtype is racism, i.e. the inherent biological as well as cultural superiority of one so-called racial group over all others with its manifest destiny to control the inferiors. Another subtype found in a variety of cultures, is the *machismo pattern*<sup>11</sup> which may be briefly defined as a cult of masculinity or masculine virility with its corresponding martyr complex in women. "In the middle class, machismo is expressed in terms of sexual exploits and the Don Juan complex whereas in the lower class it is expressed in terms of heroism and lack of physical fear."<sup>12</sup> The basic social model of the nativist value-orientation is the patriot-warrior.

The market value system is synonymous with materialism and a pecuniary mode of evaluation.<sup>13</sup> The basic values center on goods,

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<sup>11</sup>Anguiano, Armando, "Machismo," *Atlas*, Vol. 3, No. 3, March 1962, pp. 241-244; Lewis, Oscar. *Five Families*. Mentor edition, (New York: 1965), New American Library. For the American equivalent in lower SES males, cf. Miller, Walter, "Lower Class Culture as a Generating Milieu of Gang Delinquency," *Journal of Social Issues* 14, (April 1959), but Miller views lower class culture essentially in terms of male street corner gang; Salisbury, Harrison, *The Shook-up Generation*. (New York: 1958), Fawcett World Library.

<sup>12</sup>Lewis, Oscar. *The Children of Sanchez*. (New York: 1961), Random House, p. xxvii.

<sup>13</sup>First enunciated in Karl Marx's vitriolic discussion of the bourgeois and bourgeois family life in *The Communist Manifesto*; more systematically developed by Thorstein Veblen in his pecuniary culture, pecuniary canons of taste, etc. *The Theory of the Leisure Class*. (New York: 1931), Modern Library edition, Viking Press.

wealth, money, social status, fame and/or notoriety. Happiness, as the advertising media make quite clear, comes through the accumulation of goods, the command of services, a polished, sweet-smelling appearance, and being like the others. Hedonism, conspicuous consumption and conspicuous leisure, and the expense account style of living are variants of this set of values. The representative social types of models vary from the self-made man referred to by Veblen as the captains of industry but from another point of view as the robber barons, the successful manager and/or organization man (the current model), but also the other-directed person, the fixer, inside-dopster, and publicity seeker.<sup>14</sup> The social anchorage of this value system is in 'cafe' society or the jet set, business organizations, middle and upper class suburbia, trade associations, the entertainment world, and much of organized or syndicated crime.

A fourth type of a cultural value system is the common man. While the type is primarily derived from materials of the trade union movement, what I have in mind is a type of populism, a plain folks mythology. Mutualism, collective action, dignity of the worker, equalitarianism, modest ambitions, a comfortable level of living may be listed as the end values. The social type is the worker citizen, the toiler, the little man, salt of the earth image.

The last type of value system is humanistic. End values here are creativity, experimentation, man as the measure of things, knowledge, the freed intelligence. The rooting of this value system lies in the universities and schools, museums, theatres, symphonic halls, technology and industry when not restrained by the stress on salability, and some marginal rebel groups. The basic social type is the scientist or artist citizen. In psychological terms, these would be self-actualizing people as described by Maslow.<sup>15</sup>

Perhaps I should add a sixth type, remnants of which in the United States were located in the Appalachian-Ozarks region. This culture value system is identified essentially with the world as constructed by rural primary groups and antedates urban focus. This system may be labeled familism in which the primary value inheres in the wider kinship structure, where responsibility lies in the *genos*, where the gods are household gods, where property ownership inheres in family and members enjoy simply usufruct rights, where the family is regarded as sacred and the individual is recognized only through his family acts.<sup>16</sup> However, famil-

<sup>14</sup>Larner, Max. *America as a Civilization*. (New York: 1957), Simon and Schuster, pp. 651-654.

<sup>15</sup>Maslow, A. H., "Self-Actualizing People: A Study in Psychological Health," in Moustakas, Clark, ed. *The Self*. (New York: 1956), Harper and Row, pp. 160-194.

<sup>16</sup>Zimmerman, Carle. *Family and Civilization*. (New York: 1947), Harper and Brothers, for a discussion of families and the trustee family, a term unfortunately not adopted by family sociologists. Also Sorokin, Pitrim, Zimmerman, Carle, and Galpin, Charles. *A systematic Sourcebook in Rural Sociology*. (Minneapolis:

ism, while important in other areas of the world, is only of peripheral interest to us. Our culture and society is simply a different world from that of rural primary groups.

### THE SIGNIFICANCE OF VALUE ORIENTATIONS

The discussion has dealt with cultural value systems in terms of end values and the preferred social model or type. The significance and interrelationships among these value systems needs to be worked out.

Few items in a culture can be value neutral. This follows from the presumption that a culture is a moral and value reality. Thus, every fact has a value aspect or implication on close examination. Every item in a culture is value involved. Cleanliness is a fact. But cleanliness is also a value, next to godliness, at least in the United States. Speaking a particular language is a fact, but it also may be strongly imbued with ethnocentric values, as many children of immigrants well know. A cross is simply materials arranged in a certain geometric form (fact), but it stands as a symbol for the Christian religious complex and it is also regarded as a sacred object. The teeth of a cross-cut saw are sharpened at a bevel so that they are pointed like the end of a knife blade. The teeth of a rip saw are sharpened like chisels. A rip saw usually has larger teeth than a cross-cut saw of the same length. These are simply a few facts about tools. Such tools are means-ends rational, which is to say that they are instrumentally efficient for the task they are to carry out. Or, in more precise value language and generalization, the correct tool always makes work easier. It saves time and energy and produces better results. A man and a woman are living together — fact. On a value scale this could signify a legitimized connubial relation, a common-law marriage (if that is legally recognized), or unlawful cohabitation. The right of consortium is recognized in the first case and may be withheld in the others. Here is a question of both moral and legal values. Bones are found in a pit and another ancestor is located called Piltdown man — scientific fact. Later it is found that this is a fraud. Truth values are involved, matters of scientific integrity and honesty. Whether viewed instrumentally or symbolically, a value aspect inheres in every cultural fact.

What something means, moreover, is relative to one of the value systems. This statement expresses a more general proposition, namely that the meaning and function of anything is a matter of its context.<sup>17</sup>

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1931), University of Minnesota Press, Vol. 2. "Family as the Basic Institution and Familism as the Fundamental Relationship of Rural Social Organization," pp. 3-123; Jones, Virgil. *The Hatfields and the McCoys*. (Chapel Hill: 1948), University of North Carolina Press.

<sup>17</sup>Cf. Buhler, Karl. *Das Gestaltprinzip im Leben Des Menschen und der Tiere*. Hans Huber, Bern und Stuttgart, 1960; Welleck, Albert (Bern: 1955), *Ganzheitspsychologie und Strukturtheorie*. Francke; Bosanquer, Bernard. *Implication and Linear Inference*. (London: 1920), MacMillan and Co.; Lee, Dorothy. *Freedom*

I take this as a rather elementary principle. To fully understand something is to understand it in its setting. Take, for example, the idea of relationship to nature, excluding personal and idiosyncratic meanings. From a religious point of view, nature can be viewed as God's creation and man is placed in a stewardship relation. From a nativist view relationship to nature becomes significant in terms of size of territory, amount of resources under one's command, defensive nature of one's terrain, etc. From a market view, nature is another exploitable item, salable to the highest bidder, used and abandoned depending on the profitable return. From a humanistic view, nature can be viewed appreciatively, i.e. as an articulated mechanical and ecological system, or conservatively, that is, to maintain the balance and structure of the ecosystem in itself and for human use. If we take any major concept, such as property, the person, competition, work, justice, wealth, leisure, marriage, family, etc., the meaning and significance of each, if the concept is thoroughly explored, is so by virtue of its position in one of the value systems. To put it another way, the concept takes on difference in meaning and in feeling tone depending on the value orientation in which it is located.

Most people mistakenly presume that the other understands their communication on the assumption that the other is functioning within their value system. Misunderstanding occurs because such is not the case. One way to ward off an argument and perhaps win it is to ask constantly for the opponent to define his terms. What may be more helpful is to discover from what value position he is projecting his communication. The same problem occurs in the sciences when people speak from different theoretical positions. Not only do they not communicate but also much of the mutual criticism is beside the point, for A is really demanding that B give up his theoretical ground and accept A's.

There are two other points regarding the significance of the value systems, their claim to totality and their embodiment. Each system is totalitarian in the sense of its being the sole ground of principling a culture and a society. In other words, on the basis of each, one could construct a total working society, and proponents would claim such a society to be the best of possible worlds. Such a construction is a theoretical possibility, though the probabilities may be slim. Religion has always made a total claim and historically at one time may have been such a ground. Even today, the claim is still asserted though not with the fervor of earlier days. In political terms, the state would be a theocracy in which membership in the religious conventicle is the

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*and Culture.* (Englewood Cliffs: 1959), Prentice Hall Inc.; Mead, Margaret, ed. *Cultural Patterns and Technical Change*, UNESCO, approach is relevant here. Buckley, Walter. *Sociology and Modern Systems Theory.* (Englewood Cliffs: 1967), Prentice Hall Inc.; Wiser, Wolfgang. *Organismen, Strukturen, Maschinen.* (Frankfort am Main: 1959), Fischer Bucherei.

basis of citizenship and the distribution of civic rights, duties, and privileges. The family is to be a Christian family, the person should have a Christian character, education should be Christian education, etc. From a nativist value system there is the warrior society (Sparta as an older example) or militarism<sup>18</sup> as a way of life (upper class feudalism and extending well into the nineteenth century though new forms may be developing) to totalitarianism in the dictator or tyrannical form. Here rights, duties, privileges, access to goods and services tend to be monopolized by the warrior or military sectors on the one hand. On the other hand as Hanna Ahrendt points out,<sup>19</sup> the juridical person is liquidated in the totalitarian dictator form so that on one day one is the executor and the next day one is executed. It is the sense, as attributed to participants at the Nuremberg rallies, that as an individual you are nothing but in the mass all powerful. At any rate, all social forms are bent into the orbit of the nativist system, economics, church, unions, families, education, etc. and in a paradoxical fashion there is both an atomization as well as massification of society, rent by mutual informing, disappearance into the concentration camp and the continuous crowd rallies to massify. A similar total structuring can be seen in the nativist subtype of a racist society-union of South Africa, Rhodesia, or in certain sections of the United States. Without going in any detail into the other forms, I might simply point out that from the market view, the political form is most likely to be oligarchic or plutocratic, in the humanist most likely a meritocracy, and from the common-man point of view, democracy.

Let us consider for a moment the role of the teacher in the context of these value systems. It will be differently organized to meet the demands of a particular value system. From a nativist view the teacher may be a martinet or strict disciplinarian; from a market view, a technician, practically oriented and making heavy use of competition and rewards; from a humanist view, a counselor.<sup>20</sup> Each role is more or less incompatible with the others. The nativist may view the humanist as wishy-washy, mollycoddling pupils. The humanist may view the nativist as stunting and inhibiting child growth. Relations between teacher and student will take on a specific quality, aside from personal idiosyncracies, i.e. in terms of domination and submission, or mutualism and positive social tendencies.<sup>21</sup> In addition, curriculum content may take on distinctive quality and flavor depending on the value system

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<sup>18</sup>Vagts, Alfred. *A History of Militarism*. (Glencoe: 1959), The Free Press.

<sup>19</sup>Ahrendt, Hanna. *Origins of Totalitarianism*. rev. (New York: 1958), Meridian Books.

<sup>20</sup>Dahlke, H. Otto. "The Teacher in a Context of Values," *Educational Horizons* 38. (Winter: 1959), for a similar approach, Doring-Lubeck, W. O., "Psychologie des Lehrers," *Einführung in der Neuere Psychologie*, Saupe, Emil ed. (Osterwieck-Harz: 1931), A. W. Zwickfeldt, pp. 249-259.

<sup>21</sup>For clarification of these terms, cf. Hiller, E. T. *Social Relations and Structures*. (New York: 1947), Harper and Brothers.

affirmed and supported — another way of saying that no curriculum content is value neutral.

The question of embodiment may be formulated as the clash between values and existence. The problem may be summed up in the old saw that preachers do not practice what they preach. The values represent the level of aspiration. What one does is the level of achievement, and on the whole one falls short of the values one tries to express in one's behavior, frequently leading to a sense of unworthiness and inadequacy. It is a sort of built-in failure system. While the embodiment in a personal life style is difficult, it is still more complex in terms of institutional embodiment. Man is all too human. How many schools really attain their educational objectives assuming they know what they are? Indeed, where there is a literature on the values of an institutional association, it is quite clear that the paper image is one thing and the actualities rather different, but not wholly and exclusively different, for then there would be no continuities between the values affirmed and supported and the on-going social system. The fact that there is this discrepancy between value and actuality leads on the one hand to fairly constant exhortation to do better or on the other at attempts to reconstruct the social system so that it manifests more distinctly the professed value system. The gap may act as motivation to change. Much of educational and religious literature falls into these two types.

The concept of embodiment (attainment or fulfillment) of a value orientation signifies that what is, or at times what must be in order to avoid disaster and catastrophe, will not be taken for granted. As they are a yardstick of what ought to be, constant effort must be made to transform existence into the behaviors and behavior models explicated and implicated in each system. In other words, what *is* ought to express or embody a particular normative and value system. Competing norms and values ought to be minimized or suppressed. Consequently, personal and social tensions and conflicts are fairly inevitable, and problems of self-expression and of unity and integration are posed. The issue may also express itself in terms of generation conflict when the coming generation takes a critical stance towards the accomplishments or their lack of the older.

#### INTERRELATIONSHIPS AMONG THE VALUE SYSTEMS

There are three forms of interrelationships to be considered among the value systems: 1. capture; 2. perversion; 3. affinities. Capture refers to the utilization or exploitation of one value system in the interests of another. Capture, of course, is carried out by the functionaries in one system, at times against the opposition of those in another. Capture is an attempt at maximizing one's value system and correlated behaviors, an attempt to secure a more advantaged position *vis-à-vis*

someone else. Such efforts often involve pseudogemeinschaft relations and dissimulation. Capture is seen in both its most subtle and blatant forms in the mass media, particularly in advertising. The themes, values, and symbols of any of the other value systems have been used by business to sell goods. Whatever halo effect there is in the others may carry over to sanctify and expedite business practices. Capture of the religious and humanist (as science) is prime, for if either God or science is backing you, you obviously cannot be wrong. Capture may also include the employment of functionaries who are ostensibly portrayed as exponents of the captured system, chaplains in the army, for example, or the "incorporation" of universities as adjuncts of the military complex through contracts or in the role of consultants. In recent years, especially after the Camelot episode,<sup>22</sup> this has led to a re-examination of the issue of ethics and science and the alleged value neutrality of science, especially of the social sciences. Capture tends to weaken the significance and meaning of values, in part through sheer overuse, in part through a recognition of the hypocrisy involved.

Perversion involves a dual reference: one to the values professed, the ostensible, "official" values, and the other to support perhaps unwittingly, or unintentionally, and possibly even deliberately values of a differing and incompatible system. To illustrate via an awkward metaphor: it is a case where the mass entertainment athletic tail wags the pedagogical dog. The official values of schools are essentially humanist, but the values supported in the athletic entertainment pattern are both market and nativist. Again, while man cannot worship both God and Mammon, the church has done right well with Mammon. In the United States, thanks to a privileged tax status, organized religion has assets of \$79.5 billion — double the combined assets of the country's five largest industrial firms.<sup>23</sup> The church has become big business and has more than just a spiritual stake in the events and affairs of the country. An artist using his capacities primarily to increase income by producing and selling fashionable potboilers may be thought of as perverting his talents. In the United States the emergency of the professor-politician-entrepreneur role may suggest a subtle perversion of the original role as intellectual and scholar. The multiversity which acts essentially as a service agency to whoever will pay appropriate prices or award suitable contracts again suggests a certain shift from humanist to market and nativist values. However, there are those who will argue that such shifts in role and function are both good and legitimate, and an appropriate rhetoric is devised to rationalize this position. Mental hospitals and correctional institutions which covertly espouse a custodial point of view rather than a healing and rehabilitative orienta-

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<sup>22</sup>Horowitz, Louis. *The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot*. (Cambridge: 1967), MIT Press, also his "Social Science Yogis and Military Commissars," *Transaction*, Vol. 5, (May: 1968), pp. 29-38.

<sup>23</sup>Balk, Alfred. *The Religious Business*. (Virginia: 1968), John Knox Press.

tion suggest perversion in values. Again when perversion is recognized, that may lead to attempts at reform in support of the officially designated values, to attacks and/or disengagements because of the felt incongruities and hypocrisies. Such behaviors indicate preference for and consistency with a particular value orientation. The perversion concept is predicated on the assumption that an institutional system attempts to maximize the "official" values affirmed and supported. Obviously they all are concerned with property and wealth, with prestige, with power, and with intelligence and knowledge but these terms are filtered through the end values of the system.

The last point is affinities. Generally, the virtues of one system are "vices" from the viewpoint of another; hence, value clashes, and hence, also the difficulty of establishing common ground or a compromise solution by selecting elements from each which, in effect, would amount to the construction of some hybrid value system. As it would lack any institutionalization, it most likely would remain a paper system. However, the market and nativist have more affinity to each other than do the common man and the humanist. The religious value system may be closer to the common man and humanist. Affinity does not necessarily mean compatibility. Nativist and market may conflict on the regulation of business. Religious orthodoxy and humanism have been in clash for some centuries. Until last year the teaching of evolution in some areas of the United States was proscribed by law. As intellectual controversy today shows, market and nativist views dominate with the other three essentially on the defensive.

Socio-cultural values tend to become uncertain and insecure as to significance and meaning under conditions of capture, perversion and conflict. Ceremonial occasions and rituals which focus on these values tend to become empty form, leading to such interesting statements as for example, in the United States by many clergy of "putting Christ back into Christmas." The rhetoric becomes primarily a means of phatic communication at the minimum or as means to evoke mainly emotional moods which increasingly become labile and flattened. Socio-cultural values tend to become precarious when their definition becomes unclear. In the welter of contending values this is very likely to happen, so that certain key words, such as democracy, justice, work, religion, liberalism, for example, become increasingly vague.

When values lack embodiment in existing goals and standards of committed groups, their precariousness also increases. There is lack of normative reference, and no one knows what the various symbols really mean. There is content weakness and weakness in the normative structure. We can see this most clearly in the religious value system where the major symbols and values have been subjected to increasingly sharp scrutiny and where the normative system has increasingly narrowed. Thus, at one time the church attempted to control warfare

in the in-group situation through the Truce and Peace of God. It attempted control of phases of the economic system in terms of fair dealing or just price and by the prohibition of usury. It further influenced the economic order insofar as guilds were *confratritiae*, had patron saints and insofar as their normative structure also reflected the religious ethos.<sup>24</sup> Education was under its surveillance. Marriage and family were incorporated in the normative system of religion. Canon law really meant something. Today, the situation of the church has retreated to an increasingly narrow sphere. Its normative system also has narrowed so that its concepts of values and norms about education, economic activity and organization, marriage and family, state and power are no longer really functional within the social order, i.e. the secular normative order expressed in positive law has pretty much superseded that of the church. However, some statutory law may still reflect the religious orientation. Efforts on the part of churchmen to restore or recreate a new working relationship with the social order, such as the social gospel, situational ethics, Jazz masses, have not worked out too well insofar as these have not been incorporated into the church's institutional order. Moreover, the church increasingly lacks appropriate sanctions to enforce its normative system. The current birth control fracas within the Roman Catholic Church is quite apropos of this point. In the United States where this church was effective in proscribing the dissemination of birth control information and materials by inducing legislatures to pass appropriate legislation in two states, these laws are on their way out through challenges as to their constitutionality which implies also a different value stance.

With different degrees and variations in the clarity or murkiness of goals and objectives, of the normative system, and of available sanctions, the same holds for the other value systems except for the market. In producer-oriented societies, such as ours, the normative development expansion has been tremendous. This can be most clearly seen in the development of corporation law, law of contracts, law of property, etc., and internal policing through trade associations and cartels with appropriate use of sanctions.<sup>25</sup> In contrast law and sanctions for sake of the

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<sup>24</sup>Rumpf, Max. *Deutsches Handwerkerleben*. W. Kohlhammer. (Stuttgart, 1955), also, "Ordinances of the Guild Merchant of Southampton," and "Ordinances of the White Tawyers of London," in Marshall, Leon, ed. *The Emergence of the Modern Order*. (Chicago: 1929), University of Chicago Press, pp. 115-121.

<sup>25</sup>Simpson, Sidney and Stone, Julius. *Cases and Readings on Law and Society, Book Two: Law in Modern Democratic Society*. (St. Paul: 1949), West Publishing Co., Berle, A. A. and Means, Gardner. *The Modern Corporation and Private Property*. (New York: 1937), The MacMillan Co. For a later statement by these authors to the effect that the development reviewed in the 1930's has intensified: Berle, A. *The 20th Century Capitalistic Revolution*. (New York: 1954), Harcourt Brace and Co.; Gardiner, Means. *The Corporate Revolution in America*. (New York: 1962), Crowell-Collier Publishing Co.; Adams, Walter, and Gray, Horace. *Monopoly in America*. (New York: 1955), The MacMillan Co.; Brady, Robert. *Business as a System of Power*. (New York: 1943), Columbia University Press.

consumer remain somewhat undeveloped and especially in that area now labeled in the United States as the law of the poor. Such expansion and uneven development, however, is congruent with the market value-orientation, for which Adam Smith was the first great propagandist.<sup>26</sup>

#### VALUES AND SOCIAL CLASS

A social class system is a system of inequalities where those in the top stratum try to reserve for themselves the available privileges and advantages. If there is equal access or an equal distribution of privileges and advantages, there is no social class structure. A social class system, hence, collides head-on with equalitarian values. Consequently, the top group must persuade the others that this inequality is fair and legitimate; hence, apologists for this group, the almost vicious evaluation of the lower stratum by the middle and upper, and negative patterns of conduct toward inferiors. The top group, especially the *nouveaux riches*, will express condescension and contumely. Going down the scale, there will be expression of snobbery, respectability pretensions and prudery, resentment and aggression, and, as the very bottom is reached, apathy and resignation. A social class system is a contempt-resentment system. On color groups, such as Negro, Mexican, Indian, Puerto Rican, all this falls with intensified force. It is bad enough being a lower socio-economic status white, but to be a lower socio-economic status non-white is much worse.

Yet, given an open class society, all classes are oriented to similar values, though in different ways and with different stresses. Since there is no pressing need, work is immaterial, especially to the old line upper class, and may take on dilettante quality. However, for the newly arrived, work is all important as it became the means to accumulate the wealth, property, and power to function on upper levels and ensure for children the opportunities to learn the necessary social graces.<sup>27</sup> To the career-oriented upper middle class, work is the means of social mobility and advance, and hence quite crucial. With a corporate assist, they live the life of the affluent but not of the rich. To the lower middle class, work is a symbol of respectability and a means of holding on to one's social position. Many of the working class, primarily semi-skilled operatives, are allegedly work alienated, despising and hating what they do but willing to endure the job for the sake of the income. Members of

<sup>26</sup>Ginzburg, Eli. *The House of Adam Smith*. (New York: 1934), Columbia University Press, in which he shows that Smith was one among many polemical writers of his time, especially in their attack on mercantilism. *The Wealth of Nations* has become a hallowed propaganda tract, a rather weighty one.

<sup>27</sup>Mills, C. Wright. *The Power Elite*. (New York: 1956), Oxford University Press; Amory, Cleveland. *Who Killed Society?* (New York: 1960), Harper and Brothers; Kavalier, Lucy. *The Private World of High Society: Its Rules and Rituals*. (New York: 1960), David McKary Co.

the very bottom stratum place little or no value on work since it is such a sporadic phase of their struggle to stay alive. All classes have some orientation toward work — either positive or negative.

The same may be said of education. To the upper stratum, education is a matter of polish and prestige, or of the right preparatory schools and universities, and being trained in the right professions. To the upper middle class, a college education is the *sine qua non* of existence and mobility. To the lower middle class it is a respectability symbol and a possible means of trying to get ahead. To the other strata education has less meaning, for it has little relevance to their existence. That does not mean that all members of the lower stratum are so oriented. From 21 to 45 per cent of the lower socio-economic status groups (SES), depending upon the study, are positively oriented to higher education, mobility, and professional occupations,<sup>28</sup> a not surprising finding in light of an open class system. Though there are slum schools (a labeling by outsiders) and schools essentially with middle and upper class populations, education is not necessarily an adjunct to a social class system. Most schools in the United States are publicly created and publicly supported institutions, and in terms of values, equalitarian since education is provided for all. Insofar as schools embody inequity, to that extent they may be thought of as perverted or subverted by the class system from the original objectives. Thus, there may be a basic institutional clash — between a discriminatory social class structure and a diversified, equalitarian public association.

All classes are religiously oriented, or at any rate, church centered, varying from emotionalized sectarian groups to the formal, ritualized, or intellectualized denominations of the other strata. Nor does this preclude the fact that members in all strata may be negatively oriented to religion. The very negativity is an acknowledgment of its presence. We know that churches are rated by their location in the social class system, but this tokens again the corrupting impact of this system, a fact recognized some centuries ago in the plaintive doggerel: "when Adam delft and Eve span where was then the gentleman?"

The materialistic or market orientation of social classes varies from the view that the world is a racket to professional pretensions, from the instalment-repossession pattern of the lower strata to the conspicuous consumption and leisure of the upper strata. All are hedonistic-erotic oriented. The lower strata may have more early, direct sexual expression, but the other classes, though stressing continence, show more petting, necking, and sexual phantasies. Lower class gratifications may be secured via tavern, Sneaky Pete, bordello or burlesque; in the others,

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<sup>28</sup>Hyman, Herbert, "The Value Systems of Different Classes: A Social Psychological Contribution to the Analysis of Stratification," in Bendix, Richard and Lipset, Seymour, eds. *Class, Status, and Power*. (Glencoe: 1952), the Free Press, pp.422-26.

via stag party (apparently in the United States a middle class phenomenon), cabaret, swank night clubs, high priced call girls<sup>29</sup> and swap clubs. In terms of social class valuation the erotic and sex behavior of the lower SES is thought to be crude and vulgar compared to the refinements and sophistications of the upper stratum. In some ways, the lower SES is more prudish than other strata which are more likely to be experimental, especially those with college education. However, the whole area is overlaid with statutes and ordinances representing the Puritan sex ethics.

#### VALUES AND SUBCULTURES

This discussion on value systems and social class raises the general problem of the way these systems manifest themselves not only in social structure but also in institutional organization. This problem is especially relevant to educational institutions and policies, regardless of the level of education. It is also pertinent to the "subculture" concept as to the extent to which such subcultures are continuous with or largely independent of the larger culture. It seems that almost any culture pattern becomes a subculture — a football subculture, a baseball subculture, a resort subculture, each occupation as a subculture, regional subcultures, etc. until there are only subcultures and no culture.

An alleged subculture in the United States is that of poverty. While certain facets of living in poverty may be described (the apathy and fatalism, immediate gratification, lack of concern for the future; the presumed concentration of illegitimacy; the high infant and maternal mortality, tuberculosis, murder, assault and battery, and psychosis; the least education; the menial and servile jobs which make living pleasant for the other strata; the low income and overcrowded dilapidated living conditions, the larger number of unemployed, underemployed, and unemployables; disorganized and broken families, families with female heads; the large proportion of non-whites, the lack of communal and other public services, presumed distinctive linguistic and cognitive patterns),<sup>30</sup> there is no evidence that the persons in this pattern prefer and value it. A possible exception is the machismo pattern, but this suggests that a goodly amount of analysis has centered upon the lower SES young male to the virtual disregard of the female and those who are middle-aged and elderly. Indeed, there is evidence to the contrary, and the

<sup>29</sup>Breedlove, William and Breedlove, Jerrye. *Swap Clubs*. (Los Angeles: 1964), Sherbourne Press. How reliable the data is, of course, is a problem. While the authors suggest that these groups represent a move towards a new sex ethics, it seems clear from the description of some groups that they are in it for the kicks. For a literary statement towards a new group sex morality, cf. Rimmer, Robert. *The Harrad Experiment*. (Los Angeles: 1966), Sherbourne Press.

<sup>30</sup>Much of this has been known for decades, except that now the subculture twist is added. Riessman, Frank, Cohen, Jerome, and Pearl, Arthur. *Mental Health of the Poor*. (New York: 1964), Free Press of Glencoe, The MacMillan Co, especially Parts 1 and 2.

suggestion has been made that we may be dealing with social-science-created stereotypes.<sup>31</sup> The value focus may not be far different from the other strata, and if market and nativist values receive emphasis, this could hold true throughout the social structure. The same may be said of the so-called youth culture which may be in part a commercial contrivance. The adolescent world, far from being unique, mirrors the hedonistic, erotic, materialistic and violent world of the adults.<sup>32</sup> The student revolts, however, are not a matter of the adolescent world. Different age categories are involved, and excluding dropout and far out dropouts, the students are concerned with educational and political problems that do not seem to hold the adolescent, certainly not in the United States.<sup>33</sup>

#### THE GRADED ORDERING OF VALUE SYSTEMS

This issue is not a problem for descriptive and analytic sociology insofar as it claims an alleged value neutrality. For matters of analysis any value system is as good as any other. However, this "official" stance does not preclude implicit valuations, a point which will be discussed elsewhere. Cultures and societies do have different value emphases. What they are, how this comes about, what the consequences are in the affirmation and support of a single or a pluralistic set of value systems, how social structure and institutional organization are formed or deformed by such emphases, the impact on social relations and social interaction, become points of analysis. Perhaps by appropriate methods, which would amount to a sort of vote, one could determine how a sample population orders the various value systems. This resolution would appear unsatisfactory to many as it would leave values to the vagaries of public opinion, the more so because of its manipulability in our times.

<sup>31</sup>Jeffers, Camille. *Living Poor*. (Michigan: 1967), Ann Arbor Publishers. *Poverty's Children*. Health and Welfare Council's Child Rearing Study of Low Income Families in the District of Columbia, n.d.; Herzog, Elizabeth. *About the Poor: Some Facts and Some Fictions*. Children's Bureau, Social and Rehabilitative Service, U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1967; Valentine, Charles, *Culture and Poverty: Critique and Counterproposals*. (Chicago: 1968), University of Chicago Press; *Rainwater*, Lee, et al. *Working Man's Wife*. (New York: 1962), MacFadden Bartell.

<sup>32</sup>Cf. Tsung-Yi Lin, "Tai-pu and Liu Mang: Two Types of Delinquent Youths in Chinese Society," in *Growing Up in a Changing World*. (London: 1958), World Federation for Mental Health; Salisbury, Harrison, *op cit.* for middle upper class and international trends; Muchow, Hans. *Sexualreife and Sozialstruktur der Jugend*. (Hamburg: ); Rowohlt, Marin, Peter, "The Open Truth and Fiery Vehemence of Youth," *The Center Magazine*, Vol. 2 (January, 1969), pp. 61-74. Coleman, James, *The Adolescent Society*. (New York: 1961), Free Press of Glencoe, The MacMillan Co., Schelsky, Helmut. *Die skeptische Generation*. Eugen Diederichs, 1963, for a somewhat different analysis of post World War II youth.

<sup>33</sup>Bergman, Uwe, Dutschke, Rudi, Lefevre, Wolfgang, Rabehl, Bernd. *Rebellion der Studenten*. (Hamburg: 1968), Rowohlt, written by student leaders. Miller, Michael and Gilmore, Susan. *Revolution at Berkeley*. (New York: 1965), Dell Publishing Co., for an international survey, "Students and Politics," *Daedalus* (Winter: 1968).

As each value system asserts a total claim as previously discussed, a principle of ordering cannot be derived from their study. The principle, therefore, has to be a formal one. In the Platonic typology, the formal principle is the whole, and this also presupposes some characteristics of that whole. This was referred to as Apollonian, a harmoniously, functioning whole. As other values come to the fore, this whole becomes increasingly disorganized. The axiology also takes its cue from the trinity of the good (the social dimension), the true (the knowledge dimension), and the beautiful (the esthetic dimension). The logical underpinning need not concern us, except it would appear from these grounds that the value systems would be arranged in terms of the humanist and religious (in a rather broad sense) as more significant and as having more worth than the common man, market, and nativist in that order.

A somewhat similar solution is found in Aristotle when he opts for the contemplative life as man's true vocation. This conclusion is based on his determination of man's distinctive quality and function which separates him from other species. The ground for an ordering of values lies in man's nature which is both social and rational (in terms of intellectual and moral virtue, virtue in terms of excellence in function). Since virtue is a "kind of mean," his position is essentially Apollonian. Nothing in excess. While Aristotle argues for the life of mind and the fulfilment of the rational principle, he is shrewd enough to recognize that the philosopher needs a material substratum in order to function. Two other distinctions need to be noted, that between the common good or interest in contrast to private interest and between instrumental and intrinsic values. From the former the difference between true and defective or perverted states is derived so that royalty, aristocracy, and constitutional are true forms; tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy are defective. From the latter, for example, the somewhat low valuation placed upon property and economic activity and the high valuation placed upon the pursuit of wisdom and moral virtue.<sup>34</sup> On the other hand, the valuations might be accounted for as a reflex of extant valuations, i.e. the low esteem in Greek culture bestowed upon metics, artisans, and other modes of work insofar as carried out by slaves and the high valuation placed upon civic functions.

Be as they may, these distinctions have become an integral part of the Western perspective, especially the distinction between instrumental and intrinsic valuation, as seen in the following examples.

. . . All values (instrumental or contributory) belonging to the realm of the physical, material organic order of beings represent only the facilities, commodities, and techniques invented by man for the conquest of his physical environment . . . and the establishment of a material civilization (industry

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<sup>34</sup>Aristotle. *The Nocomachean Ethics*, trans. by D. P. Chase. (New York: 1911), J. P. Dent; *The Student's Oxford Aristotle*, trans. by W. D. Ross, Vol. VI, Politics and Poetics. (New York: 1942), Oxford University Press.

and technology). Consequently, the values belonging to the order of material well-being cannot be regarded as 'ends in themselves'; their essential utilitarian character identifies them as values of a secondary order needed for man's liberation from his original dependence and subordination to the forces of nature.

'Values in themselves,' on the contrary, belong to man's personal, psycho-spiritual and cultural life, which do not possess the element of practicality, functionality, instrumentality, and pragmatic utility. Here belong the values of religion, morality, philosophy, science, and esthetics. The socio-political values (harmony, friendship, love, and the will to power) cannot be regarded as values in themselves because of their explicitly instrumental character; the social and political organization of human life represents only the needed framework for the development and education of the individual human person whose continued efforts are subordinated to the final goal of personal autonomy and perfection. Should one promote the socio-political values to the eminence of values in themselves, one would justify all totalitarian organizations of political life demanding the enslavement of the free person.<sup>35</sup>

On the basis of Spranger's innate, latent value-tendencies which have some affinities to the typology presented in the body of the paper and on basis of the Greek concepts mediated through scholastic philosophy, the following hierarchical axiology is made: 1. the religious value; 2. the cognitive value; 3. the esthetic value; 4. the social value; 5. the political value; 6. the economic value. This arrangement is, in addition, based upon certain ontological considerations.

Another classification, proposed by a sociologist, interestingly follows a similar type of ordering:<sup>36</sup>

There are the quasi-values or *gratifications*, taken at a hedonic or physiological level, especially important (in) material comfort. We may identify *instrumental interests* or means-values, for example, wealth, power, work efficiency. Although these interests may become values in themselves, it is convenient (!) to consider them primarily as instrumental to the achievement of other values. Third, we have the *formal-universalistic values of Western tradition*: rationalism, impersonal justice and universalistic ethics, achievement, democracy, equality freedom, certain religious values, value of individual personality. Fourth there is a class of *particularistic, segmental, or localistic evaluations* that are best exemplified in racist-ethnic superiority doctrines and in certain aspects of nationalism.<sup>37</sup>

While there is some hedging in this statement, it on the whole is in line with Western tradition and is rather Greek in its orientation. However, the schema lacks, excepting perhaps the racist-ethnic superiority "values," any concept of disvalue or "negative values," or value antinomies, e.g. truth-falsity, useful-useless, sacred-profane, harmony-conflict, beautiful-ugly, virtue-vice, etc. It also presumes a unitary value system rather than diversified value systems.

If we take our cues from this discussion, then a rough ordering of the typology, and by implication of institutional order, would be: reli-

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<sup>35</sup>Patka, Frederick. *Value and Existence*. (New York), Philosophical Library, pp. 95-96.

<sup>36</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 96-97.

<sup>37</sup>Williams, Robin. *American Society*, 2nd ed., rev. (New York: 1960), Alfred A. Knopf.

gious and humanist first, common-man second, market third, and nativist fourth. The nativist can be conceived of as a "disvalue" and as an antinomy to the humanist. That this ordering does not jibe with the actualities seems to me patent. Hence, the value conflict not only relative to the institutional associations but amongst the associations themselves.

#### SUMMARY

Our point of departure is a value malaise as this is manifested in student revolts, in a peculiar generation conflict, and in institutional maladaptation within the area of education so with regard to content and to administration (centralized, decentralized, participation of students in decision-making, etc.). Underlying these specific issues is a value clash, hence, the disorders. The broad problem is one of social order, i.e. of the values that constitute it.

How values are "constitutional principles" was indicated by a brief look at the Platonic typology in which the relationship between values and social organization or disorganization was seen. The idea of whole viewed Apollonianly was seen to be an ordering principle. Values identified with the thrust of history, a late Western invention, was not an adequate mode of conceiving the relation of values and existence. Contemporary values derived from an examination of institutional associations suggests five types and some subtypes. The significance of these value systems was examined in terms of their claim to totality, of embodiment, and of meaning and context. The interrelationship among these socio-cultural value systems was considered in terms of capture, perversion, and affinities. The precariousness of values was examined from the viewpoint of symbols, rituals, the normative order and available sanctions. A flattening of symbols and rituals and a constriction of norms and sanctions contribute to the increasing liability of values. It was seen that in an open class society, all strata orient themselves to similar values though realizing them in different ways. However, specific associations may also be rated by their location in the class structure. The relationships between the school as a public, equalitarian association and the class system was seen as a basic value and structural clash. The discussion concluded with a statement on the graded ordering of the value systems in which some general principles elaborated in Western tradition (the whole, instrumental or contributory values, and values in themselves or intrinsic values) appeared germane to the problem. The resolution of the malaise lies in a clearer concept of a hierarchy of values and the way this can be instrumented into the ongoing institutional order. This is a matter of public policy insofar as the governing process is that which deals with life or society as a whole.