

Relevance's limitations in educational rhetoric are examined briefly; its possibilities and confusions in educational theory are explored. Glasser connects relevance with such disparate concerns as methods, materials, emotions, a child's ideas, occupations and aims. Such excursions are limited by the concept's relational and value-neutral nature. An educationally important, but oft-ignored epistemological context, is discussed from which closing remarks are made on what might be meant, and involved in, developing a "sense of relevance".

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Education and Relevance: A Philosophical Analysis of William Glasser

Introduction

In the most recent wave of disenchantment with the American School, it has been charged that the "education" has not been relevant, though to what has not always been clear. The criticism has varied from concern with issues such as motivation, interest, failure, to other matters relating to the value of what is or ought to be taught. Whatever falls under the heading of being "relevant," often is presented as a panacea for an undefined range of ills. In educational argument, the introduction of relevance has a curious impact: to assert that an educational practice is 'relevant' is almost to perform the act of justification itself. Such is the persuasive power of the notion in much discussion.

There is little doubt that "relevance" has been used in slogan contexts, though it may not, and perhaps need not, be confined to these.² How often and in what variations have we been exhorted to make education relevant to students' needs? Slogans have their uses in arousing interests, achieving unity, in directing interests, and on occasion, reminding us of fundamental — sometimes conceptual — truths. However,

¹This is a slightly revised version of a paper first presented at the Twentieth Annual Conference of the Far Western Philosophy of Education Society held in Tempe, Arizona, December 3-5, 1971.

²For a discussion of relevance as an element of slogans, see Michael W. Apple's "Relevance — Slogans and Meanings," *Educational Forum*, Vol. 35, May, 1971, p. 503-7.

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“. . . slogans are systematically ambiguous . . . A slogan that remains in this state is empty; it does not summarize. This is the sense in which we speak of a slogan as meaningless. Not that it has no reference, but that it is embarrassingly rich in this commodity.”³

And so it is with ‘relevance.’ As a slogan “education should be relevant to the student” is popular, but it is no substitute for theory. Our task here is limited to asking: Can “relevance” be a viable concept in educational theory, or is it restricted to being simply part of a slogan system? We propose then to perform an analytical task. In undertaking this, we assume that in this role, the philosopher does not attempt to legislate about language, but to make us more aware of subtlety, complexity, its possible confusions, and to set out distinctions which aid communication. It is probably this conception of philosophy which Wittgenstein held in the *Philosophical Investigations*:

“A main source of failure to understand is that we do not command a clear view of the use of our words. Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity . . . Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language, it can in the end only describe it. It leaves everything as it is.”⁴

In this paper we will examine the uses to which relevance has been put by one popular writer, and the apparent shortcomings will be used towards a positive presentation of the ‘logic of relevance.’ The reasons for concentrating on William Glasser and *Schools Without Failure* are not difficult to find. First, he makes frequent references to relevance, and these appeals often take the form of a justification, or vindication of the point he is trying to make. Second, his practical influence on the conduct of teaching, and the activity of classrooms generally, has been immense.⁵ Hence, we might say that if philosophy of education is to be relevant (!), it behooves us to check out the credentials of the theory purporting to guide this phenomenon.

In general we argue that if Glasser is presenting “relevance” as a “unitary concept” (that is, picking out homogeneous, not disparate elements), then his account is internally incoherent. If such a defect were general throughout Glasser’s theory, the results could be disastrous for educational practice.

This permits us to make a general point about the relation between practice and theory. Glasser’s own practice might be commendable, yet

³B. P. Komisar and J. E. McClellan, “The Logic of Slogans,” *Language and Concepts in Education* (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1961), B. Othanel Smith and Robert H. Ennis, editors, p. 200-201.

⁴Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967), Sections 122-124.

⁵In 1970-71 there were fifty-three “clusters” of schools participating in the Schools Without Failure Seminar Program involving 10,401 principals and teachers in eighteen states. By March of 1972, 116 “clusters” were operating with an estimated participation of 18,000. Last year 2,500 senior high school teachers enrolled in a television course in the Sacramento, San Diego and Los Angeles areas. This year with a new two segment elementary school course television enrollment has climbed to over 10,000. An official of the Educator Training Center claims that Glasser’s theories and practices are now influencing over one half million students.

the theory which he creates to guide others may be misleading. The interpretations educators reasonably make of his writing may not be what Glasser would do in practice. There is a powerful historical precedent for such a situation. It was out of John Dewey's (perhaps quite justifiable) practice at the laboratory school in Chicago that he wrote *Democracy and Education*. More than twenty years later, recoiling from the practices of others who claimed to act in his name, he attempted in *Experience and Education* to clarify, perhaps purify, and certainly to justify, his theory. It is fashionable to argue that Dewey had been interpreted carelessly, and that had we taken the trouble to discern what Dewey "really meant," the later defense would have been unnecessary.

We take another view, namely, that conceptual confusion and ambiguity are so rife, that *Democracy and Education* was an invitation to alternative interpretations, some of which were educational disasters in Dewey's eyes. The same possibility exists for William Glasser.

Relevancy and Dr. Glasser

The first line in Dr. Glasser's chapter entitled "relevancy" states: "In this chapter I shall discuss relevance and its relationship to school failure."⁶

This, then, is the context of the discussion: it is claimed that there is a connection between certain kinds of failure and some notion of irrelevance, though there is a dearth of supporting evidence. Indeed none of the students he mentions has been identified to have failed in any way. His characteristic mode of presentation is limited to personal experiences, a variety of assumptions, and the relating of anecdotes. This shortcoming is serious, though for the purposes of this paper, it will be overlooked.

(a) Methods

Apparently Dr. Glasser believes that class meetings are relevant. He describes his class meeting as:

"... a method to get the whole class involved in thinking seriously about some important topic."⁷

Given that there exists some kind of inhibiting atmosphere in the regular teaching setting, certain kinds of serious thinking do not transpire as well as might be desired. The 'class meeting,' as Glasser conceives of it, might be more successful. Glasser is simply advocating a methodological alteration. 'Relevant' here means simply relevant to achieving certain aims which have been justified. Whether his recommendation is more efficacious than other alternatives would be a matter of empirical investigation.

⁶William Glasser. *Schools Without Failure* (New York: Harper and Row, 1969) p. 45.

⁷*Ibid.* p. 45.

(b) Materials

But this simple use of relevance soon becomes confused with a second. To illustrate the first, he relates a personal classroom experience. A discussion of the topic, 'For what is reading useful?' is thought important by Glasser. A class meeting is organized during which the children seemed unable to apply reading to their daily lives until one 'timid' child mentioned comic books, a suggestion which was greeted with an enthusiastic response. To quote Glasser:

"The children had adopted the moral equivalents *good* and *bad* for certain types of reading. Comic books were classed as immoral . . . They believed either that reading was irrelevant to their world, or when it was relevant, it was wrong."⁸

Among other things, he seems to assume that comic books have a place in the classroom, that they are in some sense relevant.⁹ But to what? A possible redeeming value of comic books is that they provide a chance for a child to relax, and not do much thinking. There certainly is a time and a place for every person to relax. Adults do it by reading *Dear Abby*, the sports page, or *Life* magazine. Surely, teachers ought not to give the impression that it is morally wrong for children to relax in a similar manner. In an important sense comic books might be relevant to what is in one's interests, for at times it is in one's interests to do what one is interested in, in this case, relax. Comic books might be thought to be remotely relevant to education in that they can provide rest and enjoyment between the more strenuous efforts of educational learning.¹⁰

There is another sense in which comic books might be 'relevant': they might be used as a pedagogical technique to gain a student's interest and attention with the purpose of broadening or transforming that interest into something more educationally worthwhile. Thus these materials would be indirectly relevant to education for they would provide a motivational means for getting the educational process going at all. Whether the advantages of this approach would be worth some of the drawbacks would be a matter of practical judgment, and would depend on features of the particular situation in which the teacher finds himself.

For purposes of education, there is an important question to be asked: do a child's interests make things relevant, or might something be interesting because it *is* relevant, say, to a problem under investigation. Glasser has attended to the first only: comic books might be relevant to education in the weak sense in that they might provide what is thought to be necessary relaxation, or they could be used as a motivational device. But imagine a problem which students are already interested in solving;

⁸*Ibid.*, p. 48.

⁹We omit any discussion of specially designed 'educational' comic books; they do not appear to be central to what Glasser has in mind.

¹⁰It should not be construed from these remarks that the authors of this paper consider this a sufficient justification for the practice considered.

a suggestion is made which appears promising for it looks as though it might be relevant to the solution. Such a suggestion would be interesting because it is relevant, and not the other way around. This sense of relevance we call epistemological, and is one which, though we think important, is totally ignored by Glaser. More will be said of it later.

(c) Emotion and relevance

Dr. Glasser's discussion of emotions is puzzling perhaps because it is over-simplified. He is concerned with the lack of emotion:

"A serious failing in most school materials is that the emotion has been completely drained out of it. Emotion helps the child see the relevance of what he is studying. Most school materials have little or no respect for the children's culture, especially its rich emotional content."¹¹

In such a passage we are stymied not only by the element of the nonsensical, but by the totally opaque use of the concept of "emotion". But it is the claim that emotion helps the child see the relevance of what he is studying that we can use as a springboard for a few brief comments on feeling and relevance. As a starter, the blood and guts details of battles of the American Civil War or the frank explanation of all the "double entendres" in Hamlet may well hold the interest of the class. In fact, students might well become connoisseurs of both. But what either of these has to do with the economic, racial and political causes and consequences of that war — had these been our aims — or with exploring the nature of the human condition is not clear. Perhaps Glasser's point is quite elementary though badly stated: we should find elements in our material which, based on our understanding of a child's culture, we have reason to believe will interest the student. Starting with and holding him with these, we hope that he will be around long enough to come to "see the relevance" of what is *really* the core of our lesson. Teachers, like Shakespeare, have to make some concessions to the groundlings if they are to stay in business at all.

There is a second possible interpretation. In its strong form it might be argued that a necessary condition of having understood a particular event (or range of events) is that one have experienced certain accompanying feelings.¹² We might then say that a student did not have a "real" or "full" understanding of the Civil War if, for example, he had not *felt* something of what it was like to have been a black slave. Such an emotional component, then, would not be instrumental to understanding something else, but would be built into the nature of the understanding itself. It is important to note that, if this epistemological point could be sustained, it becomes the objective ground for having certain aims in teaching history and employing specific materials: not to seek some emotional dimension would be to provide a student with a partial experience

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 56.

¹²This point was made most forcefully at the Tempe Conference by Prof. Bob McLaren of California State College at Fullerton.

of history. It would be an additional contingent question whether this emotional element "helps the child see the relevance of what he is studying" or connects with the rich emotional content of the child's culture.

Perhaps we might be permitted one or two additional points about the relation between relevance and feeling. We wish to distinguish cases where we say:

- (1) a student feels that "X" is relevant
- (2) "X" is relevant
- (3) a student sees that "X" is relevant

The first case does not entail either of the other two. One can feel (think, believe, and possibly be excited) that one thing is relevant to another, without "X" being relevant, and that disqualifies any claim that "X" is seen to be relevant. Second, "X" can be relevant without a student seeing or feeling the relevance. Finally, seeing that "X" is relevant entails that "X" is relevant, *and* that it is felt to be relevant. "Seeing" here is an achievement verb; it would be a mistake to claim that one "sees X" when "not X" is the case. In such an instance when the error is discovered we modify our statement to "I felt X was relevant". A student who claims to see that "X" is relevant (3) when "X" is not relevant (2), is entitled to claim only that he "feels X is relevant" (1). Glasser is right to demand that a curriculum be relevant; our task as teachers is to get a child to see it as such; feeling that it is so, will follow automatically.

(d) Relevance and a Child's Own Ideas

Glasser relates that he once asked students in a class meeting, "What do teachers want from children in school"? One student volunteered that teachers want *right* answers. He went on to ask, "Can teachers ask questions that do not have right and wrong answers, but that still can have important answers"? Apparently this question threw the children totally off balance and they were unable to recover for the rest of the discussion. It would seem that because the students "were thrown totally off balance," Dr. Glasser has come to some interesting conclusions:

"Placed in a situation for which they were unprepared, they had almost nothing to say. They did not believe that their opinions — what they bring from their world to the school — are important in education. They could not see the connection between their own ideas and a discussion in school. Their own opinions, ideas, and judgments had not been sought for during the four years they had been in school, and they had no reason to think they ever would be."¹³

We need not accept Glasser's interpretation of events: there are several quite plausible possibilities which would account for the students being "thrown totally off balance" by what was a highly abstract, philosophical question. However there seems implied in this incident the idea that discussions in school are "relevant" if students see some importance at-

¹³*Ibid.*, p. 52.

tached to their own ideas. Such an unqualified assertion is of the type about which we gave warning early in the paper: so diffuse are the possible interpretations that several might conflict sharply with what might be Dr. Glasser's more carefully guarded thoughts. The expression of one's own ideas might be a form of therapy, and though this might be helpful to the furtherance of education, it is no substitute for it. Or the expression of a child's own ideas might be relevant to fostering feelings of fraternity within a class. This is probably one of the justifications offered for the practice of "Show and Tell". There is a third possibility: though of little interest to other students, perhaps the expression of one's own ideas is helpful in building a "good self-concept."¹⁴

There is, however, an important educational point in encouraging children to express their views on a problem being considered. In matters concerning knowledge, students must recognize that belief is not justified because a proposition originated with a certain authority. Students must grasp the idea that *their* view *could be right*. Authority in the sphere of knowledge is provisional at best.¹⁵

"Paradoxically enough a teacher must be both an authority and teach in such a way that pupils become capable of showing him where he is wrong."¹⁶

But to reach the stage where a student can demonstrate that a teacher may have erred, requires that he have mastered the skills, concepts, and tests for truth of a given form of knowledge. This requires practice, and so we have a second educational justification for student participation. Such a view is a far cry from some of the more romantic notions which receive wide coverage in some educational circles. There is no suggestion in our position that there is any necessary merit in the content of a particular contribution from a student or teacher, only that, given the impersonal standards implicit in forms of knowledge, there could be.

Of course, Glasser is not arguing that teachers should stop asking questions, the answers to which possess a high degree of certainty.¹⁷ He wishes that they extend the range to those questions where certainty is more difficult, if not impossible, to attain. It may not be a matter of opinion that " $2 + 2 = 4$," but there is plenty of latitude of discussion over social policy (Ought we to have another moon mission?), morals (Is it morally acceptable to exploit someone if he is willing to be exploited?),

¹⁴This is not the place for detailed consideration of Glasser's concept of self. However, we would argue that outside of some objective appraisal of self in relation to others, and their achievements, etc., there is a serious danger that the exaggerated view of self will become as prevalent as the sense of inferiority that now concerns educational psychologists. Consideration of this objective appraisal is as neglected in Glasser's account, as it is missing in many others.

¹⁵R. S. Peters, *Ethics and Education* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1966), p. 250.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 621.

¹⁷This is probably what he means by his misleading phrase, questions which have "right and wrong answers."

and religion (How could a beneficent, omnipotent God permit so much suffering?). However, it may be seriously misleading to draw the conclusion from the proposition "There are some questions for which certain answers are not to be found" that "On such questions one person's opinion is as good as any other's." A degree of uncertainty does *not* entail the absence of agreed upon standards. It might be more defensible to explain to children that there are many questions for which rational, non-arbitrary answers are difficult to reach, due to the complexity of situations, the uncertainty of the effects of a course of action, the lack of precision of standards of judgment, and so on. However, the difficulty involved does not remove from us the obligation to stay with rational procedures and to offer justifications for conclusions we have reached. To be fair, Glasser has not drawn this open-ended conclusion explicitly, but then neither has he denied it. If he is seeking to guide our practice, particularly when confusion on such matters is so widespread amongst teachers, it is a question which cannot be overlooked.

(e) Relevance and Occupation

Glasser puts considerable store in the results of a poll taken at San Fernando Valley State College:

"The main dissatisfaction the students had with the curriculum was that it was not relevant to their lives. Almost 60 per cent of the students said that they could see no relationship between what they were doing in schools and what they expected to be doing later on. They were ittter and complaining about this lack of relevance."¹⁸

It is difficult to know even what interpretation to give this passage without knowing a great deal more about the test and the participants.¹⁹ Glasser's account does nothing to alleviate the haze. One reasonable interpretation might be that many students did not see any direct connection between what they were studying and the vocation which they expected to pursue after graduation. For this to take on the character of a complaint, as distinct from an observation, it would have to be assumed that the students who held this particular view thought that such a direct connection ought to exist.

If a curriculum is relevant to certain aims, and if there is a disagreement about aims, then, *ipso facto*, there is a disagreement about what is relevant. However, if my aim is to seek an education, to widen my rational perspective of the world, then another whole range of activities becomes relevant. That these pursuits may not fit me for a particular practical role is irrelevant.

¹⁸W. Glasser, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

¹⁹Glasser's interpretation is quite extraordinary: "If the anger on our college campuses seems out of proportion to what seems to be the problem on the campuses themselves, I suggest that the anger stems not merely from the irrelevance of the student's college education but also from their sudden realization that all of their educational experiences from the first grade on have been irrelevant. The anger is now bubbling up from the depths of these many years of educational frustration until it erupts in College." W. Glasser, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

This leads us to conclude that relevance is purely a relational concept, which, while it has positive emotive connotations, solves no value questions. Talk about what is "really relevant" usually occurs in the context of a persuasive definition and often appears plausible by blurring this distinction between the value of the end and what is relevant to it, i.e., is part of or leads to the end.

Thus, it does not follow with any logical necessity that because a certain percentage of students declare that the university is irrelevant in some way, that the university should alter its aims. If it were the university's primary task to educate, and most students sought a training, then we would *expect* them to reply in a poll that "they could see no relationship between what they were doing in schools and what they expected to be doing later on."²⁰ But the argument here is about aims, not relevance. Perhaps the student has simply chosen the wrong institution for what he wants. Of course, in the case we have imagined, the university may be said to have failed, but it is not the kind of failure that is usually presumed. We may not have failed by not having provided what was wanted, but rather for not having converted the student to recognizing the intrinsic worthwhileness implicit in civilized pursuits. And the remedy may not be to change our aims, but to improve our means.

(f) Relevance and Rhetoric

At times Dr. Glasser is moved to deny the relational quality of the concept of relevance as when he declares,

"I suggest, therefore, that the teaching of relevance itself be part of education."²¹

and

". . . the great teacher . . . is by definition the relevant person, the one who understands, communicates, gets through."²²

In the first, without a context we cannot understand even what is meant, much less evaluate the proposal. In the second, when taken literally, it must be assumed that persons can be part of the category of things which can be relevant. Just how this can be possible is not apparent to us. We suggest that such utterances are contributions to the rhetoric of education, but not its theory.

Summary and Conclusion

In this paper we have argued that relevance is a relational concept of the form "X is relevant to Y" if (a) "X is part of Y" or (b) "X leads to Y." To be meaningful, if something is said to be relevant, it must be understood as being relevant to something else.²³ Uses of relevance which

²⁰*Ibid.*, p. 54.

²¹*Ibid.*, p. 54.

²²*Ibid.*, p. 58.

neglect this feature may be persuasive rhetoric, but could not be contributions to educational theory.

This led us to a second point: appeals to relevance do not in and of themselves solve value questions. In fact, its use presupposes the successful conclusion to a value inquiry. Referring to our schema, "X may well be relevant to Y but if Y is morally worthless, then the relevant X is also without worth, at least arising out of its relation to Y. Conversely, if Y is worthwhile, and X is relevant to Y, then there is a *prima facie* case for considering X as worthwhile." Thus we have come to the conclusion that if a student were to declare that a course of study did not appear relevant to him, this would not be conclusive grounds for altering the aims of the course. This point might be put another way. It has been argued by Komisar²⁴ that all curricula are needs-curricula. The same point can be made for relevance: all curricula must be conceived by someone as relevant curricula, though there can be considerable discussion about the efficacy of the methods and materials. If we are concerned with the value context, and we claim that 'X is relevant to Y' then it matters very much for practice how we conceive of and articulate the 'Y'. The opportunities for retreating into ambiguity are numerous and frequently taken: viz., growth, the development of the whole man, critical thinking, etc. Thus judgment on whether any particular 'X' is relevant would be deferred until further analysis had clarified the meaning of the metaphor, slogan or whatever. Or again, if we claim that a certain course is relevant to the student's education, whether this is the case depends in part on what concept of education is being employed: Is it distinct from training, or at least certain forms of training? from socialization? from mental health? from physical development? and so on. Once again, the tools of philosophical analysis are useful in making educational theory intelligible.

We have also argued that there may be a place for considering what a student 'feels' is relevant, though such a determination does not solve aims questions in education. We might say that we have a *prima facie* obligation to consider what a student thinks is relevant simply because we have a general moral obligation to consider other people's interests. However, as educators, we may have additional obligations deriving from other principles, and so, what a student feels is relevant need not be decisive.

Motivation is the most frequent context in which we use the idea of "what a student feels is relevant." We start with what a student feels is

²³This is also the view taken by Peter H. Wagschal, "On the Irrelevance of Relevance," *Phi Delta Kappan*, October, 1969: the contrary is asserted by W. B. Crabtree, "An Age of Irrelevancy," *Educational Theory*, Vol. 21, No. 1, Winter, 1971, p. 38.

²⁴B. P. Komisar, "'Need' and the Needs-Curriculum," *Language and Concepts in Education* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1961), eds., B. Othanel Smith and R. H. Ennis.

relevant to his life and seek to transform that into what is (thought by authorities to be) relevant to some justified educational end. This is parallel to the distinction between what a student is interested in and what is in a student's interest.²⁵ The former may be seen to motivate a student but implies nothing about the value, or lack of it, towards which he is moving; the latter posits something thought to be valuable, though it does not follow that a particular student will be interested in pursuing it. A teacher's task might be seen as trying to get children interested in what is in their interest, and, analogously, to *see* the relevance of what is relevant to something of value. As a device, a teacher may, though he need not, take what a student is presently interested in or feels to be relevant.

There are two other forms of relevance that are of special interest to educational theory. Traditionally, and perhaps conceptually, education has been concerned to develop a mind capable of understanding the world rationally. Necessarily, it has involved initiating students into those forms of knowledge — science, history, the arts, etc. — within which the world becomes intelligible. Part of this process involves developing an understanding of the distinctive types of problem and explanation which characterize the forms. And once one has decided what is distinctive about each form — and this is by no means an uncontroversial issue in epistemology — then one has set quite definite guidelines for what could be relevant towards an answer to a particular question. For example, if we ask, "Was Plato right in his account of moral knowledge?" it is irrelevant to offer observations about Plato's disenchantment with fifth century Athenian democracy, though this might be relevant to the answer of another, perhaps similar sounding, question. Putting this negatively, sometimes we do not know what is relevant to a question we have been asked, because we do not know within what domain it has been posed. If we were asked, "Why did Plato adopt the position he did on the nature of moral knowledge?"²⁶ we would not know what would constitute a "relevant answer" until we knew whether the question was historical, psychological or philosophical.

What *could be* relevant is one thing; what is relevant to a particular question is another, though it presupposes the former. Something which *is* relevant to a question is something which is part of the answer. In education, we are concerned that students develop the ability to solve different kinds of problems. Part of this ability is expressed in the phrase, "a sense of relevance." We say a student, who possesses a sense of relevance, is one who has a "good nose for the solution" or has a feeling for the appropriate move in an inquiry. It is clear that there is much light

²⁵Cp. R. Dearden, *The Philosophy of Primary Education* (New York: The Humanities Press, 1968), Chapter Two, "Aims (I): Needs and Interests".

²⁶One might easily argue that one of the major contributions of philosophy to the growth of human understanding is the role it has played in the differentiation of different sorts of question.

which could be shed on this mental phenomena by psychology, for it has, certainly, a psychological dimension.

It is about this that Polanyi has written at considerable length.²⁷ But what may vitiate his entire account of "tacit knowing" is his reversal of the places of philosophy and psychology. It is our view that the psychological sense is parasitic on the epistemological, and that it is only because a person quite regularly "gets things right" that we say he has a sense of relevance. In his article, "Toward a Disciplined Intuition", Bruner remarks,

"Let it be said at the outset that nothing is known about the training of intuition and that very likely we are still too unclear about what is intended by the word to devise proper educational procedures."²⁸

This would seem like an area in educational theory where the distinctive contributions of conceptual analysis, epistemology, and psychology acting in respectful co-operation could make important contributions to our understanding.

²⁷M. Polanyi, *Personal Knowledge, The Tacit Dimension, Knowing and Being* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962, 1967, 1969 respectively).

²⁸J. S. Bruner, *The Relevance of Education* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1971), p. 89.