

COMMUNICATIONS

The Scholar as Educator: Response

Verily, men have made for themselves all good and evil. Verily, they received it not, they found it not, it came not down as a voice from heaven.

Man . . . gave meaning to things, a human meaning. Therefore he calleth himself 'man', that is, the valuer.

To value is to create: hear ye creators! Valuation itself is the treasure and jewel of all things valued.

Valuation first giveth value: without valuation existence were as an hollow nut . . .

. . . Verily, a monster is this power of praise and blame. Say, brethren, who shall overcome it? Who shall yoke its thousand necks?

A thousand goals have there been heretofore, for there have been a thousand peoples. But the yoke upon the thousand necks is lacking, the one goal is lacking. Mankind hath as yet no goal.

But tell me, I pray, my brethren: if a goal be lacking to mankind, is not mankind itself lacking?¹

In response to the paper "The Scholar as Educator: A Nietzschean View",² I would like to push matters further by examining and evaluating the argument Nietzsche himself gives to support his ideal of the individual/genius/superman against whom the scholar was rated and found wanting.

In the book in question,³ Nietzsche is tackling what for him is THE question: What is the meaning of life?⁴ He judges that unless life, in general, has a meaning (that is, an over-arching meaning/purpose, henceforth designated 'Meaning'), then his life, or any life in particular, cannot be Meaningful, can only be filled with petty, unfulfilling, superficial meanings; that meanings are forever doomed to remain mere meanings if they lie outside the Meaning of life.⁵ For one's life to be meaningful,

¹F. Nietzsche, *Thus Spake Zarathustra* (London: Dent, 1960) p. 51.

²J. Hillesheim, *The Journal of Educational Thought*, April 1969, Vol. 3, No. 1 (April, 1969), pp. 20-28.

³F. Nietzsche, *Schopenhauer as Educator* (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1965). Henceforward, all references to this book will be by page number only.

⁴" . . . the remand of every great philosophy which, when taken as a whole, always says in effect: this is the picture of life as a whole, and learn from it the meaning of your life. And conversely: read only your life, and understand from it the hieroglyphs of life in general." p. 26.

"What is life worth, if anything at all?" p. 33.

⁵" . . . how neither becoming rich, not being respected, nor being learned can raise the individual above his disgust at the valuelessness of his existence, and how the struggle for all these good things is given meaning [my meaning] only by a high and transfiguring overall goal: to win power in order to come to the help of nature . . ." p. 26.

then, one must 'partake' in the meaning of life, one's goals must be consistent with life's Goal, hence Nietzsche insists that we look at "the overall picture of life and existence . . . [and that] without such a normative overall picture the sciences are threads which nowhere lead to a goal [my Goal] and make our life's course all the more confused and labyrinthine." (p.25). He condemns crowd mentality, our ordinary daily lives caught up in the normative machinery of our day and generation, as essentially irrational. We do not know what 'it' (life and existence) is all about. It is as though life/existence were a spaceship — we all have our jobs to do, our roles to play, our pleasures and ambitions within the spaceship setting, but none of us knows where the craft is heading, nobody knows what the trip is all about. The meaningful tasks, pleasures and ambitions that we immerse ourselves in are, then, an opium,⁶ an evading of "What is the Meaning of life?" What is seen as reasonable and rational within context is seen as meaningless and basically irrational once one steps back and looks at one's context — Nietzsche sees philosophy as a looking at the picture of life and existence as a whole, that is, one frees oneself from being caught up in it in order to look at it as a whole.⁷ Thus crowd life covers up the problems,⁸ but for Nietzsche, as for Sartre and Camus, facing up to reality is the basic virtue. In fleeing reality, the crowd lives within an illusion and living becomes roleplaying, a comedy.⁹

Camus sees life as Meaningless:¹⁰ man's dignity and happiness is to be Sisyphus who holds *his* rocks in his own hands but who nevertheless is constantly aware that the context is absurd: Sisyphus is going, but going nowhere, just up and down, up and down, up and down . . . Sartre sees man as without justification: "It is absurd that we are born: it is absurd

⁶"There are moments when we all know that the most extensive arrangements of our own life are made only to escape our real task; . . . we are slaves even to hard daily work — more fervently and unreflectively than is necessary to live, because it seems to us more necessary not to reach the stage of reflection . . . we hate the silence and drug ourselves with social life." pp. 53-54.

⁷The logical difficulties of stepping back to view the whole (i.e. how can you step back out of the *whole*, or, out of life and existence?) are not insuperable. One way out, though not the only way, is to think of man as a Sartrean 'nothingness' and/or 'negating' in which case man is a stepping back. The Sartrean position roughly boils down to: I am not the world and I (thereby) can imagine and question. See J. P. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956) pp. 622-625.

⁸" . . . people have not only lost the last remains of a philosophical way of thinking, but also of a religious way, and in place of this they have gained not optimism but journalism. Every philosophy which believes that the problem of existence has been set aside, or even solved, by a political event, is a cosmic pseudo-philosophy." pp. 35-36.

⁹" . . . how they themselves strut about in a hundred masks as youths, men, old men, fathers, citizens, priests, officials and merchants, thinking only of the comedy they are playing and not at all of their selves." pp. 46-47.

¹⁰"Dying voluntarily implies that you have recognized, even instinctively, the ridiculous character of that habit [living], the absence of any profound reason for living, the insane character of that daily agitation, and the uselessness of suffering." A. Camus, *The Myth of Sisyphus* (New York: Random House, 1955) p. 5.

that we die";¹¹ "life decides its own meaning";¹² "the for-itself is effectively a perpetual project of founding itself qua being and a perpetual failure of this project."¹³ But Nietzsche — the Nietzsche who wrote *Schopenhauer as Educator* at least — declares that there is a Meaning, in the light of which my life can become meaningful; he rejects the Heraclitean flux, the "eternal becoming" (p. 47), the eternal going but going no place, the eternal up and down. For him there is another psychological spaceship from which vantage point one sees the picture of life and existence as a whole and discerns the meaning of it all.

Nietzsche states that the meaning of life is metaphysical.¹⁴ He rejects theology but embraces metaphysics; he rejects Heraclitus but accepts Empedocles. Nature does have a Goal, and insofar as man shares in it, or is it, life is deeply meaningful, for man is part of nature. The Goal of nature is to have no Goal.¹⁵ This is the essential paradox in this work of Nietzsche where many, if not all, of our probings of Nietzsche finally come to toss and turn. The Goal is ENLIGHTENMENT. The highest value open to man (i.e. an absolute) is to be enlightened: "Her [nature's] transfigured features now express a great enlightenment over existence: and the highest wish that mortals can wish constantly, and with open ears, is to participate in this enlightenment." (pp. 54-55).

Enlightenment is, in some sense or other, appreciating things as they 'really are' and being what one 'really is'. Nietzsche gives as examples of enlightened individuals: the philosopher, artist and saint. The philosopher looks with simple, strict honesty at reality: "the overall picture of life and existence". He has no ambition toward money, prestige or respect: his future is to be present and he does not hearken to the crowd. The artist does not create in order to sell. He creates to create, to capture. He appreciates simply to appreciate. His future is to be present, and he does not hearken to the crowd. The saint is not concerned with his own advancement in society, is not consumed with private ambition, but goes around doing good. His future is to be present and he does not hearken to the crowd. Each sees through the falsities of crowd life; each sees the Meaninglessness of the eternal pursuit after the next crowd carrot dangled in front of one, the meaninglessness of being swept along by the prevailing norms and picture of reality as if one's day and generation had to be right, the meaninglessness of being stretched out into the future such that one never captures or appreciates the present. Each sees the significance of creative, self-surpassing 'true selves', aesthetically

¹¹J.-P. Sartre, *Op. Cit.*, p. 547.

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 543.

¹³*Ibid.*, p. 620.

¹⁴" . . . existence holds a mirror up to herself in which life appears no longer senseless but in its metaphysical significance." p. 52. ". . . nature needs the philosopher . . . artist for a metaphysical purpose, namely, for her own self-enlightenment . . . and thus reach self-knowledge." p. 56.

¹⁵" . . . nature . . . feels for the first time to be at her goal, that is, where she realizes that she must forget to have a goal . . ." p. 54.

and intellectually aware. On being "true men" (p. 54) as opposed to being animal, Nietzsche says:

Quickly and proudly they would reply to the question "To what end do you live?" by saying "to *become* a good citizen, scholar or statesman" — and yet they *are* something that can never become anything different — and why are they just this? . . . This eternal becoming is a deceptive puppet-play over which man forgets himself, a diversion which disperses the individual to the four winds, an endless, silly game which time, that overgrown child, plays before us and with us. The heroism of truth consists in ceasing one day to be time's plaything. In becoming, all is hollow, deceptive, superficial and contemptible; the riddle which man is to solve can only be solved in the unchangeable, in being, in being such-and-no-other. He begins to test how deeply he is involved in being and in becoming, and a huge task arises before his soul: that of destroying all that is becoming and of bringing to light all falseness in things (p. 47).

Truly it is a severe punishment to live as an animal in such hunger and desire and yet to come to no rational attitude toward this life . . . And when the whole of nature is impelled toward man, she intimates that he is necessary for her redemption from the curse of animal life, and that finally, in him, existence holds a mirror up to itself in which life appears no longer senseless but in its metaphysical significance (pp. 51-52).

From all this, Nietzsche does not draw so much a philosophy of awareness as a philosophy of social activism, albeit on behalf of enlightened individuals:

Culture demands from him not only inner experience, not only the judgment of the exterior world of flux, but finally, and chiefly, action. This means fighting for culture and being hostile to the influences, laws and institutions in which he does not recognize his goal: the production of genius (p. 62).

Nature needs man. Man and man are part of nature. If nature is to be enlightened, man must help his fellow man. Nietzsche protests that he loves his fellowmen, so much so that at the cost of personal happiness he will continue to try and show them what is false about crowd living, show them that they have yielded up their selves, that they are basically irrational in avoiding or not knowing the answer to the question, "What is the meaning of life?"

Thus nature finally needs the saint in whom the individual ego is entirely melted away and who feels his suffering life as an identity, affinity and unity with all that is living: the saint in whom that wonder of transformation occurs, upon which the play of becoming never changes, that final and highest becoming-human after which the whole of nature strives for its redemption from itself (p. 57).

Men are brothers, not because a God is our father but because, as in Eastern philosophy, we are all one, all part of nature. The individual, then, must act in society and root out all that hinders the development of enlightened persons, those who value the true and the beautiful, and thereby, the good.

It is on this basis, then, that Nietzsche raises his ideal individual, the ideal against which the academic scholar, as depicted by Nietzsche and as exposed in the paper being responded to, was measured and found wanting. I maintain that this basis is wholly unacceptable.

Nietzsche is here holding out social/political activism *and* aesthetics as valuable; he urges us to do our own thing (see pp. 2-4) *and* to do nature's thing; he urges us to be a true self *and* to be selfless. These differing notions reflect his basic plank of 'the goal of nature is to have no goal'. I believe that the apparent antagonisms do permit of reconciliation, that the paradox cannot easily be dismissed, but what I wish to pursue is the more basic question: Is Nietzsche's view of nature acceptable? If it is not, the paradox does not even come up for discussion.

Nietzsche always speaks of nature as a person, as "she" who has a "goal", who "needs", "feels", "must forget", "has played", "intimates", "realizes", "strives", etc. Can we make sense of "nature" as Nietzsche uses it?

Nature would include, among other things, sticks and stones. To declare "nature has a goal" is to declare that nature has a purpose. Goals and purposes we readily attribute to persons; I might say to someone, "What is your purpose in doing that?" because I assume that usually a person has some goal or purpose in mind which gave rise to the 'doing'. But I do not at all assume that sticks and stones are purposing. In fact I cannot conceive of any argument that would be sufficient to make me believe they can purpose. Where 'person' ends and 'non-person' begins is a problem, but no more so than where the chin ends and the cheek begins. Nobody knows, though if we cared to we could simply arbitrate the matter, but it would be an arbitrary decision based on the distinguishing characteristics which got the two words going in the first place. In other words, it is well known that there is a systematic vagueness in language.¹⁶ The important point is that in fact I have a very clear idea of 'chin' such that if someone says to me "Your chin is bleeding!" I do not at all question him as to what he means by "chin". Similarly, I have a very clear idea of 'person' and of 'inanimate matter' (or somesuch); the former I conceive as purposing, feeling, intimating, etc., and the latter I conceive as being incapable of purposing. Just as I do not mix up 'chin' and 'cheek', neither do I mix up 'person', 'stick', and 'quanta' (or whatever). But Nietzsche is trying to make me mix them up, trying to make me accept that nature (of which man is only part) purposes. And Nietzsche has declared God dead — so no purpose could be assigned to nature by such a Person.

In exactly parallel fashion, Nietzsche talks of his ideal individual as not at all being a loner but part of the community, that is, mankind; Nietzsche sees the individual as one who actively works toward the enlightenment of humanity which is "held together not by external forms and laws but by a fundamental idea . . . the fundamental idea of culture." (p. 56). But just as 'purpose presupposes person' so, surely, 'idea presupposes mind'. The idea of culture clearly does not arise from the community of human minds, since Nietzsche has condemned the crowd.

¹⁶See W. Alston, *Philosophy of Language* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964), ch. 5.

And Nietzsche is not at all merely saying, "This idea of culture is my own — isn't it a good one!" And God is dead, which is to say that there are no supernatural persons. Who then can think this idea? Nature? At least Hegel stressed mind. Here we have a mindless idea.

Nietzsche's move from 'God is dead' to, in effect, 'nature is alive' was a bad one. Yet the 'New Theology' has moved along this very path of making God, a person, being.¹⁷ Similarly, Heidegger talks of the "voice of Being",¹⁸ "pay attention to the appeal of Being",¹⁹ "the appeal of Being speaks".²⁰ Is anything accomplished by this assimilation of person and non-person? Sartre distinguishes radically between being-for-itself and being-in-itself (establishing at the same time, however, the essential relation between the two such that being-for-itself requires being-in-itself, but not vice versa).²¹ From a different viewpoint, Strawson too makes the distinction radical.²² Are we intellectually prepared to say that nature (i.e. reality, excluding God or anything supernatural but including, though not wholly constituted by, persons) can purpose? If you answer in the affirmative then I expect to be offered dramatic new evidence²³ that, for example, stones can purpose. That is, I expect, a supported statement to the effect that we now realize that non-persons are, after all, persons, that they do in fact meet the criteria of personhood. If, however, you reply in the affirmative but have no such evidence, then I am completely at a loss to know the difference between 'person' and 'non-person' (which is not at all to say that I am vague as to peripheral boundary instances of them) — whereas in fact I know the English language as well as the next man. You are talking a different language, or you do not realize what you are saying, or you are mixing 'person' and 'non-person' by assimilating them under a more general category such as 'nature' or 'being' so that the distinguishing marks are cloaked. But cloaking them does not remove them, and I begin to look on you as a deceiver. I currently know of no evidence that would make me in the least inclined to accept the proposition that non-persons, such as sticks and stones, can purpose. Nature, then, cannot purpose, cannot have a goal, in which case life has no meaning. Being cannot talk, in which case there seems little point in listening.²⁴

¹⁷See H. Barnes, *An Existentialist Ethics* (New York: Knopf, 1967) part 4.

¹⁸M. Heidegger, *What is Philosophy?* (N. Haven: College & U. Press, 1956) p. 77.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 75.

²⁰*Ibid.*, p. 75.

²¹" . . . the for-itself without the in-itself is a kind of abstraction; it could not exist any more than a color could exist without form or a sound without pitch. A consciousness which would be consciousness of nothing would be an absolute nothing . . . the in-itself has no need of the for-itself in order to be . . . If it is impossible to pass from the notion of being-in-itself to that of being-for-itself and to reunite them in a common genus, this is because the passage in fact from the one to the other and their reuniting cannot be effected." J.-P. Sartre, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 621, 622, 623.

²²See P. Strawson, *Individuals* (London: Methuen, 1965).

²³That plants apparently react to man's thoughts/feelings, is at least a step in this direction. But to react is not to act.

²⁴Cf.: "This correspondence occurs in different ways according to how the appeal of Being speaks, according to whether it is heard or not heard . . . We are trying to listen to the voice of Being." M. Heidegger, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 75, 89.

In other words too much violence is being done to the word 'purpose'. We do not in fact use the word in connection with sticks, stones and suchlike, neither separately nor as a sum, yet to say that nature has a goal is to so use it, on no grounds whatsoever; such a use would be radically divorced from its stock use. You must say that in fact persons and non-persons have the same ontological ability to purpose and then give me your supporting evidence, or your use of "purpose" is so bewildering that all communication ceases — not because I am stupid and you are profound, but because you have destroyed our main means of communicating, namely, the common language. I simply do not know what you are talking about and can legitimately wonder if *you* do.

But, it may be argued, by 'nature' Nietzsche means 'human nature' and hence he does not stray into a realm containing non-persons and hence my objections lose all weight. Given this position, the "Goal/Purpose/Meaning" derives not from men (if this were the case one would find the meaning of life by means of an empirical study into men's valuing whereas Nietzsche has condemned the crowd and appealed to a metaphysical meaning), nor from a man, but from 'man'. Then much of Nietzsche's talk of nature would be regarded as merely loose and figurative, and would be taken to mean: If the world is to be known and appreciated for what it really is, and if, thereby, a true self is to be, a certain sort of man is required. As a matter of fact, the structure of man being what it is, this being and knowing and appreciating is the only Meaningful, deeply fulfilling engagement man is capable of. This sort of man is a "true human being" (p. 63). Thus the desire which man is, is the desire for 'being'.²⁵ The 'goal of human nature' now makes sense since it refers to a certain end assigned by the structure of man and grounded ontologically in some sort of tendency. Hence only goals, not the Goal, are open to man's purposing; man's purposing can channel man into, or away from, the Purpose, which is to say that he can elect to do what is deeply fulfilling or opt for a popular superficiality.

All this is consistent with Nietzsche's thesis outlined above, and is, basically, the powerful realist position.²⁶ Such a position, however, bogs down in subjectivity. How do I know that you know what will fulfil me as man? Who are you to pronounce on human nature and what fulfils it? Who is the artist, philosopher and saint? But quite apart from the difficulties involved in making a final and/or authoritative pronouncement about human nature (from one Sartrean angle man has no nature, he is a nothing/negating), even if every person agreed with the pronouncement, found it to be the case that such activities did in fact result in

²⁵We thus eventuate, virtually, in the basic Sartrean position that being-for-itself is the desire for being-in-itself (though Sartre's version is much more elaborate — see J.-P. Sartre, *Op Cit.*, pp. 566-568). Sartre maintains that such a desire is incapable of realization and hence man is a futile passion, but Nietzsche says it is the Meaning of life.

²⁶See J. Wild, *The Challenge of Existentialism* (Bloomington: Indiana U Press, 55), also H. Broudy, *Building a Philosophy of Education* (N. Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1965).

some sort of feeling/awareness of deep fulfillment, the Nietzschean ethic of selfless dedication to culture, to the enlightenment of *all*, to the "production of the philosopher, of the artist and of the saint within us and outside us, and thereby to work at the consumation of nature" (p. 56.) can NOT be derived merely from a base of personal feelings of fulfillment; that I feel fulfilled has little to do with whether or not I am going to care about the fulfillment of all others.

It may also be argued, however, that Nietzsche is merely speaking of evolution (see especially pp. 59-63, 83-88.). In this case, the goal of nature is neither a purpose/purposing nor that which fulfils man as man; it is that which, as a matter of fact, is a present end result in an ongoing evolutionary process — that is, man. Thus blind instinct, blind forces of natural selection/mutation have given way to a self-conscious, goal-creating man; blindness has given way to enlightenment; the Goal is to have no Goal; man is not a driven animal but an aesthetic, intelligent, creative being. But on looking around, Nietzsche sees men as animals,²⁷ driven by the crowd or by sensual appetite, chasing carrots, caught up in mediocrity, suffering senselessly, etc. Then he cries for the fulfillment of nature.

There is no doubt that Nietzsche did have evolution in mind, but his appeal to nature as support for his cry for the production of the 'individual' is entirely illegitimate — if by "goal" he means "end result" he cannot appeal to it as that toward which we ought to aim since that end result has happened: man is here. What this position boils down to is that certain men are intelligent, aesthetic, unselfish, and others are not. The latter are more like animals than the former. Man is a newcomer on the evolutionary scene — let us, then, says Nietzsche, be 'true men' and not live like animals. Nietzsche has, in fact, a vision of intelligent, aesthetic, creative man and urges us to strive toward this ideal; he is announcing his version of the good society and condemning the society of his day as animal-like, irrational, and such. But why should I listen to Nietzsche? Who is he to pronounce on what is truly human and what is not? But then again, why shouldn't I listen to him?

Nietzsche has indeed every right to proclaim his version of the good society but he should not appeal to an objective nature; he has every right to legislate but he should not appeal to a legislature which, it seems, we all should obey; he has every right to proclaim an ideal but

²⁷"In that sudden illumination we look with a shudder around us and behind us. There the refined beasts of prey run with us in the midst of them. The tremendous animation of men on the great desert earth, their founding of towns and States, their waging of wars, their restless gathering and dispersing, their confused moving about, their imitating one another, their mutual outsmarting and downtreading, their cry in need, their howl of joy in victory — all this is a continuation of animality as if man had been intentionally formed to regress and cheated of his metaphysical predispositions." pp. 52-53.

"But so it is with all of us the greater part of our lives: we usually do not transcend animality; we ourselves are the animals who appear to suffer senselessly." p. 52.

it should be stated as such and not asserted to be humanity's goal as if he had learned it from some authoritative, beyond-man source; the 'ought' may be grounded in Nietzsche, it should not be grounded in nature. Hence the following is unacceptable:

When a species arrives at its limits, and at the point of transition to a higher species, it is easy to see that the goal of its development does not lie in the mass of specimens and their wellbeing, or even in the latest specimens to evolve. Rather it lies in the apparently scattered and chance existences which, given favourable circumstances, come into being here and there; and it should be just as easy to understand and demand that humanity, because it is *capable of becoming conscious of its goal*, shall look for and produce those favourable conditions under which those great redeeming men can come into being (pp. 59-60. My italics).

He who is convinced, however, that the goal of culture is to further the genesis of *true human beings* and nothing else . . . will find it necessary to replace "blind instinct" by conscious will (p. 63. My italics).

The 'is' of evolution/nature does not determine that I *ought* to be a Nietzschean individual; blind instinct does not determine what goal I, the enlightened one, shall consciously hold.

But, it may be argued, what Nietzsche is saying is that man, the present end result of blind natural forces, is in fact FREE, is no longer a slave to such forces, hence he should live free, should use his freedom rather than perpetuate a state of being driven. This would be part and parcel of interpreting Nietzsche to mean: man, the present end result of nature/evolution, is an intelligent being, in which case he ought to live intelligently, ought to see through the falsities pervading crowd life, ought to realize, among other things, that there are no absolute values/strictures dictated from without and hence the way is clear for creative self-surpassing. Each man, Nietzsche is saying, has the potential for intelligent, aesthetic, creative living, so he ought to fulfil it; that is, he ought not to be hoodwinked by the crowd out of his natural heritage, his 'true self'; the 'ought' arises from within — it is not at all a question of imposing an 'ought' on people from without. It is a question of jogging people into realizing what crowd thinking/living had caused them to pass over; it is a question of waking a drugged self,²⁸ of waking a sleeping giant/superman.

It is indeed plausible to maintain that to *be* intelligent is in fact to recognize the *claims* of intelligence. To be intelligent is to accept that one ought to act intelligently; that is, 'is' and 'ought' merge here and hence the prior objection loses all weight.

But from this Nietzsche will never derive his ethic of 'work selflessly for the enlightenment of all'. Intelligence does not require that I work for the benefit of all others, though caring-for-others does require this; intelligence only demands that I care about some people all the time, or

²⁸"Certainly, there are other means of finding oneself, of arriving at one's self out of the narcosis in which one usually moves as in a black cloud, but I know of no better way than to think of one's educators." p. 6.

differing 'somes' at differing times, for I do need help. Caring-for-others has little, though not nothing, to do with intelligence; ethics has little, though not nothing, to do with reason; the ethical 'ought' has little, though not nothing, to do with the 'is' of a highly developed nervous system. Intelligence does demand that I be a philosopher (a truth-seeker). It may possibly demand that I be an artist, but it does not demand that I be a saint.

Thus Nietzsche's ideal individual, against whom the academic scholar was measured and found wanting, derives from his proposition that nature has a goal. I find the proposition unacceptable: if man is part of nature, then nature (the whole) contains non-persons, therefore it makes no sense to talk of nature having a goal and therefore man does not have a Goal. If by 'nature' Nietzsche means 'human nature', then apart from the difficulties inherent in the task of declaring what fulfils man as man, his picture of the ideal individual holding to a value of 'enlightenment for all' does not follow from it. If he is talking figuratively of evolution, then either he cannot derive from it a supported 'ought', or once again he cannot derive from it the ethic of 'enlightenment for all' that he advocates; if he is chopping and changing his meaning without altering his terms, then one is forced to view Nietzsche with grave suspicion.

Another way of expressing all this is to say that if Nietzsche is declaring that life becomes Meaningful when one assents to the proposition "Nature has a goal of self-enlightenment" such that one gains a cause to live which carries with it some sort of deep emotional fulfillment, then the Meaning fails since the proposition fails. If he is declaring that certain sorts of activities (e.g. being creative) gives a 'feeling of Meaningfulness', then apart from the fact that if challenged he cannot prove his point because the ultimate 'Good' is now subjective, his ethic is not required by it. If he is declaring that to live intelligently is to live a meaningful life, then once again his ethic is not required by it.

Nietzsche's ideal, therefore, as portrayed in *Schopenhauer as Educator*, must be rejected, or argued for on other grounds, or merely evinced. Perhaps, then, the cloistered academic scholar is not so useless, not so blighted, after all. Perhaps, then, the schools and universities should not feel badly if they contribute to the making of such a one. The 'perhaps' remains.

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