

The literature that discusses the question of whether or not teaching is a profession has typically construed the problem as a matter of definition. This approach both begs-the-question and fails to inform in any important way.

There are criteria that may be regarded as the necessary conditions that any occupation must satisfy to be recognized as a profession. Educators, however, have both misunderstood or misapplied these criteria.

SOME REFLECTIONS ON EDUCATION AS A PROFESSION

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In the Preface to his classic study, *Education as a Profession*, Myron Lieberman charged that "one of the major obstacles to the professionalization of education (was) the widespread failure of the public to understand the conditions necessary for it." Nearly two decades have passed since the publication of *Education as a Profession* and no doubt public ignorance of the conditions necessary for the professionalization of education is as widespread as it ever was. But what is more discouraging is the continuing evidence of the widespread failure of educators, themselves, to understand the conditions necessary for their professionalization. Symptomatic of this failure is the ubiquitous and indiscriminate usage of the term 'professional' by educators. This term is used and misused to describe (and prescribe) all manner of diverse behaviour (e.g., "Tardiness is unprofessional, etc.".) Indeed, it is progressively less clear whether the term 'professional' is a noun or merely an adjective (or worse, a slogan) used to characterize certain things considered desirable at the moment.

The purpose of this essay is not to decide the question of whether education *is* or *is not* a profession, nor is it to provide yet another definition of a profession. Our concern rather, is to help clarify the question of what it means to say that certain behaviours and practices are or are not professional, and to tease out some of the implications of these meanings for curricular renewal in teacher education and for collective political action by educational organizations. In short, this effort attempts to behaviourally "unravel" the concept of a profession, and professional worker, for educators.

It is clear that historically educators have looked to the more established

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professions such as law, medicine and theology as a means of determining which features of these occupations are associated with professional status. Often this has resulted in more attention being paid to the superficial attributes of high occupational status than to the necessary conditions of professionalism, as such. It is obvious, however, that certain ostensible features of professions such as community status, white-collar dress or salary or fee-based remuneration are at best contingent attributes of professions.¹ Professions are not professions *because* of them. There are presumably more fundamental characteristics of a profession which are integral to the concept and which can be regarded as *necessary conditions* for correctly applying the term to any occupational group. It is against these more basic characteristics that educators, in particular, must assess their own occupational status and behaviour to determine whether their work is properly described as “professional” as such. The problem of specifying just what those fundamental characteristics (or properties) are, is the task to which we must now turn.

Some Problems of Definition

For some time now, at least since the time of Socrates, philosophers have been interested in the definitions of terms, and the problems surrounding definitions in general. Many an argument has been won or lost by simply defining one’s terms appropriately. If one employs an overly-restrictive definition, then certain cases will be ruled out *a priori*. Conversely, if one employs a sufficiently loose definition of a term then virtually any case or too many cases, would qualify for membership, and the term thus fails to convey significant meaning. The literature on “professionalism” is no exception to these problems. It is simply one case in point.

There exists a substantial body of literature which attempts to define the concept of a ‘profession’ and to determine which occupational groups qualify for membership and which do not.² Unfortunately, this literature does not seriously address itself to the many and varied problems associated with definitions — problems which have interested philosophers for centuries. Most of the analyses simply proceed by presenting lists of features which are alleged to characterize and define the professions. These lists may include as few as two characteristics or as many as ten. Myron Lieberman’s list of

¹Harold J. Wilensky documents the fact that not only did educational professional organizations begin after the other major professions, but educators had a professional organization *before* they had any formal training required for entry; “The Professionalization of Everyone”, *American Journal of Sociology*, 70, No. 2, 1964, p. 143.

²See for example: Byrne J. Horton, “Ten Criteria of a Genuine Profession”, *Scientific Monthly*, No. 58, 1944, p. 164; T.M. Stinnett, *Professional Problems of Teachers* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1968); Sidney Dorros, *Teaching as a Profession* (Columbus, Ohio: C. Merrill, 1968); Myron Lieberman, *Education as a Profession* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1956); Abraham Flexner, “Is Social Work a Profession”, Paper presented at the Forty-Second Annual Meeting of the National Conference of Charities and Correction, Baltimore, Md., May 1915; R.H. Tawney, *The Acquisitive Society* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, In.), 1920, p. 92; H.J. Wilensky, “The Professionalization of Everyone.”

characteristics defining a profession is both typical and suggestive:

1. A unique, definite, and essential social service,
2. An emphasis upon intellectual techniques in performing its service,
3. A long period of specialized training,
4. A broad range of autonomy for both the *individual practitioner* and for the occupational group as a whole,
5. An acceptance by the practitioner of broad responsibility for judgments made and acts performed within the scope of professional autonomy,
6. An emphasis upon the service to be rendered, rather than upon the economic gain to the practitioners, as a basis for the organization and performance of the social service delegated to the occupational group,
7. A comprehensive self-governing organization of practitioners,
8. A code of ethics which has been clarified and interpreted at ambiguous and doubtful points by concrete cases.³

Lists, such as Lieberman's, are helpful insofar as they at least sketch the general class of criteria we are concerned with investigating. That is, they are a good place to begin. As we have suggested above, however, such lists may be overly-restrictive or overly-liberal as definitions. Furthermore it is important to recognize the intrinsic methodological (philosophical) difficulties involved in establishing any such list as a definition. In particular, how does one begin to generate such a list of characteristics? Does one examine the existing professions to see what common characteristics they all possess? Or does one construct a list of characteristics, and then determine which groups, if any, possess these attributes? In this respect, one is in the same position as Euthyphro when he tried to provide Socrates with a definition of 'piety', and Socrates asked, "if things are pious because they are loved by the Gods, or are they loved by the Gods because they are pious?". Either way that Euthyphro chooses to proceed has serious methodological and epistemological difficulties built into it.

Consider for a moment the difficulties inherent in the empirical procedure of simply examining a variety of professions in order to compile a list of characteristics which they all possess. Which occupations does one consider, and which of them does one ignore? This procedure clearly pre-supposes that one already knows what a profession is before his investigation begins — how else does one know which occupations to look at?

Alternatively, one might begin by assuming the concept of a 'profession' has an *ideal* meaning, in the Platonic sense, and that this meaning is independent of any particular instances of professions. Occupational groups

³*Education as a Profession*, pp. 2-6.

which purport to be professions are then assessed to determine the degree to which they do or do not approximate the ideal model. The difficulty with this procedure is in justifying one's claim to knowledge of the *real* meaning. By what means, Socrates might ask, does one gain knowledge of the Forms?

Still another strategy might be simply to appeal to ordinary language and construct a meaning for the concept on the basis of the way people ordinarily speak about professions. This procedure, however, is confounded by the inconsistencies one finds in ordinary usage; more importantly, it confers professional status upon too many occupations because of the careless and vague ways language is often used. Indeed, it is precisely this ordinary and indiscriminate use of the term "profession" that generated our problem in the first place!

Apart from these logical difficulties involved in formulating a completely adequate definition of any concept, there remains an additional semantic hazard. As G.E. Moore once observed, "The Problem with definitions is that they typically replace one problematic word with several others."

It should thus be recognized that the problem of defining the concept of a 'profession', as with other concepts, is not an exclusively empirical task. The literature which attempts to define a 'profession' commits a common and fundamental error — the failure to recognize a philosophical task when confronted by one.

If one's goal is to understand professional behaviour, complete definitions (even when they can be adequately provided) may not be particularly informative. In our view, too much energy has been expended in *defining* a profession and too little in *understanding* implications of such definitions. One can try to understand what a horse is, for example, without knowing whether donkeys and mules are included in the definition of a horse. In this sense, the approach taken here is more pre-emptive. We will make no attempt to provide an exhaustive definition of 'professionalism'. Rather, we will examine only those salient features of a profession which emerge from the literature, and which appear in virtually every list attempting to define a 'profession'. These consensual features can be regarded as the minimally *necessary* conditions for being considered a profession:

- (1) That there exist a technical (specialized) literature which forms an intellectual basis for its practice.
- (2) That the occupational group provides a needed social service as its primary *raison d'être*.
- (3) That there exists a set of standards designed to ensure, or certify, minimal competence for membership in the group.
- (4) That there exists a broad range of autonomy both for the individual and for the occupational group to practice according to its own informed judgement.

Others might insist that a code of ethics, and other attributes, are neces-

sary also, however the few characteristics listed here are non-controversial and appear as basic in every study. It is surprising that even these basic features of a profession are the source of considerable confusion and neglect amongst public educators. Indeed, the purpose of this essay is to help clarify these basic components of professionalism for educators in particular.

A Specialized Literature as an Intellectual Basis for Practice

The first feature (number (1) above) requires that there be a body of technical literature which forms the intellectual basis of the field for the occupational group. Medicine, for example, obviously enjoys a very wide and well-established body of medical literature that includes such things as physiology, anatomy, immunology, etc. And more importantly, the practice of medicine is based on this literature.⁴ Similarly, law has a corpus of legal literature including such things as statutes, torts, writs, contracts, precedents, etc., and the practice of law is derived from this literature. When it comes to education, however, the situation is not nearly so apparent. In particular, to the extent that a technical literature in education exists, it is not nearly so extensive nor non-controversial as the literature of the older professions. And furthermore, it is anything but clear that educators, including teacher educators, derive their prescriptions for practice from this literature – limited as it may be.

Although there is a relative lack of a well-established literature in education, we would argue that this merely represents a difference in *degree* but not *kind*. And despite probable disagreement about what would constitute the *core* of this literature, the general argument remains tenable.⁵ Therefore, to the extent that teachers and teacher training institutions fail to justify their prescriptions and practice by direct appeals to the technical literature, then they fail both to train and practice as *bona fide* professions. More often than not a given practice is prescribed on the basis of someone's "personal experience", but this type of apprenticeship has little to distinguish it from a craft or trade. In short, educators do not take their own technical literature seriously.

There is, moreover, evidence which suggests that this failure is widespread if not endemic to education. Teacher training institutions present widely different courses, readings, and pedagogical prescriptions for people to do identical jobs. There is virtually no unanimity on what constitutes correct preparation.⁶ Educators frequently acknowledge that professions, as distinct from trades, are largely intellectual endeavours, but they fail to recognize that practice, *qua* professional practice, requires the application

⁴We use the term "literature" in place of "knowledge" so as not to beg any epistemological questions about alleged facts. Since today's "facts" often turn out to be yesterday's "mistaken beliefs", the best any field can do at any time is to appeal to its contemporary literature for its collective wisdom.

⁵The literature would consist of both "foundation" literature and "methodology" literature.

⁶Stinnett, *op. cit.*, pp. 59-60.

of a technical literature.⁷ Educators, as an occupational group, fail to see the force in the observation, once made by Harold Wilensky, that:

any occupation wishing to exercise professional authority *must find a technical base for it, assert an exclusive jurisdiction, link both skill and jurisdiction to standards of training, and convince the public that its services are uniquely trustworthy.*⁸

The Orientation toward Social Service

The second basic feature of a profession requires that the occupational group provide a needed social service as its primary *raison d'être*. This particular feature of a profession serves, in part, to distinguish it from other occupational groups whose services are rendered, ultimately, for private profit. One might argue that an automobile manufacturer is providing a service to the community and point out that "What's good for General Motors is good for the country!" However, one must not fail to recognize that the "service" which the manufacturer provides is a *by-product* of his pursuit of profit — the "service" is not an end in itself nor prime purpose for his activity.

Education, like medicine and law, is now regarded by most developed nations as a necessity for the individual citizen, and the survival of the society at large. Indeed, the extent to which a country has universal public education is a basic measure of its social progress. As one cross-cultural study points out:

Whether it be mainly lip-service or not, no political party or government would today dare to belittle the social importance of education, and we all vie with each other in raising the social value we attach to providing the best possible education for the community's children to the status of a life and death matter . . . At the societal level the scale of investment in education is universally regarded as perhaps the most important index of social progress, and a nation's economic well-being, or even survival, in a competitive world is seen to depend more on the success of its educational policies than on any other issue.⁹

While there is little doubt that the collective function of public teachers as a group is to provide a needed social service, one must be careful not to infer from this anything about an individual teacher's personal reasons for belonging to the group. Although the societal role of the occupational group may be to provide a public service, one cannot (and should not) infer that a given practitioner must be motivated by a desire to provide this social service. An educator's motives for teaching may well be for fame, glory, or personal gain, and this would in no way deter from his competence as an outstanding professional teacher. A teacher, like a surgeon or lawyer, might simply be intrigued by the nature of the work independently of any social service which his work might provide to the public.

⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 54-55; also Dorros, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

⁸Wilensky, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

⁹R.H. Kelsall, *The School Teacher in England and the U.S.* (Oxford: Pergamon, 1969), p. 148.

While this point about motives is rather obvious to anyone who thinks about it, it is all the more surprising that educators have failed to recognize it. Indeed, one often gains the impression that teacher training institutions attempt to inculcate an Albert Schweitzer-type ‘attitude’ in their charges as part of their professional preparation. The Hall-Dennis Report, *Living and Learning*, for example, clearly suggests that individual dedication to the public service is the basic motivation of the true professional:

Legal recognition of the profession denotes the offering of a service to the public on the one hand, and the acceptance of recognized rights of the profession on the other. The enthusiasm and *dedication* with which the obligation to serve society is discharged underlie the spirit and character of the profession. This spirit can exist among teachers as a professional body only when the majority of its members have a vital enthusiasm which permeates the whole group.

In an even more revealing vein, the Report continues:

Herein exists the area of the conscience of the individual member of a profession, his own personal and private sense of dedication to society. It is in this subtle area of private endeavour that a profession, in its totality, achieves greatness. Sometimes it is called professional spirit. It is the result of the association of men and women of superior type with a common ideal of service above gain, excellence above quality (sic), self-expression beyond pecuniary motive, and loyalty to a professional code above individual advantage.¹⁰

This reasoning, so pervasive in educational circles, commits what elementary logic books call the “fallacy of division”. It consists in arguing fallaciously from a property which is possessed by the *whole* to the conclusion that each of the *parts* must possess the property as well. (For example, notice that each piece of a large valuable machine need be neither large nor valuable.) In this instance, it does not follow that because the occupational group exists for the purpose of providing a social service each individual member must have that purpose.

People enter and practice various occupations for many diverse reasons, ranging from interest to avarice to selfless altruism. But none of these motives is a reliable index of professional competence. There are very successful teachers, who might even hate children or who teach for the money. And there are some very bad teachers, who love children, or who teach out of a “devotion to mankind”. The goal of education to be recognized as a “profession” will be better served when attention is turned away from attitudes and motives toward cognitive and pedagogical skills.

Standards for Entry into the Profession

Professions generally establish a set of standards required for entry into the occupational group. In education this typically means that one must become “certified”. Quite apart from the long standing controversy over which group has, or should have, control over determining and maintaining these standards for certification (e.g., whether government agencies or profes-

¹⁰E.M. Hall, L.A. Dennis, *Living and Learning: The Report of the Provincial Committee on Aims and Objectives of Education in Ontario*. 1968, pp. 134-135.

sional teachers' groups), there are other aspects of this requirement which have not been adequately recognized.

There is a familiar story about Albert Einstein not being qualified to teach physics in the State of New Jersey because he did not possess a valid teaching certificate. And more recently there is the case of John Bremer, the British-born educationist, architect of the Philadelphia Parkway School Project, and one time President of a major university, being refused the job of Director of Education for Toronto and London, Ontario because he possessed neither a secondary school principal's certificate nor an elementary school inspector's certificate. These and probably other less ironic instances could be cited at length as apparent abuses of certification requirements as a means for controlling entry into the occupation. However, such cases as these do not, by themselves, constitute arguments against certification but they do give one pause to reconsider the basic purpose of certification. Surely the purpose of certification is not (or should not be) to keep *competent* people out of the occupational group, but rather to insure that *incompetent* people do not get in. Certification should be simply a means of ensuring *minimal* competence. It is one among other sufficient but not necessary conditions for entry into the profession. But more often, it is construed as both a necessary and sufficient condition for admission.

Moreover, public educational groups often regard their stern maintenance of certification requirements as a cause for pride (if not snobbery). They are assumed to guarantee a high quality education. We would point out that some country clubs also have very rigid membership requirements, but this says nothing of the quality of golf played by its members. Rigidity does not imply quality.

Perhaps the most serious misuse of standards for entry into teaching lies in the oft-cited fact that public teaching now requires a baccalaureate degree as a condition for employment. The degree requirement, even more than certification *per se*, is now heralded as the last battle won in the long war for professional status recognition. What is particularly noteworthy however, is the ubiquitous failure to recognize that *just any* baccalaureate degree does not specify any unique type of college preparation necessary for entry — just a degree. If there is nothing specific or uniform in this degree requirement, and apprenticeship in teaching can begin at this point, then it becomes clear that no special *cognitive* preparation is required for the job. The practice of medicine requires *medical knowledge*, the practice of law, *legal knowledge*, but the practice of teaching just requires practice. The difference between a housewife with a B.A. and a 'professional teacher' is primarily a brief period of apprenticeship. Again, this situation has come about because educators have failed to exploit the value, indeed the necessity, of the available specialized knowledge which educational theory and research has provided.

To those who might respond by saying that teacher preparation also requires students to take 'foundations' courses in education (*e.g.*, educational

psychology, philosophy of education, etc.) we would assert that (1) to the extent that this is true it is a step in the right direction, but that (2) educators, themselves, place the lowest priority on these subjects, and merely tolerate them in teacher preparation. As Myron Lieberman points out:

There are many educators at all levels who do not appreciate the fact that only an occupation requiring extensive theoretical training for practical efficiency can be regarded as a profession. One frequently hears the terms 'theory' or 'theoretical' used to disparage courses in education. Among students and faculty alike, the professor whose course is 'practical' is supposed to have achieved some sort of superiority over the professor whose course is 'theoretical'. Studies of teacher education curricula over the past half century show very definitely that the 'theory' courses have been and are a minor segment of the total programme, whereas the amount of time devoted to 'practical' courses has increased markedly.¹¹

It is, however, specialized knowledge, as against practical experience gained through apprenticeship, which demarcates a true professional group from mere degree holders in the general population. Until such time as educators in general, and teacher training institutions in particular, require that 'practice' be based upon or derived from 'theoretical' knowledge, teaching will be indistinguishable from a craft or trade — notwithstanding the B.A. requirement. Contrary to recent trends in teacher education, this argues for increased emphasis upon the so-called 'foundations' areas, and upon the theoretical justifications of both curriculum and instruction.

Professional Autonomy

Presumably the requirement of professional autonomy is simply the recognition of the fact that the professional needs plenty of freedom, or 'elbow room', to exercise his expert skill and knowledge. That is, 'professional autonomy', *per se*, consists in the freedom and ability to implement the theoretical knowledge and technical know-how one has learned in his years of training prior to entry into the profession. Indeed, the service, *qua* 'professional service', for which a professional worker is hired is to make responsible decisions based on his educated judgement as to the most appropriate means for carrying out his service. In effect, all professional workers are authoritative experts in their field, albeit some may be more competent than others. Thus, when a professional worker's expert decision-making powers are diminished, so much so is his autonomy diminished, and thereby his capacity to act as a professional.

It is well known that there are many factors which have mitigated against teachers having the full range of professional autonomy. Typically these constraints are traced to the public or lay influence (if not control) in many areas affecting educational policy-making. To clarify the autonomy issue, however, it is useful to distinguish between two dimensions or levels of professional autonomy. The first refers to the autonomy of the professional group as a whole. This collective autonomy is usually achieved and safeguarded by a group of representatives from the profession who lobby in the political arena for the interests of the profession as a whole. The second

¹¹Lieberman, *op. cit.*, p. 196.

level of autonomy, however, concerns the freedom of the *individual* practitioner to exercise his judgement and to make decisions in specific job-related situations. Obviously, whatever is decided upon and legislated at the group level will have important implications for the working conditions of the individual practitioner. Despite the fact that there are certain curtailments legislated from "on high" which partially restrict the autonomy of individual practitioners, it is important to clarify the nature of these restrictions.

First, while many of the prescriptions which are legislated for (or by) the profession by government agencies do affect the autonomy of individual practitioners, many of these legal prescriptions do not affect the professional autonomy, as such, of individual practitioners. For example, if the government should decide that the society cannot afford to build several new hospitals for physicians, or several new schools for teachers, this may, indeed, impose hardships on these groups and thereby restrict their autonomy. But such a decision would not necessarily violate their *professional* autonomy, as such. Professional autonomy, *qua* professional, is based upon decisions which require theoretical knowledge and skill in the area of the group's special expertise. Thus while practical considerations can often affect a practitioner's autonomy to perform his services under optimum conditions, such restrictions do not render him any the less a professional.¹² Of course, in addition to the legislative prescriptions which do not affect professional autonomy there are many prescriptions which *do*, and it is the responsibility of each profession to disentangle which are which.

It may be instructive at this point, to consider for a moment some of the typical demands for which teacher organizations often lobby in their negotiations with government. Very often they are such things as better equipment, newer buildings, higher salaries, fewer extra curricular responsibilities, etc. These demands are pursued with even more vigour than such things as the right to select textbooks and construct curricula and courses to one's own (judgement) guidelines. Such a confusion, or inversion, of so-called "professional priorities" suggests that teachers either do not know, or are not really concerned about, what is truly in their professional interest.

Perhaps one other point about autonomy is worth mention here, since it too results in the usurpation of professional autonomy for teachers. We would argue that the only occupations which require professionals are those which have a theoretical knowledge base but have no systematized routine, or algorithm, for implementing that knowledge. Where the means for carrying out a given task (or job) can be exhaustively prescribed there is no need for professional judgement. Thus the relationship between the degree

¹²On this particular point we would disagree with one of Myron Lieberman's remarks on autonomy. Lieberman says, "legislative prescriptions are always in principle violative of professional autonomy (except in cases where prescriptions by the professional group have the force of law) . . ." (*Ibid*, p. 101). We distinguish between general autonomy and "professional autonomy", as such; and since "professional autonomy" is linked with the theoretical knowledge base, only those prescriptions which usurp this later autonomy are violations of professional autonomy. Thus, even in principle, not all legislative prescriptions are violative of professional autonomy.

of routinized, occupational decision-making and the need for professional judgement, tends to be inversely proportional. This is not to deny that some parts of some professional occupations can be (and are) routinized. For example, one need not be a physician to take blood samples or measure blood pressure. The areas of an occupation which make it a *professional* occupation, however, are precisely those areas where there is no unambiguous “cookbook” for implementing the theoretical knowledge base. Curiously, however, educators seem to have construed the absence of a clear-cut technology for teaching as an argument for permitting the public to decide *what* should be taught, and *how* it should be taught in the schools. They have failed to recognize that it is just these sorts of questions that require professional judgement and not public opinion. Indeed, one might well argue that it is precisely because there is no technology of teaching that teachers need autonomy, and a relatively free environment to experiment according to the dictates of their professional judgement. In the land of the blind, the one-eyed man is king!

Educators have also been apprehensive about making all the professional decisions in education in recognition of the fact that the public is paying the bill. But this is to confuse who is paying the bill with what the bill is being paid for. The public does not attempt to usurp the professional decision-making of public attorneys, army doctors, or psychiatrists and physicians in state hospitals, because the public recognizes their proper claim to autonomy. As Lieberman points out:

If anything, professional autonomy ought to be protected even more in the case of a publicly employed profession since the public has a more direct stake in seeing to it that professional decisions are made by professional persons. When the public hires a professional worker and does not get the benefit of his professional skill and knowledge, it is wasting its money.¹³

In sum, educators have not so much had their autonomy *taken away* by administrators and lay groups as they have *given it away* out of confusion about where to plant their feet, and why.

This interpretation of professional autonomy for teachers implies that the public, and administrators alike, must be prepared to give teachers the *freedom to fail*. It is only with the possibility of *failure* that one can take proper credit for *success* in doing his job. And it is only with such freedom that anyone can expect the kind of genuine interest and dedication that is characteristic of true professional involvement. No one burns the midnight oil (at least not for long) to carry out someone else’s project. Curriculum design, course content, textbook selection, and teaching methods, must fall within the absolute jurisdiction of the teacher’s professional judgement! So-called “guidelines” should never be anything more than helpful suggestions. Without professional autonomy, one cannot expect professional behaviour. And without professional behaviour, there is no profession.

¹³*Ibid.*, p. 110.

It may well be that teacher education is not adequately preparing the rank and file teachers to make these important decisions, but this at least clarifies what has to be done, and why. More pessimistically, it may be that teachers do not want to make these major educational decisions. This possibility must be faced. But should teachers abdicate this responsibility, they should also relinquish any legitimate claim to professionalism. Indeed, when one considers the low priority which teachers have traditionally given autonomy in their negotiations with governmental agencies (*e.g.*, financial issues can generate strikes, but autonomy can hardly generate conversation) it is surprising that even a pretense to autonomy remains.

Apart from the quasi-legalistic requirement that professional workers have autonomy, there appear to some psychological benefits associated with occupational autonomy not the least of which is *job satisfaction*. Many labour unions, such as the U.A.W. in North America, and auto workers in Sweden, have come to realize that an important cause of job dissatisfaction and low productivity is monotonous, routine work that is unfulfilling. And labour negotiators are beginning to assign the kind of priority to "meaningful work" that they once gave to the "meaningful wage". Perhaps teachers should take a lesson from labour unions and lobby for the kind of autonomy that would render their work both more satisfying *and* more professional.¹⁴

¹⁴Important relationships between amount of autonomy or self-determination and job satisfaction have been suggested in a number of studies. See for example N.C. Morse and E. Reimer, "The experimental change of a major organization variable", *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, No. 52, 1956, pp. 120-129. A recent British study investigating the role conflicts and role strain of scientists in industrial laboratories found that, "by far the largest single source of strain reported, centred around the problem of autonomy." See S. Cotgrove and S. Box, *Science, Industry and Society: Studies in the Sociology of Science* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1970), p. 98.