

An analysis of how 'judgment' functions in moral discourse reveals that rational moral judgment is a rule-governed activity. The process of judgment (p-judgment) is distinguished from the belief state (b-judgment) arrived at as the product of the process. The moral rules and principles used in assessing b-judgments are also the rules employed in rational p-judgments. To the extent that it is possible to instruct others in these rules and principles and how they apply in actual cases, to that extent it is both possible and desirable to instruct others in moral judgment.

CAN MORAL JUDGMENT BE TAUGHT?

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1. *The Concept of Judgment*

The term 'judgment' has many and varied usages. To examine the logic of these usages helps to establish in what contexts it is appropriate to talk of moral judgment and also to determine what is involved in the making of moral judgments.

Some of the confusion regarding the notion of 'judgment' is the result of failure to distinguish between the process of judgment and the product of judgment. 'Judgment' may refer to a proposition, stated or statable, that something is the case or that something ought to be done. Or again it may refer to the procedure or method of arriving at such a proposition. The latter can be thought of as a process of judgment (or a p-judgment) in which people do something. The former is the result or conclusion of such a process and can be thought of as the product of judgment and as such is a proposition which is believed. I shall refer to them as b-judgments.

That the products of p-judgments are beliefs is the case whether they are theoretical or practical. Ordinary theoretical judgments, if true, are statements of fact. They are knowledge claims which conceptually imply belief even if they are false. 'My desk is thirty inches wide' is a true theoretical b-judgment. This can be put without change in meaning as ' "My desk is thirty inches wide" is the case.' 'I ought to tell the truth' is a true practical b-judgment. It can be put without change in meaning as ' "I ought to tell the truth" is the case.' Thus for both theoretical and practical (which includes the moral) b-judgments the pattern is 'X is the case'. It makes no difference how one fills in the X. That is to say, the objects of a belief (and of judgments in this sense) are propositions, whether theoretical or practical. The difference in their epistemological status is solely in the criteria for arriving at the truth (or falsity) of X. It is of course not necessary that the belief be stated either verbally or sub-vocally; but if called upon to do so, the belief must be capable of being stated. One cannot, by definition, have

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beliefs without at some time having been conscious of them. The objection that some philosophers have in accepting the above stated parallelism of theoretical to practical matters is that the decision or verdict that such-and-such is the case in practical affairs is confused with the decision to do such-and-such. But reaching a decision that X, even if X is an injunction that something be done, must be distinguished from deciding to do X. If this is granted then there is no difficulty in accepting the claim that b-judgments of whatever variety are beliefs. It is true that b-judgments arise out of a decision, but the decision here is simply that X is the case. Since b-judgments are beliefs, they imply the existence of standards or criteria in virtue of which they, unlike attitudes, are or can be deemed right or wrong. With the availability of these criteria, b-judgments can be assessed as right or wrong, wise or foolish etc. And, as will be noted later, the assessment criterion can be helpful in sharpening the process of arriving at moral b-judgments.

When speaking of judgment as a process (p-judgments) one refers to something that goes on in the mind and which results in our arriving at a belief. There are many ways of reaching these belief states. These ways can be thought of as degrees of applying explicit criteria available for reaching beliefs and can thus be placed along a continuum. At one end we 'make' judgments in the full sense of arriving at a belief by going through a process of reasoning in which the standards appealed to lead unequivocally to a correct belief, (b-judgment). At the other end one simply makes a judgment in the sense of 'taking' a decision that such-and-such. There is here no appeal to a criterion or standard. When one is asked to give a reason for holding that such-and-such is the case, no answer can be given or could be given. An example might be, 'I'm going to be lucky today.' What is being suggested is that such a statement, such a belief, is not a standard case of 'making' a judgment, even though ordinarily we might refer to them as judgments in the 'product' sense. In other words, even though all b-judgments are beliefs, not all such b-judgments were the result of p-judgments. Some beliefs are not rational b-judgments because they were 'taken' (in the second sense above) rather than 'made' (in the first sense). For my purposes then I will distinguish between 'making' judgments and 'taking' judgments; the former implies reaching a decision that X as a result of a logical process while the latter connotes 'settling on' or 'jumping to' a decision that X without warrant.

To the extent that some criterion is available, explicit and applied, to that extent rational judgments can be 'made'. To the extent that a criterion is unavailable, unclear, and not applied to that extent the b-judgment is 'taken' or is merely a guess. Thus as we move from the left to the right of the continuum we can view the process of judgment as technique, as intelligent guessing, as wild guessing, or, at the extreme, as absence of any p-judgment.

When a criterion of judgment is clear and easily applied we can say that there is an evident technique for judging. Such a technique is used primarily

in the area of theoretical judgments where answers are required for logical, scientific, and to a lesser extent, historical questions. When asked to determine the number of pages in a book, I simply count them or look at the figure on the last page. When asked for the width of my desk, I take a yard-stick and measure and can answer "thirty inches wide." There is little doubt about the adequacy of the technique useful in ordinary affairs requiring answers to such straightforward questions. It is worth emphasizing that judgment-making at this level involves relatively undisputed applications of standards or truth criteria for arriving at conclusions which are equally accepted and undisputed. It is perhaps fair to say that 'judgment' as used in this connection is a technical term. Ordinarily when we refer to conclusions of theoretical considerations we think of them as answers to questions.

When the exact application of any standard of judgment is in question, we can talk of the judgment process at another level. In ordinary language the term 'judgment' is reserved especially for such cases, as is reflected in Webster's and in the Oxford dictionary, for example, where definitions of judgment include 'forming an opinion' or 'giving an estimate'. It is reflected, too, in ordinary language by such expressions as 'just use your judgment', or 'that is a matter for judgment', for these expressions are typically used when no decisive answer to a question can be given. Such a meaning of 'judgment' applies in theoretical as well as practical affairs. If I am lacking a yardstick and I still need to 'know' the width of my desk, I may be asked to use my judgment. Here one refers to the special ability to make an accurate guess. When I then judge the width to be thirty-two inches, I may be deemed a good judge of short distances. In a sense, however, all I did was *guess* the width, but not in the same sense of 'guessing' as when I guessed that there are four million grains of sand in a bucket or in the sense in which I 'guessed' which card would turn up next from a shuffled deck. My guess of thirty-two inches was an 'intelligent' guess because I did, after all, appeal to the standards of the yard-stick, if only from memory, as it were. Nor is it necessary that I must have used or even seen a yard-stick in the past for me to have made this intelligent guess. I may have learned to apply this standard, as we say, from experience, from being criticized and corrected by others, or merely by observing others applying it. When it is suggested that judgment-making on this second level is like intelligent guessing, the emphasis is on 'intelligent'. I am pointing out, as has frequently been done, that even if one cannot use precise measures in making moral judgments, there is, nevertheless, appeal to rules and one can become reasonably skilled at applying the rules intelligently. This view has implications for the teaching of moral judgment on the apprenticeship basis, for here the learner can observe others and be corrected by others who have acquired the skill and thus he himself can learn the rule or standard. There is nothing mysterious about such judgments even though they are sometimes made out to be mysterious. Kurt Baier has pointed out:

We could not say of anyone that he had good judgment unless there were some way of verifying his judgments.¹

¹Kurt Baier, *The Moral Point of View* (New York: Random House inc., 1965), pp. 11, 12

And the standard used in the verification is the standard used in the making of the judgment if the judgment is to be intelligent guessing rather than merely wild guessing. That such standards are used in moral judgment is implied by the epithets which qualify such judgments as 'good' or 'bad', 'sound' or 'unsound', 'wise' or 'unwise', etc. The same epithets suggest that the criterion appealed to is perhaps not absolutely clear and explicit, or that the application of the standard is not possible in any straight-forward technical manner. We normally say that judgment is called for where there is no clear standard for determining the solution to a problem, and yet we cannot make 'sound' judgments, or any rational judgment at all, without appeal to some standard.

What I have said about judgment on this level agrees in part with Kurt Baier's views on judgment in *The Moral Point of View*. He says:

Judgment involves giving correct answers under difficult conditions. It involves being able to give correct answers more quickly, in bad light, or without instruments when reliable answers cannot be given without a special skill . . . ; they (judgments) differ from guesses, conjectures, or intuitions in being based on a skill or gift, about which we know enough to develop it by practice.²

But what is this 'skill or gift' about which we know enough to develop it by practice? Is it the skill of applying standards even though they are not explicit? Such application, despite Baier's reminder to the contrary, is a kind of intelligent guessing. It is the skill of arriving at an answer which approximates the requirements of the standard. One must agree with Baier that it is different from intuition. Intuition is not a skill about which we know enough to develop it by practice. But making intelligent guesses is precisely such a skill. Teaching others how to make judgments in the practical sphere by enabling them to grasp the standards (in morals these standards are moral rules and principles) and applying them to moral situations is, in a sense, like teaching others the concept of an inch, a foot, a yard without the aid of a ruler or yardstick, perhaps by extending our hands and fingers and saying, 'A foot is this long.' As such, it is rather straight-forward instruction, as is the instruction in rules and principles with their exceptions. Yet there is more to it. Practice and repetition are required in the application of these rules, and not until they are satisfactorily applied can it be said that the rules have been acquired.

Much of the literature in ethics concerns the clarification and justification of these rules and principles which serve as standards of correctness. Judgment is the ability to apply these rules in concrete cases. And unless a child actually observes adults making such judgments it would seem impossible for him to learn to do so. But the process is not mysterious. The child must be observing something that he can grasp and understand. Instruction has then a role again in explaining to the child that what he has observed is such-and-such a standard used in such-and-such situations. Given enough time the child may learn by inductive generalization or by trial and error. But it

²*Ibid.*, p. 9

would seem to be obvious that he could learn much more by direct instruction.

2. *The Myth of Judgment*

There is still another use of 'judgment' that has gained currency in ordinary language and which omits what I consider to be an essential criterion for rational judgment, namely, the requirement that appeal be made to a standard or rule in the making of judgments. The emphasis in this sense of judgment is on the special ability people have to hit upon a reasonable solution to a problem without going through a logical process. It resembles what was earlier termed 'taking' a judgment as opposed to 'making' a judgment. Emphasis is upon the creative or innovative aspects of judgment and resembles, in this respect, artistic endeavours. It is a special ability of special people imparted to initiates in a special way with the result that there has arisen a myth about the character of judgment which has become shrouded in mystery. This myth needs to be exploded without giving the impression that making judgments is easy or clear-cut. I shall therefore elicit from this account those elements which are true and which give this myth its plausibility and basis.

Kurt Baier, as we noted, referred to judgment as a 'gift'. While it is quite evident from Baier's general thesis that he does not place very much weight on this notion, it is, nevertheless, this kind of remark that contributes to the myth referred to. Baier does say that judgment is a skill or gift 'about which we know enough to develop it by practice'. But is it the case that we can develop a 'gift' by practice? Perhaps we can develop the skills necessary to exploit a gift, but it is not really the gift we develop. We are born with gifts; and the point of saying that someone is a gifted musician, for example, is to indicate that the individual was born with a special capacity to become skilled in music above the levels which could be achieved by mere practice. To call judgment a gift is then to point to a special inborn capacity for arriving at valid propositions without going through a logical process. But there simply is not the evidence to claim that some people are natively endowed with a *general* capacity to make judgments — as if there exists in some people a judgment-making faculty. If anything, the gift or talent is a capacity to judge in a specific, and usually very narrow and specialized, field of knowledge or art.

Another element of the myth is that judgments are not subject to demands for justification but can stand as valid in virtue of the special ability to make judgments. A position roughly like this is taken by Sir Geoffrey Vickers in his book *The Art of Judgment* in which he attempts to show that even factual (he calls them 'reality') judgments ultimately rest on values and that

The value judgments of men and societies cannot be *proved* correct or incorrect; they can only be *approved* as right or *condemned* as wrong by exercise of another value

judgment.³ (His emphasis)

The statement that value judgments cannot be *proved* is unobjectionable if by 'proof' one means a tight analytic or scientific proof. But it certainly is a mistake to say they can only be *approved* or *condemned* by the special ability of judgment. He says elsewhere:

Judgment is an ultimate category, which can only be approved or condemned by a further exercise of the same ability.⁴

Once again there is here an appeal to this special ability. But surely something is approved or condemned on the basis of a standard. The ability to judge is one of finding and using this standard for the making of judgments which can be right or wrong according to this standard. To think of judgment as a bottomless pit of special ability judgment-'takings' is to sacrifice any standards of objectivity.

Perhaps Michael Okeshott more than anyone else has recently contributed to the myth. He claims, for instance, that

(Judgment) is all that goes beyond the point where critical rules and methods leave off. and all that is required to drag appropriate precepts from these rules. It is what escapes even the most meticulous list of qualities required for practicing the craft of the textual critic.⁵

He does here seem to be talking about the ability to judge; but is it the ability to 'make' judgments, in the sense of going through the logical process, or is it the imaginative leap to hit upon or 'take' a judgment? He seems to want to emphasize the latter. Is there, then, at the heart of judgment this mysterious intuitive ability? Okeshott in the above quotation is referring to the *divinatio* of the textual critic who is able to detect corruption of texts and suggest emendations. But is this any more mysterious than a child's ability to detect the error of a mis-spelling? To latch on to a mysterious notion of judgment because of the inability to describe in precise detail the mental operations (the psychological story) in a person's detection of an error, is to misdirect our attention and our interest from the significant aspects of judgment that permit characterization in propositions or even in rules. There is no wish here to deny that creative mental leaps, 'intuitions', insights, and gestalt-like understandings occur, and that they occur in every judgment made. But what one must deny is that there is anything mysterious about these leaps which obviates the need for rules and standards as guides in judgment making. To suggest, as Okeshott does, that judgment begins where rules leave off is to overemphasize one aspect of all thinking — i.e. the fact that some ideas come to us, as it were, out of the blue and the fact that the mind does intuitively make connections and have insights, which are all part of reaching a conclusion, a judgment — and to exalt this aspect till it becomes the central and only feature of judgment. Okeshott's mis-

³Sir Geoffrey Vickers, *The Art of Judgment: A Study in Policy Making*, London, Methuen and Co. Ltd. (University Paperbacks), 1965, p. 71.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 13.

⁵Michael Okeshott, "Learning and Teaching" in R.S. Peters ed., *The Concept of Education*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967, p. 169.

take is failure to recognize the two levels of the process of judgment that have been distinguished and to have built up out of all proportion the significance of the intuitive element with the tendency to deny the standard cases of judgment-making. His denial that critical rules and methods have a part to play, say, in a child's judgment of how to spell a word would be a denial that a child can be helped by direct instruction in rules, both rules of spelling and the specific rule that constitutes the correct spelling of a word. Has he forgotten the painstaking effort that goes into (or ideally ought to go into) teaching a youngster how to spell? To suggest that rules cannot aid judgment in spelling is simply false. But when he extends his argument to fit moral judgment it is also reprehensible. Oakeshott says of moral judgment:

The moral and legal rules which set out in propositional form the recognized rights and duties, and the prudential maxims which give some flexibility to those rules, constitute only a small part of the knowledge comprised in the ability to live a civilized life. The precepts themselves require interpretation in respect of persons and circumstances; where there is a conflict between precepts, it cannot be resolved by the application of other rules. 'Casuistry', as it has been said, 'is the grave of moral judgment'.⁶

Here again Oakeshott is in part right; the error is again one of emphasis. It is notoriously difficult to make a judgment when, as Oakeshott phrased it, 'precepts conflict'. But it is wrong to say that rules and maxims play only a *small* part in moral judgments and wrong to suggest that other rules cannot resolve conflict of precepts. Unless we can judge in virtue of some rule or criterion we cannot judge rationally at all; we simply opt. We may at times be required to take imaginative leaps — an Oakeshottian judgment — but unless we can in virtue of some criterion show or recognize that our leap ended in a safe landing, our leap is nothing but a flop. There may here have to be appeal to standards hidden in the culture. Principles and rules there may be which have never become explicit. One may have to rest on the precedents of other competent judges; but these others, it will be discovered, have been selected as models because they will have made competent judgments in other circumstances where the standards have been explicit. A good judgment will still have to be assessed by standards implicit in the social order or by extensions and deductions from already existing explicit standards. The purpose of the imaginative leap is to make the implicit, explicit. Rather than abandoning rules to enhance and make room for intuitive judgment, we ought to take imaginative leaps to enhance rule-based judgments. Oakeshott's concern, seems to be that moral judgment will become stalemated without inventive imagination, initiative, and innovation. That imaginative expansion of operating rules and extension of workable criteria for the making of moral judgments is both necessary and desirable is, in our rapidly changing society, doubtlessly true. But this is nothing more than widening the scope for more and better casuistry. Casuistry, once it is disconnected from the sophisticated and deprecatory connotations which surrounded it in medieval times, is the art of applying rules to concrete practical situations in order to solve problems about what ought to be done. Oakeshott is surely wrong when he agrees that casuistry is the grave of moral

⁶*Ibid.*, p. 169

judgment. On the contrary, casuistry is the essence of moral judgment.

The myth of judgment extends also to the teaching of judgment. Perhaps the infiltration of the myth into the sphere of teaching can best be pin-pointed by suggesting that there has developed a false view of the purpose of the master/apprentice relationship in teaching such that the deliberate attempt to extricate and explicate the logic of rule application is played down and even denigrated and the trial-and-error method of learning, together with learning by watching a master at work, are seen to be meritorious and ideal. The result is failure by teacher and student to attempt to formalize the logic and to make clear the operative rules and principles so that they may be used as guidance devices in the making of judgments later when the student leaves the master. The major criticism of the view, then, is that it is inefficient. But it also halts progress in a field of knowledge if strictly applied. It is like suggesting that arithmetic be "imparted" by having a student observe the master doing arithmetic without ever attempting to explain what he is doing and why. It is not being suggested here that learning by watching a master doing is inferior or completely ineffective. But to do this to the exclusion of pin-pointing procedures, clarifying rules, and providing formulae when possible is to seriously retard advancement in the field and to short-change the student by not giving him the best possible advantage of others' experiences. Under the conditions described it would take a child a life-time to learn his arithmetic. One does not want to oversimplify by suggesting that it is possible in moral judgment to provide a formula which can always be relied upon, but there must at some time in the student/master relationship, emerge a pattern of thinking in the making of moral judgments. It is worth focusing on this pattern and discussing it. To observe this pattern operating in the mind of an adult master is precisely the point of 'teaching by example' which Oakeshott is correct in recommending. But to fail to attempt explication of this pattern, to fail to elicit the criteria applied in the making of the judgment is to fall prey to the myth that this attempt is damaging to social morality, that there are no such rules that can be elicited in judgment-making — the myth that we can attain 'the habit of listening for an individual intelligence at work in every utterance'⁷ made by a teacher *without* having a standard in virtue of which it can be judged as intelligence at work.

3. *The Role of Judgment in the Moral Life*

Making judgments, then, involves appeal to standards and canons of validity. This emphasis on judgment is consistent with rationality in the moral life as distinct from thoughtless, routine, rule-bound behavior. It is in fact to give weight to the suggestion that moral action is doing the right thing for the right reason. Yet this rationalistic emphasis is frequently opposed and challenged.

One type of objection to the rational emphasis is that the introspective, motive-searching, deliberative procedure of decision-making is not practical for day to day moral living. This view is espoused by M. Oakeshott in *Ra-*

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 175

tionalism in Politics.⁸ He fears that an emphasis on the judgmental aspects of morality detracts from the urgency of inculcating moral habits and dispositions and argues that a "reflective application of a moral criterion" which requires defence and open criticism undermines and is ruinous to settled habits of behaviour. He says that 'most of the current situations of life do not appear as occasions calling for judgment, or as problems requiring solutions⁹ and that 'morality in this (rationalistic) form, regardless of the quality of the ideals, breeds nothing but distraction and moral instability.¹⁰ He then recommends a programme of moral education which might well be described as social osmosis. It is the process of acquiring habits of conduct and affection by interaction with adult members of a society. It is an acquisition of 'habits of behaviour sufficiently compelling to remove hesitation (and) it must not be considered to have failed merely because it leaves us ignorant of moral rules and moral ideals.¹¹ Oakeshott objects to a moral education that attempts to enable people to determine behaviour by self-conscious choice and an understanding of the ideal grounds of choice because such a programme is ruinous to stability and social morality.

But views such as these are fundamentally mistaken about the role of habit in moral life. Emphasis on rational morality is not an attempt to replace habit with reason and self-conscious deliberation. This would in any case be impossible. It is an attempt to invoke reason in the formation of habit so that the habits one has are the right ones. It is further an attempt to make allowance for the need to alter and correct habits. It is even more an attempt to fill a gap in the total picture of moral education, a gap created by failure to see that frequently situations arise for which no appropriate habit has been formed. Implicit in what is here argued and recommended is the view that sometimes, and in a changing society frequently, well-meaning and well-intentioned people are in doubt about what they ought to do. At such times it is necessary to make a judgment on a sound basis. Circumstances alter cases. And where new circumstances arise it is impossible to rely on habit, or if possible, then not advisable. To rely on habit has the attendant danger of not even recognizing when the circumstances call for a judgment. And it is particularly important in such cases that the agent in question be able to make a judgment because he may not be able to seek advice, or if able, then he must be able to judge on the soundness of the advice given.

More serious than these objections to the rational emphasis are those raised by R. Guttchen in his article, 'The Logic of Practice'¹² in which he attempts

⁸M. Oakeshott, 'The Tower of Babel' in *Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays* (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1962), pp. 59-79.

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 61

¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 74

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 63.

¹²Robert Guttchen, 'The Logic of Practice', in *Studies in Philosophy and Education*, Vol. VII, No. 1, 1969.

to show that rational judgment in morality is impossible because even though there is a logic of moral judgment (the assessment criterion), it is of no avail in practical situations because it cannot function as a method in the process of making judgments. He argues that the Mill model of practical inference, though valid, is nothing more than an *ex post facto* proof of a judgment rather than a method of making judgments. People do not *in fact* think in practical syllogisms but arrive at their conclusions by a different method. Thus the method or process of making judgments is at variance with the logic, or proof, of the judgment. This raises a larger question about the distinction between the logical and the psychological aspects of judgment. The general distinction between what is logical and what is psychological is by no means clear and raises numerous philosophical issues which cannot now be dealt with. This discussion shall consequently be limited to what this distinction means in the making of moral judgments. In attempting to elucidate the logic of moral judgment I shall therefore, following J. Kemp in his *Reason, Action, and Morality*,¹³ hold to his broad distinction between assessment of judgments and description of judgments. Kemp observes that with respect to any belief (and this includes b-judgments in morals) we can ask a number of different questions. He differentiates the following five: (1) We can ask for a description of the way the mind was working before and at the time of decision or the process which led up to or accompanied the formation of the belief. (2) We can ask for a causal explanation of the decision or belief. (A decision to commit suicide — i.e., the judgment that I ought to — might be caused by depression following the death of a lover.) (3) We can ask for an individual's reason for holding the belief. The answer to this would be information about how an individual justifies his action or belief. (4) We can ask whether a belief is reasonable given a certain set of conditions. (5) We can ask whether the belief is true or false, right or wrong, correct or incorrect, etc. Kemp notes two categories of questions among these five and makes a general distinction between describing an action and its antecedents or accompaniments on the one hand and criticism and assessment of the belief on the other. Since this general distinction is of such fundamental importance to the ensuing arguments, it is worth quoting Kemp at length in his comments on these kinds of questions. He says:

The important thing to notice is that questions (4) and (5) are radically different from questions of the other three types. They ask for assessments, not descriptions, and, in particular, for assessments of the reasonableness or truth of what is believed, not for descriptions of the act of believing, or anything connected with it. They do not even ask for assessments of the way in which the belief was arrived at. We can, of course, assess, and not merely describe a man's thinking as careful, methodical, or well-organized and, conversely, as slipshod or slovenly; but such comments function essentially as answers to questions of type (1). To a large extent in questions of type (4), and to an even larger extent those of type (5), we are no longer concerned with (Smith) as an individual; we are interested in assessing the reasonableness or truth of the belief no matter who happens to hold it.¹⁴

¹³J. Kemp, *Reason, Action, and Morality* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964), Chapter VI.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 97.

It is Kemp's latter concern — 'the reasonableness or truth of the belief' — that is also the present concern in attempting to provide a logic of moral judgment. The logic of moral judgment is then a question of assessment, of providing a 'proof' for the truth or falsity of a belief that something ought to be done or ought to be the case. It is this logic or 'proof' that comes under attack in Professor Guttchen's paper. Guttchen recognizes the distinction between the logical and the psychological as roughly stated by Kemp and comments on the disparity between the two. He argues that the traditional version of the logic of practice as constituted by Mill's interpretation of the practical syllogism (he calls it the Mill Model) is 'in its main outlines an adequate formulation of the most widely held views about what men do.'¹⁵ Then almost in the same breath he says that, 'It is also, we think, one of the grandest over-simplifications that men, as well as most philosophers, have ever entertained.'¹⁶ He next proceeds to show that the model is inadequate because it does not depict the *method* of arriving at a judgment for ordinary people. Mill's formulation is not, he says 'a straightforward reading of our experience and activity, but a highly sophisticated theoretical construction.'¹⁷ And again he notes:

When Mill speaks of method, then, . . . we had better read method of justification and not method of discovery or inquiry. Logic, for Mill, supplies canons for criticism of results already achieved, or in the realm of practice, of goals already decided upon and courses of action already fixed . . . We might say that Mill's logic supplies us with a basis for an after-the-fact-critique of a course of action.¹⁸

Guttchen believes Mill's model to be inadequate because it does not take into account how people come to hold certain beliefs and does not adequately describe *the process* of making judgments. Since Guttchen feels that any logic of practice would have to take into account this descriptive element, he rejects Mill's logic and, with qualifications, adopts Dewey's logic of practice, which, since it is identical with his (Dewey's) theory of inquiry in science, does take account of the descriptive elements. Guttchen seems to be lamenting the lack of empirical findings on how people think rather than protesting the lack of criteria for evaluating the conclusions of their thoughts, for he states:

The nature of the difficulty of questioning the Mill model lies in part in the fact that the canon, or the logical reconstruction, is not viewed as a description of what men actually do.¹⁹

For reasons that cannot be pursued here and now, the conclusions Guttchen reaches are questionable.²⁰ Yet Guttchen must be given credit for

¹⁵R. Guttchen, "The Logic of Practice", *op. cit.*, p. 34.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 34.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 35.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 35, 36.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 36, 37.

²⁰Two suggestions for further inquiry along these lines are: (1) Dewey's logic of inquiry is itself more than a logic because it overlaps into the psychological; (2) Dewey's theory of inquiry is not and never can be a theory of the logic of *moral* judgment without sacrificing the autonomy of moral discourse.

having raised two extremely important questions in connection with our inquiry.

The first question concerns the relationship between a logic of moral judgment, which Guttchen views as an 'ideal, a norm, or standard of rationality', on the one hand and the process of moral judgment, which is a description of what men actually do or how they actually think, on the other hand. Can any evidence of how men in fact do think about practical matters undercut the ideal or norm? Or is it possible for men to learn to think in terms of this ideal or norm? If it is possible, should they be taught to think in this manner? Or is it the case that the logic or norm which serves as a criterion for determining the truth or falsity of the belief is entirely independent of the mode of thinking that leads up to the formulation of the belief? If they are related, how are they related? If they are not, is it still the case that both are necessary? From recent discussions on the logical and psychological aspects of learning and teaching, we can obtain sufficient clarity on certain problems that are raised here. Professor P. Hirst, for example, argues that with respect to a particular form of knowledge (he uses the examples of historical thinking) 'what we want pupils to acquire, both in structure and content, can be totally characterized without recourse to any psychological investigation of thought sequences.²¹ Does the content, the ideal, or the logic, then, have no bearing on the processes of thought? Is the method of arriving at a conclusion totally divorced from the assessment criterion in virtue of which the conclusion is judged true or false? Not exactly; there is certainly some connection argues Professor Hirst. He says:

....it is surely a mistake to think that explanations are seen to be valid only when elements are pieced together by temporally following a logical sequence. To grasp a valid proof or explanation is to *recognize*, in the end, *an overall pattern of logical relations between propositions that satisfy certain criteria*. To insist that this sequence of truths can only be grasped as truths, by temporally building on previously adequately established truths, is to take the characteristics of what is to be achieved as an end for the characteristics of the process by which the end is achieved.²² (My emphasis)

The question we must now answer is: To what extent must the process of thought (the descriptive element) reflect the product (more accurately, the logic of assessment of the product) in order to be considered a process of thought at all. In other words, we need to ascertain what it means 'to recognize . . . an overall pattern of logical relations between propositions that satisfy certain criteria.' Does someone who 'intuits' what he ought to do or someone who believes on authority alone that he ought to do X 'grasp' or understand that he ought to do X? What has he 'recognized'? Has he thought at all, and if so, what? Is it not the case that in order to think about or reason through a problem the very thought must include the 'logic' of the solution to that problem in order for it to be considered thought about that problem? It would in any case be impossible to answer the question 'What

²¹Paul H. Hirst, "The Logical and Psychological Aspects of Teaching a Subject" in R.S. Peters ed., *The Concept of Education, op. cit.*, p. 47.

²²*Ibid.*, p. 55.

did you think?' without recourse to some logical order. Suppose I am able to hit upon the right answer for the area of a rectangle while pruning the roses, can I be said to have recognized the 'logical relations between propositions that satisfy certain criteria' unless my thoughts, however suddenly and swiftly, included consideration of length and width and multiplication? In any meaningful sense of 'know', I cannot be said to know the right answer unless my thinking included such considerations. This does not necessarily mean that I directly needed the formula, $A = l \times w$, to arrive at the conclusion. It certainly does not mean that I needed to be conscious of the full logical structure of the proof, as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} A &= l \times w \\ l &= 3 \text{ feet} \\ w &= 2 \text{ feet} \\ A &= 6 \text{ square feet} \end{aligned}$$

What it does mean is that the thinking that occurred, in whatever order, to a certain extent is guided by the 'logic' or the assessment criterion. Is this perhaps what is meant by the otherwise unintelligible and contradictory notion of 'logical process'? This phrase will be adopted to mean the mental process of thought when what occurs in the conscious mind parallels or in some way reflects the logical structure of the assessment criterion. 'Logical process', then, refers neither to the complete description of what goes on in the mind nor to the logical anatomy of the criterion used in testing the thought or belief arrived at. It is a selection (from the mental processes) of those elements of thought that reflect, include, embrace, or are guided by the logical structure of the proof. It serves to explain the relationship between process and product and answers our former question about what is the connection between method and assessment. We are now also in a position to answer the question whether or not any evidence of how men do in fact think about practical matters, or any other matters, can undercut the ideal or norm of thought. The answer is that without the aid of the norm we cannot even describe what the actual thinking was. Furthermore, even if we could so describe the thoughts, we couldn't assess those thoughts without appeal to the norm. How men in fact think is in any case not a sufficient gauge for how they *should* think. To claim this would simply be another form of committing the naturalistic fallacy. Even if it were true that the ordinary man never makes judgments by appealing to rules or norms, even if he always acted spontaneously or simply did what at the moment he preferred to do, this would be no argument for how he ought to proceed or how he ought to think. The truth is that norms or ideals cannot be undercut by a description of what men in fact do.

The second question prompted by Professor Guttchen's paper arises out of our consideration of the first. If it is not by an examination of how people in fact do think about practical matters that we establish a logic of practice, by what standard or method does one then proceed to criticize or establish the validity of a logic of practice? Professor Guttchen suggests we proceed

by 'consideration of its (the logic's) range of relevance.²³ He then shows that the means-ends model as presented by Mill is irrelevant to creative endeavours and discovery, and, further, that in the moral life the model is vicious. His ethical position in this respect is that there are no objective criteria for judging what men ought to do. No wonder that for him the 'range of relevance' of the logic of practical inference is not wide enough to include morality. The logic of practical inference is rejected because acceptance of it would commit him to the moral principles functioning in the first premise of the syllogism. His way of showing that the logic of practical inference does not apply to the logic of moral reasoning has already been examined; he says that people do not *in fact* think in practical syllogisms. But as we noted 'the range of relevance' cannot thus be determined. How then can it? To find an answer to this would take us into the heart of moral theory. Recent studies indicate²⁴ that the question 'What ought I to do?' presupposes principles which function in the determination of what to do. Such principles are higher order rules which, when taken together with the relevant facts of the case, yield an answer to the moral question asked. This logic can be formally represented as the practical syllogism. Whether or not the range of relevance of this logic applies to moral reasoning is to be determined then, by seeking and clarifying the principles presupposed by the point and purpose of moral discourse, not by a description of what men do. To Guttchen it must be rejoined that he needs the logic he has rejected to establish that it ought to be rejected. Thus the logic is relevant to any moral question including the question whether or not we ought to adhere to it.

The conclusions reached can be summarized as follows: (1) Judgment of any kind, including moral judgment, is a rule governed activity; (2) Judgment is necessary to morality from the practical point of view and, if understood correctly in relation to habit, is logically necessary to morality; (3) The psychology of judgment is to be distinguished from the logic of judgment. These, however, are related in that the process of making a judgment presupposes a standard for determining the validity of the judgment. The process can, and, it is argued, must, both from a conceptual and moral standpoint, reflect the logic of assessment; (4) When the process and the logic more or less coincide we can talk of a 'logical process'. The aim of instruction in moral judgment is to transmit this logical process. The question whether the logic can be of avail in guiding our moral life will, in brief, be answered, 'Yes; it can be and it ought to be.' The standard used in verifying a judgment is the standard used in the making of it. It follows that to the extent that it is possible to teach the rules and principles employed in assessing our b-judgments to that extent it is possible to teach others to make p-judgments.

²³R. Guttchen, 'The Logic of Practice', *op. cit.*, p. 37.

²⁴See, for example, R.S. Peters, *Ethics and Education* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966).