

juxtaposed with maturing children for "schooling" to take place. Accordingly, "the chief argument for asking teachers to study educational psychology and similar subjects is based on an esthetic rather than a practical imperative."

Most of *Part Two* (Chapters 2-7) is given over to socio-psychological speculations about the respective roles of the home and the school as mediating agencies of the educative process. The author acknowledges that his discussion is aimed at understanding rather than reform and that his intent is "to explain how it is that the schools are as good as they are." It is a little difficult at times to appreciate his distinctions between the immediate (survival) and non-immediate concerns of the home and the school, respectively, since criteria must surely be relative to priorities induced by a given culture. Much more convincing is his documentation of largely negative evidence concerning the improbability of processes of schooling through curricular, methodological, and administrative manipulations. The means for rapidly accelerating human learning are not yet known; and, as with the mechanisms of child care in the rearing of children, we are inexorably driven to the conclusion that inner ("psychological") factors, in teacher and pupil or in parent and child, are much more important to educating-learning processes than easily accessible externals.

In the remaining section of his book, Stephens discusses such diverse topics as the effective teacher, limitation of the school's function to academic matters,³ the case for a less frenzied, less compulsive approach to teaching as a process and as a profession, and (in his final chapter) possible tests of his hypotheses. This latter discourse will be a let-down for those who have followed his arguments to this point and have, quite understandably, been expecting some rather original suggestions as to how to come to grips with the "basic forces" to which the author has frequently alluded.

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Sybil Winn and Maurice Jacks, *Aristotle*. London: Methuen and Co., 1967. 114 pp. 25s.

The thesis propounded in *Aristotle* is that conditions of education in modern England bear sufficient resemblance to those of classical Greece to make the educational thought of Aristotle pertinent. It must be emphasized that this appeal to the thought of Aristotle is not based upon classical realism. Winn and Jacks are not arguing that universal properties of human nature and of external reality entail that what was sound educational theory in classic Greece will be sound for this generation of Englishmen.

³See Educational Politics Commission, *The Central Purpose of American Education* (Washington, D.C.: National Education Association, 1961).

The authors argue for more specific parallels. The most important one they find is that Aristotle, in proposing education for freemen who had leisure to cultivate their minds, was facing a problem similar to that confronting modern educators who find that industrialization and automation are creating a nation of comparative "freemen."

The position today is that the machine, especially the automated machine, is the slave, and so the situation is becoming strikingly parallel to that in Aristotle's day. For the existence of some form of slave economy, human or machine, was a basic assumption in Aristotle's educational programme (p. 14).

The parallel between Aristotle's considering what was fit education for the choice few in Athens and the present need to consider what is suitable for all the inhabitants of an industrial state is superficial rather than striking. There may be an analogy between the functions of slaves then and machines now, but the variety of leisure pursuits now in vogue is far removed from what Aristotle said in the *Ethics* when defining the happy life to which men should aspire. "The most fortunate of men is he who combines a measure of prosperity with scholarship, research, or contemplation; such a man comes closest to the life of the gods."

The issue which Winn and Jacks do not face is whether Aristotle, with his penchant for a self-sufficient good such as "contemplation," is dealing, in essence, with the problems of modern mass education. Moreover, they do not even face the issues involved in current attempts to meet the challenge of mass education.

They merely approve of present educational programs, including some for working people, which emphasize skills in arts and crafts, for example, that may be utilized in leisure time. Larger and more vital questions they take for granted. They assume that mass education means differentiation of programs and selection and segregation of pupils. Without examining the implications of varied educational provision for different groups, they offer a summary of current English procedures. Mere mention of G.C.E. Examinations and C.S.E. Examinations, with a quotation to the effect that the latter are not "to be regarded as watered down versions" of the former is simply trifling.

Without even a mention of theories of learning, or motivation, or socialization which might afford the basis for differentiation of programs, it seems to be assumed that present efforts in England are in the right direction. Ultimately, the issue is summed up with some conciliatory word-play:

In other words, there should be equality in education, but not identity; equal opportunity, but varying provision. This enlightened opinion of Aristotle, though he does not develop it at all, is one which would be whole-heartedly accepted by our educational experts today (p. 54).

What is most startling is citing Aristotle as a proponent of differentiated educational programs including, presumably, the vocational programs now afoot in England.

Winn and Jacks attempt such a reading, and they base it on two remarks in the *Ethics*, paraphrased: "Learning to rule and be ruled," (p. 54) and "education works on a 'natural endowment of intelligence and spirit'" (p. 52). In the first remark, Aristotle is not so much distinguishing between pupils who can learn two kinds of things as he is stressing that those who are to rule must first learn to be ruled, while his second remark virtually distinguishes men as educable or non-educable. It is playing fast and loose with Aristotle to use such slender hints as justification for a modern program of diversified education in which several degrees of ability are recognized. Because the arguments from Aristotle rest on such flimsy grounds, his thought is not used so as to shed light on current problems.

That Winn and Jacks have been superficial, that they have merely called (and rather desperately) upon Aristotle to defend present practices is further demonstrated by comparing their argument to the position held by some widely known neo-Aristotelians. Hutchins, Adler, Broudy, and Maritain, however much they may differ in their hopes for the generality of mankind, agree in shunning vocationalism in education and in calling for a common education founded on the liberal arts. To stress a common education founded on a concept of universal human nature is the usual reading of Aristotle. In taking the opposite view, Winn and Jacks might have the beginning of an unorthodox but stimulating interpretation. They fall short of being stimulating because their exposition of Aristotle is so brief and helter skelter.

Applying this warmed-over Aristotle to modern issues proves doubly disastrous when the modern issues are dealt with as slightly as was Aristotle in the first instance. Neither in their classical allusions or their contemporary survey do the authors make more than occasional mention of the principles involved. In lieu of substantial discussion they offer generalizations and platitudes:

Deep specialization even in liberal subjects in sixth form work may be just as 'illiberal' in effects as exclusive courses in various branches of science for the depth and the demands on time can narrow the student's interests, restrict his sympathies and give him a false sense of superior wisdom. But, as a result of much deliberation on the matter, there is now much more give and take between the sciences and the humanities. Indeed, it may be stated without fear of contradiction, that the aim of our more discerning leaders in the field is the education of the whole man (pp. 65-66).

In all, *Aristotle* is a trifling book which merely bandies terms and ideas which serious educational theory seeks to examine, to understand, and, perhaps, to reject.

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