

their broader educational role. A chapter on "Miscellaneous Educative Institutions" further confirms a bias that education takes place only in institutionalized settings — preferably those blessed by W. G. Davis! Where are the free schools, Rochdale College, the youth culture, travel, summer camps and other kinds of educational experiences? The reader is left with the nagging suspicion that Fleming's obsession with formal institutions and structure is characteristic of the entire provincial educational establishment during the period.

In addition, the concentration on structure leads to a neglect of process. What was it like to go to school or university in Ontario in the 1960's? We are given the most detailed explanations of curriculum changes and structural alterations, but little on what it was like to be a student. At times it is difficult for the reader to remember that education supposedly has something to do with kids! There are 448 pages on university developments, but only one paragraph on the social and psychological barriers to university attendance. The growth of the Metropolitan Toronto School Board is chronicled in detail, but no attention is given to the "south of Bloor Street controversy" involving the alleged streaming of lower class children into terminal programs. Teachers fare only slightly better than students, while parents are nowhere to be found. The forthcoming Volume Six, *Educational Contributions of Associations*, will not alleviate this problem unless it goes beyond a discussion of the traditional teachers' and parents' bureaucratic organizations.

The overwhelming impression created by Fleming is that formal schooling has and will contribute to an onward and upward progression of society. All that is needed is more and more of the same. Quantitative growth is stressed, while any discussion of the quality of education provided is missing. The author has posed the traditional questions that might be asked of post-war Ontario education. But education needs writers who can also pose alternative kinds of questions. What kind of society is to be perpetuated? What kinds of educational experiences will produce individuals able to survive in that society? Do these educational experiences have to be confined to schools and universities? Who decides? These questions were undoubtedly raised — and partially answered — in Ontario during the 1960's. But the search for this sort of discussion through thousands of pages of factual details is not a rewarding one for the reader.

Robert M. Stamp
The University of Calgary.

Indoctrination and Education by I. A. Snook. Pp. X + 118. General Publishing: Don Mills, 1972. Price \$3.95.

This is a new volume in the Students' Library of Education, originally published by Routledge and Kegan Paul in London, England. Writing now in New Zealand, Dr. Snook can and does take full advantage of earlier discussions in the U.S.A. and in Britain. The former serves him mainly as an object lesson in how not to do philosophy of education: "It is hard to find a better argument for conceptual clarity in education than . . . the disputes which occurred in the United States during the 1930's" (p. 17).

The British discussion began in the later 1960's, and it is this which Snook has found positively helpful. Whereas the American discussion was, for obvious reasons, primarily concerned with political indoctrination, the British has, for equally obvious reasons, concentrated upon the religious case. The recognition there of what is locally most relevant has often been frankly expressed. It is also equally manifest in certain laboured attempts at repression or diversion. That Snook shares these British concerns is shown by the fact that, after he has in his first three chapters completed his main work of philosophical analysis, he devotes most of a fourth chapter to the question whether religion can be taught without indoctrination.

Snook's central conclusion is: "A person indoctrinates P (a proposition or set of propositions) if he teaches with the intention that the pupil or pupils believe P regardless of the evidence" (p. 47). Compare this with one of the earlier suggestions, which Snook rejects: "Indoctrination consists in implanting, with the backing of some sort of special authority, of a firm conviction of the truth of doctrines either not known to be true or even known to be false".

Snook's definition makes indoctrination a species of the genus teaching, and the special authority is that of the teacher. This is no doubt correct. But by not limiting the possible content of such teaching to propositions which may, however vaguely, be classed as doctrines he becomes committed to saying: "The deliberate teaching of what is false must be subsumed under 'indoctrination' . . . if a teacher deliberately set out to teach his pupils that Melbourne is the capital of Australia, he would be indoctrinating even though no doctrines or ideologies were involved" (p. 36). This still strikes me as paradoxical. Certainly the teacher who taught his pupils such undoctrinal falsehoods — perhaps to ensure that he and not they won the \$64,000 prize in a quiz show! — would be doing something very scandalous. But indoctrinating?

On the other hand Snook is surely right to insist "that the indoctrinator intends that the pupil believe P 'regardless of the evidence' . . . this captures very well the difference between the indoctrinator and the educator" (p. 55). Indeed it does, so far as it goes. For the object of

the exercise precisely is to ensure that the subject acquires a Roman Catholic faith, or maybe a conviction of the truth of the doctrines of 'scientific socialism', which will survive all trials. And what could be more trying to any such faith than evidence showing or suggesting that it is not in fact true?

It is again similarly beneficial to stress that the sorts of shift to which the ideologist resorts in order to evade the implications for his theory of falsifying fact can be seen as expressions of his determination to maintain his beliefs 'regardless of the evidence'. Snook cites some familiar moves made in defence of some of the more indefensible doctrines first of 'scientific socialism' and then of Roman Catholicism: "In an ideology, the claims are more important than the evidence . . . We do associate indoctrination with ideologies . . . The misuse (not necessarily the suppression or denial) of evidence is one of the main reasons why this is so" (p. 57).

I conclude that, although I am not myself persuaded that an account of the nature of indoctrination can avoid specific reference to doctrines, Snook has produced a valuable essay which should do a power of good in the places to which it is specially directed. But I do have two relatively minor hesitations. First, Snook writes that if a "person can say nothing in support of his beliefs, it is difficult to know to what extent they can be called beliefs. If, for example, I assert that there is life on Mars but refuse to give any justification at all for saying this, can I be said to believe that there is life on Mars?" (p. 39). The correct answer to this rhetorical question is not 'No' but 'Yes'. What would impugn the genuineness of a supposed belief would be general failure on the part of the believer to appreciate what it implies and what it precludes. For though a belief can be a belief notwithstanding that it is held wholly without rational foundations, you cannot believe that a particular proposition is true unless you understand what that proposition means.

Second, Snook quotes the remark: "The reiteration of the root word *doctrine* may suggest, beneficially, the notion of a limitation on the possible content of indoctrination". He then proceeds to argue "Against those who argue on etymological grounds . . ." (p. 29). But to say that etymology may be, in this particular case, beneficially suggestive is not to argue, but scrupulously to avoid arguing, that etymology, rather than established usage, determines the present meanings of words.

Antony Flew
Department of Philosophy
The University of Calgary
Alberta CANADA