

ARTICLES

ABSTRACT

Educational institutions are proper instruments of socialization only when socialization is understood as civilization, i.e., the process of realizing trans-cultural ideals. If education is seen as civilization, the weaknesses of educational conservatism and educational radicalism are easily recognized. The concept of civilization can thus serve as the philosophical underpinning for a moderate approach to the problem of socialization.

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Education as Civilization

INTRODUCTION

Even those educational theorists who realize that *education is civilization* have failed to apply this insight in dealing with two central problems of the philosophy of education: the extent to which educational institutions are proper instruments of socialization; and whether educational institutions should encourage belief in the existence of absolute moral values. The modern educator is expected to both socialize and desocialize, to be an agent of the state and to foster tolerance. Conservatives emphasize the former obligation and radicals emphasize the latter. But bad socialization is dangerous, as is any educational method based on ethical relativism. We must thus look for a *middle course between conservatism and radicalism*. The concept of civilization is clear enough to serve as the philosophical underpinning for an educational theory which avoids the problems of conservative and radical educational theories. *Civilization is the process of realizing*, primarily through reason, the greatest possible number of *trans-cultural* (universal) *aspirations* (ideals), both for oneself and for others. To educate people is to civilize them, to assist them to realize trans-cultural ideals. Educational institutions are thus proper instruments of socialization, but only if socialization is understood as civilization. If schools are to be effective instruments of civilization, they must not only encourage belief in the existence of absolute moral values, but must help young people to see what the trans-cultural values are and how they may be realized. Several illustrations and applications of this theory are given.

EDUCATION AS CIVILIZATION

Education is civilization. To most educational theorists it is intuitively obvious that one way in which education can be understood is as the civilizing process. Since to others it is not obvious, I will defend the position. But my concern here is not with an educational slogan but with two concrete problems of the philosophy of education: (A) To what extent are educational institutions proper instruments of "socialization"? (B) Should educational institutions encourage belief in the existence of absolute moral values? My aim is to show that even those educational theorists who have realized that education is civilization have failed to apply this insight in dealing with these two central problems of the philosophy of education.

1. *Two Conflicting Obligations of the Educator*

The modern educator is expected to "socialize" his students — i.e., render them social — by leading them to appreciate the merit of the basic principles,

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institutions, and values underlying the particular society to which he and the students belong. Teachers in New York County are hired to explain the value of the Presidential system of government, free trade, separation of Church and State, etc. Teachers in Wellington County, Ontario, are hired to explain, among other things, the value of the Parliamentary system of government, British traditions, and biculturalism. Teachers in Kiev are hired to explain the value of Marxist-Leninist principles. Local school boards and administrators allow teachers to criticize certain institutions of their own particular society, but only within limits. This kind of "socialization", of adapting the student to the ways (of thinking and acting) of his society, is defended primarily on the grounds that it promotes social stability and enables young people to "succeed" in the society in which they will probably one day participate as full-fledged members. The fact that these young people are not being prepared to "succeed" in other social systems is underplayed. The modern educator is *also* expected to show his students that though other people may not share our basic beliefs or ways of doing things, these people are not necessarily stupid or wicked or even misguided. In other words, he is expected to foster "tolerance", the acceptance of "legitimate" differences. Teachers are mainly encouraged to show the importance of tolerating people within their particular society (e.g., people of different races and creeds, immigrants from distant lands); but they are not discouraged from imparting to their students a limited respect for the institutions and values of other societies and cultures. Indeed, students are taught that tolerance is itself one of the most important values of our society, that it is wrong to dismiss something as silly or evil simply because it is not what we are accustomed to believing or doing ourselves. It is rarely suggested to teachers that these two tasks, "socializing" and fostering "tolerance", may not be reconcilable. On the surface it appears that they are; for one can believe that the institutions and values of his society are basically sound without believing that they are the only possible sound institutions and values. One can also believe that though his society's basic institutions are generally sound, some specific ones are not, and we would do well to import certain institutions from other societies. But two institutions or values may be diametrically opposed. Though it is not hard for a teacher in New York County to foster tolerance of Canadian or British institutions, it is harder for him to foster tolerance of Soviet institutions. At some level, effective socialization into a particular society requires persuading young people not to tolerate or accept as legitimate certain institutions and values of other societies. For if a young person grows up believing that the value-system of the Maoist is not substantially worse (by some standard) than our own, he has not been effectively socialized, and he cannot be expected to defend or even respect "our" value-system when it is attacked by radical or reactionary intellectuals. Secondly, the weaknesses of our system (or any other) are not superficial, and this fact is apparent not only to most teachers but to a good many advanced students. In the primary schools, teachers usually have little trouble convincing their pupils that our economic system is basically sound while racial prejudice and social injustice are bad. Older students, being conscious of the relationship between our economic system and social injustice, are more inclined to be tolerant of Marxist values than their younger brothers in the primary schools. Students who genuinely appreciate the importance of tolerance — to the point where they are no longer "ethnocentric" — cannot easily be restrained from tolerating values and principles which they were at one time told are intolerable. It is harder to socialize a tolerant person effectively than it is to socialize a dogmatic one. And many teachers lack the enthusiasm or the intellectual ability necessary for persuading sophisticated students that our institutions and values are preferable to or as good as those of other societies. In a sense, fostering tolerance and respect for foreign beliefs and values is a kind of "desocialization." School boards and administrators expect

teachers to socialize and desocialize simultaneously; yet, (A) they cannot force teachers to be enthusiastic about the institutions and values that they have been hired to defend; (B) they do not provide teachers with sufficient rational apparatus (i.e., good reasons and arguments) for effectively socializing older, sophisticated students; (C) they accept indoctrination as an alternative to rational justification for those cases where rational justification is impossible or very difficult, even though indoctrination is at odds with the values of tolerance and rationality; and (D) they do not provide teachers with an adequate method for distinguishing, either for themselves or for their students, between "unjustified" intolerance (of, e.g., the Parliamentary system, or what Moslems believe) and "justified" intolerance (of, e.g., Fascism, or what Maoists believe).

Conservative educational theorists like Kandel argue that the teacher is the agent of the state and that the teacher's main responsibility in the area of moral education is to transmit the ideology, value-system, and cultural heritage of his society to his students. Radical educational theorists, with an eye on Vietnam, Watergate, and the deep-rooted weaknesses of our social system, argue that conservative educational theory is dated and that teachers must play an important role in the reform of our society. Conservatives emphasize the teacher's obligation to socialize; radicals emphasize the teachers' obligation to desocialize. If there is a happy medium, one certainly would not know it from reading conservative and radical educational theorists. In recent years, "liberal" educational theorists, following Dewey, have believed that they have found a reasonable balance between the two obligations. But have they? In the eyes of both conservatives and radicals, "liberal" educational theorists are simply confused and indecisive.

Kandel believes that schools not only *should* mirror society but actually *do*. At the same time he believes that teachers have a responsibility to socialize their students, especially because no individual instructor should take it upon himself to determine what in society is really good and what is really bad. But if the schools truly mirror society, then desocialization must be on the rise. No serious historian of twentieth-century thought can fail to be struck by the increasing popularity of relativism in physics, philosophy, and the social sciences. One does not have to read the works of Westermarck, Herskovits, Mannheim, Wittgenstein, or C. L. Stevenson to be aware of this fact. Any student of educational theory who has undertaken a careful study of Dewey's writings knows that there are passages therein which express a relativism — epistemological and ethical — that would have made Protagoras blush. Tolerance and the sensitivity to relativity go hand in hand.¹ Historicists, pragmatists, emotivists, and cultural relativists have told us as much. At least until very recently, belief in the existence of absolute moral values and even objective truth has been declining, not only among intellectuals, but among reflective men in general. Of late, some philosophers, social scientists, religious leaders, and politicians have condemned relativism on intellectual, moral, and utilitarian grounds. But since educational changes generally reflect intellectual changes of an earlier period, and since the recent attack on relativism has not been a very strong one, we are first now witnessing the influence of relativistic theories in schools. We are witnessing the emergence of a generation of young adults who are remarkably tolerant and flexible but confused and devoid of firm principles

¹Cf., e.g., Wilhelm Dilthey, *Pattern and Meaning in History*, ed. and trans. by H.P. Rickman (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1961), Ch. VI; F.C.S. Schiller, *Must Philosophers Disagree? and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy* (London: Macmillan, 1934), pp. 11, 163; William James, "The Will to Believe," in *The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy* (New York: Longmans, Green, 1907), pp. 13-41; and my paper, "Metaphysical Relativism," *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 12 (1974): 435-448.

and values. Critics of relativism and modern educational theory argue that the time has come for the schools to return to the job of socializing — vigorously — even if so doing will lead to the next generation's being less tolerant and flexible than its predecessor. But must we return to a conservative educational theory, or is there another alternative?

2. *Conditions of Civilization*

The alternative that I have in mind involves seeing education as the civilizing process. Here is a working definition of "civilization": it is the process of approximating or realizing, primarily by the use of reason, the greatest possible number of trans-cultural or universal human aspirations, both for oneself and for others. Some societies are advanced in the process and others less so. One can civilize himself, others in his society, or people outside of his society. Whatever weaknesses it has, this working definition conforms with the way in which people use the term "civilization". But allow me to explain it. "Civilization", like all words which end in the suffix "-zation", refers to a *process*. We may speak of *a* civilization or certain civilizations, but we should not forget that the term "civilization" primarily signifies a process which something is undergoing or has undergone.² We often make judgments about the degree to which particular groups of people are or have been civilized. We say that savages are relatively uncivilized, at an early stage in the process. We think that *we* are relatively advanced in the process, i.e., that the groups with which we identify ourselves have undergone more civilization than most other groups in history or in the contemporary world. We believe that the ancient Greeks were more civilized than the ancient Vandals and that modern Scandinavians are more civilized than modern African tribesmen (although not necessarily in all areas of human experience). Cultural relativists (e.g., Herskovits) complain that we use terms like "civilized" and "primitive" carelessly and uncritically. Most men like to think of themselves as being members of a group which has been highly civilized, and to some extent we are "ethnocentric" and regard societies as advanced on the scale of civilization if they resemble our own. Men disagree in their judgments about the degree to which particular societies have been civilized; what is called "civilization" by people in one society is often dismissed as "barbarism" by people in another. *But assigning positions on the scale of civilization is not wholly arbitrary.* For consider these four facts: (A) We are not so "ethnocentric" that we cannot regard real or ideal societies as more civilized than our own. Few people in our society regard it as utopian. We can all see ways in which our society can be further civilized. We can admire institutions and values of radically different societies (e.g., the social welfare policies in the Soviet Union). We can admit that certain societies of the past were in many ways (or in general) more highly civilized than our own; (B) There is a good deal of consensus regarding the height of certain societies on the scale of civilization. Capitalists, communists, Nigerians, and Norwegians all basically agree that the Mayan peoples of the New Empire underwent more civilization than the Huns; (C) There appear to be trans-cultural values which are venerated in all or almost all societies; and (D) There are certain qualities (only indirectly related to its value-system) which characterize any society commonly regarded as highly civilized, qualities which gradually appear as the society develops and often recedes as the society disintegrates. The first two points are evident enough, but I owe you an explanation of the others, those related to the *conditions* of civilization. We should begin by observing that there indeed are certain trans-cultural values which are venerated in all or most societies; these values are abstract but important, and we find them in societies

²R.G. Collingwood, *The New Leviathan* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1942), Part III.

considered relatively uncivilized as well as in those considered highly civilized. An inexhaustible supply of empirical data indicates that love, justice, peace, economic prosperity, wisdom, self-realization, beauty, etc. are trans-cultural values; let it suffice for me to observe here that even cultural relativists like Herskovits and Westermarck admit that abstract ethical universals exist. Nor should this fact surprise anyone, for human nature is rather uniform. The question before us, then, is, given the fact that the value-systems of almost all societies are built upon a limited number of trans-cultural values, why do we have ethical relativity, and why are some societies more civilized than others? The answer must be that trans-cultural values are abstract aspirations or *ends*, and people in different societies disagree as to what the appropriate *means* to those ends are. Plato's *Republic*, the Bible, and the *Communist Manifesto* all deal with issues related to justice, peace, and wisdom, but they propose different approaches to these ends. Height on the scale of civilization, then, is not so much a matter of what values are venerated in a society as a matter of how much or how successfully its ideal values are realized. This is important for several reasons. We can see why we are not doomed to be as ethnocentric as some cultural anthropologists and behaviorist psychologists think we are. Any mature North American can see that while his society venerates (at some abstract level) love, justice, peace, wisdom, etc., his society, for various reasons, condones policies and institutions which conflict with these ideals. There is nothing wrong with the *basic* aspirations of Americans or African tribesmen or Chinese communists. But civilization is not a process of developing new aspirations as much as it is a process of realizing traditional ones. Our political leaders praise love, justice, peace, and wisdom, but their policies clearly are not always effective means of approximating these ends. Our leaders praise justice while condoning racial discrimination; they praise peace while using force to achieve economic objectives. And the public accepts this inconsistency, even though it recognizes that we would be higher on the scale of civilization if our society did not condone racial discrimination and casual use of force. The main obstacles to further civilization would seem to be confusion and lack of incentive rather than gross hypocrisy. Moreover, not only can we now see why we are not doomed to be ethnocentric, but we can also see why rational judgments can be made about the height of other societies — even distant ones — on the scale of civilization. Barbarians may praise love, justice, peace, and wisdom, but we can see for ourselves how ineffective their methods for achieving these ends are. To some extent, the Saracens and Huns and Nazis disagree with highly civilized men on questions of value; but if one studies Nazi documents, he finds that the official aspirations of Nazi society to a great extent resemble those of our own. The point here is that we can make sound, rational judgments about the relative amount of civilization undergone by the ancient Greeks, Mayans of the New Empire, Nazis, modern African tribesmen, etc., because we can evaluate the effectiveness of the means that they have agreed upon for approximating trans-cultural aspirations. If there were no trans-cultural values, then we would be left with ethical relativism and an empty concept of civilization. But if there are universal ethical *termini*, no matter how abstract, then inter-cultural dialogue on ethical questions is possible, and we can learn from people in other societies about ways of more rapidly realizing universal aspirations.

There are also three *qualities* which seem to characterize all societies which are widely regarded as advanced on the scale of civilization; these qualities, which must be distinguished from *values*, gradually appear as a society matures and recedes as it deteriorates: rationality, respect for the rights of "outsiders", and complexity of the value-system. If we cannot reason with people, and if they cannot reason with one another, then it is hard to regard them as civilized. As a child matures, it becomes more rational; similarly, as a society matures, its members tend to become more rational and less emotional, dogmatic, and

superstitious. I am not making a value-judgment here; I am stating facts. With regard to the second point, let me cite the observation of Westermarck: "A stranger is in early society devoid of all rights. And the same is the case not only among savages but among nations of archaic culture as well. . . . When we pass from the lower races to peoples more advanced in civilization we find that the social unit has grown larger, that the nation has taken the place of the tribe, and that the circle within which the infliction of injuries is prohibited has been extended accordingly."³ Again, Westermarck is not making a value-judgment here but is *describing* something that happens when a society matures. "Primitive" men do not see those outside the tribe as having the rights that those inside the tribe have. As men become civilized, they see more and more people outside the "tribe" as having rights. Finally, those societies which are considered highly civilized are societies with complex value-systems.

Many educational theorists (e.g., Hutchins) have pointed out that education involves more than simply *changing* a person; education involves changing a person in such a way as to make him *better* (by some standard). So education is not simply "socialization" in the sense of making young people fit into a society, appreciate its institutions and values, obey its legal code, etc. Most of us believe that "teachers" in a state like Nazi Germany do not *educate* young people. They train, condition, and indoctrinate, but they do not educate. If education is socialization, then, it is only socialization in a certain sense. It is not simply a matter of promoting social stability or even enabling people to be successful in the context of one particular society; it is not a matter of getting people to be very much like the other people in their particular society. When we say that a man is "educated", we are not simply saying that he now has beliefs, values, and dispositions which are *different* from those that he had before; we are saying that he now has beliefs, values, and dispositions which are *better* than those he had before and closed to those that *all* men *ought* to have. And so an "educated" man is one who has been *civilized*.

Conservative educational theorists rightly argue that the single most important obligation of the educator is to socialize his students. If we foster tolerance among our students to the point where they have no absolute moral values (and no *belief* in the *existence* of absolute moral values), then they may end up with a moral code which is not much better than a barbarian's. We may also have left them in a state where they are as susceptible to the influence of the propaganda of barbarism as to that of the propaganda of civilization. On the other hand, radical educators who are *dogmatic* can be as dangerous as those who are relativistic. Conservative educational theorists like Kandel are justified in observing that we cannot always trust sincere educators who have taken it upon themselves to decide for their students what is absolutely right and what is absolutely wrong. Still, the fact that certain beliefs and values already *prevail* in the educator's own particular society in no way establishes that those beliefs and values are *good* (by some standard) for his students to hold. Bad socializing — radical or conservative — is as dangerous as radical desocializing.

3. Two Kinds of Socialization

We have seen that the modern educator is expected to socialize and desocialize simultaneously. Traditionalist and conservative educational theorists have

³Edward Westermarck, *Ethical Relativity* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1932), p. 197. Cf., e.g., Morris Ginsberg, *On the Diversity of Morals* (London: Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, 1953); Albert Schweitzer, *The Philosophy of Civilization*, trans. by C.T. Campion (New York: Macmillan, 1959), esp. Ch. 3; and My paper, "Ethical Relativism," *Laval Théologique et Philosophique*, 28 (1972); 63-74.

emphasized the teacher's obligation to socialize. Radical educational theorists, pointing to the deep-rooted weaknesses of the society to which they belong, see this kind of socialization as indoctrination through propaganda. These radicals warn us that no matter how rationally and how persuasively he argues for "our" principles and institutions (i.e., those favorable to the interests of the "Establishment"), the modern educator is forced to be selective in presenting ideas to his students. Whether threatened with imprisonment, loss of his job, or simply inferior working conditions, the modern teacher is effectively intimidated into operating as the agent of the state rather than as the agent of his conscience or of civilization. Radical educational theorists see clearly what is wrong with the kind of socialization that conservatives defend. But do they propose an adequate alternative to it? Some are simply dogmatic; they are Marxists or Maoists or supporters of some other ideology, and they believe that we should socialize students in such a way that they will be able to appreciate why Marxism or whatever is good and all other ideologies are bad. Their alternative to propaganda is different propaganda, and conservatives like Kandel rightly point out that we must not permit individual instructors to force their own personal value-system on their students. Many radicals in educational theory, however, refuse to be dogmatic and instead adopt a relativistic viewpoint. They tell us that instead of socializing, teachers should be encouraging their students to be tolerant and flexible, to see that other value-systems are not really much worse than our own. In a way, relativistic radicals want educators to get out of the business of moral education. They want students to see the strengths and limitations of the major competing ways of life, including that which is predominant in our own particular society, and they want students to decide for themselves what is best for them. Unfortunately, as we have seen, we pay a high price for ethical relativism. Older people complain that students leaving the schools have no values and will tolerate or condone anything. These older people fail to realize that to some extent young people are simply more enlightened than they are and have better values. Still, there are big gaps in the value-systems of many of the young people leaving our schools. They are tolerant and flexible, but they rarely act on the basis of principle. The relativism which breeds tolerance and broad-mindedness also breeds confusion and lack of conviction. The gap in the young person's value-system often is filled in by the scientologist, the local drug "pusher", and the slick businessmen who control advertising on the television and the radio.

The "liberal" educational theorist must find some way of steering a middle course between the narrow socialization of the conservative and the excessive relativism of the true radical. But it is not enough to believe that such a course is possible; one must see some philosophical basis for it. I have proposed the following alternative: education is a special kind of socialization; specifically, education is civilization. Bad socialization and radical desocialization do not change young people for the better; hence, bad socialization and radical desocialization are not proper educational methods. Civilization cannot be bad socialization. We all agree that civilization is a good thing, as is civility or being civilized. It is an analytic truth that being civilized is better than remaining relatively uncivilized. It is an analytic truth that being highly civilized is better than being less civilized. Even Rousseau and Thoreau would not argue against this point, although they might agree with certain conservatives and radicals that the concept of civilization is not well-defined. I do not deny that most concepts are not as ambiguous as that of civilization; but I repeat my earlier claim that the concept is far from empty. Moreover, it is clear enough to serve as the philosophical underpinning for an educational theory which avoids the problems of what I have called (following convention) "conservatism" and "radicalism".

When I say, then, that to educate people is to civilize them, I mean that to educate them is to assist them to realize, mainly by means of reason, a large number of trans-cultural ideals (e.g., love, peace, justice, and wisdom), not only for themselves, but for their fellow creatures, too. Of course, they can civilize themselves; a man can be "self-educated". But an educator can help others, both in his own society and in other societies, to realize more ideals more rapidly. When an educator civilizes people, he makes them better citizens of their state — better Canadians, better Brazilians, better Indians, etc. He also encourages them to be tolerant and flexible, to respect the rights of men in other societies, and to respect the ability of men in other countries to help us to become more civilized. He thus satisfies the demands of both conservative educational theorists and radical ones. But he does more. He encourages his students to repudiate institutions and policies which conflict with the trans-cultural values, whether they can be institutions and policies endorsed by foreign "leaders" or our own "leaders". He helps us to see, for example, why we should admire America for the policy of freedom of religion and why we should not condone legislation in America which creates injustice and promotes ignorance. He helps us to see that we can learn from the Soviets about efficient programs of social welfare but must condemn their methods of stultifying free thought. And so on. In short, educational institutions are proper and vital instruments of socialization, but only if socialization is understood as civilization. And if institutions are to be effective instruments of civilization or education, they must not only encourage belief in the existence of absolute moral values, but they must help young people to see what the trans-cultural values are and how they may be realized.

4. *Illustrations*

We may now descend from philosophical abstractions to concrete conditions. A child in a primary school in North America is relatively uncivilized, relatively low on the scale of civilization. He is not what we would normally consider a "savage" or a "barbarian", because he belongs to a family and a society which is itself dominated by people who are relatively high on the scale of civilization, and in time, with the proper education, he too will take his place as a highly civilized member of a highly civilized community. But still he must be regarded as relatively uncivilized (uneducated, unsocialized); he is not wholly rational (or even close to being so), he sees few "outsiders" as having rights, and he has extremely naive conceptions of love, justice, wisdom, beauty, and other trans-cultural values. He does not really understand his way of life, but is drifting along under the (often inadequate) direction of his parents and friends. The child is only a human being, and so his potential values and aspirations are limited; he does not have the powers of a god, and it is inappropriate for him to be satisfied with the value-system of a beast. When he has grown up, then, his basic ideals will be some of the trans-cultural ideals that we have been considering. But if his human nature dictates that his basic ideals will be love and/or justice, etc., why is it necessary for the school to get into the business of moral education? The answer is that the school does not so much expose him to new values, although it may occasionally do so, as it deepens his understanding of values he already holds. A ten-year-old child does have ideas about love, justice, wisdom, and beauty; but they are naive, confused, and inconsistent. In many cases, children pick up such ideas from adults whose ideas about trans-cultural values are naive, confused, and inconsistent. Consider the case of a ten-year-old child who steals a pen from a classmate. If he could articulate clearly what he regards as the justification of his act, he might tell us, "I need the pen more than this fellow does because his parents are wealthier than mine," or, "My parents have told me that sometimes it is all right to steal, especially when no one is hurt very much." When

the teacher tells this child about justice and fairness, it will not be the first time that the child has been lectured to about justice and fairness. Undoubtedly he has been told about the importance of justice and fairness by the very same parents who have encouraged him to be aggressive and prudent. The teacher has to sharpen the student's conception of justice; he has to make it less abstract in the student's mind. Five years later, the students' defence of theft will be more sophisticated. It will probably have a Machiavellian or a Hobbesian twist: "Everyone steals. My parents cheat on their income taxes. Politicians exploit people both at home and abroad. My teachers draw a nice salary while being pretty much unconcerned with the oppressed people of the world. All these people who always lecture me about justice and fairness are hypocrites. To get by in this world, one has to be aggressive and bend some rules." Again, the teacher's obligation here is to sharpen his student's conception of justice. He has to show the student that it is necessary to distinguish the absolute value of justice, which is an ideal to be realized, from the "shadows" of justice that have been placed before him by hypocritical parents, politicians, clergymen, teachers, television personalities, and other sophists. To counter his cynicism, the teacher must appeal to simple rational arguments of the utilitarian or deontological kind.

When we look at the large number of students in secondary schools and colleges who are disenchanted with our "system" and attracted to exotic radical ideologies, we should immediately be reminded of the weaknesses of the kind of socialization that the conservative educational theorists defend. When the child of ten is told that his nation can do no wrong, he has no reason to believe that the people who are telling him this are liars. When, at the age of fifteen or sixteen, he sees that the weaknesses of our codes and institutions have been hidden from him, he may well overreact, either by becoming radical or just cynical. On the other hand, if he has been socialized so "successfully" that he cannot see any weakness in his nation's codes and institutions, then he is now morally blind and incapable of criticizing evils in his society. Bad socialization can lead, then, to hatred of one's own society or hatred of other societies.

But how can the educator sharpen his students' conceptions of love, justice, and the other trans-cultural values? Traditionally, his main tool for civilizing has been the study and discussion of great literary works. When I was in school, I was required to read such books as *Arrowsmith*, *Hiroshima*, *The Good Earth*, *King Lear*, *Macbeth*, and *David Copperfield*. Though these works vary in aesthetic quality, they all force us to reflect on moral questions and deepen our understanding of trans-cultural values. When I was older, I was ready for works like *Faust*, *Don Quixote*, *Hamlet*, the novels of Kafka, and the major Greek tragedies. Eventually I was able to understand works of moral philosophy and Oriental literature. At each stage of my reading, I came to realize that (A) there is a limited number of ultimate aspirations; (B) great thinkers have remarkably similar ideas about these ultimate aspirations; (C) it is possible to have a deeper understanding of justice, beauty, and achievement than I used to have; (D) many people that I once trusted use terms like "love" and "justice" far too casually and uncritically; and (E) there are alternative ways of approximating any particular ideal. Another tool for civilizing has been the study and discussion of history. Also, it is usually in school that one first learns how to appreciate a painting, a symphony, and a poem, how to keep himself in good physical condition, what to look for in a walk through the country. In other words, one is not only taught what to avoid; one is also shown how many positive things life has to offer. This kind of socialization not only enriched my experience but enabled me to distinguish between what is truly good and bad in any human society, including my own. It has enabled

me to avoid both the narrow-mindedness of ethnocentrism and the cynical aimlessness of relativism. As for the "civics" that was forced upon me in elementary school, I doubt whether it still exerts much influence upon my judgment.

Consider as a final illustration the case of the Roman Catholic "parochial" or "separate" school. Traditionally, most North American parents who have sent their children to Catholic schools have done so because in their circle it is the accepted or conventional thing to do. But reflective Catholic parents have seen the school as having a *raison d'être*. We often hear them say that they want their children to be exposed to Christian values, and the public schools do not effectively expose young people to such values. Indeed, the Catholic schools cannot be accused of having discouraged belief in absolute moral values, and we can see why relatively few graduates of these schools have an inclination to disregard principles and bend rules. The Catholic school has traditionally imparted to its students a respect for moral discipline — but it has paid a high price for doing so. Many Catholic intellectuals complain that the parochial schools make young people *too* parochial: ethnocentric, intolerant, inflexible, irrational, dogmatic and uncreative. Moreover, many Catholic secondary school and college students, after having been repeatedly taught that Catholic values are superior to other values, are embittered when they find hypocrisy in Catholic institutions and overreact by becoming hostile to what is good in Catholicism. They are also embittered when they find that many non-Catholics have found their own way of approximating such "Christian" ideals as love and justice. Sensitive to these phenomena, modern Catholic educators have initiated reforms in the Catholic schools. Many have demonstrated to advanced students a willingness to criticize certain Catholic ideas and institutions. They have openly acknowledged inconsistency at some levels in the hierarchical Church. They have begun to introduce their students to a wide range of non-Catholic sources. They have abandoned catechism in favor of a broader discussion of ethical concepts. And they have pointed to the universality of high ideals. The *raison d'être* of the modern Catholic school is not necessarily that it alone exposes young people to good values, but that, like Catholicism itself, it can be a highly effective instrument for civilizing them.

RESUME

Les institutions d'éducation ne sont de vrais moyens de socialisation que si l'on donne à socialisation le sens de civilisation, c'est à dire la réalisation d'idéaux transculturels. Si l'éducation est considérée comme civilisation, les faiblesses du conservatisme et du radicalisme en matière d'éducation apparaissent clairement.

Le concept de civilisation peut donc servir de support philosophique à une conception modérée du problème de la socialisation.