

## BOOKS

Contemporary interest in school programs in moral education has issued in several recent publications from philosophical and interdisciplinary perspectives. Four such publications are examined in terms of the contribution each makes with regard to (1) philosophical elucidation of moral education, (2) accumulating empirical knowledge of moral development, (3) developing curricula and instructional materials, and (4) informing teachers of the nature and conditions of moral education that they may more confidently assess and undertake programs of moral education. The review argues that the epistemological and social authority of the teachers are matters requiring more adequate attention from publications of this kind; and it shows the relevance of social and political philosophy to the study of moral education.

JOHN L. McNEILL\*

### *Recent Philosophical and Interdisciplinary Studies of Moral Education, A Review Essay*

John Wilson, Norman Williams, and Barry Sugarman. *Introduction to Moral Education*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1967. Pp. 463.

Nancy F. and Theodore R. Sizer, Eds. *Moral Education: Five Lectures*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970. Pp. 136.

C.M. Beck, B.S. Crittenden, and E.V. Sullivan, eds. *Moral Education: Interdisciplinary Approaches*. New York: Newman Press, 1971. Pp. 402.

Barry I. Chazan and Jonas F. Soltis, eds. *Moral Education*. New York: Teachers College Press, 1973. Pp. 192.

Moral education has been one of the most neglected aspects of formal education in the recent history of the study of education. The concept of public schooling seemed to exclude the curricular enunciation of objectives in moral education (though moral training, it seems, continued as part of the hidden curriculum). Given this exclusion little interest and less effort was aroused in scholars studying education. The exceptions such as Dewey were interested primarily in the school as a social entity and little attention was paid to the conceptual and empirical uncertainties of moral education. Private schooling has also contributed to the neglect of the academic study of moral education by the tendency of its participants and supporters to conflate moral with religious education.

The current interest in moral education is the result of three factors at least. First, there is the increasingly common view that the schools have failed in socializing children. For some the failure is not in the trying but in the nature of the task. The attempt to socialize children by encouraging them to direct their own actualization fails in assuring the necessary discipline and understanding for social compatibility. Secondly, it is more commonly recognized that moral claims do not entail religious claims and, consequently, though religion is properly excluded from the curriculum, morality is not. At least, one can be taught how to make critical value decisions. Thirdly, the transforming effect of twentieth-century philosophical analysis on philosophy of education has brought contemporary philosophers of education to both a more critical analysis of the normative character of education and to a more discriminating understanding of the philosophical issues underlying the problem of teaching virtue.

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\*John L. McNeill is Assistant Professor, Department of Educational Foundations, University of Calgary.



philosophy and to basic philosophical issues underlying the enterprise of moral education when studied together and sequentially. The purpose of this edition, then, it seems, is to provide an introductory course textbook in the philosophy of moral education. The Introduction and sectional commentaries by the editors provide the orientation of the text and a brief account of the relationship of the papers in each section and of their relevance to moral education.

The Wilson, Williams, Sugarman publication is the first report of the Farmington Trust Research Unit at Oxford University which was established in 1965 to conduct research on moral education. John Wilson, a philosopher, is director of the Unit; Sugarman (sociology) and Williams (psychology) are research fellows of the Unit. The book seeks to inform a wide readership (i.e., inclusive of teachers and social leaders) of the conceptual order of moral education, of the implications of recent social science research for moral education, of the directions in which research may usefully be conducted, and of the practical possibilities for the intelligent conduct of moral education. Given the intended audience, the authors acknowledge their tendency to present abbreviated argument in their presentation.

The Wilson, Williams, Sugarman publication is a remarkable contribution to the enterprise of moral education by account of the variety of functions literature on the subject of moral education may serve. Chazan and Soltis distinguish three such functions in their postscript to the organization of papers they present (p. 183f.). These functions are (1) the philosophical elucidation of the moral sphere and of moral education, (2) the accumulation of empirical knowledge of moral development in children, and (3) the development of curricula and teaching materials adequate to the task of moral instruction. There is clearly a fourth function which such literature may serve in the area of moral education, that of (4) informing school teachers with a more sophisticated understanding of the philosophical and empirical underpinnings of the intelligent conduct of moral education, that teachers may thoughtfully and confidently assess and eventually undertake school programs of moral instruction.

(1) The Wilson, Williams, Sugarman volume serves the first of these functions to a commendable degree. Wilson's discourse on the conceptual structures of morality and moral education is not merely a representation of the recent contributions of moral philosophy. At several points Wilson makes significant contributions to this disciplinary elucidation. His discussion of the relationship of judgements made on the basis of personal ideals, moral principle, and prudence helps clarify the complexity of practical judgements of rightness (p. 80ff.). Again, his account of the error and confusion characteristic of our conceptions of morality, rationality, and mental health is an original contribution to moral philosophy (*passim*). And the philosophical understanding of moral education is advanced by Wilson's efforts to clearly identify the moral components of the morally educated person by which moral instruction may be conceptually organized and assessed.

Barry Chazan's paper is the only previously unpublished work in the Chazan and Soltis volume, and although Chazan's brief analysis of the moral situation as the central subject of moral education is informative, it does not constitute the volume as a significant contribution to the philosophical clarification of the moral sphere and of moral education. The Sizer and Sizer volume is not and is not intended as a contribution to philosophical scholarship. The brief characterization of moral action made by James Gustafson is used by him to make some very general suggestions as to how education and religion might affect its development. R. S. Peter's elucidation of moral principles, moral judgement, and moral education is a

concise formulation of the basic arguments of Part Two of his *Ethics and Education*.

The Beck, Crittenden, Sullivan volume is the most significant of the four under review in its contribution to the philosophical understanding of moral education. Kurt Baier's critical distinctions between public and private morality and between tolerance of moral behaviour and tolerance of moral opinion enable him to clearly distinguish the legitimate aims of moral education in a pluralistic society. A. I. Melden's clear elucidation of moral action as a conceptual formation of movements, feelings, and intentions shows the complexity of moral training, the requisite development of intelligence in the learner, and how the infant's recognition of others as persons logically entails his acquisition of the fundamental ethical principles presupposed by the development of moral reasoning. David Gauthier distinguishes three stages in moral education where many have only recognized two. The first is the acquisition of moral dispositions or virtues which Gauthier argues does not require use of any other kind of training than that used in developing dispositions generally. The second stage is the attainment of practical wisdom or correct moral policy which, he argues, is learned by membership in a community of valuers and not by formal instruction. The third is the growth of moral awareness or sensitivity to the consequences of action which means, he argues, that moral education "involves simply showing people what they are really doing" — those people, that is, who already possess moral virtue and practical wisdom (p. 146). The first section of the lengthy discussion in Part Five of this volume deals directly with the philosophical questions of what counts as moral, and of the place of rationality in morality. It is also worth noting that the discussion as a whole enables readers to "listen in on" eight philosophers in philosophical discourse with several scholars in psychology and sociology.

(2) With regard to the second function to be served by literature on moral education, Normal Williams and Barry Sugarman both convincingly show the relevance of empirical research for moral instruction and both identify what appear to be the most fruitful areas of research in their disciplines for the development of effective school programs of moral education. However, whereas Sugarman's sociological perspective on the identification of social experiences conducive to the development of moral regard in children is restricted to that of the literature of the structural-functionalist approach to sociological inquiry, Williams seeks and achieves an integrated view of moral development which draws on the literature of two major perspectives within psychology. He examines in relationship to moral development the substantial theories of both Freudian and behaviourist psychology. Bruno Bettelheim's paper in Sizer and Sizer is dissatisfying in this regard. Bettelheim accounts for moral development in terms of Freudian theory only. This allows him to claim that conscience develops on the basis of fear and that "for a long time learning does not proceed well unless also accompanied by some fear." Consequently, according to Bettelheim, if affection is guaranteed to a child, "there will be no fear" and "neither will there be much morality" (pp. 88-9).

One part of William's paper is a critical exposition of Jean Piaget's work on general cognitive development and on moral development specifically. Interestingly, Williams draws attention to the lack of any adequate account of what Piaget described as the "two moralities" phenomenon. Children at various stages of development seem to exhibit both an authoritarian, non-rational moral judgement *and* an egalitarian, cooperative moral consideration (p. 262ff.). Williams indicates the need for inquiry regarding the possibility of a heteronomous morality surviving the development of moral reasoning in adulthood. His concern seems to be the same

as that which the discussants of the Beck, Crittenden, Sullivan volume put to Lawrence Kohlberg whose research follows from Piaget's studies. Michael Scriven, Jan Narveson and A. I. Meldon all question the neatness of distinctive stages of moral development partly because Kohlberg's various descriptions of the stages are not consistent, and partly because it is not established that we do not properly reason differently in different moral situations — sometimes, for example, arguing from fixed social rules with an orientation to authority and sometimes from ethical principles such as the consideration of interests of others with regard for the dignity of the individual person (p. 357ff.). The stage theory of moral development, which is presented by Kohlberg in three of these publications (the exception, of course, is the Wilson, Williams, Sugarman volume), does not adequately account for the possibility which Williams points out in Piaget's research. If in fact heteronomous morality survives the development of autonomous thinking for specific kinds of moral decision-making, then much of Kohlberg's theory is mistaken. In particular, this would support Justin Aronfreed's suggestion that all that Kohlberg has shown is that moral development is a specific case of cognitive development and that he has not established the normative quality of moral development nor the normative quality of different types of moral reasoning (Beck, Crittenden, Sullivan, p. 364f.).

(3) Only one of the four publications under review makes any attempt to develop curricular and instructional material for moral instruction in school systems. Since this function is a central expectation of the Farmington Trust Unit, Wilson makes some tentative suggestions for teachers who must proceed immediately with programs of moral education. In Part III of *An Introduction To Moral Education*, Wilson examines the practical possibilities implied by the preceding conceptual and empirical studies. He comments on the general requirements of school programs in moral education, the matter of context and content, the issues of the teacher's attitude to, and ability for, the conduct of moral education. (It is worth noting that Wilson has recently published a curriculum for a program of moral education.)

(4) The fourth function which literature in moral education may serve is that of informing teachers of the conceptual structure and empirical conditions of moral education. It is clear from the discussion under (1) and (2) above that the Beck, Crittenden, Sullivan volume is intended to be contributory to the scholarly study of moral education in the disciplines of philosophy, psychology, and sociology. And it is the one book of the four that any scholar will find informative and challenging. To a lesser extent the Wilson, Williams, Sugarman volume is also informative to the scholar. Its most obvious value in this regard is its informative assimilation of "findings" within each of these disciplines. Researchers may gain a clear and concise accounting of research and study in the two other disciplines for which research is reported. Its primary intended audience, however, is the teaching profession. The book is the most satisfactory of the four in informing teacher understanding of the nature, scope, and conditions of the enterprise of moral education. Though the Chazan and Soltis publication is a useful text in an introductory course in the philosophical study of moral education, it is limited by the incompleteness of argument and theory which characterizes the compilation of brief excerpts from a large number of works spread over several distinct philosophical concerns with moral education. Such a compilation in general depends on instructional organization and direction to achieve a significant increase of understanding.

The Wilson, Williams, Sugarman introduction to moral education, on the other hand, is an integrated and complete address to the entire profession of teachers

and other educators. It is purposefully written to achieve a reasonably complete understanding in its readers. At the same time the authors are careful to remind their readers that the book does not expose the depth of understanding which may be achieved by further study. Finally, the Wilson, Williams, Sugarman text enables teachers to acquire an integrated appreciation of the sociological, psychological, and conceptual aspects of moral education.

There are, however, two aspects crucial to the conduct of moral education to which none of these volumes pays adequate attention. These are the epistemological authority and the social authority of the teacher in moral education. The logical possibility of moral knowledge is not adequately accounted for by these studies. That moral opinion is rational opinion is clearly established in each of the publications; that we can know what we ought to do is not. John Wilson points out that we can know the rules of procedure by which moral judgement is made and that knowing these rules is the condition of objective rational judgement (pp. 72-6). He argues that knowing our own feelings and desires, the consequences of acting on them and, therefore, the interests of others, as well as knowing the form of moral judgement is a necessary condition of being morally educated (pp. 63-6 and p. 76ff.). Wilson also argues that "there is no doubt a corpus of moral knowledge, handed down by tradition, of whose validity we have every right to feel certain" and that there are facts about the nature of human beings "which can be used as the basis for the 'primary rules' in morality, or could be called 'natural law' " (p. 113). The facts of human nature, however, are not moral facts and knowledge of them is not moral knowledge — i.e., knowing what I ought to do. And one is warned about this conceptual difference by Wilson's phrasing: *which can be used as the basis for and could be called*. The suggestion is that, given the lack of logical warrant and restriction, we can, if we need to, exercise pragmatic warrant.

Further, having a right to feel certain about the corpus of moral tradition is not the same as knowing that what I ought to do is what traditionally men have thought they ought to do. Baier makes this very clear in distinguishing between knowing what the societal norms require of me and knowing that what the morality of my group requires of me may be different from what is morally required of me (Beck, Crittenden, Sullivan, p. 98). However, for Baier, one's knowing at some point that there is in fact a difference is a matter of his recognizing the unsoundness of the group morality. This requires knowledge of the form of moral judgement and knowledge of the facts of human nature, feelings and desires, and the likely consequences of an act. The first is philosophical knowledge, the second is empirical knowledge, and knowledge of the group morality is social knowledge. Moral knowledge is knowing what I ought to do; it is knowing which moral principle has priority over the other in the case of moral dilemma. The irresolution of moral dilemma, and the consequence of ethical pluralism are the telling reminders that we do not yet have and maybe cannot have moral knowledge. Being quite clear about the nature of the teacher's epistemological authority in moral education is likely to facilitate the willing participation of teachers in school programs of moral education. Recognizing that his participation does not constitute a claim to moral knowledge, but rather to the kind of philosophical, empirical, and social knowledge argued for in these publications, will enable a teacher to proceed with confidence and integrity.

Perception of choice is an obvious factor in the general belief in our democratic social structure, and because it is a necessary condition of moral autonomy, many teachers who perceive themselves as being morally autonomous will expect that the introduction of programs of moral education in the schools is a matter of

their choosing it. Many will genuinely believe that there are alternatives to the general view of moral education put forward by these four publications. That is, given a tendency to reduce autonomy to choice, and given the popular reading of some or all of these publications, or of summary accounts of them, one judgement will be that moral education as the initiation of persons into the standard and form of moral reasoning is only one possibility. That there are other conceptions of moral education compatible with moral autonomy or, at least, with being moral, will appear to be obvious. For many involved with schooling there will be the alternative of a religious interpretation of moral autonomy and for others there will be the alternative of a political interpretation of being moral. The fact of ethical pluralism will be assumed by many to include both the content and the form of moral reasoning. A major inadequacy of these publications, then, is that they do not clearly show the impossibility of conceptual ambiguity in *moral education*. The problem of ethical pluralism is examined only in terms of moral belief and not in terms of the justification of beliefs. Chazan and Soltis, in their section on objectivity in moral judgement, do superficially address the possibility of this ambiguity, but their organization of papers does not constitute a critical rejection of this possibility.

The probability is, however, that many teachers will opt for a "form" of moral judgement which does not assume the presupposition of second order principles such as justice and the consideration of the interests of others. Some will choose a "form" which grants autonomy only to the divine or to the state, or which grants authority only to nature or to the state, and which compel man to the one fundamental choice of faithful submission, or for natural fulfillment. If philosophers recognize ethical pluralism or some range of moral subjectivity, then they have to be quite clear and convincing about the propriety of claims for the general presupposition of moral principles or about the necessary form of moral reasoning. One cannot assume teacher acceptance of the authority of philosophers in these matters. That the authority of philosophers in the conceptual clarification of moral education is properly accepted by teachers has to be shown. And just because, as most teachers of physics are not physicists, most teachers in programs of moral education are not and will not be philosophers, it is important that philosophers provide clear explanations of the nature of their discipline. Clearly, teachers will be more effective in their tasks if they have the confidence of some understanding of the nature of the epistemological authority on which they ultimately depend. The perception that conceptual clarification results in one viewpoint among alternatives indicates that one has not understood the basis of philosophical conclusions. One basic responsibility of philosophers then is to make quite clear to teachers the nature of philosophical reasoning and the basis, then, of the philosopher's authority. This seems a pre-condition of responsibly making conceptual claims of the import of those made in these publications to non-philosophers.

Finally, it must be recognized that the institution of school programs of moral education will give rise to some interesting questions about the teacher's social authority. All of the publications under review make reference in one way or another to the uncertainty of teachers in transmitting values. Yet, surprisingly, none of the publications directly addresses the matter of the teacher's social authority in the conduct of moral education. Most teachers do not doubt that they have the right to set, and the responsibility to enforce, school rules. However, there seems to be much uncertainty as to what authority teachers have regarding the conditions of socializing children. Are children properly made to attend to instruction? By whom? By what means? What standard of achievement is to be taken as minimal?

Within what parameters of commendation and promotion? Within what subject areas? What beliefs and attitudes are to be reinforced in children? What interactional behaviour and habits are to be conditioned? What values must be taught and what must be avoided? What deviances and idiosyncracies and preferences of teachers, or others, are to be concealed from students? What is the nature of the teachers's social authority? And what is the logical relation of his social authority to his instruction in programs of moral education? It seems clear that one cannot assume that the teacher's social authority is left unaffected by the introduction of moral education in the schools, for as Peters argues (Sizer and Sizer) any such program entails the concrete application of principles. Consider the presupposition of the principle of truth-telling. A child must be able on the basis of the consideration of the interests of others to determine when it is right to tell the truth and when it is right not to tell the truth. Now in helping a child to recognize instances of each of these right actions the teacher must necessarily and directly teach the child that, though the presumption is truth-telling, it is not always right to tell the truth. That one should always tell the truth is a standard maxim adults set for children. The social rule is to always tell children that they must always tell the truth. The teacher in this case, however, necessarily denies this maxim and breaks this rule. Has the teacher the authority to upset socially-sanctioned maxims? Is he responsible in breaking relevant social rules governing the socialization of children? Does the nature of his social authority constitute him a social critic? Or is his social authority limited to representation and application of relevant social rules? What social rules must be applied — those of the social context of the child's community or those of the middle-class domination of schooling?

Consider the case of the Social Studies teacher who, having intentionally engaged his junior high class in a discussion of the issue of unrestricted abortion, properly (as one engaged in moral education) brings to the attention of his students the possibility that the Government is avoiding public identification of either side of the issue as government policy by allowing only the Minister of Justice himself to speak to the issue and thereby distract attention from the government because of the common "knowledge" that the Minister's personal religious commitments are compatible with only one side of the issue. What is the nature of the teacher's social authority by which it may be said that he properly or improperly breaks, unnecessarily, the social rule of allowing children to view and respect Cabinet Ministers (and especially the Minister of Justice) only as statesmen and not as politicians? Are teachers properly limited in their activity as moral educators by their responsibility for the socialization of children? If the public school teacher is to seriously undertake the moral education of children then it seems we must clearly understand his social authority, and thereby determine that it does not consist in uncritically representing and applying the social rules widely held to be relevant to the instruction of children. None of the publications under review adequately deals with the conceptual relationship of teacher as social authority and teacher as moral educator. And yet, it seems at first look, that the teacher as moral educator must assume the role of social critic. If this is correct and if this is not recognized in advance, then there is a very large chance that programs in moral education will flounder on subsequent uncertainty, lack of courage, or lack of will.

Finally, it has to be noted that despite the commitment to interdisciplinary and philosophical study indicated by these publications not one of them includes a contribution from social or political philosophy. And yet, it seems obvious that the development of autonomy in moral judgement does preclude the ac-

ceptance of some forms of social and political organization, unless it is possible for the morally autonomous person to genuinely decide to give up his autonomy of judgement. And even if this is consistent with moral autonomy it is clearly regressive. What kind of relationship to the state or to society can the morally autonomous person enter into and maintain? What form (or forms) of social and political organization must teachers in programs of moral education endorse and defend? What forms must they necessarily repudiate? Is there not implied in the development of an autonomous judgement a critical independence of the social and political authority of others. The morally autonomous person is subject to the authority of no one else, though he may at any time, and often, act in accord with authority. Robert Paul Wolff reluctantly argues the case that "philosophical anarchism would seem to be the only reasonable political belief for an enlightened man" (*In Defence of Anarchism*, Harper Torchbooks, 1970). And though the possibility of this implication is surely not news to the philosophers who have contributed to and edited the works here under review, it likely is news to most of those who it is anticipated will institute and conduct educational programs which are meant to assure the wide-spread development of moral autonomy. Showing the possibility of this implication is not the same thing as demonstrating the implication, and inclusion of the critical inquiry of social and political philosophers is obviously appropriate to and highly desirable for any philosophical or inter-disciplinary study of moral education. Only with this kind of contribution may the compatibility of moral education with democratic forms of government be clearly shown and confidently asserted.

Anthony Burton. *The Horn and the Beanstalk*. Toronto: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1972. Pp. xii, 129 (paper with bibliography)

Richard D. Heyman, Robert F. Lawson and Robert M. Stamp. *Studies in Educational Change*. Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972. Pp. ix, 259 (paper).

Terence Morrison and Anthony Burton (eds.). *Options: Reforms and Alternatives for Canadian Education*. Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973. Pp. vi, 425 (paper).

Murray Shukyn and Beverly Shukyn. *You Can't Take a Bathtub on the Subway: A Personal History of SEED—a new approach to secondary school education*. Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973. Pp. xiv, 235 (paper, appendices).

Hugh S. Stevenson, Robert M. Stamp and J. Donald Wilson (eds.). *The Best of Times, The Worst of Times: Contemporary Issues in Canadian Education*. Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972. Pp. xix, 586 (paper, bibliographies).

Other than having been published recently by Holt, Rinehart and Winston and dealing with education, these five books have little in common. Four of them are exclusively concerned with Canadian education, two of them are collections of articles, one documents an innovative educational program, and another one undertakes a critique of Canadian education.

The two collections of articles, *Options: Reforms and Alternatives for Canadian Education* and *The Best of Times, The Worst of Times*, offer an interesting comparison because the former volume is composed of articles solicited for the occasion while the latter volume was culled from extant writings. Since Morrison and Burton are generous in reporting the support received from their publisher, and as they speak also of the enthusiasm and ready compliance