

ly, Bissell cites the growth of the University of Toronto Press under the directorship of Marsh Jeanneret, the School of Graduate Studies headed by Ernest Sirluck, and "the single clearest mark of a great university," the concentration of new, large library resources.

In Chapter Seven, "The Winds of Change," Bissell assesses the commission on university government which responded to the growing pressure of new institutions and the desire for a comprehensive plan for university development that would reflect provincial priorities. In May of 1962, a "brief and succinct" report, essentially representing the deliberations of a university presidents' research committee, became "the first — and the most significant — example of government and university cooperation; and from this point on the problem was to devise some structure whereby that co-operation could be assured and strengthened" (p. 113). In the years to follow, Bissell's own theory of university government and the particular belief "that the university should have one representative, authoritative body to deal with all matters" (p. 120) acted as a benchmark in the resolution of the many complex issues encompassing the university.

From 1968 to 1971, attention at the University of Toronto centred on the critical and social involvement of staff and students in university affairs. Student dissent and expressions of concern focussed on the decision-making process within the university — concerns which, in many instances, coalesced with those held by faculty and administration. There was a "need to widen the internal basis for decision-making; the need to rationalize the structure of organization; the need to establish a firm and clear relationship of the institution to the government." In Bissell's view, the forces acting upon and within the university should be in balance. The resolution of these forces was not found in sensation-grabbing protest but, as so often is the case, in necessary "prolonged, intensive and often tedious discussions of duly appointed bodies" (p. 159).

These tumultuous and disquieting years marked the end of an era and new circumstances challenged the survival of the institution.

The university lost its rigid hierarchical structure . . . it lost its protected position in society, with the end of business control and the growth of government suspicions. The university was now, in a sense, on its own. Autonomy was no longer a grace automatically bestowed; it had to be won in the dust of the arena; and a long tough road lay ahead. Within, dissident elements must be reconciled, and a strong, rational center created to speak for the whole; outside, the university must greatly expand and intensify its program of explanation, and work out more direct, specific means of relating scholarship to social action (p. 191).

The "great good place" had disappeared. No longer was it the same ivory tower. A new, more clamorous, but more vital, place was emerging.

Bissell's account does not stand as a coherent picture of the "idea of a university" such as advanced by Newman or Jaspers, nor is it a comprehensive documented history of the University of Toronto. Rather, it is a refreshingly human commentary which examines the problems of higher education in a manner that is personal, penetrating, and, indeed, inspired.

"What about the title?" you may ask. I refer you to Chapter Two.

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Martin Jay. *The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923-1950*. Toronto: Little Brown & Co., 1973. Pp. 382. \$3.95 (paper).

It is gratifying to read a book which sometimes seems to include everything of significance in 20th century social philosophy. It is, however, difficult to attempt to review such a book with any confidence that the complexity of the ideas, the intellectual intensity of the work can be conveyed to readers. This must have been a much more serious difficulty for Martin Jay himself, however, for his subject carried him into the centres of contemporary social science and philosophy, and required incisive selection from comprehensive intellectual debate often involving a sequence of scholars (e.g., Adorno on Kierkegaard, Marcuse on Heidegger, Horkheimer on Jaspers on Nietzsche).

Jay's *History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research* combines intellectual history and social science criticism in a way that makes it a book for all disciplines. Partly because the subject of the book, the *Institut*, was committed to a uniquely collaborative effort to bring a synoptic interdisciplinary perspective to modern social research and philosophy, and partly because Martin Jay was able to reflect so faithfully and integrate so well the diverse intellectual and aesthetic aspects of the work, it is a book which communicates in one's language of specialisation, but also connects that special interest to other fields necessarily related in the study of society.

To praise the integrative quality of the work is not, however, to suggest that it blurs important distinctions or, worse yet, resolves them through those compromises of imprecision which may be characteristic of "our culture's uncanny ability to absorb and defuse even its most uncompromising opponents" (p. xiii). In fact, the chief value of the book may be its portrayal of the painstaking attempts of the Frankfurt school to seek conceptual precision in their analyses of complex social and philosophical questions — to fight against both formalistic and vaguely overgeneralised pseudo-resolutions. In tracing these attempts in a similarly painstaking way, Jay imposes a caution on all who like to take social theory lightly, to use the jargon of social science loosely, or to cut their research slice too thinly. Moreover, even those inherently difficult connections in social science, such as that between social research and social action or, more specifically, between the methodology of the former and the method of the latter, become distinct in the *Institut's* frontal concern with their relationship. Either through the central concern with the theory-praxis relationship itself, or through the ultimately forced theoretical preference, the inner circle of the *Institut* had no confusion — intellectual struggle, disillusionment, agonising reversals, yes — but at no time were they ignorant of the problematic nature of such connections or tempted to mask their difficulties with an explanatory facade.

The *Institut für Sozialforschung* was created in Frankfurt in 1923, financially through the patronage of Felix Weil, son of an Argentine grain merchant, and officially by an act of the Ministry of Education, to study Marxism as a scientific discipline. Through its successive dislocations, to New York (Columbia University), and partially to Berkeley (University of California), during World War II, then back to Frankfurt in 1949, the *Institut's* character was maintained as a centre of intensive theory, research, and documentation, operating within a set of shared assumptions and over a range of disciplines. It is one of the author's central points that the unique significance of the *Institut* in the period covered was its maintenance of a collective identity, not only through the physical dislocations and personal readjustment, but also through the intellectual trials inevitably occasioned by the attempt to work in the dialectical gap between symbol and reality (p. xiv). The significance of this last phrase is itself remarkable, as Jay's treatment amply illustrates.

Not only did this involve the difficulties of reconciling different bodies of content with inherently different methodologies, but it involved the confrontation of basic differences through their theoretical reference. Members of the *Institut* were to disagree fundamentally on political posture, on the place of utopian optimism in social theory, on the function of psychoanalysis in linking social substructure and superstructure, and even on the theory-methodology-action connections implied at any point in their work. Nevertheless, for the *Institut*, as an entity, their agreement was more significant, though it could never be static, rigid, or unequivocal. The agreement was based on the application of *critical theory* in a framework of neo-Hegelian Marxism (p. 124), but the intellectual approach necessarily superceded any constraints of the framework. They ultimately had to abandon such Marxist tenets as the revolutionary potential of the working class, the centrality of class struggle in history, and the subordination of superstructural cultural phenomena to economic change (p. 296). Although their approach remained constant, they "refused to make a *fetish* of dialectics" (p. 54), and they were able to integrate different methods, primarily the empirical methods learned during their period in the United States. Even their initial purpose of interpreting the relation of theory to *praxis* had to be modified according to their progressive disillusionment with the perceived degeneration of social philosophy into leftist propaganda and of revolutionary potential into state monopoly capitalism. They finally had to question the possibility of *praxis* in the modern world (p. 158), and to put their major emphasis on the capacity of theory to "preserve the truth even if revolutionary practice deviates" (p. 79).

The doubts, rejections, and contradictions were anticipated in the intellectual commitment of the school, however. Their adamant opposition to singular polar explanations never wavered. Their acceptance of empirical methods did not indicate a positivistic "abdication of reflection" (p. 62); they never reduced subjectivity to either a "wholly autonomous (or a) wholly contingent" condition (p. 81); they were equally unwilling to root all knowledge in social context or to ignore the truth of a time; they rejected both the arbitrariness and dissolution of individuality through the concept of the individual as dialectical *Durchgangsinstrument* (p. 207). In short, they consistently probed into and energised their inquiry from the "force field between consciousness and being" (p. 54).

The book is perfectly organised, beginning and ending with the organisation of the *Institut* and with initial and final theoretical summaries. In between, Jay traces the work in specific areas: the integration of psychoanalysis, the studies of authority, analyses of Nazism, aesthetic theory, and the *Institut's* empirical work. In this progression, the names related in some way to *Institut* members and the works listed by or in reference to them are impressive. The work of key figures from the *Institut* itself makes up the content of these chapters, but it is the contribution of Max Horkheimer, director through its period of greatest creativity, which appears to be the integrating thread for the *Institut* and for the book.

When I began the book, I intended to select for review those aspects most relevant to readers of the *Journal* in the educational profession. It would be something of an insult to both the author and to the scholars he studied, however, to vulgarise their intellectual honesty with a fragmentary review. "To do so would have implied a fetishization of [education] as something apart from the social totality" (p. 118). Instead, I prefer to refer this book to anyone who is intellectually concerned with the institutions of society. As Adorno wrote, "No one can compose any longer who has not sensed with his own ears the gravitational pull towards the twelve-tone technique . . . [but] to be true to Schonberg is to warn against all twelve-tone schools" (p. 183) — so, no one can work any longer in the social sciences without apperceiving critical theory, yet resisting its reification.

In an age when irrational political extremism is opposed by drifting political relativism, social action in any institutional area is vulnerable to the manipulation of extremists, common in their estranged subjectivity and objectification of persons. In the face of this, it is an intellectual mandate to follow the tradition of the *Institut* in searching for a philosophy of society, on whatever premises, which contains a rational social dynamic and through which persons may be fulfilled, rather than repressed into a false totality. Certainly this mandate especially in its reference to the thought and behaviour of emerging generations, is pertinent to the conduct of education, and thus to those of us who have some responsibility for that institution.

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Robin Barrow, *Plato, Utilitarianism and Education*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975. Pp. 211. \$15.25

Mr. Robin Barrow, in his book, *Plato, Utilitarianism and Education*, argues that, in the *Republic*, Plato recognised the view that utilitarianism is the only acceptable ethical theory. It is not, of course, formally enunciated, but it can be shown that ". . . the *Republic* is consistently grounded on utilitarianism" (p.1). Stated simply, utilitarianism is the ". . . principle that all men are equally entitled to happiness and that consequently provision should be made for the happiness of all men in the ideal state" (p. 1). The people's happiness, therefore, is the ultimate criterion for assessing right and wrong and/or good and bad. Such an end is to be achieved via education: "[Education's] prime object should be to produce adults who may successfully contribute to the happiness of the whole community, while themselves enjoying happiness within that community" (p.1). And so Plato proceeds to develop his well-known comprehensive total educational system in connection with the above aim.

In arguing that human happiness for all is the ultimate moral principle, Plato, as Barrow convincingly points out, was led to the suggestion that freedom in both society and education must