

Abstract

The arguments of three critics of attempts to expand children's creativity in the classroom are examined. While flaws in theory and practice are admitted, it is maintained that the critics apply standards to creative education that are not applied to general classroom teaching, and that there is a tendency to select from inferior practices and overrestricted examples to support their criticism.

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Creativity And The "Standards" Question

The term 'creative education' has a ready ability to polarize educational opinion. Its champions welcome it as a counterbalance to arid intellectualizing, while its critics associate it with badly examined concepts, novelty at the expense of articulated educational objectives, and chaotic practices. By substituting whimsicality and regression for the demanding task of becoming a creative artist or scientist, teachers have 'sold out' aesthetic and intellectual standards, it is claimed.

Some of these complaints are justified enough to warrant a refinement of the use of the term and a reserve toward haphazard practices; but it will be reasoned in this paper that common objections to creative education actually distort the relationship between creativity and what may legitimately happen in a classroom. In order to discuss the critical position in some detail, the arguments of three educationists, White¹, Cochrane², and Crittenden³ will be selected as representative of an unjustifiedly severe approach to creativity in schools. Their admonitions hinder useful activities of teachers in three ways: (1) by restricting the definition of the word "creative" to such an elevated range of behaviour that they make the task of fostering creativity in the classroom so difficult as to be abandoned; (2) by assuming that certain inferior teaching methods are representative of all creative education, they leave the impression that creative education is an unworthy educational activity; and (3) by over-reacting to fears of 'faculty psychology' (which, broadly is the notion that various mental faculties such as Mind or Will can be strengthened as a muscle can be strengthened) to such an extent that even appropriate attempts at teaching or training are paralysed. The second part of this paper will attempt to suggest contexts where the term 'creative education' is a useful and reasonable one.

The methodology of Cochrane and White is similar in that both select certain examples of teaching-learning procedures and argue from those cases. White takes four instances ranging from a girl at infant school scribbling with crayon, to a boy of twelve writing down uses for a brick, to a primary child discovering his own rule for mathematics, to Dostoevsky as a novelist or Einstein as a scientist. Cochrane expands White's four cases and uses seven 'paradigms' of creative education: a child building a sandcastle, a child scribbling, an iconoclast, a fourteen-year-old who paints in a cubist style, Einsteins, Joyces and Picassos, artistically creative people, and problem solving. As it is not possible to respond to every example from each author, some will be selected which are most relevant to what happens in classrooms.

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The definition is too restrictive.

Cochrane's second case involves a small child who, having been provided with paper and paint, puts down marks that are new to her, in which marks she feels good, and takes pleasure in both the newness of the marks, and the marks themselves. Of such an activity, Cochrane⁴ says that the standards for judging the success of the project are "simply subjective", and that:

whether such a level leads to other types of creativity and under what conditions awaits empirical investigation. Until such times, little can be said about its potential educational value; of an intrinsic educational kind it would appear to have none. Thus, from an educational point of view, there is no obligation to attempt to promote it.

Cochrane's dismissal of the activity merits a response, since were it accepted by teachers, it could paralyse some standard and quite appropriate classroom practices.

Firstly, Cochrane appears to assume that the only value "of an intrinsic educational kind" occurs if the level attained leads on to other types of creativity; nor that there is any educational value in itself in leading a person to make objects that are aesthetically pleasing to the person making them, or in encouraging delight in the student's ability to bring to being new forms and structures. Even if leading a person to produce objects aesthetically pleasing to him at that time is short of where one wishes to finish, pleasurable construction of objects is not ruled out as an important educational objective both for what it leads to and in itself. One would also, over time, assist students to make objects of more artistic complexity, and to refine their discrimination about what is and is not aesthetically pleasing.

Secondly, if Cochrane's counsel were to be followed, much of the activity that goes on in kindergarten and the lower grades, where children are only very slowly learning the vocabulary of the various media in which they work, would be negated. There seems to be no acknowledgement of various grades and steps in education, no recognition that although we might aspire to the end result of the 'educated person', such a result is rather a sophisticated one that requires painstaking steps to attain. In the case of the child in Cochrane's example, it is probably of some significance that she receives encouragement to explore with marks on paper, and important that she be allowed to delight in this process and in what she produces. The significance stems not from the point of view of mental health (which the writers appropriately proclaim as being tangential to the process of education) but from the belief in aesthetic construction is very much the business of education. One wonders where Cochrane would have the process begin, for it to have value "of an intrinsic educational kind": perhaps when the child is already producing recognisably valuable aesthetic objects. If so, one cannot but wonder how she is to do this without any prior steps. Could it be that she is to take these prior steps in secret, or at home, since they are not yet 'educational'? Education, in this restricted definition, seems to take place only when one is already educated.

After discussing his other examples of the iconoclast and the boy who 'discovers' cubist painting for himself, Cochrane returns to the point of the value of the activities of a child

who does not produce anything egregiously novel or outstandingly valuable. Cochrane admits that it is "not altogether implausible" to suggest that a person may gain confidence from making, a sense of ease in accepting the unfamiliar, and an ability to stand against accepted conventions which may be useful "psychological equipment for someone who has other more cognitive capabilities for creative work", although such personality components are "not necessary" for creative work. In philosophy of education, maintains Cochrane⁵, it is as important to demand "absolute clarity in distinguishing personality components from psychological processes as it is to speculate on connections that are more contingent than logical necessity".

It is likely that Cochrane has again set his sights a little high: he grudgingly allows that it is "not altogether implausible" for students to gain confidence from making things, and a sense of ease in accepting the unfamiliar. But these are only useful "psychological equipment", an optional appendage, as it were, for someone who has "other more cognitive capabilities of the creative worker". The strict separation of "cognitive" and "psychological" capabilities hints at the very faculty psychology that Cochrane and White are concerned with eradicating. Although it would be incorrect for a teacher to concentrate exclusively on psychological processes such as self-confidence or risk taking in the hope that students' creativity will thereby be developed, it is equally naive to imagine that creative artists simply invoke "cognitive capacities" of a rational and critical nature, no matter how highly developed these may be.

When creativity is defined in such a way as virtually to exclude its possibility from classroom practice, one's concept of the educated person becomes incomplete: the keynote of the educated person, according to White⁶, is of a person who is "able to make independent, if not creative judgements, works and actions". The paradigm appears to be the critic, the person who is not easily caught out in errors of taste or reasoning; certainly it is desirable for a teacher to help refine a person's powers of reasoning, knowledge, understanding and critical judgement. Certainly the educator need not regard himself to have failed if he is able to assist in such intellectual formation. But it is surely also desirable to encourage generativity, ingenuity and the capacity to produce as well as to evaluate. An English course, for instance, that was capable of bringing its students to a reasonable knowledge and critique of great works of literature, but never involved that student in construction of his own (assuredly lesser) stories and poems, would be an admirable but diminished course; diminished because even though the students were capable of making independent critical judgements, their own fecundity has not been encouraged.

Indeed it would be almost impossible for White *et al* to succeed in their aim of encouraging purely creative criticism whilst not rewarding or regarding creativity, since independent judgements, works and actions themselves involve a synthesis and reformulation of material. In White's own article attacking creativity, he does not solely evaluate the works of others, but presents new structures and reordered concepts for our contemplation, and thereby engages to an extent in the creative process. Critical judgement is an active as well as a reactive process; where it results in a product such as an essay or an article, it may be said to be a creative activity. The creative process may be seen as a continuum which does not cut off suddenly if one is not composing music or writing novels or making sculpture. The intellectual is not only one who stands off and regards the work of others, but one who produces new frameworks, who generates and manipulates ideas which are to varying

degrees original and novel. Where his work is to become public, used as a lecture, book or article, he takes great care with the finish of his product for presentation as an aesthetic unit. Even in criticizing creativity, the critics to varying degrees exercise it. White's assumption that an educator may regard his task as being done if he assists people to be merely reactive founders when one examines the issue of whether a critic can be merely reactive, and when one considers White's own writing as an example of creative output.

Although detractors of creative education rightly stress the insufficiency of mere novelty or originality as criteria for judging an object to be 'creative', there is less justification for demanding that classroom output meet very high standards of excellence before one could purport to be educating students for creativity; the paradigms of Beethoven, Einstein, Joyce and so on are simply not useful in terms of what one can expect from children. In such a reservation of the word, "creativity" is something to which a relatively small number of individuals, acclaimed geniuses, attain. Thus, Crittenden is able to interpret the concept of creativity as 'significant originality', suggesting that to use it in other circumstances is to do so in a "devalued sense of the term"; it would be preferable, he says, to use such words as 'constructive', 'inventive', or 'imaginative'.

While it is certainly not absurd to reserve the word 'creative' for people of significant and excellent output, it is not very helpful either, since our everyday language freely allows the word to be used both of people working in the arts at all levels ("He is a creative artist"), and as an honorific word which distinguishes the person, idea or thing from others which are repetitive, banal, or which don't provide adequate solutions to a problem (as in "that is a very creative solution to the problem"). In this latter case, the word carries the implication of ingenuity, of novelty, of diverging from well-worn paths for a solution.

To confine a word very severely to a highly restricted usage may allow conceptual clarity, but it can also provoke linguistic paralysis; the pruning shears wielded too willingly can kill the tree as well as shape it. A scholar's service is to clarify certain concepts so that the various meanings of the word emerge, rather than to restrict the uses of words in such a way that it is scarcely possible to use language at all. Such is the case with creativity: a restriction of the word "creative" to only a minute section of the population appears both unjustified, because of common usage, and uneconomical because other words will be needed to describe the phenomenon, such as 'inventive' or 'imaginative'; but these in turn could be restricted by a philosopher who laments the prostitution of the word 'inventive' to apply to school children when it should only apply to outstanding inventors, or 'imaginative' only to such poetic imagination as results in literary acclaim. Words like 'creative', 'inventive' and 'imaginative' do admit of degrees which allows them to be applied appropriately to a child's painting, to a painting in an amateur art show, and to a painting exhibited in a famous collection, just as the word 'intelligent' is applied as a term of praise, ("that was an intelligent remark"; "he is an intelligent fellow") in a number of situations. Quite clearly, 'intelligence', when used in this sense, is regarded as a trait possessed in varying degrees by everybody. When it is said of a person that "he is not intelligent", such a statement does not mean that the person is not intelligent at all, but rather that he does not display the characteristics of intelligent behaviour to a high degree.

Reserving the word 'creativity' to publicly acclaimed figures singles out the word for some rather unfair treatment in the educational context. It is rather like reserving the word 'educated' for encyclopedists, or 'intelligent' for geniuses. But very few educationists would argue that because a student will not reach the highest levels of intellectual ability, that is, that he becomes a Johnson, a Bertrand Russell, even an R.S. Peters, he should not be

educated at all. Even though the paradigm for the educated or the intelligent person is far above the reach of most, educationists and teachers would argue that one strives towards that paradigm as much with the bright student as with the dull, notwithstanding that both will fall short. Such is accepted practice, and the situation would be an invidious one were it otherwise; when a student's work in English or Mathematics does not absolutely attain to the highest standards of rationality, clarity and precision, we do not hesitate to praise the work on intellectual grounds, nor do we cease in our attempts to educate a person because they will never be admitted to a tertiary institution, far less attain the status of genius.

The tolerance that we show for people's efforts on the beginner's slopes of the intellectual life, however, does not seem to transfer to creativity. Here, the criteria appear to be the production of very sophisticated pieces of music, paintings, novels or poetry; if what students are doing in the classroom *does not directly lead to such productions*, it is implied that there can be little relationship between teaching such a student and creativity.

The examples selected are unrepresentative of creative education.

The second way in which the critics do not fairly represent creative education is in their reduction of it to certain activities which they rightly disparage. Once these activities have been called into question, it appears that the whole effort of educating for creativity has been thus disestablished. White⁸, for instance, takes as his primary exemplar the following:

A girl at an infant school is given a pad of newsprint and a box of crayons. She is left alone to draw what she likes instead of having to fill in a colouring book with fixed outlines.

White suggests that "most of the argument in these matters centres round the sort of creativity manifested by the girl crayoning" and proceeds to embroider around the example a world of 'creative education' where there is no guidance from the teacher, no structure, and no emergence of aesthetic or intellectual values. In this version of creative education the teacher plays a minimal role, merely providing materials and possibly also topics about which children can draw or write what they want. It is easy to shy at such coconut figures representing permissive education at its worst, but such a fantasy does not match any but the most inane descriptions of creative education. White imagines an educational world where novelty is the only value and where the approved form of teaching is "the exclusive use of unguided activity". Such a world does not find, one hopes, much correspondence in educational reality. Where unguided activity is used in 'creative education', and it is surely but one of the teaching techniques employed, the aim of the activity is not its 'unguidedness', but the hope that the activity may be successful in bringing about the development of products of aesthetic interest. An argument for unguided activity is not necessarily one that implies that *all* educational activities should be unguided, just as someone who writes in an educational magazine about the value of writing a retrospective journal of one's experience, or about the value of school excursions, or the desirability of trampolining in schools, does not imply that this is the sole activity that should take place in a school. To take a suggestion about a teaching practice and argue against it as being representative of all education is at once an easy and futile task, since what is destroyed is only a straw man.

Most critics of creative education point to the fact that in the central paradigms of creativity — the Einsteins, Beethovens, Picassos and the like — the creative worker has worked within a discipline, thoroughly understood its rules and conventions, and has altered some of these in a recognisably successful fashion. But the fantasy implicit in the same critic's rejection of attempts to educate for creativity is that teachers have waived all rules, all knowledge of the language of a given form, that they do not hope to advance the

students by any means other than the most arbitrary and accidental discoveries, and that any sort of work whatsoever, provided it is 'original', is given the most fulsome praise. 'Creative' is not to be equated with 'discovery', although discovery methods may from time to time be used in creative education.

Cochrane's idea of creative education centres more on unusualness of teaching methodology. He maintains⁹ that "most often the idea in use requires that the method be novel" which he contrasts with "standard" methods which are, or ought to be defined as, "those which tend to be successful; creative methods, then, should be more so". Cochrane maintains that one should use such "creative" methods of teaching only when "standard" methods had failed, or when a teacher has a flair for inventiveness and fails when she uses "standard" methods. Under such conditions the teacher may be permitted to teach "creatively", although there should be no pressure on other teachers without this "gift" to do so. It goes without saying that if one regards only one extreme of creative education, Cochrane's argument is quite sound; to encourage in training institutions bizarre novelties that take no account of outcome would indeed be a fatuous exercise. But it is again easy to oppose a position which few teachers would seriously propose; novelty of teaching style may be a small part of creative education, but it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for that process to be carried out.

In educating for creativity it is more important to emphasise the *acceptance* of novel ideas in students, and to hope that the children display freshness, imagination, ingenuity and ease in their approach to learning. Although creative education does not positively rule out novel approaches on the part of the teacher, since these may lead to breakthroughs in perception by the students, or may increase motivation, or may cause the students to be less intellectually inhibited, exclusively novel approaches to teaching are not synonymous with the process. To propose the adoption of random and bizarre approaches that have no chance of success in any way is indeed worthy of condemnation, but it is unlikely that anyone has knowingly done so.

Reactions to faculty psychology

A third way in which critics are somewhat over-stern on the notion of educating for creativity is their association of it with an outmoded faculty psychology. Here again, creative education appears to receive more rebuke than, say, education which encourages critical thinking. White remarks that although teachers have largely given up simplistic beliefs in developing mental muscles such as strengthening the Will or the Memory by practice in character-building or retentive tasks, "there still seems today to be much support for the notion of a *Creative* faculty, which for its development requires practice of a different sort: not practice in storing ideas, as with Memory, but practice in letting ideas *flow* from their sources in the Unconscious".¹⁰ We have already observed that White appears to identify creative education with an extreme type of *laissez-faire* classroom; it is also clear that he identifies creativity with a reduced form of regression in the service of the ego, where educationists who advocate original productivity make no call on energy, criticism, knowledge or research from their students.

Without resorting to faculty psychology it is possible to view creativity as a habitual stance, a resourcefulness, a readiness of the person to be flexible in his thinking, an enhanced ability to try many different sorts of solutions to a problem, an acceptance, through custom, that the person is capable of producing objects of aesthetic interest. These may be some generalized characteristics of a creative person, but they no more bespeak an

implicit faculty psychology than does the hope of producing students who can think critically bespeaks a Critical Thinking faculty. Critical thinking legitimately may be aspired to as an educational aim, even though it is a generalized ability or stance that comes into play in a number of diverse situations. The person who has received extensive training in practical criticism in English literature, for instance, may be expected to demonstrate his abilities in a number of different situations that are not explicitly to do with English poetry. One would be very disappointed as a teacher, I expect, if one had spent years training a student in literary criticism only to find that there was absolutely no carry-over when the student was asked to evaluate a film. Similarly, a teacher clearly does not stand in a classroom and give 'creative education' which is not concerned with any particular content; rather, the art teacher may encourage the students to be a little bolder, a little freer, a geography teacher may present problems whose solutions are multiple, or the English teacher may unite with the physics teacher in the production of a mime relating to atomic structure.

From all of this one might expect a student with a different stance towards the world than one would from a school, say, where such activities were explicitly forbidden. Any aim in education that points to and gives practice in a constellation of skills, abilities and attitudes runs as much risk being labelled "Faculty Psychology" as does creative education.

Contexts of creativity in education

1. Making

'Creative' is currently such a fashionable term of praise that its primary meaning tends to be obscured by a large number of less essential meanings connected with solving problems, divergent thinking, imagination, ingenuity and innovation. Elliott¹¹ points out that the most primitive use of the word 'create' comes from the biblical myth of creation where the world was brought into being from nothing. In this usage of the word, that of freshly bringing something into being, we most immediately think of artists, musicians, writers and inventors, because they present us with an object complete in itself which comes to existence suddenly, as it were, from nothing. In many cases of invention, and in all cases of artistic creation, this object will be judged as a success or failure on the grounds of whether it is aesthetically pleasing, and whether it is in some way original, although the originality will not necessarily be one which radically changes the language of the form. A person involved in artistic creativity is not necessarily devising novel techniques or making dramatic changes to the medium: it is sufficient to produce objects that are pleasing, whether or not such objects are absolutely innovative or revolutionary. What is ruled out is mere copying or unchanging repetition of a single form. If the products show little ingenuity, imagination, originality, finish, or evidence of intelligence, one may still say that they have been 'created', but that they demonstrate a relatively low level of creativity. The verb 'to create' is definite, and connotes a certain class of actions; 'creative', on the other hand, is an honorific term, which one can apply in varying degrees to an object or a person. It would be legitimate, then, to say "4E were creating some sculpture today, but only Forsyth's was very creative; the rest were pretty mediocre". That is, all the class were involved in bringing into being objects for contemplation, but only one person did so with a praiseworthy result.

When educating for 'creativity' in the simple sense of the word of getting pupils to make things such that the beholder may delight in the objects for their own sake, and which involve originality (making a table according to a plan drawn up by the teacher would not do, but new design for a table would), one hopes for appropriate standards to be met, and for

the students to be introduced to the language and established forms of the art in which they are working. Creativity in its honorific sense implacably involves questions of value, and one naturally hopes from one's students the best work possible, which usually implies knowledge of the paradigms of the field. Sometimes, and for a particular purpose (for example, not wishing to over-awe the students), this introduction to the best available works may be delayed, but it is never in question.

Efforts to achieve excellence in a given discipline normally require acquaintance with the works that set the standards in that field; but it is also permissible and sometimes desirable to work in a medium in which the students have had very little experience (for example, in the field of musical composition), and which it is unlikely that they will pursue in any detail. The task may be to produce short, simple, but relatively pleasing pieces of music, for the purpose of making the students aware of their powers in this area, of the sorts of difficulties to be overcome for a piece of music to sound pleasing, and so on. Clearly, if such an exercise were never carried forward in any one discipline, and if the curriculum consisted solely of innovative but brief and essentially amateurish products, schooling would become a shallow and demoralising experience for the participants. But the fact that an activity loses value if abused does not imply that there is no value in the activity itself when it is judiciously used.

In the first sense of 'creative education', that of education that encourages people to make or do things, the mainstream of such a programme might be to promote as much excellence as the students are capable of in any one of the arts, whether it be dance, music, the visual arts, writing or whatever. In such a programme there may be pursued at the same time a quest for excellence and an encouragement and acceptance of the students' own ideas for different approaches to the medium, exploring in the process its restrictions and possibilities. This atmosphere is far from a caricature of novelty for novelty's sake mentioned earlier, but is more a permission to the students to explore the boundaries of their materials, and not *merely* to stay within their traditional confines. There is no real virtue either in traditionalism or novelty; the test of the appropriateness of each lies in the quality of the final product. For such a programme to be successful students in the long run need both training in the language of the medium and encouragement to meet aesthetic standards.

A creative education programme, then, may look exactly like an 'ordinary' art, music or writing class; it may branch off from the mainstream of any one discipline and have a workshop of some hours' length in the making of music, or junk sculpture, or pottery or poetry, even though it is unlikely that any follow-through will take place. The value of such a programme is that people can rapidly experience their resources in fields where they thought they had none, and can develop a product which is quite pleasing. Although critics of creative education quite rightly deplore the subsidence of education into therapy, a sense of confidence in manipulating the real world, and some understanding from the 'inside' of the major artistic media of the culture seem to be eminently justifiable educational objectives. It seems also educationally desirable to assist students to have a sense of their artistic fecundity, their capabilities as creators rather than merely as consumers.

2. *Problem Solving*

A second, and more recent notion of creativity has developed which has the *scientist* as its primary analogue: in this case, the creative person does not so much bring an object into being as ingeniously discovers truths about the world which are in a sense 'there already'; that is, he creates a new vision of the world, or restructures it so that we see it differently. By

extension of this concept, as Elliott points out, it is not so much necessary to make anything in order to be creative, as to manifest imaginativeness or ingenuity in any valued pursuit. The plethora of psychological tests derived from Guilford's model has helped to promote this idea of creativity as problem solving, which has become so prevalent that it has edged out the primary meaning of creativity, that of making objects which are whole and pleasing. So powerful is this new notion of creativity as problem solving, that artistic creativity is now sometimes wrongly construed as solving artistic problems in novel or original ways. Such a construction distorts the nature of the artistic act, and leads to absurdities such as the question as to which problem Beethoven's Fifth Symphony may be seen as a solution.

Although there are technical problems that have been overcome in any successful artistic work, it is a distortion of whatever it is that makes art, literature or music valuable to us, to see it as a solution to a 'problem'. While Michelangelo's *David* is a work that involved very great difficulties in terms of structure and materials, it is not valued for that; the distinction between technical skill and real artistic ability is widely recognized in critical circles. To suggest that in carving the face of *David* Michelangelo surmounted the 'problem' of carving a commanding, youthful face is to lapse into tautology. The endeavour is an entirely different one from that, say, of the 'problem' of building a lightweight bridge of a certain span, or of making a pair of pliers that will fulfill three functions.

The conception of creativity as problem-solving runs two risks. The first, discussed above, is that artistic creativity will wrongly be seen as 'solving' artistic problems. The second is that where teachers are teaching discrete skills believed to lead to creativity, they will confuse the acquisition of a set of personality characteristics or thinking skills alleged to be 'possessed by' creative persons as being demonstrations of creativity itself. Creativity is judged by products, not by processes, for two reasons. In the first place, the view that creativity is associated with a set of personality characteristics is an incomplete one, since no one quite knows what these characteristics are. Although numerous studies have been conducted on the relationship between personality characteristics and creativity test scores, the tenuous results make it difficult to know whether the individual's creativity affected his personality, or vice versa. In the second place, even were it possible, so to speak, to 'strip down' enough currently creative people to see what they were 'made of', there is no guarantee that a grafted selection of characteristics or processes from creative persons will result in creative product.

Such a complexity is not always recalled by psychologists when they push Humpty Dumpty off the wall to see what he is made of. There is no guarantee that all the bits necessary to put him back together again are available. Although significant creative activity draws on many abilities, not all of them are knowable, replicable or quantifiable. Even when the abilities that are replicable and knowable are separately encouraged and practised, there is little likelihood that the amalgam will be a 'creative' genius. In this the critics are correct: schooling can no more *produce* a creative genius than it can an intellectual prodigy. But even though it is naive to imagine that practice in discrete skills believed to be part of the creative process will produce a creative genius, it is too despondent a position to leave production of aesthetic objects or solving problems entirely to luck or to some mystical flowering process within the individual. While no one can 'train' a creative genius, there are intellectual and physical abilities that seem to be involved in high levels of creativity that can be encouraged, rewarded, reinforced and explained. It is obvious that students learn what they are taught, or if that seems over-optimistic, that they do not learn what they are not taught. If problem-solving is even largely a logical process involving

specific thinking operations, it probably can be taught, or at least students' skills may be improved in the area. It would seem, therefore, that if creativity in the second sense, that of producing original and apt solutions to problems, is a desirable educational objective (and it would be difficult to argue that it was not) and that such an ability can be taught, this teaching may form part of what can be called 'creative education', always keeping in mind that 'problem-solving' does not exhaust the meaning of creativity.

Conclusion and Summary Statement

'Creative education' may be seen as the approval of a constellation of approaches on the part of the teacher and students. Many of the exhortations to teachers given by such writers as Torrance¹², Williams¹³, Logan and Logan¹⁴ and others go over more or less the same ground of rewarding novel ideas in children, helping them have confidence in their ability to create, rewarding an inquiring attitude to things, encouragement of venturesomeness, generating excitement in the learning process, tolerance for conflict and ambiguity, asking provocative questions, and giving opportunities to students to see their own goals. Such exhortations read more like apologies for 'modern' education from the early 1950's than anything specifically connected with creativity, although it would be difficult to disagree with the sentiments expressed.

It is possible, on the other hand, that there are stages in which creativity in the first sense, that of making, might be best enhanced by imposing the most rigid standards on the students to produce very perfect work. Nor is it beyond possibility that some subjects may be taught 'creatively', for example, 'creative mathematics', where even rote learning is used to achieve a mastery of certain fundamental forms before moving on. In an art or music class a stage will almost certainly come when the teacher doesn't accept the primitive, unstructured or playful use of art materials. Regression is not creativity, although regression may be a part of the creative process, and consistent encouragement of regression without informed production is more likely to lead to boredom and triviality than to progress.

In short, 'creative education' has no particular process, but is more directed to ensuring that the end (that students are 'more creative' than before) is more likely to be achieved. It will usually involve an attitude on the part of the teacher which is able to lay aside for a while conventional wisdom, presuppositions and formulations of problems. It may or may not include activities and exercises designed to induce regression to primitive ego states. It will usually but not necessarily involve a warm relationship on the part of the teacher, a commitment and enthusiasm for the creative task seem more to the point. It may or may not involve novel teaching methods. If it is directed towards problem solving, it is likely to require a tolerance for ambiguity and an acceptance of apparently "wild" and "silly" suggestions. The two types of creativity that have been discussed may require different sorts of approaches on the part of the teacher which preclude formulae as to creative teaching. Artistic creativity can sometimes demand a perfectionism on the part of teacher and student that is not so necessary in the generation of ideas or solutions to problems, where a more game-like atmosphere may prevail.

Whatever the methods, creative education can be a worthy educational activity which is not to be pushed aside by arguments that ignore its essence and exploit its abuses. The persistent critical theme that has been addressed in this paper is that expectations are placed on creative education to produce significant works that are not imposed on other classroom activities which are accepted as meritorious. Further, examples used by the critics of creative teaching are in fact examples of an extreme form of encouraging for novelty in the

classroom. Such examples are drawn from of the worst rather than the best of creative education, but yet are taken as representative of the whole spectrum. It is argued that creative education does have a place in schools for intellectual, aesthetic and developmental reasons. The creative process in the classroom is significant, not always because the product is of outstanding merit, but because the process involves some of the best things about being human.

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