Abstract

*According to T.W. Moore (**Educational Theory: An Introduction,** London, 1974), general theories of education of the sort developed by philosophers from Plato to Dewey have quite rightly gone out of fashion. Moore would restrict the contemporary philosopher to a more formal, analytical contribution to educational theory. The author contends that he (and many of his fellow philosophers of education) ignores the special resources a philospher can bring to educational questions as an educated man, coming from a distinguished tradition of analysis and synthesis, and usually engaged in teaching. These are resources that the current educational system can ill-afford to waste.*

Brian Hendley*

Wasted Resources: What Philosophers Might Contribute to Educational Theory But Often Don't

When I come to the end of the first half of my two-semester course in the Philosophy of Education, I look for some means of establishing a transition from past to present philosophers of education. My students have worked their way through selections from such historical philosophers as Plato, Rousseau, Whitehead, and Dewey; now I want to tell them what to expect from contemporary thinkers. With this in mind, I close out the term by having the students read T.W. Moore's, *Educational Theory: An Introduction.*[1] This short book manages to combine an admirably clear and concise summary of historical theories of education with a straightforward description of the present state of the art.

Moore's description of what today's philosophers can contribute to educational theory is an accurate reflection of the position held by many philosophers of education in Great Britain and North America, a view whose current acceptability is a cause of alarm for those of us seeking a sense of historical continuity in the philosophy of education. In essence, it consists of the claim that there was something definitely wrongheaded about the general theorizing about education that was done by philosophers in the past, and the admonition that, putting all that sorry business behind us, we should now get on with our proper, more analytical tasks. Rather than help me establish a transition, Moore's approach forces me to justify to the students what we have already studied and come to grips with the problem of what I think the contemporary philosopher has to offer to educational theory.

The book does contain a useful analysis of what a theory is, what is distinctive about an educational theory, and the different sources it can draw upon. Moore defines the new role of the philosopher of education and tries to fit it into a contemporary model of educational theory. Those of us who reject his conclusions must look at his argument and examine his analysis. That is what I shall do in this paper. First, I shall briefly explain Moore's position, with particular emphasis of his view of educational theory and philosophy's contribution to it. Second, I shall raise some objections to Moore, based largely on the claim that he is ignoring some of the special resources the philosopher can bring to bear on educational questions. Finally, I shall make some concluding remarks on how I initiate student into contemporary philosophy of education in the second half of my course.

Moore on Educational Theory

According to Moore, educational theory consists of a general, practical set of recommendations aimed at influencing educational activities. It is practical, rather than explanatory, because it aims not

---

*Department of Philosophy, University of Waterloo, Ontario, Canada.

so much at describing what is the case or predicting what we might expect to occur (as does scientific theory) as it does at prescribing or recommending what should be the case. It is general rather than limited because its recommendations are not intended to deal with specific pedagogical problems (e.g. what visual aids should I use to teach geography to 35 bored and unruly Grade 9 students?), but rather spell out an overall view of the purposes and objectives of the educational process as a whole (e.g. what kind of person or society should education produce?). Moore argues that general theories of education can be tested for consistency, coherence, and faulty assumptions.

Philosophers from Plato to Dewey have developed such general practical sets of recommendations for education. Moore acknowledges them as an important source of "useful insights into what goes on in schools and into what ought to be going on there".[2] On the other hand, he criticizes the "metaphysical" or untestable nature of their hypotheses and maintains that such blueprints for the good life have now quite properly gone out of fashion in philosophy. According to Moore, "Philosophy tends now to be seen as a 'higher-order' activity, working on the concepts and arguments used at a lower logical level." Instead of attempting to formulate comprehensive views of the nature of reality and man's place in it, philosophers now rightly see their task as that of "analyzing and clarifying the conceptual apparatus used by other disciplines, and of examining the arguments used in theorizing of various kinds".[3] Besides this change in the attitude of philosophers themselves toward what they should be doing, Moore points to the tremendous increase in psychological and sociological data as well as the present uncertainty about values as factors which tend to discourage philosophizing about education in the grand old manner.[4]

He thinks that a modern approach to educational theory should be in terms of a three-tiered model. On the first or ground level are educational activities: "teaching, learning, training, demonstrating, punishing - the sort of activities to be found in classrooms anywhere". At the next higher level comes educational theory: "A body of connected principles, counsels and recommendations, aimed at influencing what goes on at the ground level." This is no longer the exclusive preserve of the philosophers and, as we shall see in a moment, Moore distinguishes several different contributors to educational theory. Finally, at a higher level still, is the philosophy of education which seeks to clarify concepts like "educating" and "teaching" used at the lower levels and critically examines the theories which operate there, "testing them for consistency and validity."[5]

A contemporary educational theory will draw upon several different sources. It should derive its substantial assumptions from social science where objective experimentation and disciplined observation in areas like child study, learning theory, and the sociology of education provide us with "a reliable basis for educational prescriptions".[6] Philosophy can make clear the formal assumptions of any theory of education; it can give us a general outline of what must be presupposed in regard to the aims, subject-matter, and methods of education. Showing the influence of Richard Peters on his thought (an influence which he freely admits), Moore summarizes this as follows: "Granted that we are to achieve educated men, then, on the basis of what we currently know about children and their development, we should initiate them into what we can justify as worthwhile knowledge, skill and attitudes, using such methods as satisfy the canons of morality, pupil-participation, and effectiveness".[7]

Taking his factual assumptions from social sciences and mindful of the conceptual requirements of the formal frameworks developed by the philosopher, the practising teacher should then fill in the specific content. Such detailed content seems to involve day-to-day decisions about curriculum materials, pedagogical methods, goals, and objectives which, according to Moore, may be derived from contemporary material, from actual commitments to values, and such up-to-date knowledge as is available. In this way, "the teacher can make an on-going theory of education which will be as up-to-date as he cares to make it".[8]

I object to Moore's three-tiered model and disagree with his view of the relatively limited contribution philosphy can make to educational theory. I think his model is too rigid and tends to isolate components of the educational process which might more realistically be understood as

overlapping. I also feel he does not fully appreciate the special resources that the philosopher can bring to bear on educational theory as an educated man who has been trained in the art of generalization and who is now engaged in teaching. Let us consider each objection in turn.

Moore's Three-tiered Model

Moore wants us to think of education as involving an "inter-related set of activities going on at different levels, something like a building with more than one floor occupied".[9] The differences between levels are to be understood as "logical", which means that though the levels are distinct, "each higher stage arises out of, and depends on, the stage below". Thus, educational theory is distinct from educational activities, yet it depends on them for its point; similarly philosophy of education can be distinguished from both educational theories and activities, even though it presupposes both. Moore, like many other contemporary philosophers of education, tries to delineate the proper role of the philosopher in regard to education by emphasizing the "higher-order" character of philosophizing.[10]

The trouble with his model is that floors of a building can also be seen as separate, self-contained units and the sense of their interrelatedness can easily be lost. For example, what goes on at the ground floor (in the classroom) can occur with no thought whatsoever given to the theories and analyses being developed at higher levels. The higher levels, in turn, can be see as too removed from the realities below to produce anything relevant or practical. When we come to Moore's philosopher of education, I can't help but think of Socrates as portrayed in *The Clouds*, elevated in his basket and occasionally coming forth with unintelligible pronouncements from those lofty heights, most of which are ignored by those with their feet planted firmly on the ground. I cannot deny that there are philosophers today who seem to fit this description, revelling in their abstractions while remaining professionally aloof from practical concerns, but surely they should not be singled out as models of philosophical thinking!

Finally, Moore's later claim that the practising teacher should be his own general theorist of education calls to mind an individual frantically running up and down flights of stairs so as to be all things to all people. Moore simply doesn't tell us how educational theories and analyses are to filter down to the ground level, nor how practical problems are to rise to the attention of higher level thinkers. He ignores Dewey's view of the interaction of theory and practice whereby education is seen as "the laboratory in which philosophic distinctions become concrete and are tested".[11] Dewey saw theory in terms of practical problem-solving and even on the level of general, philosphical theories, he argued that their acceptance or rejection should make a difference in practice. For Dewey, philosophy of education "is not an external application of ready-made ideas to a system of practice having a radically different origin and purpose; it is only an explicit formulation of the problems of the formulation of right mental and moral habitudes in respect to the difficulties of contemporary social life".[12] Philosophical analyses arise out of and should have application to practical contexts. There is an implicit divorce of theory from practice in Moore's model that seems to lead to the sterile abstractions and uninformed practice all too prevalent in education today.

The three-tiered model is meant to convey logical differences, but instead it manages to obscure the real situation. I am a trained philosopher, concerned parent, practising teacher, and an educational theorist. In writing this paper I may (hopefully) call upon my critical and analytical powers, but I also have in mind my own practical educational experiences (as teacher, student and parent) as well as my familiarity with the theories of philosophers like Plato, Rousseau, Whitehead, and Dewey. I can't simply shut off parts of my awareness in order to operate on the appropriate level; to do so would be to make it no longer *my* thinking about education. I am a philosopher and a human being and I don't see how the two can be divorced.

Moore wants to isolate what one does *qua* philosopher from what is done by practising teachers and educational theorists. By attempting to draw such fine logical distinctions within educational activities, he commits what Whitehead calls "the fallacy of misplaced concreteness" which consists in "mistaking the abstract for the concrete".[13] I would argue that most of us who deal with educational

issues do not really function on such distinct levels but rather that our point of view is the result of a series of overlapping experiences, activities, and ideas. In addition, I think that Moore sells most philosophers of education short by failing to appreciate the special resources that we can bring to bear on educational questions, resources that the educational system can ill-afford to waste.

The Resources of the Philosopher

To begin with, one assumes that the philosopher meets Peters' criteria of an educated man, a person with an all-round development morally, intellectually, and spiritually.[14] Such a person is defined as one who has been sufficiently initiated into the various forms of knowledge that he or she can appreciate the distinctive character of each, recognize the interrelatedness of the forms, and their applicability within the context of daily life, and be aware of further possibilities in each area.[15] This means that the philosopher should have a general educational background which combines an acquaintance with various factual approaches to problems with the ability to relate different cognitive perspectives and look for the practical application of theories and the verification of hypotheses.

The specific training in philosophy should add to this general background a sense of logical rigor, a facility for analyzing concepts, appraising arguments, discovering presuppositions, and an exposure to a long tradition of great thinkers attempting to formulate overall views and general hypotheses about man and reality. The intellectual heritage of philosophers from Plato to Dewey is more than a collection of historical relics to be admired by handled with care; neither is it a kind of primitive, pre-scientific catalogue of errors on a par with astrology and alchemy.[16] The metaphysical, epistemological, ethical, and political systems of the past can be seen in Peters' terms as equipping the philosopher to travel with a different view, to look at the educational situation and the mass of empirical data that pertains to it and attempt to synthesize the details into a general theory of the aims of education, its methods and content, private and public aspects of learning, moral and social worth. The educational theories of Plato, Rousseau and Dewey can help us get clear on the dimensions of the task of educating the young, as well as suggest how different curricula, pedagogical methods, and objectives can be theoretically justified.

This is not to claim final truth for any of the theories, merely to underscore their usefulness in our own grappling with the larger issues. As John of Salisbury put it in the twelfth century: we are like dwarfs perched on the shoulders of giants, "We see more and further than our predecessors, not because we have keener vision or greater height, but because we are lifted up and borne aloft on their gigantic stature".[17] Philosophers like Plato and Dewey can raise our sights from our own particular educational circumstances and encourage us to formulate a comprehensive overview. Thus the appositeness of Dewey's remark that theory is "the most practical of all things" because it widens our attention, creates farther-reaching purposes, and enables us to use a deeper range of conditions.[18]

There are some contemporary philosophers of education who would disagree with Moore and O'Connor and defend the role of general theorizing in education. Paul Hirst, for example, asserts that "whatever, one may think of the truth claims of metaphysical beliefs and the form of justification of moral values, both these enter into the formation of educational principles and judgments. They cannot be ignored or wished out of the way".[19] Hirst rejects O'Connor's charge that such theory is worthless because it is unscientific and defends it as being legitimately concerned with "forming rationally justified principles for what ought to be done in an area of practical activity".[20] William Frankena goes even further and argues that the factual science of education may well continue to borrow hypotheses from speculative philosophy, and he urges philosophers not to give up the search for such general hypotheses about men and the world which may be relevant to the process of education.[21] Frankena treats historical philosophers of education as part of the normative philosophy of education which he thinks should still be taken seriously.[22]

The influence of past philosophers on current educational thought can also be traced in the work of certain psychologists like Lawrence Kohlberg and Jerome Bruner. Kohlberg[23] claims that his cross-cultural research on moral development lends empirical support to the Platonic hypothesis that virtue is a kind of knowledge and justice is the highest moral principle. Bruner[24] has argued that

Dewey's view that the linguistic procedures an individual employs "necessarily reflect the circumstances in which he has lived and how he has coped with them" is borne out by his own researches into how children acquire language. Robin Barrow suggests that many of the insights of Rousseau in regard to freedom and learning are being substantiated by educational practice and claims that we can learn from the educational experiments of the freeschoolers and deschoolers.[25]

What is important to my mind is not so much the empirical results as the attitude toward these past theories of education. It is an attitude that runs counter to O'Connor's view that the untestability of metaphysical claims renders them of little use to the contemporary educational thinker. For all his empathy towards historical theories of education, Moore apparently accepts O'Connor's criticism as conclusive. And yet surely the general theories of Plato, Rousseau, and Dewey can be checked for internal consistency, coherence with what is known, and applicability to the educational process.[26] Some aspects of these theories may fail to meet such criteria, others, as suggested in the examples above, seem to provide what Whitehead likes to call fruitful generalizations which act as a restraint upon specialists and lead to an enlargement of their imaginations.[27] In Whitehead's terms, thinking about education can be seen to follow a rhythmic cycle which starts from a romantic awareness of possibilities, moves through a stage of precision, analysis, and organization, and on to a stage of generalization or synthesis which yields "a comprehension of a few general principles with a thorough grounding in the way they apply to a variety of concrete details". This makes us aware of even more possibilities and the cycle starts again.[28] Whitehead might have chided O'Connor for getting stuck on the level of (scientific) precision, thereby bringing the whole process of thinking about education to an abrupt halt.

I have been arguing that the philosopher, coming from a distinguished heritage of synthesis and general hypothesis, can uniquely contribute general sets of recommendations aimed at influencing practical educational activities. It is a sad commentary on the state of the discipline to see Moore repudiate this traditional role of philosophy and suggest that the teacher become his or her own general theorist of education. Even on these grounds, he ignores the fact that most philosophers are also practising teachers and thus are in a position to see the practical effects of certain methods of teaching, to have a sense of what might be realistically expected of students and to be directly aware of where theory falls short in practice. Ideas do have consequences and philosophers should be at least as able to relate the theoretical to the concrete as Moore's practising teacher. I agree with Dewey's observation that "philosophers in general, although they are themselves usually teachers, have not taken education with sufficient seriousness for it to occur to them that any rational person could actually think it possible that philosophizing should focus about education as the supreme human interest in which, moreover, other problems, cosmological, moral, logical, come to a head".[29] This is again to assert the inappropriateness of locating the philosopher of education on an upper level, twice-removed from classroom activities. My whole point in this paper has been to claim that as an educated man, specially trained in analysis and synthesis and usually a practising teacher as well, the philosopher has more to contribute to educational theory than Moore and many of his fellow philosophers of education will allow.

Where Do We Go From Here?

Such a contribution requires that philosophers regain a respect for (and perhaps also get reacquainted with) their own tradition as a source of large, working hypotheses about man and the world which provide us with both a general framework and a proposed content for educational theory. This content can be appraised in terms of consistency, coherence, and applicability to the present situation. It is neither unquestionably true nor unintelligibly nonsensical. It can raise our sights to a general overview of particular problems and create a response to them that should combine thorough analysis with productive synthesis.

This is, of course, not to ignore the need for philosophers to be conversant with new developments in ethics, social and political philosophy, and epistemology, especially as these seem pertinent to educational issues. Moves in this direction have been taken in books like Richard Peters' *Ethics and*

Education,[30] a flawed but pivotal attempt to deal with educational issues from a contemporary ethical perspective; Brian Crittenden's *Education and Social Ideals*,[31] which tries to apply new insights in social and political philosophy to educational questions; and Allen Brent's *Philosophical Foundations for the Curriculum*,[32] which tries to construct an epistemological basis for the curriculum from the ideas of Hirst, Chomsky, and Wittgenstein. There have also been attempts to draw upon phenomenology, psychoanalysis, and neo-Marxist perspectives and relate them to curriculum inquiry.[33]

More communication between philosophers and social scientists seems in order, particularly in exploring educational issues of common concern. Such communication could take the form of personal discussions, formal papers, a certain amount of reading in educational psychology or sociology of education, jointly sponsored symposia, interdisciplinary programmes, visiting scholars, and the like. If we accept Moore's definition of educational theory as a general, practical set of recommendations aimed at influencing educational activities, we should realize how well-suited it is for breaking down the barriers of artificial specialization. We can isolate ourselves on Moore's higher level by sins of omission as well as commission. A philosopher ignorant of the facts is ill-equipped to generalize about them.

This means that we should also pay more attention to the practical classroom experience that most of us have. I am not suggesting that we turn our classes into control groups, nor that we be so self-consciously aware of what we are doing that we end up doing it badly. I am saying that as practising teachers we can gain direct experience of what teaching and learning involve, what students want and need, how appropriate certain curricula are for these students. Such direct experience can both illuminate and stimulate much of our conceptual understanding of education.

It has been my own practical experience that my students can be initiated into contemporary philosophy of education by having them read and discuss recent work by philosophers on the curriculum. We start with Paul Hirst's well-known analysis of the forms of knowledge,[34] then consider some criticisms of it by Pring,[35] a refinement of the theory by White,[36] a proposal for a compulsory core to the Canadian curriculum by Barrow,[37] and finally a radical alternative put forward by Illich.[38] The students seem able to relate questions of the justification and proposed content of the curriculum to their own experience and they follow the arguments with interest and, sometimes, even enthusiam. Whenever it seems appropriate, I make comparisons between old and new theories (e.g. Plato and Hirst, Rousseau, and Illich, Dewey and Pring). The students thus gain some sense of the continuity and new developments in the philosophy of education.

It is my hope that the return of philosophers to their traditional role of educational theorizing will be part of an overall resumption by philosophy of its historical tasks. While not minimizing the difficulty of propounding general, practical sets of recommendations, I have tried to indicate the special resources that philosophers can bring to the attempt. My attitude towards philosophy is quite similar to the view of Donald Levy who analyzes Diotima's claim in the *Symposium* that "the object of love is to procreate and give birth in the presence of beauty" (206e) as follows:

> It is not enough, she seems to say, for a philosopher, a lover of wisdom, merely to assist at the birth of ideas in others, playing the midwife, herself barren (to which Socrates often compared himself), examining the new-born ideas for soundness. Such activities have no intrinsic worth; they are of value only if they lead the philosopher to bring forth theories of his own. The genuine lover of wisdom must himself conceive.[39]

Conclusion

The point of this paper has been that philosophers should stop wasting their resources and begin making more of a contribution to educational theory. Brand Blanshard has said that "Philosophy is the persistent attempt to understand the nature of things by the exercise of reason, and it has its own injunction, namely, loyalty to reason in thought and practice".[40] In the domain of education, this means that the philosopher attempts to understand what is going on, why it is happening, and what should be happening. There is a concern for truth and value, in thought as well as in practice. I am willing to grant that philosophers have no monopoly on theory-building in education. We need joint inquiry in these matters by philosophers, psychologists, and those who teach, counsel, and direct the

young in the classroom. The philosopher can attempt to bring together the disparate findings of more specialized inquiries into some kind of meaningful whole in the course of making general recommendations about the type of person or society education should produce.

What seems worth stressing in this endeavour is the philosopher's commitment to seeing that our ideas and practices in education be reasonable. The allegiance to reason can bring the philosopher into conflict with special interest groups or social mores; yet the call to have good reasons for what we say and do about educating the young is one that must be defended. It is the Socratic ideal that the unexamined life is not worth living that the philosopher can bring to our discussions of education and our attempts to provide an overall rationale for our educational practices. In my view, this is the most valuable contribution that philosophers can make to educational theory. Consequently, I repeat my appeal to philosophers to return to a task that is not honorific but time-honoured: the development of general theories of education.

Notes

[1] T.W. Moore, *Educational Theory: An Introduction* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974).

[2] Moore, p. 64.

[3] Moore, p. 85.

[4] Moore, p. 67.

[5] Moore, p. 8.

[6] Moore, p. 68.

[7] Moore, p. 95. In a more recent formulation of his view, Moore states that "A valid educational theory would be one that made morally acceptable assumptions about aims, correct and checkable assumptions about children, philosophically respectable assumptions about knowledge and verified assumptions about the effectiveness of methods." cf. T. Moore, "The Nature of Educational Theory," in *Theory and Practice of Curriculum Studies*, ed. Denis Lawton, et. al. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), p. 14.

[8] Moore, p. 97.

[9] Moore, p. 8.

[10] A strikingly similar model has been proposed for philosophers of religion by Basil Mitchell in his book, *Morality: Religious and Secular* (Oxford, 1980), pp. 98-9.

[11] John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York: The Free Press, 1966), p. 327.

[12] Dewey, p. 331.

[13] Alfred North Whitehead, *The Aims of Education* (New York: Mentor Books, 1963), p. 52.

[14] cf. "Education and the educated man," in *A Critique of Current Educational Aims*, ed. R.F. Dearden, P.H. Hirst, and R.S. Peters (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), p. 7.

[15] cf. P.H. Hirst and R.S. Peters, *The Logic of Education* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), p. 67.

[16] The view of D.J. O'Connor, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957), p. 17. O'Connor sees the word "theory" used in educational contexts in a purely honorific sense.

[17] *The Metalogicon of John of Salisbury*, trans. Daniel D. McGarry (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1955), p. 167.

[18] John Dewey, *The Sources of a Science of Education* (New York: Liveright, 1929), p. 17.

[19] P.H. Hirst, "Educational Theory," in *The Study of Education*, ed. J.W. Tibble (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966), p. 41.

[20] Hirst, p. 42.

[21] W. Frankena, "Toward a Philosophy of the Philosophy of Education," *Harvard Educational Review*, 26 (Spring, 1956), p. 94-98.

[22] cf. for example, W. Frankena, *Three Historical Philosophies of Education* (Chicago: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1965).

[23] L. Kohlberg, "Education for Justice: A Modern Statement of the Platonic View," in *Moral Education/Five Lectures*, ed. Nancy F. and Theodore R. Sizer (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Havard University Press, 1970, pp. 57-83).

[24] Jerome Bruner, "Language and Experience," in *John Dewey Reconsidered*, ed. R.S. Peters (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977), pp. 18-34.

[25] Robin Barrow, *Radical Education* (New York: Halstead Press, 1978).

[26] A point made by Beverly Shaw, "Is there any relationship between educational theory and practice?" *British Journal of Educational Studies*, XXIX (February, 1981), pp. 19-28.

[27] Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and Reality* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960), p. 26.

[28] cf. his *Aims of Education* (New York: Mentor Books, 1963).

[29] John Dewey, "From Absolutism to Experimentalism," in *Contemporary American Philosophy: Personal Statements*, Vol. II, ed. George P. Adams and W.P. Montague (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1930), p. 23.

[30] R. Peters, *Ethics and Education* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1966).

[31] B. Crittenden, *Education and Social Ideals* (Don Mills, Ontario: Langman Canada Limited, 1973).

[32] A. Brent, *Philosophical Foundations for the Curriculum* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978).

[33] cf. W.F. Pinar (ed.) *Curriculum Theorizing: The Reconceptualists* (Berkeley, California: McCutchan, 1975). A good review of current developments in curriculum theory is that of William Schubert, "Recalibrating Educational Research: Toward a Focus on Practice," *Educational Researcher*, 9 (1980), pp. 17-24 & 31.

[34] Often reprinted, the article, "Liberal Education and the Nature of Knowledge," originally appeared in *Philosophical Analysis and Education*, ed. R.D. Archambault (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), pp. 113-138. Also of interest is Paul Hirst, *Knowledge and the Curriculum* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974).

[35] R. Pring, *Knowledge and Schooling (London: Open Books, 1976).*

[36] *J. White, Towards a Compulsory Curriculum* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973). Also of interest is Keith Thompson and John White, *Curriculum Development: A Dialogue (London: Pitman Publishing Company, 1975).*

[37] *R. Barrow, The Canadian Curriculum: A Personal View* (London, Ontario: University of Western Ontario Faculty of Education, 1979). Also of interest is his *Common Sense and the Curriculum* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1976).

[38] Ivan Illich, *Deschooling Society* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970). Also of interest is *After Deschooling, What?*, ed. Alan Gastner, Colin Greer, and Frank Riessman (New York: Harper & Row, 1973).

[39] Donald Levy, "The Definition of Love in Plato's *Symposium*," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. LX, No. 2 (April-June, 1979), p. 285.

[40] Brand Blanshard, "Autobiography" in *The Philosophy of Brand Blanshard*, ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp (La Salle, Indiana: Open Court, 1980), p. 96.