

# ARTICLES

## Abstract

Philosophical analyses of the concept of teaching have the potential for contributing to our understanding and practice of teaching. Yet this body of literature is often remote to educators outside the tradition of philosophical analysis. Two analyses are compared in order to comment on the function, method, and importance of conceptual analyses of teaching.

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## Thoughts On Conceptual Analyses of Teaching

The starting point for this paper is the assumption that an understanding of what it means to teach is an important ingredient for evaluation and improvement of the craft. While these are persistent issues in teaching they are even more so in a period of declining resources when pressure mounts to retain only those who are most capable in the profession. Under these circumstances it is not a time for educators to have fuzzy ideas about the nature of teaching.

Philosophical analyses of the concept of teaching is a body of literature which directly addresses the question of what it means to teach and consequently has *prima facie* relevance for considerations about evaluation and improvement. My experience suggests, however, that this body of literature is peculiarly inaccessible and distant to those outside the art and practice of philosophical analysis. Some of the difficulty is an unfamiliarity with philosophical discourse — certainly philosophical analysis employs a kind of jargon, in style if not in substance, which can be difficult for the uninitiated. Too, some of the difficulty is that the relevance of conceptual analyses of teaching to practice is not apparent. And some of the difficulty can be attributed to a lack of understanding of what the philosopher is doing when he analyzes a concept and how he is doing it.

In this paper I will address all three sources of difficulty but will focus on the last. The primary function of the paper, then, is to reflect on philosophical analyses of the concept of teaching with the intent of assisting an understanding of what these analyses are and why they are important. The paper is organized as follows:

- (1) A brief overview of the method and substance of conceptual analyses of teaching is presented which shows issues philosophers typically attend to when discussing the concept.
- (2) Selected aspects of two different analyses of teaching are compared in order to point out a potential source of confusion, namely: How can the conclusions of two analyses of the same concept differ so radically?
- (3) An attempt is made to account for the different conclusions in terms of the methodological tenets of conceptual analysis. (Parts one through three concern the what and how of conceptual analyses of teaching.)
- (4) The paper concludes with brief comments on the relevance of conceptual analysis to practice.

### *Overview of Method and Substance of Conceptual Analyses of Teaching*

Generally speaking analytic philosophers can be seen as attempting to clarify the meaning of ambiguous concepts like "teaching" — concepts which may have a number of meanings, depending on the context in which they are used, and/or concepts which are closely related to other, equally ambiguous, concepts. The goal is to elaborate such concepts with some degree of precision so that they can be understood and used with less ambiguity. The activity of conceptual analysis may

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involve uncovering the various meanings of a concept according to the context in which it is used and/or showing how related concepts can be distinguished.

Because the activity of conceptual analysis is focused on meaning there is a sense in which the philosopher's task can be seen as searching for the definition(s) of complex terms like teaching. However, the similarity between conceptual analysis and lexicography is more apparent than real since the philosopher is examining the contextual use of terms — the way they are used in the language. This allows an elaboration of the richness of terms in a way which cannot be found in a dictionary. At their base the methodological skills of conceptual analysis depend on the notion of logical entailment and the way that entailment operates in related concepts. The analyses themselves are played out in argument with the aid of example statements using accepted meanings of terms. Thus, philosophers are not dealing explicitly with the empirical phenomena of teaching. They are not engaged in activities like classroom observation, experimental research on teaching methodology, or, say, research on how people learn. They are engaged in the analysis of concepts.

It is important to recognize that conceptual analysis attempts to *describe* how terms are correctly used in the language, rather than *prescribing* how they should be used. As Komisar and Nelson say, 'the objective is to produce a definition that reports rather than reforms our understanding of the meaning of teaching.'<sup>1</sup> Or, as Scheffler remarks, he is analyzing the 'standard' use of teaching rather than a stipulated use:

We turn then to an examination of the term 'teaching', in an effort to understand the ways in which it is typically applied, and that to which it typically refers. Our concern is thus to provide an account of the accepted meaning of the notion 'teaching'.<sup>2</sup>

When we turn to the substance of analyses of the concept of teaching a number of patterns emerge and I shall briefly mention three here. First, it is common to find an attempt to distinguish teaching from closely related concepts. For example, we often find an attempt to distinguish teaching from indoctrinating, instructing, or training.

Second (as a subset of the first), equally likely is the chance that we will find an attempt to distinguish teaching from learning or at least an attempt to show how these two concepts are related. The distinction between teaching and learning is an interesting one because it appears so benign. Who would argue that teaching is a different thing from learning? Certainly on the face of it this is not as difficult a problem as, say, distinguishing teaching from instructing or training. Yet the question 'Is teaching distinct from learning?' is not usually the way the problem is posed. The problem is put in a somewhat more subtle and certainly more provocative fashion by these kinds of questions: Does teaching imply learning? If the students have not learned, has there been teaching? Can there be teaching and no learning? These kinds of questions have sparked a considerable amount of debate, and typically the analytic philosopher's position is that *teaching does not imply learning*. (Paul Komisar has called this the Smith-Scheffler thesis or the 'standard thesis'.)<sup>3</sup> To say that teaching does not imply learning is to make a strict logical distinction. 'Imply' is being used in its philosophically technical sense of 'logically entailed', just as we would agree that to say 'I have a brother' implies or logically entails that my sibling is male. The standard thesis is clearly exhibited in Hirst's comments on the intentional sense of teaching.

A person may teach in the fullest sense of that word and yet, in spite of the intention and the appropriateness of the activities involved, the pupils may learn absolutely nothing. Here the notion of teaching is simply that of trying to get people to learn and no more . . .<sup>4</sup>

A third common element in analyses of the concept of teaching is to distinguish the *intent* and *success* sense of the verb to teach. The intent sense of the verb to teach recognizes that we often talk about teaching in such a way as to indicate that a teacher is engaged in specific kinds of activities the intention of which is to produce certain kinds of outcomes. The distinction between intent and

success is helpful because it admits that we commonly talk about teaching in two ways. When we use the intent sense, then teaching does not imply learning (i.e., the standard thesis is correct). When we use the success sense, then teaching does imply learning.

### *Two Treatments of Teaching*

While there are substantive similarities in analyses, it is also true that they can differ in important respects. One analysis might draw the line between teaching and indoctrinating in a different way or place than another, for example. The fact that such differences occur and may represent quite different conclusions about the concept of teaching can be puzzling when the expressed goal of conceptual analysis is to promote clarity in our thinking about teaching. If philosophers are not prescribing how terms should be used, but rather are describing how in fact they are used — reporting common understanding of their meaning — how is it that different analyses of the concept of teaching can come to different conclusions? In order to show how different conclusions can be reached as well as sources of confusion for the reader I shall examine selected aspects of Paul H. Hirst's 'What is Teaching?'<sup>5</sup> and B. Paul Komisar's 'Teaching: Act and Enterpriser.'<sup>6</sup> (Note: Aspects have been selected in order to make my points about conceptual analyses. The reader should not think that I have provided an adequate and total account of the analyses themselves. Such an account can be obtained only by digesting the whole of the arguments of which I cite only portions.)

### *Hirst*

Although Hirst agrees with the standard thesis he is quick to point out that this does not mean that in the intent sense of the verb to teach there is not an intimate relationship with a concept of learning. A sketch of Hirst's argument reveals the following major points:

- (1) In order to characterize teaching acts we must look at their purpose. The purpose of teaching, its intention, is to bring about learning. a grasp of the concept of teaching, therefore, requires that we have a grasp of the concept of learning.
- (2) Just as with the concept of teaching, if we are to make sense of a concept of learning we must look at the purpose or intention of learning. The intention of learning is some specific achievement or end state.
- (3) Consequently an analysis of teaching coupled with an analysis of learning indicates that

. . . to understand what is involved in teaching, one must start at the other end of a logical chain of relations, with an understanding of the end achievements to which everything is being directed . . . This logical dependence of teaching on learning, and learning on the nature of the achievements to which it is directed is thus once more no mere academic matter.<sup>7</sup>

One of the reasons Hirst finds it necessary to propose such an intimate connection between teaching and learning lies in the attempt to distinguish teaching from other kinds of activities like, say, entertaining. The problem is simply that, based on observable features alone, we cannot always distinguish between two. Consequently, Hirst asks if there are 'necessary features of a publicly observable kind which all teaching activities must possess?'<sup>8</sup> and suggests two. The first is that what is to be learned must be indicated to the pupil.<sup>9</sup> The second criterion is that in order for an act to be called teaching that which is to be taught must be 'learnable' by the pupil.<sup>10</sup> Hirst points out the absurdity of teaching Wittgenstein to six-year-olds (and calling that teaching) even if the intent to produce learning is present and what is to be learned is indicated.

However, as Hirst suggests, his account of teaching does not, as far as it goes, allow a distinction to be made between teaching and more closely related concepts such as indoctrinating.<sup>11</sup> He does indicate how such distinctions might be made. From Hirst's account it is evident that 'teaching' is the subsuming category under which lie concepts like indoctrinating, instructing, training, and so on. While all of these might satisfy the criteria for teaching in its broad sense, some of them can, according to Hirst, be distinguished by looking at the end-state of the learner. For example, in the case of indoctrinating the learner holds beliefs unshakably whereas with instructing he holds beliefs

rationally.<sup>12</sup> What is important to recognize (as will be seen later) is that these distinctions are not made on the basis of *observable* attributes of the teaching act itself (as it is happening) but on the basis of an after-the-act assessment of the learner's state of mind.

### *Komisar*

Komisar's analysis leads in a distinctly different direction from that of Hirst. Komisar takes pains to distinguish three different senses of teaching: occupation, enterprise, and act (in this his analysis is similar to Hirst's). He argues that the standard thesis is basically correct in the enterprise sense. However, the situation reverses itself at the intellectual act level and the way in which it is reversed is one of Komisar's major points.

Komisar focuses on intellectual acts (demonstrating, questioning, explicating, to name a few of his examples) and he argues that they are 'logically lucid in that the act is done not only with the intention of securing a certain "uptake" (an awareness of some point), but also so as (a) to divulge to the student what the intention is and (b) to achieve his awareness by identifying the reasons given as the intelligible grounds for the point the students are to become aware of.'<sup>13</sup> According to Komisar the criterion of logical lucidity is important because it is here that we can distinguish intellectual teaching acts from cousins to teaching such as indoctrinating or training, which could not be distinguished at the enterprise level. (Hirst, remember, was unable to rule out these cousins in examining teaching acts. His approach was to rule them out by looking at the end-state of the learner.)

Komisar contends that with reference to intellectual acts teaching does imply, not learning, but awareness.

*As regards [intellectual] acts like demonstrating, proving etc., in order to be doing them at all, an auditor is required, who is successfully becoming aware of the point of the act. This denies the idea that there are two stages: first the teacher is demonstrating something, and then when the student gets the point, the teacher is demonstrating successfully. There are not two stages. Rather the claim is that the 'auditor-uptake' is a precondition of the doing of the act itself. So one can not say "I see you are explaining X to John, but is John understanding X?" If you are explaining to John, then John is getting it. The idea of doing as separate from succeeding does not enter here; doing is succeeding.<sup>14</sup>*

Thus, in the intellectual act sense of the term if the teacher has taught then the students have been made aware. If the students have not been made aware, then there has been no teaching (in the intellectual act sense). The intensity of Komisar's point as he argues it is important to regard. To Komisar the intellectual act sense of teaching is no trifling matter; it is the most precise concept of teaching extant: 'The strictest, the basic, the keenest concept of teaching we have is the concept we apply to designate particular occurrences of intellectual acts directed to the auditor.'<sup>15</sup>

### *Accounting for the Difference*

In spite of their numerous general similarities, the analyses of Hirst and Komisar are significantly different. For Hirst there is a logical dependence of teaching on learning, the nature of which is such that it is impossible to understand the concept of teaching without first understanding the concept of learning. For Komisar the most precise concept we have of teaching is one to which the term 'learning' is not even referred. In this portion of the paper I will attempt to articulate two reasons for the difference, primarily in terms of the methodological tenets of conceptual analysis. Hopefully this will clarify some potential sources of confusion to a somewhat puzzling situation. (As an aside, it is important, generally, to dispel the notion that the analysis of a concept must always lead in one direction and come to a single conclusion; or, in other words, that the reality of how we use words is 'out there' and the philosopher's job is to work hard to discover it. This is too simplistic because, though the philosopher is looking at the logical relationships among ambiguous terms, those

relationships are embedded in a context of language usage. Contextual aspects of language are rich enough to support analyses which, while internally consistent, move in different directions and come to different conclusions.)

### *Conceptual-empirical*

There are at least two areas where it is useful to look for reasons for the disparity between Hirst and Komisar. The first relates to the claim that philosophers are doing conceptual rather than empirical research. Strictly speaking, this is true. They are not observing classrooms, testing students, and the like, but what is important to recognize is that empirical phenomena — real teaching/learning situations — form the backdrop, the context if you like, to these analyses. For example, at one point Hirst talks about the oddity of calling an act teaching if it is impossible for the pupil to learn. He then suggests that 'One reason why we are inclined to think that there could be teaching even when the present state of the pupils is grossly misjudged, is I think that we spend so much of our time teaching classes, not individuals, and the condition I am insisting on seems to make almost impossible demands.'<sup>16</sup> What is to be noticed in this quote is that while Hirst is clearly engaged in the analysis of a concept, he is also obviously referring to the empirical world of teaching. It is an empirical matter that generally speaking teachers 'spend so much . . . time teaching classes not individuals.' Hirst's comment takes into account some of the practical realities of classroom teaching as most of us recognize it. He is not *just* analyzing concepts, he is also keeping his eye on the phenomena of teaching, and his analysis gains its credibility, in part, through reference to this empirical world.

Significantly, however, *reference to empirical context sometimes shapes the moves that the philosopher makes in his argument* and it is on this point that we can begin to see Hirst and Komisar separating company. For instance earlier it was pointed out that Hirst would distinguish indoctrination from other forms of teaching by looking at the end-state of the learner. Hirst's position involves what Komisar calls a 'future-referring' criterion. That is, in order to determine whether the teacher is indoctrinating you must look at the end-state (sometime in the future) of the student. There is nothing distinctive in the acts themselves that allows you to say whether teaching or indoctrination is occurring.

In discussing how teaching can be distinguished from related concepts like indoctrination, Komisar finds the future-referring criterion unacceptable:

Such a criterion fails from form alone, for it can not serve as a basis *now* for deciding whether Zeno is teaching. That such decisions are made and are not all predictions, I take as obvious.<sup>17</sup>

What is important to note is that these are *empirical grounds* for unacceptability. According to Komisar the future-referring criterion has the unfortunate empirical consequence of not allowing us to say *now*, by looking at the act, whether the teacher is teaching or indoctrinating. Komisar, too, is relating to the empirical world, not just the conceptual relationships among terms.

Obviously Hirst is not troubled by the fact that a future-referring criterion means that we cannot *now* characterize certain teaching acts. Komisar is concerned about this and what is more his concern moves his whole argument in a direction such that he *can* distinguish teaching from indoctrination without future-referring. The immediate consequence of this is to simply note that one reason two analyses of the same concept may diverge is because their direction is shaped according to the different significance or weight given to empirical considerations.

### *Prescription/Description*

A second area where it is useful to look for reasons for the disparity between Hirst and Komisar concerns the distinction between prescription and description and the claim that conceptual analysis is not a normative activity but rather is meant to describe how words are used in the culture.

However, an interesting possibility is that an analysis may in a subtle way prescribe a new use of a term, or at least a use which runs contrary to common understanding. That is, perhaps sometimes an analysis errs by reforming rather than reporting our common understanding of the meaning of teaching or of terms central to its meaning. If this were to happen it would help explain divergent analyses. In order to examine this possibility it is instructive to look more closely at Komisar's analysis as an example.

As outlined earlier Komisar regards the 'intellectual act' sense as the keenest concept of teaching and argues that teaching in the intellectual act sense implies awareness. (For the remainder of the discussion of this point I shall use the superscript IA to indicate this sense.) He says that when a teacher demonstrates<sup>IA</sup> there is not a two stage process: first the teacher demonstrates<sup>IA</sup> and when the student becomes aware then the teacher has been successful. There is only one stage. If the teacher has demonstrated<sup>IA</sup>, then the student is aware. Demonstrating<sup>IA</sup> necessarily implies awareness.

Now there seems to be no reason why this is necessarily the case. Consider the following example: We enter a classroom to find Jones, the teacher, hunched over a lab table on which sits an intricate looking machine. A small group of students looks on. Jones points to various parts of the machine, sets it in operation, and says things like 'And so, if you feed the materials in here, then . . .,' and 'Now observe what happens when I push this lever.' At this point one of our less committed observers (he has been daydreaming) leans over and whispers 'What is Jones doing?' and we respond 'He is demonstrating<sup>IA</sup> the way that machine works.' Given common language usage it certainly would seem peculiar to suggest that our response is anything but appropriate. But notice that, according to Komisar's analysis, in order for this claim to be true we are also committed to the claim that there has been uptake on the part of the students, that they have been made aware. This, it would seem, puts us in an awkward position since it requires that somehow we must ascertain whether or not the students have been made aware before we can legitimately say that Jones has been teaching<sup>IA</sup>.

Two problems, of somewhat different order, present themselves: First, in keeping with Komisar, it will not do to try to determine after the act, after the 'demonstrating', whether the students have been made aware since it employs a future-referring criterion. It is largely to avoid this criterion that Komisar takes pains to elaborate intellectual teaching acts in the first place.

The second problem more specifically concerns Komisar's concept of awareness. Given his use of the term, awareness does not carry with it any implication of retention.

In proving, demonstrating, elaborating, etc., we succeed in our aim *even though the point grasped by the student may be promptly forgotten* (my emphasis). Learning, however, is always dispositional. No intention to bring learning about is fulfilled unless there is a 'semi-lasting' effect on the student, by which I mean some presumption of reproducibility, however miniscule, beyond the immediate awareness.<sup>18</sup>

If it is the case that a student can immediately forget a point he has been made aware of (while this may be an empirical phenomenon, it is also a defining characteristic of awareness — Komisar's implicit definition of awareness does not entail retention of the point), then it is also the case that we can never be certain that a student has not been made aware of a point. (The behavioral criteria that we might use to monitor awareness — gleam in the eye, rapt attention, etc., — are notoriously unreliable. Their presence can be ingenuine, their absence is no guarantee of lack of awareness.) Further, it means that we can never say that a teacher has not been teaching<sup>IA</sup>.

The lack of any notion of retention in Komisar's concept of awareness also suggests that we may have no criteria for judging that a student has been made aware and consequently we are also in a position of never being able to say that the teacher *has taught*<sup>IA</sup>. Any of the more rigorous criteria that might be employed to determine student awareness (the student reiterates the point in his own words,

appropriately applies the point in a unique context, etc.) not only depend on retention, they are curiously similar to the grounds we would use to say a student has learned. Given Komisar's analysis, this will not do since it makes determining awareness parasitic on determining learning. (Consistent with Komisar's analysis, learning implies awareness, but awareness does not imply learning.) But what this in turn suggests is that the only time that we can say that the teacher has taught<sup>IA</sup> is when students have learned. In other words a distinction can be made between awareness and learning, but empirically it has no consequence. Operationally, Komisar is pushed back to the teaching-learning relationship at the enterprise level which tends to sabotage any consequence of the teaching<sup>IA</sup>-awareness relationship at the intellectual-act level. In terms of his total argument this is serious because his reason for tying teaching<sup>IA</sup> to awareness was to delineate a concept of teaching such that it could be distinguished from related concepts like indoctrination without future-referring.

One way around this peculiar state-of affairs is to suggest that there is an intent and success sense of the verb to teach<sup>IA</sup>. It does not seem to go against common language usage to say that Jones is demonstrating<sup>IA</sup> though we do not know the state of the student. He is demonstrating<sup>IA</sup> with the *intent* of making the student aware. If the student does become aware, then Jones has demonstrated<sup>IA</sup> successfully. Yet Komisar will only admit of the success sense: 'As regards acts like demonstrating, proving, etc., in order to be doing them at all, an auditor is required, who is successfully becoming aware of the point of the act.'<sup>19</sup> In ruling out the intent sense of to teach<sup>IA</sup> Komisar seems to have fallen off the conceptual analysis wagon. He is *prescribing* a new use of the verb to teach<sup>IA</sup>, new because it is confined to its success sense only.

My criticism of portions of Komisar's argument has not been aimed at undermining the major thrust of his analysis by removing the concept of awareness as central to the intellectual act sense of teaching. Indeed, it adds a degree of sanity to the discourse to recognize that there are certain teaching acts for which, simply, student awareness is what the teacher is after. Rather, my intent has been to provide some insight as to another way in which two analyses can differ — sometimes an analysis may subtly introduce a prescriptive use of key terms in the argument.

Hirst and Komisar differ, then, because they emphasize different empirical considerations. Komisar's attempt to distinguish teaching from indoctrination without future-referring pushes him to analyze teaching acts in considerably more detail than does Hirst but in so doing Komisar prescribes the use of a key term. This contributes to the difference in the two treatments.

### Conclusion

In the beginning I posed several plausible reasons that the literature on conceptual analysis of teaching seems distant to those outside the tradition of analytic philosophy. One concerned the methodological tenets of philosophical analysis and their relationship to the substance of analyses of the concept of teaching. The body of this paper has dealt with aspects of that relationship by comparing, for heuristic purposes, portions of two different treatments of the teaching concept. I shall conclude with brief comments on a second reason by sketching a point concerning the relevance to practice of analyses of the concept of teaching. It will be obvious that the issue of relevance deserves a more thorough discussion than can be accomplished here; nevertheless, I feel it necessary to at least suggest the direction such discussion might take.

It should be plain that one of the central functions of conceptual analysis is to be more precise and clear with the language we use to practice and talk about the craft of teaching. For the most part the attempt for clarity is done with the hopeful expectation that, somehow, improved practice will be the upshot. As Hirst remarks, 'if it is the case that our activities depend on how we ourselves see them, what we believe about them, then if we have crazy, fuzzy ideas about teaching, we will be likely to

do crazy and fuzzy things in its name'.<sup>20</sup> Compelling as this may sound it is not altogether too clear exactly how clarity (or lack of it) might be relevant to practice. Let me suggest two possibilities.

The first is to recognize that often our teaching practice is influenced or guided (sometimes subtly, sometimes not) by slogans which by their very nature are imprecise ways of talking about teaching — 'teach the whole child,' 'individualize', 'stamp out behavioral objectives', are but a few examples. As Scheffler argues, 'educational slogans often evolve into operational doctrines in their own right . . .'.<sup>21</sup> To hark back to the earlier discussion consider, for example, 'teaching implies learning' as a slogan. Obviously this slogan is imprecise because it does not distinguish the intent and success sense of the verb to teach. By ignoring the intent sense the slogan has the potential for shifting the focus of the evaluation of teaching from the act itself to an assessment of what has been learned. Potentially this can work its way to the phenomenon of 'teaching to the test'. The slogan ignores that teachers often have legitimate goals for which it is unlikely if not impossible to see immediate effects in the learner. With these kinds of goals the teacher's 'success' can be more fruitfully monitored by looking at the teaching acts themselves with an effort to see *the extent to which provision has been made in the teaching for intentions to be realized*. It is here that the intent/success distinction is important for its recognition legitimizes the need in some circumstances to focus attention on the teaching aspect of the teaching-learning process.

A second possibility for relevance to practice concerns, in a sense, by-products of the process of conceptual analysis. In the process of analysis the attributes of a concept are articulated. That is, the identifying features of, say, indoctrination are made apparent so that instances of its practice can be recognized. It is true that at any given point in the history of a concept's analysis there may not be unanimity as to the precise nature of the attributes. As Hirst remarks in his discussion, 'what is . . . plain from the work that has already been done on the concept of indoctrination, is that most terms in this area are likely to be in some respects unclear, being used in a number of inter-related ways'.<sup>22</sup> But he further points out that what may be important is that we are aware of the distinctions being made at a given time. 'If, for instance, the notion of "believing unshakably" is seen as a distinctive result of some forms of teaching, and we for our purposes call these forms indoctrination, then indoctrination is being sharply distinguished from teaching leading to the holding of beliefs rationally, which many regard as a necessary part of education'.<sup>23</sup> Other attributes of indoctrination may be gleaned from other analyses, of course, and perhaps what is most significant is that they can be used to develop and defend a personal/professional position with some degree of clarity. Such a position may indeed affect my teaching. If a portion of my belief system includes the belief that indoctrination is a reprehensible activity, then it is important (if also I intend that my professional beliefs be consistent with my teaching) that I understand the conceptual attributes of indoctrination — what sets it off from the mainstream of my craft. For if I do not have the concepts which form the attributes of indoctrination, in spite of my beliefs it is unlikely that in more subtle instances I will be able to recognize its practice even when it is my own.

#### Notes

<sup>1</sup> Komisar, B.P. and Nelson, T.W. Introduction: conceptual analysis of teaching. In Macmillan, C.J.B. and Nelson, Thomas W. (Eds) *Concepts of Teaching: Philosophical Essays* (Rand McNally, Chicago, 1968) p. 6.

<sup>2</sup> Scheffler, I. The concept of teaching. In Macmillan, C.J.B. and Nelson, Thomas W. (eds) *Concepts of Teaching: Philosophical Essays* (Rand McNally, Chicago, 1968) pp. 19-20.

<sup>3</sup> Komisar, B.P. Teaching: act and enterprise. In Macmillan, C.J.B. and Nelson, Thomas W. (Eds) *Concepts of Teaching: Philosophical Essays* (Rand McNally, Chicago, 1968) p. 63.

<sup>4</sup> Hirst, P.H. What is teaching? *Journal of Curriculum Studies*; Vol 3, No. 1 (May 1971) p. 10.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 5-18.

- 6 Komisar, B.P. Teaching: act and enterprise. pp. 63-88.
- 7 Hirst, p. 12.
- 8 Ibid. p. 13.
- 9 Ibid. p. 14.
- 10 Ibid. p. 15.
- 11 Ibid. p. 16.
- 12 Ibid. pp. 16-17.
- 13 Komisar, B.P. Teaching . . .
- 14 Ibid. p. 86.
- 15 Ibid. p. 88.
- 16 Hirst, p. 15.
- 17 Komisar, B.P. Teaching . . . , p. 74.
- 18 Ibid. p. 77.
- 19 Ibid. p. 86.
- 20 Hirst, p. 5.
- 21 Scheffler, Israel *The Language of Education* (Charles C. Thomas, Springfield, Illinois, 1960) p. 37.
- 22 Hirst, p. 7.
- 23 Ibid.