

Abstract

The Journal is happy to offer space to the authors of this lengthy reply to their critics. Frequently books receive reviews which are too often allowed to have the "last word" regarding controversial subjects and authors are left with a sense of frustration. As one of the reviews to which the authors have replied was published in this Journal we are re-opening the discussion.

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Science, Ideology, and "Reading, Writing and Riches."

In our book, *Reading, Writing, and Riches*, we voiced our desire to "invite and urge readers to engage in a dialogue with us".¹ From 1978 to the present, a total of ten reviewers have taken up this invitation. In this paper, then, we would like to respond in turn to our reviewers and critics.

Our response of necessity goes beyond the boundaries of sociology of education into the realm of sociology of sociology. Going into this latter field is directed not only by the concerns of our reviewers but results also from the book's original conception.

Reading, Writing, and Riches was always intended by the editors as a broad-focused work with ties not only to sociology of education but also to stratification systems, comparative sociology, sociology of knowledge, and sociology of work. From the reviews, it seems that the connections between social phenomena, education included, and economic systems still present themselves as controversial items to contemporary social science. Thus, our reviewers have led us to further consider in this article such important topics as: the interrelationships between knowledge, science and ideology; the multiplicity of paradigms within sociology; the continuing debate between idealists and materialists; the dimensions of socio-economic class and power; and use of the comparative method by sociologists.

In reviewing these topics and confronting our reviewers we find ourselves continually being directed back to our own words: ". . . significant, fundamental change will not be created from a dependency upon unilinear programmes but rather, from the clash of evaluative debate and confrontation over on-going practice."²

In what follows we shall be responding to some of the critical points introduced by our reviewers. While we shall be countering these criticisms, at the same time we wish to thank our critics for calling attention to the necessity of being more explicit on certain points. For example, reviewers Edgar Z. Friedenberg, Elaine V. Harasymiw, and Robert M. Pike drew attention to the absence of Quebec material. This omission was consciously intended by us but in *Reading, Writing, and Riches* we did not adequately explain our rationale for doing so. A second example along the same lines is our agreement with Harasymiw that we did not sufficiently explain our assumption of the comparability of the United States and Canada. Both this assumption and the Quebec rationale are presented in this paper under our section entitled "Comparative Method".

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Knowledge, Science, and Ideology

Science as method and technique can be defined as an approach to knowledge. Karl Mannheim (1936)³, among others, gave carefully considered emphasis to the view that ideas, like people, are socially located. That ideas brought together at a certain time and place by people differentially placed within a particular society can become an ideology, is just another way of saying that there is an affinity between thought and socio-historical structures. Scientific thought is not exempt and as William R. Catton, Jr. has noted: "An ideology is potentially a scientific theory as truly as a scientific theory (e.g., natural selection) is a potential ideology."⁴

Several of our reviewers have raised this question of the relationship between science and ideology by making explicit their view that most of the articles in *Reading, Writing, and Riches* are "ideological". Those who make this charge seem to be most concerned with the interrelated problems of scientific objectivity and the value neutrality of the scientist. These concerns can be traced back, at least in the relatively recent past, to the classic work of Max Weber. Nelsen⁵ among others, has analyzed some of Weber's⁶ most important writings on scientific method and that argument will only be summarized here. Essentially, he argues that Weber's attempt to eliminate value bias by creating a superhuman scientist capable of separating scientist from citizen (political) self, reason from sentiment, left him not with a value-neutral body of knowledge but with a subjective sociology characterized by a persistent capitalistic value bias — with a confusing analysis in which bureaucracy appears to be equatable with capitalism, manager with worker, offices with people, politics with power, political leadership with change. In short, Weber's schizophrenic science produced a sociology that permitted him to live in and move between both his worlds without adequately understanding either one — a sociology centred upon an "objectivity" that prohibited Weber from sufficiently exploring and explaining the logic of the way in which value judgments influence the practice of social scientists.

One social scientist who has provided us with considerable insight into this area is the historian E.H. Carr. His exploration of the interrelationship between society and the individual⁷ reminds one of C. Wright Mills' emphasis upon developing a sociological imagination which "enables us to grasp history and biography and the relations between the two within society."⁸ An analytical understanding of these intersections is also applicable to the sociologist, as well as to those s/he studies. Or, in Carr's words, "Study the historian before you begin to study the facts."⁹

The sociological and historical imagination, then, force sociologists as scientists to go beyond the journalists' questions of who, what, when, where, how, and why, to ask Robert S. Lynd's (1939) question of some forty years ago: "Knowledge for What?"¹⁰ Implied in this question are the questions of knowledge for, and knowledge by, whom? It is here that Carr provides us with further insights concerning the role of interpretation in the systematic collection and analysis of scientific knowledge.

He begins by asking, "What is a historical fact?"¹¹ One could point Carr to Emile Durkheim's (1895) positivistic answer to the question, "What is a social fact?"¹² Or, we could draw upon Weber's (1904) description of a scientific method¹³ in which superhuman social scientists are trained to weave together subjective and objective reality in a manner permitting access to the facts while at the same time, enabling them to professionally stand apart from and control the passions that sway more ordinary human beings. We are reminded of Detective Sergeant Joe Friday (Jack Webb) of television's "Dragnet" fame, a somewhat larger-than-life figure to those of us growing up in 1950's America, who in his quest for all the facts was forever reminding his ordinary and plump partner Frank, as well as his witnesses: "I want the facts, nothin' but the facts."

Dragnet is off the air but detective work in the search for the facts among scientist detectives continues undeterred, spearheaded by those with an ideological bent that fails to give considered recognition to the continuing and unresolved debate over what constitutes social science fact. Some of reviewer Pike's (1979) statements seem to suggest his allegiance to this ideology when he emphasizes the need for "*objectively verifiable facts*, or for documentary sources which have a particular historical content" (emphasis added).¹⁴

We might best answer this regret with Carr's thoughtful answer to his inquiry regarding what constitutes historical fact. "It used to be said that facts speak for themselves. This is, of course, untrue. The facts speak only when the historian calls on them: it is he [she] who decides to which facts to give the floor, and in what order or context."¹⁵ And Carr again on facts: "They are like fish swimming about in a vast and sometimes inaccessible ocean; and what the historian catches will depend, partly on chance, but mainly on what part of the ocean he chooses to fish in and what tackle he chooses to use — these two factors being, of course, determined by the kind of fish he wants to catch . . . This element of interpretation enters into every fact of history."¹⁶

And yet, some explanations (interpretations) are seen as being better than others. Acceptance of a particular explanation as "better" not only has to do with the complex interrelationships between what facts are taken into consideration and interpretations of those facts, but also with the complex process of social interaction among scientists offering competing explanations. It is this interaction, this social activity, which Thomas Kuhn¹⁷ refers to in describing scientific revolutions as the replacing of one prevailing paradigm with a new one — process dependent upon a certain, if not easily measurable, degree of consensus.

While Kuhn's work suffers from his failure to analyze a case study, to specify in detail a particular socio-historical context within which his more general and abstract remarks might be examined, it does sensitize us to G. Barraclough's view that history (and we would add, perhaps other social sciences as well) is "a series of accepted judgments."¹⁸ Or similarly, Carr's suggestion that each fact "proposed for membership of the select club of historical facts . . . awaits a seconder and sponsors."¹⁹

Furthermore, Kuhn's thesis also sensitizes us to the view that the number and range of paradigms competing for acceptance in the social sciences is akin to the difference between polygamy and serial monogamy. As a case in point, sociology is, as evidence gathered and analyzed recently by Alan Wells²⁰ suggest, increasingly a multiparadigm discipline.

Paradigm Multiplicity

If the attempt by the reviewers to discuss the issues of science and ideology was controversial, as controversial as anything we suggested, so too was their attempt at labelling the editors and contributors. In the general introduction we outlined the unifying themes of the collection. All the papers are characterized in being critical, anti-pluralist and anti-liberal, concerned with making evident the close linkage of education and the economy, focused in large measure upon the specific economic system of capitalism, and focused upon critique in relation to proposal.²¹

The enumeration of this list led some reviewers to pigeon hole *Reading, Writing, and Riches* as "Marxist". Thus B.Y. Card suggested, "There is a tendency toward a Marxian orthodoxy."²² Reviewer Pike agreed, stating that "The basic ideological perspective of this book is neo-Marxist."²³ Other reviewers, it is true, disagreed. Jane Gaskell, for example, commented that "The book is not . . . consistent in any theoretical way."²⁴ Anthony Turrin does not suggest a narrowly Marxist approach, but fits *Reading, Writing, and Riches* into a wider framework, as part of "the re-established political economy tradition."²⁵ This political economy perspective has included such

well-known non-Markists as Harold Innis and the young Donald Creighton as well as the influence of Marx and the neo-Marxists of the 1970s.²⁶ Certainly the editors would not deny the influence of Marxism or Neo-Marxism, and the comment closest to our position was that of Loren Lind who suggested that the book “doesn’t ignore Marxist insight into our capitalist social order.”²⁷

The trouble with labelling our book as Marxist is twofold. Firstly, successful application of the label may eschew serious grappling with the issues. Reviewer Pike, for example, concluded that “The book is clearly intended to be polemical.”²⁸ So angry was Pike at the supposed Marxist bias, that he ended up suggesting little or nothing remained of barriers to the English working class in the educational system. Another reviewer, Card, attempted to explain the perceived orthodox Marxism of the collection by pointing to the 1960s origin of the contributors, and commented that the authors are “essentially academically young”.²⁹

The second problem with labelling the collection as Marxist or neo-Marxist is simply that it is wrong. Not only is such an assumption wrong but the label tends to override and ignore the rich shadings and hues of the multiple critical perspectives which are found in the book. Just to set the imagination loose for a minute, the critical perspective might entail the maverick radicalism of a C.W. Mills, the Red Toryism of a George Grant, the patriotic socialism of a James Laxer, the Christian socialism of a T.C. Douglas, the whiggish liberalism of an Edgar Z. Friedenberg, the pro-Soviet standpoint of an Albert Szymanski, the pro-third worldist stance of an Arthur Davis, the detached ironical style of a Thorstein Veblen, the anarchist denunciation of the capitalist state by Kropotkin, Bakunin, or George Woodcock, and one could go on. Of course, even to label something as Marxist does not help that much. Is it Trotskyist, Stalinist, Bukharinist, Marxist-Leninist, Maoist, Titoist, Castroist, Kautskyst, Lukacsian, Goldmannist, Gramscist, Althusserian?

Reading, Writing, and Riches then is clearly a book with a unified perspective, but as Turriffin points out, one “concerned with bringing together contemporary work . . . from a critical and left perspective.”³⁰ We the editors believe that it is this common critical perspective combined with the variety of critical positions employed that gives to the work its strength.

One hesitates to analyze the contributors in this vein given the problem of creating new labelling problems. However it would be coy to avoid this exercise altogether. As the editors, we have been constantly aware of our unity *and* diversity throughout the unfolding of this project. Nelsen, an American, has been influenced by C.W. Mills and Dusky Lee Smith (definitely not Marxist-Leninists) and by the counterculture and alternate lifestyle movements of the 1960s. Nock, a Canadian, came from a traditional Anglican clerical background; grew up in the burgeoning anti-imperialist, anti-American climate of the 1960s, and studied with Arthur K. Davis, an influential Alberta sociologist with a *Monthly Review* perspective. Thus, Nock has emerged out of this as a Red Tory Christian Socialist with a dash of third world Marxism thrown in.

Jim Harding came from a radical province, Saskatchewan, and from a radical parentage, was caught up in the maelstrom of radical student politics in the 1960s at Simon Fraser, got involved in the alternative lifestyle movement through farming, and might be termed a type of 1960s counterculture libertarian socialist since his awareness of the perils of the bureaucratic state is as sharp as his awareness of capitalism per se. That no Marxist orthodoxy typifies *Reading, Writing, and Riches* is revealed by his critical comment on Pincus’ contribution to the collection: “Though I agree with Fred Pincus’ structural critique . . . I think he tends toward the kind of sociological criticism and reductionism which ignores the potential for altering the planned effect of community college programmes.”³¹

Steinhouse was a typical housewife in an upper middle class Jewish Montreal family, until her delayed entry to university in the 1960s radically altered her lifestyle and consciousness. Today, rather than aiding in the charitable endeavours of Jewish philanthropy, she helps the establishment of small native businesses in Northwestern Ontario, the salaried employee of the federal government. Helping Indians become successful capitalists is not the function of a Marxist. However, one could argue that it is the praxis of a critical but realistic person. Similarly, one might point to the controversy between David Hanson and Malcolm Garber. While Hanson supports what might be called Marxist idea that no real change can occur within the system as it is, Garber is preoccupied with setting up educational retrieval programs — providing “the exile sector” with the skills and aptitudes of the “public sector”, that bulk of the middle majority. The critical commitment in Garber’s article is his near-anarchist sensitivity that retrieval programs must avoid setting up empire-building bureaucracies, and that effective local community involvement and control of the bureaucrats would aid the effectiveness of such programs so they are useful for the people involved, and not just another make-work program for M.S.W.s. Friedenberg is an intellectual gadfly, a type of critical liberal. Having thoroughly criticized the American educational system of the 1950s and early 1960s as deadening the creativity of youth, he has more recently been defending the classic liberal freedoms of the liberal democratic state, freedoms which he sees as under attack from multiple perspectives.

It is this inability to detect the range and pluralism evident in the heterogeneous critical perspectives employed by the contributors which disappoints one’s reading of reviews by such critics as Robert Pike and even B. Y. Card. Personally, we the editors are convinced that such comments by reviewers may be indicative of a real theoretical retrenchment which has taken place in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The combination of harsh economic reality, resurgent Arabs and aggrandizing Soviets, has led to pressures in academe to lockstep into conformity. Most universities, one fears, would prefer the grantsman studying local juvenile delinquents or vandals rather than the critical insight of a George Grant (witness the latter’s well-publicized resignation in 1980 from McMaster).

Voluntarism Versus Materialism

The tendency to identify the book as Marxist also had some effect of reviewers’ views about our methodological assumptions. Ironically, this debate was entered into by one of our contributors (Friedenberg), another indication to dispel the view that *Reading, Writing, and Riches* was characterized by any Marxist orthodoxy.

The methodological assumption in question was our materialist premise — what has been called in the educational literature, the Correspondence Principle. Harasymiw accused us of “oversimplifications”³², especially our assumption that the three variables of corporate monopoly capitalism were sufficient common denominators to discuss the United States and Canada in the same context. She wrote, “That everything is reducible to economics including demographic, sociological and cultural factors may or may not be a valid assumption . . . To define two economic systems *merely* as corporate, monopolistic and capitalist is insufficient . . .” (emphasis added).³³ Even reviewer Friedenberg, despite his status as “one of the contributors who explicitly cites the ‘correspondence principle’ as basic to my understanding of how the school system operates” suggested that although “heuristically . . . indispensable . . . a lot happens in schools that it cannot account for; and some things happen that contradict it . . .”³⁴

It would seem that a materialist framework is still controversial in the field of education, perhaps because of the obfuscating heritage of “progressivism” dissected by our contributor, C.J. Bullock.³⁵ Progressivism suggests that a creative educational process was possible within the existing socio-

economic arrangement — an assumption congenial to educationists wishing to expand their conceptions of professionalism.

Unfortunately the debate over materialism has often been confused or intertwined with the acceptability of Marxism as a scholarly paradigm. This may even be the case with such a valued contributor and reviewer as Friedenberg. Like Harasymiw, Friedenberg is not certain that "capitalism" is the key explanatory variable: "This is valid only if one assumes that the basic economic system of North America is capitalist; and that the schools of societies with capitalist economies are peculiarly likely to exemplify the abuses predicted by the Correspondence Principle."³⁶ Friedenberg goes on to suggest that "capitalism in its pure form is no longer to be found" and he seems to doubt that the U.S.A. might be "a peculiarly corrupt exemplar of capitalism as *ding an sich*."³⁷

Perhaps the clearest disavowal of materialism in sociological literature was presented by Seymour Martin Lipset in his work *The First New Nation*. In this work Lipset championed the view that social phenomena and social structures in particular could be explained by social values. He added that "... changes in the dominant value system develop slowly — or not at all."³⁸ The American values system was said to be composed of the twin ideals of equality and achievement. Lipset's "ideological" need to rely upon values for explanation was made clear from his section on "the inadequacy of a materialistic interpretation of change."³⁹ It stemmed from a meliorist liberal view that the U.S.A. had solved all crucial problems, and the few flaws remaining could be solved by more of the same medicine — not by a complete change of doctors and prognosis.

In his essay in *Reading, Writing, and Riches*, Friedenberg did adhere in part to the Correspondence Principle, for example his observation that "The economy of Nova Scotia . . . is a colony of a colony,"⁴⁰ but there was also some use by him of a values analysis. In particular, one can point to his reliance on a piece by Mordecai Richler attributing our problems to the Scottish influence in Canada, and their (and our) espousal of a capitalism that was "inept and timorous" rather than "buccaneering."⁴¹ In his most recent work *Deference to Authority*⁴², Friedenberg seems to rely more on a values explanation to probe the Canadian psyche. Gad Horowitz in his review in *Canadian Forum* writes, "At first it seems that Friedenberg blames the parliamentary system, the absolute sovereignty of the Queen in Parliament, for the lack of liberty in Canada," but he soon makes clear his opinion that "psychological attitudes and predispositions are at fault."⁴³

It is here that the editors wish to defend their methodological assumption of materialism. Such an approach is not to be used as a "god of the gaps", to be used for some phenomena but not for others.

It would be better if social scientists could treat such philosophical questions with as much of their vaunted objectivity as possible. Materialism is not a synonym for Marxism, and even less so for Marxist-Leninist Communism. Gradually non-Marxist as well as Marxist materialism has been gaining ground in the social sciences. For examples of the former, one might point to Marvin Harris⁴⁴ in anthropology or Gerhard Lenski⁴⁵ in sociology, and the renewed popularity of the political economy approach⁴⁶ in the social sciences in Canada (harking back to the non-Marxist but materialist Harold Innis). Many of these materialists are not left-wing — especially, for example, Lenski, whose work of technological evolutionism smacks of a Hobbesian worldview. It is time for social scientists to reject idealist explanations of the world since these are not explanations at all. What is left to do is to find the most adequate materialist synthesis. Marvin Harris has recently tried to do this in his ambitious but only partially successful book, *Cultural Materialism: The Struggle for a Science of Culture* — unsuccessful because of his excessive reliance on the variable of ecology over other materialist variables such as technology (Lenski) or mode of production and class relations (Marxist).

If social scientists could reject using “values” as explanation, then a great step forward would be effected. If we say that Germans are militaristic, that the British are a nation of shopkeepers, that blacks possess rhythm, that Canadians are placid and docile, we may indeed be guilty of producing stereotypes but we may also be guilty of using empirically valid descriptions as a substitute for explanation. One fears that “the debate with Marx’s ghost” still plagues contemporary social scientists — even for such a one as Edgar Friedenberg, who in other contexts is such a critic of liberalism, as in his statement, “Liberalism is equally ideological, and ethical obscurantism is its fatal bias.”⁴⁷

Education, Socio-economic Class, and Power

Obscurantism, ethical and otherwise, sometimes results from oversimplifications; however, we disagree with reviewer Harasymiw that our editorial decision to deemphasize the relatively less important differences between Canadian and American education and economic systems in order to concentrate on comparing their similarities is a case in point. On the contrary, to define the two systems as corporate, monopolistic, and capitalist is not only to state the central characteristics of these economic systems, but is also a long beginning step in organizing an analytical understanding of education — an understanding which uncovers and focuses upon, rather than obscures, the important dimensions of socio-economic class and power. What follows is an attempt to illustrate to reviewers Harasymiw, Pike, and others the comparative inadequacies of analyses which fail to conscientiously consider the corporate, monopolistic, and capitalist features characterizing the workings of our economic and educational systems.

First, attention to these characteristics forces one to deal with power as socio-historical process — process in which interacting people of different socio-economic classes and bureaucratic organizations (capitalist and corporate) experience traceable and specific losses and gains (monopoly dominance). Social histories of this kind can and should replace the unhealthy and pseudo-scientific fascination of Pike⁴⁸ and others with constructing “strawman” theories of conspiracy. For to accept either the view of “all history as conspiracy” (and the related misconception of Marxism as a doctrine of history unfolding in an inevitable manner under the control of a ruling class) or of “all history as drift” (no ruling class, governing class, or power elite) “is to relax the effort to understand the facts of power and the ways of the powerful.”⁴⁹

Second, then, dealing with power as socio-historical process might make Pike’s concern both with “scholastic respect for objectively verifiable facts” and for “documentary sources which have a particular historical context”⁵⁰ translatable into his own work. He, and others who practice a similar sociology, might at the very least refrain from a certain kind of selective quoting and misrepresentation of authoritative books such as the well-known text written by British sociologist Olive Banks.⁵¹ Thus, Pike misses the general drift of Banks’ argument in order to further his view that there was a significant change in the opportunity structure of the English class system between the world wars by selecting this sentence from her work: “Increasingly, after the First World War, working-class children entered the secondary schools until, in certain areas at least, all places were free, and in some schools the majority of children were from working-class families.”⁵² However, and most importantly, Pike fails to include in his review of our book Banks’ very next sentence which reads: “Nevertheless certain essential characteristics of sponsored mobility remained, notably the stress on early selection and a considerable degree of segregation.”⁵³ In brief, Pike’s attempt to fabricate a much less segregated and a much more classless society than was actually the case in post World War I England is *not* supported by Banks in the chapter (“Education and Social Mobility”) from which these quotes are taken and we refer the reader to at least seven other places in this chapter were

Banks takes note of and discusses the caste-like qualities of the English social system during this period.⁵⁴

Unlike reviewer Pike, we as editors attempted to ensure that the analyses included in our book square with available evidence from the particular socio-historical period and society under investigation. With reference to the specific interrelationships between class background, formal schooling, occupational and social mobility, and power in England, it is quite clear today, some sixty years after World War I, that participation in formal schooling (and such mobility as results from attendance) *remains* for the most part sponsored rather than contested.⁵⁵ It is a sponsorship that continues to punish the great majority of English (and we might add, Canadian) school children because they “choose” the wrong parents:

Only five per cent of children go to independent schools, yet 50 per cent of Oxbridge places go to that tiny minority. Of course many independent schools are themselves highly selective, so they will naturally have a large number of clever children. *But it is equally certain that it is not brain that decides whether a child goes into the state or private school system. At Cambridge the proportion of places going to independent schools is actually rising.* (emphasis added)⁵⁶

Third, attention to the central characteristics of the Canadian and American economies and educational systems (corporate, monopolistic, and capitalist) and the resultant emphasis upon socio-historical analysis helps one to better understand and analyze social networks. Since it is these networks of class and power which both draw together and distinguish the interactants within the systems, one is less likely to follow Pike’s lead in beginning to confuse managers with owners.⁵⁷ And, one is more likely to understand the reality of university boards of governors who see little need to exercise the authority, power and/or influence of their position except on those rare occasions when their academic managers overstep the broad operating parameters established by the boards.⁵⁸ More likely to understand that while governors of Canadian and American universities are not owners in the traditional sense of private entrepreneurship, there are important connections between the big business-education-government triangle of science that they govern.⁵⁹ Less likely to overestimate the “democratic” (pluralistic) participation of public “owners” whose taxes pay a very significant portion of the operating expenses for provincial and state universities; also less likely to underestimate the power and authority which flows from the wealthy and conservative governing class that dominates university and college governing boards — a wealth and conservatism which we hypothesize⁶⁰ is just as true of Canadian governors today as when Rodney Hartnett wrote the following description of American university trustees eleven years ago:

Trustees, as a group, are quite wealthy. More than half have annual incomes exceeding \$30,000, and at private universities 49 per cent have an annual income of \$75,000 or more. Many are business executives. At private universities, for example, nearly half are executives of manufacturing, merchandising, or investment firms. The overwhelming majority are male, white, Protestant, and in their fifties and sixties. Politically, they tend to regard themselves as moderate Republicans. In 1968 approximately two-thirds of them said their political and social views were similar to those of Richard Nixon and Nelson Rockefeller.⁶¹

Fourth, the socio-historical analysis dealing with socio-economic class and power envisioned here should force one to ask only the important and in a crucial sense, the right, questions. Thus, to take but a single example, one does not ask about and note as Pike does the percentage of university students from lower-class origins relative to participation rates of students from “more privileged classes”⁶² without asking the central questions which would lead to comparing *the differences between percentage admitted and percentage completing* university and college studies with regard to class background.⁶³ Relatedly, one might want to ask questions concerning the interconnections between, rather than simply labelling as does Pike, two different kinds of inequality — “cultural” and “economic”.⁶⁴ Ask the right questions and you get a less fragmented and abstracted, a more holistic, analysis and explanation.

In sum, then, attention to these four points taken together constitutes an approach to knowledge — an approach that helps the researcher ask the crucial questions in order to identify the major interactants and place them in a socio-historical context consistent with evidence that accurately reconstructs the relationships of socio-economic class and power among them. It is an approach offering an opportunity to replace the “liberal” discussions of Pike and others with analyses grounded in everyday practice. An approach more likely to discover that Pike’s faith in adult education or life-long learning⁶⁵ is often not enough to overcome the barriers of socio-economic class, gender, and traditional sex-role definitions of “appropriate” behaviour.⁶⁶ An approach that does not put the cart of “culture” and “education” before the horse of political economy. And thus, an approach which can explain the more obvious, such as why most of today’s university presidents conduct their offices like I.B.M. executives and why the best qualified candidate for Chairperson of the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland, Bertell Ollman — a “Marxist”, is denied the job;⁶⁷ as well as the less obvious, such as why the black-jacketed, motorcycle-riding professionalism of a C.W. Mills, highly revered today, was for many years judged not adequate enough to permit him to serve as an instructor for graduate courses at Columbia University.

In brief, the approach we favour and attempted to forward in *Reading, Writing, and Riches* did result in a sociological perspective which emphasized the dimensions of socio-economic class and power studied over time. However, this perspective did not develop as Pike claims because we are “neo-Marxist”⁶⁸ committed to “an almost paralyzingly negative view of the process of educational reform in western industrial societies”⁶⁹; rather, this perspective emerged because of the backgrounds and experiences of individuals situated in similar socio-economic circumstances (who goes to what kind of school for how long and why). Any “tendency toward a Marxian orthodoxy” did not result from “a counter structural-functionalism focused on a search for concentrated power”⁷⁰ as Card has suggested. To find evidence and analysis of concentrated power in Canada no longer requires much of a search (to name only a few, see in addition to our book, Myers, Park and Park, Porter, Clement, Nock, and Olsen).⁷¹

Perhaps Card, and Pike with his “modified conflict interpretation,”⁷² and Lipset with his values analysis and many other liberal “sunbeams” with their various strains of a priori and pluralistic theoretical agreement, would prefer more sunshine than our evidence warrants. However, while our evidence and the approach used to gather it does not produce a liberal “sociology of happiness”⁷³, it does allow us to work towards changing the inequities of the present and planning for a different future without repeating the worst sociological “fads and foibles” of the past.

Comparative Method

Many of the problems referred to above seemed to find expression as well in comments by reviewers about our comparative method. We were criticized by Harasymiw, for example, for stressing the comparisons caused by capitalism in Canada and the United States, while ignoring differences. As she put it, “The study is not really comparative: the two systems are conveniently lumped together as if no differences of any significance existed between them.”⁷⁴ At the same time, Harasymiw criticized us for the “deliberate exclusion of Quebec for cultural rather than economic reasons” and suggested that this exclusion undermines “the editors key assumption.”⁷⁵

Obviously Harasymiw has touched upon some important points in the context of current Canadian social science. We could point to section IV of the book, “Branch-Plant Marginality and the Capitalist System” which included papers by Davis and Friedenberg intended by the editors to “show two faces of the question about domination”⁷⁶, that is, to show the power of American domination. As mentioned previously we must agree with our reviewer Harasymiw that the

differences between the two countries were purposely downplayed. We shall return to this point shortly.

Given Harasymiw's comments, it was amazing to the editors to read the review essay by contributor Friedenberg where he criticized "Reading, Writing, and Riches for emphasizing the centrality of "American hegemony". In his usual witty and polished style Friedenberg went on to comment:

The mounting Canadian obsession with American hegemony has come to play a role in Canadian social thought like the heliocentric model of the solar system in cosmology. Both concepts are persuasive because they correspond to the facts and account for the atrocious and virtually irremediable climate. But both are also the source of incurable and inexcusable narcissistic wounds, and both are therefore included in explanatory models for which, though relevant, they are not always strictly essential. Without this obligatory exegesis of the role of American influence, the explanation given would not seem congruent to Canadian social criticism.⁷⁷

Of course, the delicious irony to this criticism was our inclusion of Friedenberg's piece in the section designed to show some of the effects of American hegemony. Our choice of this section was by no means idiosyncratic since textbook writers Himelfarb and Richardson pointed out that Friedenberg "argues not only that schools generally prepare people for life in a class-stratified society but that in Canada they also contribute to the development of a 'branch plant' — what others have called a 'colonial' mentality."⁷⁸

If one wanted to observe an example of "American hegemony" one did not need to go far — *Choice*, a publication of the Association of College and Research Libraries. The anonymous reviewer indicated that *Reading, Writing, and Riches* was "a restatement of the themes"⁷⁹ already mined by Bowles and Gintis and Carnoy and Levin and voiced the curious and erroneous criticism that Gintis and Bowles *Schooling in Capitalist America* was "cited in almost every chapter of the volume reviewed here."⁸⁰ Having checked this detail, the editors find that Bowles and Gintis were mentioned in a total of five essays out of a total of 16 papers (31%). Some mention of their work was, of course, mandatory but *Choice's* reviewer seemed intent on branding our work as a derivative collection.

The author then went on to suggest:

By balancing coverage of Canadian with U.S. topics, the book provides some examples not previously discussed, but it adds little to the depth of our understanding. It is not particularly illuminating to read that the governing boards of *Canadian* universities are composed heavily of leaders in banking, politics, and industry; many authors have pointed out that North American education is 'tracked' from elementary grades through higher education: the relation between jobs and education has been discussed by Ivar E. Berg . . . while the colonial character of capitalist education was fully explored in Martin Carnoy's *Education as Cultural Imperialism* (1974). The present volume may be of use to Canadian libraries that wish to include *local material*, but it is not likely to be singled out by readers in any library that contains the works mentioned above. (emphasis added)⁸¹

The *Choice* reviewer says, in effect, that if something has been shown to be true in the U.S.A. then it need not be demonstrated elsewhere (thus surely destroying the need for any comparative analysis) or that if something has been demonstrated by an American academic, then foreigners need not bother to retread the same ground. Finally and most objectionable of all, is the assumption by the reviewer that Canadian material is "local" and (reading between the lines) that American data is universal or international in scope. Edgar Friedenberg need go no further to find an example of "American hegemony" in intellectual circles, and we suggest that the reality of such hegemony is not to be compared to "the heliocentric model" of the cosmos, no matter how this adds to the punch of Friedenberg's publications.

To return to Harasymiw's more important critical comment about our emphasis on similarities rather than differences. It seems to the editors that such a procedure is perfectly justified as long as readers are warned of the emphasis. In *Reading, Writing, and Riches*, this emphasis was indicated in the Introduction: ". . . our work as social analysts provides strong support for our belief that capitalism as a social structure creates broad similarities in institutions and ideologies."⁸² At this point, we made reference to Ralph Miliband's much used and acclaimed work *The State in Capitalist Society: the Analysis of the Western System of Power* (originally published in 1969).

In this work, Miliband points out many similarities in the state systems of countries which share "in common two crucial characteristics: the first is that they are all highly industrialised countries; and the second is that the largest part of their means of economic activity is under private ownership and control."⁸³ Miliband explicitly recognized that the different countries in his analysis "have different histories, traditions, cultures, languages and institutions."⁸⁴ These countries included Britain, the U.S.A., France, Germany, Scandinavia, Japan, and Italy. If one is determined to emphasize differences, then one could have a field day with the above list. And yet Miliband's work remains a classic in its field, because the variables mentioned do seem to have a real and similar effect on the various political cultures discussed by him.

Much the same analysis is provided by C.B. Macpherson in his Massey Lectures for the C.B.C. where he points out that:

A third fact, which some people find admirable and some would prefer not to have mentioned, is that liberal-democracy and capitalism go together. Liberal democracy is found only in countries whose economic system is wholly or predominantly that of capitalist enterprise. And, with few and mostly temporary exceptions, every capitalist country has a liberal-democratic political system. It would be surprising if this close correspondence between liberal-democracy and capitalism were merely coincidental.⁸⁵

Of course the capitalism mentioned by Macpherson is the advanced capitalism of "the western system of power" since there are many nations in the world usually referred to as the Third World which are non-industrialized, capitalist, and agrarian in nature; that is to say, they lack the urbanized industrial system of the west and most of their people still work in semi-traditional agrarian systems, but they are capitalist because of their incorporation into "the world system" and the consequent ties to advanced capitalist countries.

As mentioned earlier, we did not escape criticism from our reviewers for ignoring Quebec. Not only Harasymiw and Friedenberg but also Pike who comments, "Why Nelsen and Nock did not include any papers on Quebec, since they explicitly recognize the lack of them in their introduction, remains unclear."⁸⁶ Pike went on to make the point that even we as English Canadians could comment on Quebec since "much of the outstanding work" on Quebec is by "distinguished non-quebecois" such as Hughes, Miner, Wade, and Cook.⁸⁷ Harasymiw, it will be remembered, thought we had ignored our own method by stressing the cultural differences in Quebec over the homogeneity produced by capitalism.

Perhaps this was a case when we the editors should have been clearer as to our reasoning. After all, one of the editors of *Reading, Writing, and Riches* has been a serious scholar of Quebec, having taught a course on the subject three times (once in French) and having authored a paper⁸⁸ and several book reviews in this area. Thus, it is not because we felt incompetent for the task.

Instead our reluctance stemmed from our view that the Quebecois have been a colonized people who suffered a conquest.⁸⁹ Thus, we pointed out that analysis "should treat Quebec as a national society."⁹⁰ Obviously we must differ with Friedenberg who suggested that by adding Quebec material, "The scope of the book would have become more truly national."⁹¹ From our point of view, inclusion of material on Quebec would have made the book more international. We would

have been discussing three nations and two states. We come back to a long standing problem in the English language and in Anglo-American conceptualization that tends to confuse the very different concepts of nation and state.

Needless to say, we could have added this level of analysis and conceptualization, but we come back to our original point on this subject: the Quebecois have been a colonized people, and as an important corollary, this means that they suffered a conquest (two conquests if one includes the suppression of the Patriote uprisings of 1837 and 1838). By discussing English Canada and the United States, we were attempting to compare two capitalist liberal-democratic state systems which had not undergone the processes of direct colonization and conquest. To have added this variable of conquest and direct colonization would have led us into paths which deserve more explicit discussion and analysis.

To add a critical point of our own, we feel that many English Canadian (and American) scholars still seem to face difficulty in accepting the validity or importance of these variables of colonialism and conquest. To make use of such variables in one's analysis is not to suggest also that logic further points us to "separatism". History is a textbook of examples of peoples conquering and being conquered, and of variable and differential adaptations. But the fact of conquest and colonization as sociological variables in analysis must be recognized. Otherwise one is prone to omit them, as did John Porter in his paper "Politics and Minorities: Canada and the United States"⁹² in which he suggested that most ethnic inequality in Canada had been caused by selective charter group control of immigration but ignored the threefold conquests in Canada of Quebec, Acadia, and the native peoples.

Notwithstanding the attempt by Coser (1956)⁹³ and others to integrate notions of conflict into functionalism, sociologists influenced by the structural-functionalist heritage have tended to emphasize the integrative and value-shared aspects of the social order. Consequently, they frequently ignore such a concept as conquest (and its reality) or at best, leave it understated.

Scholars from conquered nations (i.e. Quebec) are not as prone to such neglect: witness the fact that the very influential "Montreal school" of social scientists (Brunet, Seguin, Rioux)⁹⁴ have made conquest their key operating concept for explaining the status position for French Canadians.

Conclusions

According to one view of science, the scientific enterprise consists of a fairly straightforward incremental compilation of factual data, with careful observation ensuring the desired goal of scientific objectivity. Perhaps this position is most closely linked with the "positivist" school. However, most of us engaged in social science research hold this view to some degree, even if we reject the positivist label as used in the narrow sense above.

When one actually turns to an empirical field of research, it is then that the oversimplified nature of this more narrow positivism becomes evident. Since social scientists are very much part of what used to be called "civil society" and since social scientists typically have their salaries paid by business and government, it is hardly surprising that the ethos of what Milburn⁹⁵ has termed "capitalist ideology" adheres to many of the domain assumptions they use. Some positivistic social scientists would claim that there is no difference between natural and social science. Yet, natural scientists who study rocks, stars, etc. do not need to debate their objectivity (in this sense at least) by seeing themselves as both subject and object of their study, or be concerned because they are paid by the objects they study. We as social scientists, however, find ourselves in this perilous and uneasy position. This unease in overcoming capitalist ideology or the liberal ethos associated with it has

been pointed to several times by us, and each of the five sections subdividing this paper has indicated something of this debate.

Milburn has suggested that the merit of *Reading, Writing, and Riches* is that "it fills an obvious gap by providing for the first time a substantial contribution based on criticism of capitalist ideology."⁹⁶ It is rare in social science for closure to terminate debate between different paradigms. Obviously the contribution of a radical, critical perspective in the field of Canadian education is only in its beginnings. No doubt opponents of such a position will continue with their own counter analyses. Since we view scientific progress as resulting from the sallies, sorties, zigs and zags which permit modifications and even reversals of conclusions previously drawn, we may also at some future date want to counter and debate much of what is presented in *Reading, Writing, and Riches*. In sum, we like Feyerabend⁹⁷, support the position that science should and must always be an anarchistic endeavour without final closure.

Notes

¹ Randle W. Nelsen and David A. Nock, eds., *Reading, Writing, and Riches: Education and the Socio-Economic Order in North America* (Toronto and Kitchener: Between the Lines, 1978), p. 8.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8.

³ Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company), 1936.

⁴ William R. Catton, Jr., "The Development of Sociological Thought," in Robert E.L. Faris (ed.) *Handbook of Modern Sociology* (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1964), p. 929.

⁵ Randle W. Nelsen, "Science as Capitalist Ideology: The Sociology of Max Weber Reconsidered," *Alternate Routes* 2 (1978): 34-72.

⁶ See in particular two articles published in 1904 and 1919, respectively, Max Weber, "'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy," in Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch (eds. and translators) *The Methodology of the Social Sciences* (New York: The Free Press, 1949); and Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds. and translators) *From Max Weber* (New York: Oxford, 1946).

⁷ See Edward Hallett Carr, *What is History?* (London: MacMillan and Co., 1961), pp. 25-49.

⁸ C. Wright Mills, *The Sociological Imagination* (New York: Oxford, 1959), p. 6.

⁹ Carr, p. 17.

¹⁰ Robert S. Lynd, *Knowledge for What? The Place of Social Science in American Culture* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1939).

¹¹ See Carr, p. 4.

¹² Emile Durkheim, *The Rules of Sociological Method* (New York: The Free Press, 1966).

¹³ Weber, "'Objectivity,'" in *Methodology of Social Sciences*.

¹⁴ Robert M. Pike, review of "Reading, Writing, and Riches," *Queen's Quarterly* 86, 4 (1979): 702.

¹⁵ Carr, p. 5.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 18, 7.

¹⁷ Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962).

¹⁸ Geoffrey Barraclough, *History in a Changing World* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1955), p. 14.

¹⁹ Carr, p. 6.

- ²⁰ Alan Wells, "Conflict Theory and Functionalism: Introductory Sociology Textbooks, 1928-1976," *Teaching Sociology* 6, 4 (1979): 429-437.
- ²¹ See Nelsen and Nock (eds.), p. 5.
- ²² B.Y. Card, review of "Reading, Writing, and Riches," *The Canadian Journal of Sociology* 4, 4 (1979): 421.
- ²³ Pike, review of *RW&R*, p. 701.
- ²⁴ Jane Gaskell, review of "Reading, Writing, and Riches," *Working Teacher* (1979): 36.
- ²⁵ A.H. Turriffin, review of "Reading, Writing, and Riches," *Contemporary Sociology* 10, 2 (March 1981): 253.
- ²⁶ See Wallace Clement and D. Drache, *A Practical Guide to Canadian Political Economy* (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1978).
- ²⁷ Loren Lind, "After School," (a review of *RW&R*) *Quill & Quire* 45, 2 (February 1979): 29.
- ²⁸ Pike, review of *RW&R*, p. 701.
- ²⁹ Card, review of *RW&R*, p. 420.
- ³⁰ Turriffin, review of *RW&R*, p. 253.
- ³¹ Jim Harding, "Making Education Relevant to the Issues of Survival," in Nelsen and Nock (eds.), p. 293.
- ³² Elaine Verchomin Harasymiw, review of "Reading, Writing, and Riches," *The Journal of Educational Thought* 13, 2 (1979): 143.
- ³³ Ibid.
- ³⁴ Edgar Z. Friedenberg, "High Marx and Northern Lights," (review essay of *RW&R*) *The Review of Education* (Spring 1979): 148.
- ³⁵ C.J. Bullock, "The Futility of Changeless Change: The Worth Report, Progressivism and Canadian Education," in Nelsen and Nock (eds.), pp. 307-317.
- ³⁶ Friedenberg, "Marx and Northern Lights," p. 149.
- ³⁷ Ibid.
- ³⁸ Seymour Martin Lipset, *The First New Nation: The United States in Historical and Comparative Perspective* (New York: Basic Books, 1963), p. 118.
- ³⁹ Ibid., pp. 139-147.
- ⁴⁰ Edgar Z. Friedenberg, "Education for Passivity in a Branch-Plant Society," in Nelsen and Nock (eds.), p. 205.
- ⁴¹ Ibid., p. 199.
- ⁴² Edgar Z. Friedenberg, *Deference to Authority: The Case of Canada* (White Plains, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1980).
- ⁴³ Gad Horowitz, "Canadian Wimps," *Canadian Forum* LX, 700 (June-July 1980): 28.
- ⁴⁴ Marvin Harris, *Cultural Materialism: The Struggle for a Science of Culture* (New York: Random House, 1979).
- ⁴⁵ Gerhard Lenski, *Power and Privilege: A Theory of Social Stratification* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966).
- ⁴⁶ See C.B. Macpherson, "By Innis Out of Marx: The Revival of Canadian Political Economy," *Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory* 3, 2 (1979): 134-138.
- ⁴⁷ Friedenberg, "Marx and Northern Lights," p. 148.
- ⁴⁸ Robert M. Pike, "Education, Class, and Power in Canada," in Richard J. Ossenbeger (ed.) *Power and Change in Canada* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1980), p. 116.

- ⁴⁹ C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York: Oxford, 1956), p. 27.
- ⁵⁰ Pike, review of *RW&R*, p. 702.
- ⁵¹ Olive Banks, *The Sociology of Education* (London: B.T. Batsford Ltd., 1976).
- ⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 48.
- ⁵³ *Ibid.*
- ⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 41, 45, 49, 50, 55, 57, 65.
- ⁵⁵ This terminology (sponsored and contested) is taken from R.H. Turner, "Sponsored and Contest Mobility and the School System," *American Sociological Review* 25, 6 (December 1960): 855-867.
- ⁵⁶ Polly Toynbee, "Making Sure Excellence Gets to the Top," *The Manchester Guardian*, 3 December 1978, p. 19.
- ⁵⁷ See Pike, "Education, Class, and Power," in *Power and Change*, p. 122.
- ⁵⁸ See John Barkans and Norene Pupo, "Canadian Universities and the Economic Order," in Nelsen and Nock (eds.), p. 76.
- ⁵⁹ See Barkans and Pupo, pp. 69-89; Norene Pupo, "The Postwar University in Canada and the Need for Skilled Labour: The Waterloo Example," pp. 138-170; Randle W. Nelsen, "Growth and Celebration of the American Multiversity," pp. 120-135; Ken Luckhardt, "The Political Economy of the American Postwar Military-University Complex: The 'Goose Step' Revisited," pp. 90-119; all in Nelsen and Nock (eds.).
- ⁶⁰ See Barkans and Pupo for empirical evidence to 1974.
- ⁶¹ Rodney T. Hartnett, "Trustee Power in America," in Harold L. Hodgkinson and L. Richard Meeth (eds.) *Power and Authority: Transformation of Campus Governance* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc., 1971), p. 28.
- ⁶² See Pike, "Education, Class, and Power," in *Power and Change*, pp. 130, 132.
- ⁶³ For studies in which these questions are asked see Fred Pincus, "Tracking in Community Colleges," and David Hanson, "Catch-22 in Band-Aid Land," in Nelsen and Nock (eds.), pp. 171-194 and 294-299.
- ⁶⁴ See Pike, "Education, Class, and Power," in *Power and Change*.
- ⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 140-141.
- ⁶⁶ See Arlene Tigar McLaren, "Women in Adult Education: The Neglected Majority," paper presented in Montreal at the Annual Meetings of the Canadian Sociology and Anthropology Association, 1980.
- ⁶⁷ See a letter from the Adhoc Committee in Defense of Bertell Ollman, *The Insurgent Sociologist* VIII, IV (Winter 1979): 114-115.
- ⁶⁸ Pike, review of *RW&R*, p. 701.
- ⁶⁹ Pike, "Education, Class, and Power," in *Power and Change*, p. 136.
- ⁷⁰ Card, review of *RW&R*, p. 421.
- ⁷¹ Gustavus Myers, *History of Canadian Wealth* (Chicago: C.H. Kerr and Company, 1914); Frank Park and Libbie Park, *Anatomy of Big Business* (Toronto: James Lewis and Samuel, 1962 and 1973); John A. Porter, *The Vertical Mosaic: An Analysis of Social Class and Power in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965); Wallace Clement, *The Canadian Corporate Elite: An Analysis of Economic Power* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1975); David A. Nock, "The Intimate Connection: Links between the Political and Economic Systems in Canadian Federal Politics," unpublished doctoral dissertation in sociology written in Edmonton at the University of Alberta, 1976; Dennis Olsen, *The State Elite* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1980).
- ⁷² Pike, "Education, Class, and Power," in *Power and Change*, p. 142.
- ⁷³ See Dusky Lee Smith, "The Sunshine Boys: Toward a Sociology of Happiness," *The Activist* (Spring 1964): 166-177.
- ⁷⁴ Harasymiw, review of *RW&R*, p. 143.
- ⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

- 76 Nelsen and Nock (eds.), p. 195.
- 77 Friedenberg, "Marx and Northern Lights," pp. 150-151.
- 78 Alexander Himelfarb and C. James Richardson, *People, Power and Process: A Reader* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1980), p. 258.
- 79 Anonymous review of "Reading, Writing, and Riches," *Choice* 16, 2 (April 1979): 274.
- 80 Ibid.
- 81 Ibid.
- 82 Nelsen and Nock (eds.), p. 6.
- 83 Ralph Miliband *The State in Capitalist Society: The Analysis of the Western System of Power* (London: Quartet Books, 1973), p. 8.
- 84 Ibid.
- 85 C.B. Macpherson, *The Real World of Democracy* (Toronto: CBC Publications, 1970), p. 4.
- 86 Pike, review of *RW&R*, p. 702.
- 87 Ibid.
- 88 See David A. Nock, "History and Evolution of French Canadian Sociology," *The Insurgent Sociologist* IV, 4 (Summer 1974): 15-27.
- 89 See the acclaimed study of Marcel Rioux, *Quebec in Question* (Toronto: James Lewis and Samuel, 1971).
- 90 Nelsen and Nock (eds.), p. 6.
- 91 Friedenberg, "Marx and Northern Lights," p. 151.
- 92 John A. Porter, "Politics and Minorities: Canada and the United States," paper delivered at Michigan State University to the Third Annual Intercollegiate Conference on Canadian-American Relations, February 1968.
- 93 Lewis Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1956)
- 94 See Michel Brunet, "La conquête anglaise et le déchéance de la bourgeoisie Canadienne (1760-1793)" or "L'inévitable infériorité économique des Canadiens Français," in his *La Présence Anglaise et les Canadiens* (Montréal: Beauchemin, 1964), pp. 49-112 and 221-232; Maurice Séguin, "La conquête et la vie économique des Canadiens," in René Durocher and Paul-André Linteau (eds.) *Le 'Retard' du Québec et L'Infériorité Economique des Canadiens Français* (n.p.: Editions Boréal Express, 1946 and 1971), pp. 92-111; Rioux, *Quebec in Question*.
- 95 Geoffrey Milburn, review of "Reading, Writing, and Riches," *Quill & Quire* 45, 2 (February 1979): 16.
- 96 Ibid.
- 97 Paul Feyerabend, *Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge* (London: NLB, 1975).