

## COMMUNICATIONS

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### Reply to Professor Self\*\*

Professor Donnie J. Self's reply to my criticism of his article itself requires a reply. He now claims that he carefully defined the limits of his analysis. I contend that he did not. First of all, the title of his article defines the object as "Inconsistent Presuppositions of Dewey's Pragmatism," which is radically different and broader than what he now purports the object of his analysis to be; viz., just the concept of intrinsic value in *only* Dewey's *Theory of Valuation*. Second, in instances having such a narrow object as is claimed, *careful* definition involves informing the reader of how pursuit of the object might be, if that is likely the case, a distortion from a rounded, complete perspective. An example of this kind of *caveat* is one I came across a few days ago, by an author who was speaking of the concept of historicism in the context of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge. About the latter he remarked

I shall not enter here into a discussion of the points of departure from which Mannheim arrived at this all-inclusive sociology of knowledge, or of the degree to which his later writings may represent revision, retractions, and changes of the views expressed in *Ideology and Utopia*. This book ... shall be treated here independently of [Mannheim's] ideological development and later endeavors — which of course would have to be discussed.<sup>1</sup>

*This* is a careful limitation, and the reader is warned what *not* to expect. Self's readers are given no such *caveat*, his title suggests none is needed, and I suggest that others have done just what I did; namely, mistake idle analytic exhibitionism for a substantive discussion of a significant philosophic view.

Third, Self's assertion that I do not understand the nature of philosophical analysis,<sup>2</sup> be it true or false, should not detract readers from the question of Self's own claims and scholarship. Especially, it should not detract readers from a concern for the substantive issue which still remains: *is Dewey's concept of intrinsic value a viable one? If not, can it help suggest a viable theory? These* are very important questions now that so much attention is being given to empirical studies of moral, aesthetic, and religious education.

Finally, Self remarks that I have "misunderstood the philosophical perspectives which [I] wished to argue for and against."<sup>3</sup> This is a substantive charge, which would call for greater space than I can presume in the context of a series of rejoinders. May I just remark that (a) I do not adopt either his definitions or the position he conveniently constructs for me, and (b) I shall write an article for this Journal giving my interpretation of Dewey's concept of intrinsic value should its Editor invite me to do so.

I wish to express sincere appreciation to the Editor and Staff of *The Journal of Educational Thought* for their receptiveness to the exchange between Self and me.

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\*\**Journal of Educational Thought* II (1977): 47-48. My initial response is found: *ibid.*, 45-46. Donnie J. Self's article, which elicited my response, is found in this journal: "Inconsistent Presuppositions of Dewey's Pragmatism," Vol. 10, (1976): 101-109. Ralph C. Page kindly gave a reaction to this reply for which I am indebted.

<sup>1</sup> Wagner, Helmut, "Mannheim's Historicism," *Social Research*, 19, (September 1952): 301, n. 2.

<sup>2</sup> Self, p. 48.

<sup>3</sup> *Loc. cit.*