

Abstract

This paper analyses the concept of growth in Bertrand Russell's educational thought. The aim is to show that, while Russell's concept is inexact in comparison with those of Whitehead and Dewey, it incorporates a humanistic conception of the individual based on his unique capacities. Education only succeeds in developing these in an atmosphere of freedom that observes the principle of reverence. Reverence goes beyond the simple non-interference implied by the principle of liberty of traditional liberalism and requires an active caring and nurturing on the part of the adult educator.

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The concept of Growth in Bertrand Russell's Educational Thought

In *Principles of Social Reconstruction*, Bertrand Russell advances a concept of the individual which implies both a general theory of mankind as constructive beings, imbued with an innate principle of growth, and of society as an environment for nourishing constructive or creative impulses. The individual is a triad of instinct, mind and spirit and the good of the individual comprises a harmony of the three. This can only be developed through an educational system based upon a reverence for the individual as an instinctive, intellectual and spiritual being.

The core of Russell's concept of the individual is the principle of growth. Recognizing the importance of impulse and desire in the determination of individual action, Russell writes:

The impulses and desires of men and women, in so far as they are of real importance in their lives, are not detached one from another, but proceed from a central principle of growth, an instinctive urgency leading them in a certain direction, as trees seek the light. So long as this instinctive movement is not thwarted, whatever misfortunes may occur are not fundamental disasters, and do not produce those distortions which result from interference with natural growth. This intimate centre in each human being is what imagination must apprehend if we are to understand him intuitively. It differs from man to man, and determines for each man the type of excellence of which he is capable. The utmost that social institutions can do for a man is to make his own growth free and vigorous: they cannot force him to grow according to the pattern of another man.¹

Here, Russell has begun the construction of his account of the individual:

- 1) In comparing the growth of human beings to the natural growth of organisms, he places human development within biological development.
- 2) In defining the principle of growth as the unifying source of impulse and desire, he is able to formulate individual misfortunes as inessential, provided that they do not thwart the principle's development.
- 3) In conceiving intuition and imagination only as capable of apprehending the intimate centre of each individual, he calls for the necessity of caring and sensitive educational relations.
- 4) Finally, in stating that this centre differs from person to person, he is able to recommend that the task of social institutions is the liberation of the individual's potential for excellence rather than the inculcation of fixed and pre-determined patterns.

Russell thus articulates a concept of the individual which is grounded in both the species nature of mankind² (rooted in a universal principle) and in the uniqueness of each person (rooted in distinctive instinctual growth patterns).

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In this paper I shall proceed in the following manner: 1) I shall analyse Russell's account of the individual whose core resides in the principle of growth. 2) I shall analyse the principles of freedom and reverence which Russell believes best enhance free and untrammelled growth. 3) I shall consider two problems in Russell's account of growth and suggest answers to each, consistent with his premises. 4) I shall show that Russell's theory of growth is imprecise in comparison with those of John Dewey and A.N. Whitehead. Having briefly analysed each, I shall infer that Russell is more concerned with the general manner in which education is conducted (namely, one that stimulates growth) than with the exact methods of instruction required to do so.

I

Russell intends the metaphor of growth to apply to human development in both the physical and mental spheres:

There is in human beings, as in plants and animals, a certain natural impulse of growth, and this is just as true of mental as physical development.³

Whereas air, nourishment, and exercise aid healthy physical development, Russell recognizes that the external conditions which enhance healthy emotional and intellectual growth are more complex:

Men, like trees, require for their growth the right soil and a sufficient freedom from oppression. These can be helped or hindered by political institutions. But the soil and the freedom required for a man's growth are immeasurably more difficult to discover and to obtain than the soil and the freedom required for the growth of a tree. And the full growth which may be hoped for cannot be defined or demonstrated: it is subtle and complex, it can only be felt by a delicate intuition and dimly apprehended by imagination and respect.⁴

As well as emphasizing the need for subtlety and sensitivity in drawing out the individual's potential, Russell also stresses the need for freedom from oppression. In circumstances of fear, of overt force, of arbitrary discipline or of the stultifying labour so prevalent in the modern world the individual is not likely to realise his potential. As Russell puts it:

The outside influences that help [mental growth] are those that merely provide encouragement or mental food or opportunities for exercising mental faculties. The influences that hinder are those that interfere with growth by applying any kind of force, whether discipline or authority or fear or the tyranny of public opinion or the necessity of engaging in some totally incongenial occupation. Worst of all influences are those that thwart or twist a man's fundamental impulse, which is what shows itself as conscience in the moral sphere: such influences are likely to do a man an inward damage from which he will never recover.⁵

Clearly, Russell finds particularly harmful those influences which deny the individual his moral autonomy and thereby stifle one fundamental aspect of the principle of growth: the freedom to exercise individual judgement in the intellectual and moral spheres.

In general, Russell is opposed to the total control of instinct by will; in his view, the repression of basic impulses advocated by traditional morality results in either the destruction of the individual's instinctive vitality or the re-emergence of new, more destructive instinctual forms.⁶

Where fundamental impulses are stifled and vital growth crushed, the result is a feeling of impotence in the individual: "The things that crush growth are those that produce a sense of impotence in the directions in which the vital impulse wishes to be effective."⁷ Particularly destructive are instances where the individual's will is seduced by activities which counter his fundamental impulses. Russell has in mind cases where vital impulses lead an individual toward some creative activity (such as being a writer), which is given up for the safety of a conventional career (such as being a journalistic hack). If this is done willingly, it suggests to Russell that the individual has been seduced by the rewards expected to accrue to him as a hack, that he has been driven by a fear of the risks expected to befall him as a writer. The problem is not, however, resolved: either his fundamental impulses will suffer frustration in the conventional career⁸, or they will cease to be a powerful motive altogether.⁹ In the former case, the result will be an unending

search for objects of satisfaction, unending because, as long as the individual is mistaken about the nature of his impulsive motivation, he will fail to find lasting satisfaction. In the second case, the result will be a complete crushing of his vital growth and a subsequent, total loss of vitality. In Russell's view, this indeed is the present lot of the majority of mankind¹⁰ — lives bereft of satisfaction and potency.

Despite the personal and social costs engendered by the domination of will over instinct, Russell acknowledges that the will does have a role to play in the development of an integrated individual, even if it is a relatively minor one. His distinction between 'outward' and 'inward' will allows him to develop a positive formulation of this role. Outward will is directed towards tasks in which the individual meets opposition or difficulty, for example, intellectual pursuits in which the confrontation with boredom and complexity are inevitable as they inhere in the life of the mind. The discipline required to persevere is essentially that of an act of will. Outward will, moreover, is present in all those who lead a vigorous life, who are capable of consistent self-direction, who embody a central purpose; it is the *sine qua non* of the integrated individual:

The first [kind of will], which is directed outward, is called into play by external obstacles, either the opposition of others or the technical difficulties of an undertaking. This kind of will is an expression of strong impulse or desire, whenever instant success is impossible; it exists in all whose life is vigorous, and only decays where their vital force is enfeebled. It is necessary to success in any difficult enterprise, and without it great achievement is very rare.¹¹

Alternatively, inward will is coercive and deceptive; its operation generally pre-requires a lack of self-knowledge:

Often, chiefly from failure of self-knowledge, a man's will is on a lower level than his impulse: his impulse is towards some kind of creation, with a sufficient income and the respect of his contemporaries.¹²

Unlike, then, the vital and constructive character of outward will which allows an individual to realize self-directed tasks (i.e., tasks of an intellectual and spiritual nature), the repressive and externally imposed character of inward will at the most provides the individual with a mechanism to cope with inner conflict (i.e., between the impulse towards creativity and the need for security). As such, it is to be avoided except in those instances where the individual is paralyzed by inner conflict.

Such conflict, however, will be rare for the harmonious individual and as such the exertion of inward will is not a necessary capacity.¹³ Lest this seem too utopian, Russell reminds us that total inner harmony is an ideal approaching realization *given* only the correct social conditions:

The power to exert inward will when the occasion arises must always be needed by those who wish their lives to embody some central purpose, but with better institutions the occasions when inward will is necessary might be made fewer and less important.¹⁴

Thus, the integrated or harmonious individual is one who will experience fewer conflicts between his impulses and desires (e.g., an impulse to run outside and go swimming and a desire to finish the essay which he is writing), since his life will increasingly embody his central impulses in a unified form. Given the unity of his life, in particular the pursuit of spiritual goals based on a universal feeling of love, he will find lasting satisfaction in purposes which he has consciously considered. The spontaneity of his impulsive or instinctual life is integrated on a higher level with his spiritual goals, thereby re-emerging in a new, more mature, less fragmentary form. He now willingly pursues tasks, the importance of which he perceives with greater clarity. Since his desires are based directly on his instincts, inward will, or the control of one for the realization of the other, is a faculty he rarely needs to use.

Russell conceives of spirit as the major harmonizing force of the individual. Whereas instinct provides the individual with a vital and concrete sense of belonging with others, spirit takes these instinctual feelings and, by channelling them into such activities as art, philosophy, and science,

universalizes them. In becoming universal, they cease to be open to the criticism of mind, to which they are prone as mere instinct; subjective and circumstantial, instinctual feelings invite the impersonal and objective critique of mind. The spiritual transformation of instinct produces, however, a universal regard for mankind — a universal love — which combines the vitality of instinctual feeling and the objectivity of mind. This is the base of Russell's humanism and the end he conceives for individual development.

II

The ultimate aim of Russell's social theory is to establish a harmony between the interests of the individual and those of society as a whole. In order to realize this aim, two political principles must be applied in the everyday life of society:

1. the growth and vitality of individuals and communities is to be promoted as far as possible.
2. the growth of one individual or one community is to be as little as possible at the expense of another.¹⁵

Russell conceives of the second of these principles as applicable both in the private and public affairs of men and women. When applied by an individual in his personal relationships with others, it is the principle of reverence upon which his actions are based. Anyone who utilizes the principle regards the life of another as having equal importance to his own.¹⁶ In other words, he shows respect for the principle of growth of the other and does not impede its freedom to develop. The principle of reverence is of particular importance in education, since it implies a respect for the rights of the child and a responsibility on the part of the adult not to attempt to mould all children in a uniform manner.¹⁷ Applied universally, in the political realm, reverence incorporates the principle of liberty. Russell conceives of liberty as an essentially negative principle: ". . . it tells us not to interfere, but it does not give any basis for construction."¹⁸ In respecting the liberty of all men, a political theory bases itself primarily upon the right of non-interference: the right of all men to pursue their own ends, provided that they do not thereby interfere with the liberty of others. This conception of *negative* freedom, or freedom *from* oppression, poverty and coercion in both thought and action forms the basis of traditional liberalism.¹⁹ It implies, most importantly, the universal right to freedom of expression which Russell maintains as having fundamental importance.

The whole realm of thought and opinion is utterly unsuited to public control: it ought to be as free, and as spontaneous as is possible to those who know what others have believed.²⁰

It remains unclear why Russell is so insistent upon the distinction between the principles of liberty and reverence until we understand that his purpose is to provide liberal political theory with an enlarged basis upon which to construct a more adequate conception of the social and political good. The breakdown of the social order brought about by the First World War made this an urgent task:

To me, the chief thing to be learnt through the war has been a certain view of the springs of human action, what they are, and what we may legitimately hope that they will become. This view, if it is true, seems to afford a basis for political philosophy more capable of standing erect in a time of crisis than the philosophy of traditional liberalism has shown itself to be.²¹

Russell's belief in the importance of impulses in determining human action and the need for a spirit of reverence, within which the processes of education, politics and personal relationships are to be conducted, are closely interconnected. Creative impulses can only develop in the young in an atmosphere of freedom and reverence.

The principle of reverence implies more than a simple non-interference on the part of adults in the process of education. It implies an active caring and concern for the well-being and freedom of the young on the part of the educator. Moreover, it entails the provision of an environment suitable for the active channelling of his impulses in constructive activities by the child. Not only is the child to be free *from* the interference of others, but he is to be free *to* pursue those interests to which he is led by the natural development of both his growth and impulses. In this manner, he will develop as a

subject able to determine both what he wants and the means of obtaining these ends. The child is not a passive receptacle into which can be poured both the established customs of his society and the general body of knowledge accepted by society. Rather, he is a unique being, endowed with capacities, some of which he shares with the rest of mankind and others which are peculiar to himself. These capacities can only be forged into a cohesive whole through an active process of development based primarily on an inner freedom, proceeding directly from the principle of growth. This inner freedom is expressed in activities of the young child's own choosing. It can be maintained only where institutions are based upon respect for the vitality and growth of the individual and non-interference with his liberty.

The principles of liberty and reverence, which are fundamental to the correct government of social and political institutions, correspond to the complementary conceptions of negative and positive freedom. The political principle of liberty corresponds to freedom *from* coercion by others while the educational principle of reverence complements the child's freedom *to* determine for himself the ends of his own actions.²² Only in an environment where both aspects of individual freedom are respected (namely in a society based upon the twin principles of liberty and reverence) will the underlying principle of growth attain its full potential.

Institutions based simply on the principle of liberty prescribe non-interference with the individual's actions but are inadequate for the positive reconstruction of society. Such institutions partially allow for the development of individual growth by not interfering with its free expression. However, they lack a theoretical principle for determining the type of growth to be pursued and the type of institutions to be constructed. For this reason Russell introduces the principle of reverence, since it provides just such a positive basis for social and political reconstruction. Reverence towards the child, for example, will provide the correct atmosphere for the development of creative impulses and not those impulses which proceed from a thwarted principle of growth and result in war, the unending desire for property and the use of the coercive apparatus of the state.²³

Both the principle of growth and the inner freedom stemming from it are pre-social in nature. They can be realized and developed within the social context, but are a function of the individual's intrinsic nature. Certainly the child learns much from his contacts with society, but society does not simply mould his nature into any forms which it sees fit. Learning is a two-way process, in which the child is both influenced by *and* influences his environment. This is the reason why reverence and the positive aspect of freedom are so important in Russell's account. In learning to be a subject, who determines what he wants, the child learns to exercise his potentiality for growth by making decisions about the ends of his own actions. The more skilled he becomes at pursuing activities which stem from his own impulses and applying both intelligence and will in their performance, the greater the expansiveness of his principle of growth and the greater the respect that he acquires both for himself and for others.²⁴

III

Two important questions concerning the principle of growth suggest themselves. They arise from the notion of changing human nature and the methods which Russell recommends for this purpose. It is clear that Russell regards the principle of growth as an innate structure upon which the child's organic development is based. As he puts it elsewhere:

The humanistic conception regards a child as a gardener regards a young tree, i.e., as something with a certain intrinsic nature, which will develop into an admirable form, given proper soil and air and light.²⁵

The questions I wish to raise are as follows: how is the notion of the child possessing an intrinsic nature consistent with Russell's stress upon changing the psychological structure of mankind? Moreover, is there anything distinctive of human growth in addition to its biological aspects?

The inconsistency between Russell's belief in human beings possessing an innate structure and his insistence upon radical change in this structure is more apparent than real. Russell certainly believes that human nature can be changed by environmental factors and regards such factor of major importance in influencing whether the paths along which instinctive impulses develop are to be constructive or destructive.²⁶ At the same time, his emphasis upon the principle of growth indicates that he does not regard the constructive channelling of impulses as simply a matter of allowing an unstructured 'tabula rasa' to thrash about in a random manner in order to determine which avenues allow it the fullest autonomy. This conception of freedom is based upon a view of the individual as selecting his own unique paths of development without any prior constraints placed upon him. The process is a matter of chance in which the individual forges his malleable and incomplete nature by making his own private choices. For Russell, freedom only has meaning in relation to a *a priori* structure which places constraints upon such decisions and the paths of development which result from them. There are organizational forms, whose origin is to be found in the shared character of human beings, within which the drive for human freedom and knowledge takes place. As Chomsky puts it:

The principles of mind provide the scope as well as the limits of human creativity. Without such principles, scientific understanding and creative acts would not be possible . . . One who abandons all forms, all conditions and constraints, and merely acts in some random and entirely willful manner is surely not engaged in artistic creation, whatever else he may be doing.²⁷

Chomsky asserts that Russell conceives of knowledge and freedom as a function of intrinsic principles of mental organization, which place absolute limits upon what can be known.²⁸ Given such a view, freedom only has meaning in relation to these constraints and can be enjoyed only when it stems from the internal core of the individual:

There is an interplay, a complex relationship between constraints and rules and creative behavior. If there is no system of rules, no system of constraints, no set of forms, then creative behavior is quite unthinkable. Someone who is throwing paints at a wall in an arbitrary fashion is not acting creatively as an artist. Similarly some system of constraints and forms and principles and rules is presupposed as a basis for any kind of creative action.²⁹

This leads naturally into consideration of the second question posed above. The analogy between the cultivation of the young tree and the young child is just that: an analogy which points to several similarities between the growth of the two organisms, but which does not mean that the two processes are identical. The key difference between the two is that mankind, unlike trees, is both a natural and a cultural, or historical, being. While man is a biological organism determined by his genetic structure and environment, culture stems from the unique manner in which man interacts with his environment. Unlike other animals, whose behaviour is determined by instinct and reflex and who simply adapt to their environment, man changes his material circumstances through active manipulation. Men and women are capable of determining their own lives and their relationship both to nature and to each other by means of reflection and action. In this manner, they are beings who transcend the strictly biological realm, which they share with the rest of nature, including plants and animals. In order for the process of education to be successful, therefore, it must respect this active aspect of the human mind and not simply teach the child to adapt in a passive manner to the particular social order in which he finds himself. As Marx put it, in arguing against the materialism of Feuerbach:

The materialistic doctrine concerning the changing of circumstances and education forgets that circumstances are changed by men and that the educator himself must be educated.³⁰

Thus Russell's analogy between education and gardening is not to be interpreted literally, since to do so would overlook the distinctive features of human development.

As a result, when Russell writes of the need to provide the child with the 'proper soil and air and light', he is recommending that educators and parents provide for the physical needs of the child and

also approach their task with the kindness and care appropriate to the subtle process of human growth. Only in an atmosphere of warmth and freedom will the human sapling grow to realize its full potential. Freedom, in particular, is a necessary condition for the maturation process to unfold without the distortions of stunted growth. Without it, the child will bend in the directions suggested by the desires of others and thwart his own distinctive principle of growth, constantly seeking the light and air of its own choosing.

There is a distinctly romantic flavour to the position which Russell is advocating. Education is to provide favourable conditions of growth to the young, enabling them to attain the goal of self-direction. This goal can only be reached by allowing the unfolding of an innate pattern in the child, which is all too easily disturbed. Moreover, the key element in this process is the inner self of the child, not the mature self of the educator, standing in authority over the child. The stress upon the unfolding (literally, the leading out) of the child's nature lies at the core of Russell's account, as it does in the Romantic school of education in general:

With regard to childhood, this philosophy involves not only an awareness that the child possessed an inner self but also a valuing of childhood, to which the origins of the self could be traced. The adult, through taking the child's point of view, could experience otherwise inaccessible elements of truth, goodness and reality.³¹

The necessary empathy on the part of the adult is provided by Russell's principle of reverence.

IV

In contrast to A.N. Whitehead and John Dewey, Russell is imprecise about the stages of development through which the child is to proceed on the road to autonomy. For Whitehead, the initial stage of education is that of romance, in which the child's innate curiosity is to be given the fullest possible leeway. But he supplements this with two further stages: the stage of precision and the stage of generalization.³² Each synthesizes elements of the previous stage and builds upon the intellectual and emotional development of the child without destroying the instinctive curiosity which provides the motivation for education. Like Russell, Whitehead contrasts mechanical and human development as follows:

In the production of a mechanism the constructive energy lies outside it, and adds discrete parts to discrete parts. The case is far different for a living organism which grows by its own impulse towards self-development. This impulse can be stimulated and guided from outside the organism, and it can also be killed. But for all your stimulation and guidance the creative impulse towards growth comes from within, and is intensely characteristic of the individual.³³

By recognizing the conflicting, rhythmic demands of freedom and discipline and relating them to the different stages of development, Whitehead offers a more comprehensive account than Russell.

While both men concur on the crucial importance of self-discipline and its interdependence on the notion of freedom within limits³⁴, Whitehead explains how such discipline meshes with the child's own development. Once the child has emerged from the stage of romance, he seeks more precise knowledge, capable of explaining the hitherto unrelated phenomena which have met his eye. The child pushes on in his inquiry: "... getting to know the fundamental details and the main exact generalisations, and ... acquiring an easy mastery of technique".³⁵ While romance is in the background, it is not dead, simply subservient to the demands of acquiring precise knowledge. Curiosity re-emerges in the final stage of development in which the adolescent utilizes precise knowledge for his own ends. He is now capable of generalizing upon the basis of his findings, determining the principles of organization underlying various fields of inquiry and relating such knowledge to his own specific needs and interests: "The stage of generalisations is the stage of shedding details in favour of the active application of principles, the details retreating into subconscious habits".³⁶

Much of what Whitehead writes is in keeping with the tone of Russell's theory. Yet none of it is explicit in that theory. This may be because Russell was more concerned with the spirit in which education is to be conducted than with detailed accounts of educational theory and psychological development. Moreover, he only spent one chapter of *Principles of Social Reconstruction* explicitly on education and one other on growth. Both are integral aspects of a full-fledged social and political theory. It is therefore perhaps unfair to compare his educational judgements with those made in a book devoted entirely to educational philosophy. It is hardly surprising that the comparison should be unfavourable to Russell.

The point is brought home by briefly contrasting Russell's account of growth with that of Dewey. Dewey also believes that intellectual development can only proceed on the basis of instinctive curiosity:

Unless the activity lays hold on the emotions and desires, unless it offers an outlet for energy that means something to the individual himself, his *mind* will turn in aversion from it, even though he keeps at it.³⁷

Moreover, the notion of growth occupies a central position in Dewey's theory, since it is conceived as the only legitimate and co-terminous aim of education. For Dewey, growth and education are one and the same process:

Our net conclusion is that life is development, and that developing, growing is life. Translated into its educational equivalents, that means (i) that the educational process has no end beyond itself; it is its own end; and that (ii) the educational process is one of continually reorganising, reconstructing, transforming . . . Since in reality there is nothing to which growth is relative save more growth, there is nothing to which education is subordinate save more education.³⁸

Only where education stimulates the child's capacity to grow, can it be considered a success. As the child develops, his growth enables him to undertake tasks of increasing difficulty and to reorganize and restructure his experience. The task of the school curriculum is less that of imparting to him the accumulated knowledge of past generations than of developing in him the skills necessary to utilize such knowledge for his own purposes and needs.³⁹ Again, the child's mind is to be considered as an active organism, capable of manipulating the tools at its disposal, integrating them with past experience, and changing its patterns of thinking, rather than as a passive receptacle of inert facts.

Thus Dewey conceives of growth both as the founding principle of the individual and as identical with the educational process itself. For Dewey, growth, provides the aim of education. Like other progressivists, Dewey analyzes the stages of its development in some detail. Since the process of growth is dynamic, the various stages through which the growing child passes require clarification:

As an educational ideology, progressivism holds that education should nourish the child's natural interaction with a developing society or environment. Unlike the romantics, the progressives do not assume that development is the unfolding of an innate pattern or that the primary aim of education is to create an unconflicted environment able to foster healthy development. Instead, they define development as a progression through invariant ordered sequential stages. The educational goal is the eventual attainment of a higher level or stage of development in adulthood, not merely the healthy functioning of the child at a present level.⁴⁰

Dewey's concern is to enable the child to solve problems of increasing difficulty and develop his capacities by integrating different aspects of his experience with the information he acquires. In this manner, the child advances towards maturity:

Only knowledge of the order and connection of the stages in the development of the physical functions can insure the full maturing of the psychical powers. Education is the work of supplying the conditions which will enable the psychical functions, as they successively arise, to mature and pass into higher functions in the freest and fullest manner.⁴¹

Dewey gives analytic consideration to the stages of growth in a manner that is absent from Russell's account. A key difference between the two is their different conceptions of growth and

how it is best secured. For Russell growth is in an innate pattern whose unique development is to be respected by education. For Dewey, growth and development are the only legitimate aims of education and must be understood in their sequential stages for education to be successful.⁴²

To conclude, Russell's emphasis is upon the spirit in which early childhood education is to be conducted. He is less concerned with the details of individual development than with the general principles that give fullest expression to autonomy. Provided that these are carefully attended to, the exact manner in which education proceeds will take care of itself. The important thing is to ensure that the fragile being of the child is not destroyed before it has a chance to bloom. I believe that Russell would have agreed with the following:

Growth and social interaction are more important than education . . . In order to see this, we must notice that it is, on the whole, much more difficult to repair the negative effects of unfortunate social interaction in childhood than to repair the negative effects of insufficient transfer of knowledge or information, although they may be serious enough. But whereas we can, in principle, catch up with our neglected education, it is much harder, and sometimes impossible, to rehabilitate unsuccessful growth.⁴³

Notes

¹ Bertrand Russell, *Principles of Social Reconstruction*, (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1916), p. 24.

² The notion of man as a species-being is that of the young Marx. In realizing his species-character, man, unlike animals, makes of himself and his productive life "an object of his will and consciousness" and is capable of "free conscious activity". In other words, man "is only a self-conscious being, i.e., his own life is an object for him, because he is a species-being". Karl Marx: *Early Writings* (Translated and edited by T.B. Bottomore), (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1963), p. 127. In Noam Chomsky: *Problems of Knowledge and Freedom: The Russell Lectures*, (Random House, New York, 1971), p. 54 he indicates that Russell's humanistic conception of man bears certain similarities to that of the young Marx, especially in its emphasis upon the free development of the individual.

³ Bertrand Russell, *Political Ideals* (Unwin Books, London, 1963), p. 13.

⁴ *Principles of Social Reconstruction*, p. 25.

⁵ *Political Ideals*, p. 13.

⁶ P. 239.

⁷ P. 230.

⁸ P. 16.

⁹ P. 212.

¹⁰ P. 232.

¹¹ P. 238.

¹² P. 230.

¹³ P. 238.

¹⁴ Pp. 238-239.

¹⁵ *Principles of Social Reconstruction*, pp. 228-229.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ Pp., 143-145.

¹⁸ P. 228.

¹⁹ The distinction between negative and positive freedom is made by Isaiah Berlin in 'Two Concepts of Liberty' in Anthony Quinton (ed.): *Political Philosophy*, Oxford University Press, 1967. Russell refers to the importance of not placing any obstacle in the way of the expression of thought in *Political Ideals*, pp. 63-64.

²⁰ *Political Ideals*, p. 66. Cf. Christian Bay: *The Structure of Freedom*, (Stanford University Press, 1958) pp. 127-128.

²¹ *Principles of Social Reconstruction*, p. 9.

²² The application of negative and positive freedom to educational questions is made by David Ohan in 'Some Remarks on the Concept of Freedom' in Brian Crittenden (ed.): *Notes on the Philosophy of Education*, (O.I.S.E., 1972) pp. 1-2.

²³ Pp., 39, 146-147 and cf. *Political Ideals*, p. 14.

²⁵ Bertrand and Dora Russell: *The Prospects of Industrial Civilisation*, (The Century Co., New York and London, 1923) pp. 274-275.

²⁶ He mentions the following as effecting changes in human nature: . . . beliefs, . . . material circumstances . . . social circumstances, and . . . institutions. *Principles of Social Reconstruction*, pp. 39-40. Social institutions have not kept pace with the changes in science and technology that have released new opportunities for growth and made possible the liberation of human instincts (P. 26).

Institutions have a life of their own, and often outlast the circumstances which made them a fit garment for instinct. This applies, in varying degrees, to almost all the institutions which we have inherited from the past: the state, private property, the patriarchal family, the churches, armies and navies. All of these have become in some degree oppressive, in some measure hostile to life. (P. 42).

Russell's striking metaphor of institutions no longer being 'a fit garment for instinct' suggests that modern institutions have outlasted their utility and should be shed for newer garb which does not constrict the vital growth of individuals. The old garments inhibit the development of creative impulses because they are based upon authority and injustice, notions no longer able to address the needs of modern men and women. Like clothes which no longer fit the growing child, such institutions are to be discarded and replaced by new ones, founded on the principles of liberty, reverence and justice (Pp. 146-148). The opportunities for autonomy and self-expression must be regained if social and political institutions are to bring real and lasting satisfaction to the majority of mankind:

It is not only material goods that men need, but more freedom, more self-direction, more outlet for creativeness, more opportunity for the joy of life, more voluntary co-operation and less involuntary subservience to purposes not their own. (P. 43).

²⁷ Chomsky: *Problems of Knowledge and Freedom*, p. 50.

²⁸ P. 49.

²⁹ Noam Chomsky: 'Toward a Humanistic Conception of Education' in Walter Feinberg and Henry Rosemont Jr.: *Work, Technology and Education*, (University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1975) pp. 210-211.

³⁰ Karl Marx: 'Theses on Feuerbach' in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: *The German Ideology*, International Publishers, New York, 1947, pp. 197-198. The view of culture and education for which I am arguing is best expressed by Paulo Freire: *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, (Herder and Herder, New York) 1970.

³¹ Lawrence Kohlberg and Rochelle Mayer: 'Development As the Aim of Education', *Harvard Educational Review*, Vol. 42, No. 4 (November 1972): P. 452.

³² A.N. Whitehead: *The Aims of Education*, (The Macmillan Co., New York, 1929) pp. 17-19.

³³ Pp., 38-39.

³⁴ Cf., P. 35 and *Principles of Social Reconstruction*, pp. 158-159.

³⁵ *The Aims of Education*, p. 34.

³⁶ P. 37.

³⁷ John Dewey: *How We Think*, (Heath Co., Boston, 1933) p. 109.

³⁸ John Dewey: *Democracy and Education*, (Macmillan Paperbacks Edition, New York, 1961) pp. 49-50 and 51.

³⁹ Pp., 79-80.

⁴⁰ Kohlberg and Mayer: P. 454.

⁴¹ John Dewey and J. McLellan: 'The Psychology of Number' in R. Archambault (ed.): *John Dewey on Education: Selected Writings*, (Random House, New York, 1964) p. 207.

⁴² A subtle account of Dewey's conception of the aims of education is that of Jon Fennell: 'Dewey On Rousseau: Natural Development As the Aim of Education', *The Journal of Educational Thought*, Vol. 13, No. 2, (August 1979): 114-115.

⁴³ Harold Ofstadt: 'Education Versus Growth in Moral Development', *The Monist*, Vol. 58, No. 4, (October 1972) 599.