

Abstract

During the past two decades many philosophers have attempted to define indoctrination. A brief review is offered of the central debate in which they have engaged over the importance of such features as method, content, and intention. It is then demonstrated that attempts to make the intention to indoctrinate a necessary feature of indoctrination are not successful. It is pointed out that the whole debate over method, content, and intention is misconceived, as it fails to focus attention on the experience of the learner. A revised definition is offered which takes into account this important factor.

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Another Look At Indoctrination

During the 1960's and early 1970's the topic of indoctrination received considerable attention from philosophers of education. However, during the past several years interest seems to have waned. At least, that is, philosophy of education journals have carried few articles on indoctrination.¹ At the risk of being viewed by some as beating a dead horse, I propose that the discussion of indoctrination be continued. There are two factors of particular significance which constitute a rationale for doing so. The first involves the resurgent interest in moral education which we have witnessed over the past decade or so, and which has not subsided, but rather, seems to be still growing. More and more schools where moral education had become passé are instituting new programs, and other schools where it was part of the curriculum all along are looking for revised techniques. Throughout this resurgence of moral education one of the catchwords on the lips of teachers and administrators, as well as parents and other interested parties, has been that of indoctrination. Many have judged indoctrination to be undesirable, and demanded an alternative to the indoctrinative bent of traditional approaches to teaching morality. In response, new approaches have been developed which aim at avoiding indoctrination.²

All of this presupposes a clearcut understanding of the nature of indoctrination. If people are going to be talking about it, and planning educational programs so as to avoid it, an understanding of the concept is imperative. Here is where the second factor comes in. While various philosophers have trained their sights on indoctrination, their analyses have not yielded a fully definitive picture of its nature such that educators may rely on in determining in particular instances whether or not it is occurring, has occurred, or is likely to occur. There is, then, considerable room for further discussion.

A review of various analyses of indoctrination reveals that many philosophers do seem to be in agreement on two preliminary points. Beyond this, however, there has been much debate over just what indoctrination is. The preliminary points of consensus are that indoctrination is a pejorative term and that it is best defined by comparing it with and distinguishing it from some other term which has a positive connotation, e.g., "education" or "teaching."³ The disagreement is over just what it is about indoctrination, the unique feature or features implied by this term, which sets the activity it describes apart from the activity described by other terms in the educator's vocabulary. The method of teaching, the content taught, and the intention of the teacher have all been suggested. Some philosophers claim that a single one of these features is what accounts for indoctrination, although they disagree about which one it is. Others claim that a combination of two or of three of the

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features is necessary. Careful arguments and counter arguments have been devised by the supporters of each position to show not only why their position is correct, but also why competing positions are in error.

In what now follows I offer a review of the arguments concerning method, content, and intention as the defining features of indoctrination, and then conclude that the whole debate is misconceived. The participants have failed to provide a proper account of indoctrination because they have concentrated their sights too much on what the teacher claims to be doing, and not enough on what actually happens to the learner. If this dimension in the concept of indoctrination is overlooked it is most probable the cases of indoctrination in educational practice will also go overlooked. That is, one may fail to detect indoctrination if he does not know what to look for, and fails to balance a consideration of the claims of the teacher about what is occurring or is supposed to occur with a consideration of the true experience of the learner.

Method/Content/Intention

In one of the early analyses in the debate over the nature of indoctrination, Willis Moore pointed out that it is commonplace to think of indoctrination as a method.⁴ The method thesis was later supported by R.F. Atkinson.⁵ In this view indoctrination is identified with such things as propaganda, censorship, absolutism, authoritarianism. The idea is that means are used which induce the learner to accept the answers to certain questions rather blindly and without consideration (or at least without full and fair consideration) given to alternative answers. That is, indoctrination fails to consider proofs, reason, evidence, and opposes the improvement of the capacity of the learner to think for himself.

As John Wilson first, and other philosophers later, noted, the methods which are commonly linked with indoctrination are not unique but are also sometimes present in situations we would wish to think of favorably and to characterize as "education," "teaching," or something of the like.⁶ For instance, when teaching students the multiplication tables, or a foreign language, methods are employed which if employed in the teaching of morality, politics, or religion, would be considered indoctrinative. We would not, however, want to say that the students have been indoctrinated in the multiplication tables or in French grammar. It seems that we are left with two alternatives. On the one hand, indoctrination could be defined in terms of certain methods which are found to be employed in some situations generally deemed desirable, e.g., inculcating the multiplication table, and other situations deemed undesirable, e.g., inculcating Nazi dogma. If this alternative is accepted, indoctrination loses its necessarily negative connotation — the term would describe methodology, but the methodology in itself would not necessarily be thought of pejoratively, On the other hand, we could continue to use the term indoctrination pejoratively but seek its defining feature(s) in something other than method. Most philosophers have opted for the latter alternative.

Wilson suggested that while method is not to be entirely discounted, we must also consider the subject matter (beliefs) which is taught, what is commonly referred to as content.⁷ Indoctrination is identified with teaching as if they were certain beliefs which are in fact uncertain, open to dispute as to their truth. The distinguishing mark which attests that a doctrine is uncertain Wilson sets as follows:

Those beliefs are uncertain in this sense. That it is not true that any sane and sensible person, when presented with the relevant facts and arguments, would necessarily hold the beliefs. We might put

this by saying that there was no *publicly accepted* evidence for them, evidence which any rational person would regard as sufficient.⁸

The certainty or uncertainty of the beliefs, then, is determined by the evidence which backs them up. This evidence must be publicly accepted, and not simply what sectarians like to consider evidence.

In Wilson's view, the certainty of such content as the multiplication tables or French grammar is not questionable, and thus not identified with indoctrination. On the other hand, regarding political, religious, and moral beliefs, not only do we not have the necessary sort of evidence, but do not even know what sort of evidence would suffice if we were to have it. Paradigm cases of indoctrination would be inculcation of the belief that *X* is the only workable system of government, or that *Y* is the only true religion, or that *Z* is necessarily a morally reprehensible activity. Beliefs which fall within the realm of science might be identified with indoctrination, but here we are at least aware of the sort of evidence which would be needed to prove them certain.

To sum up Wilson's content thesis we may say that indoctrination occurs if a belief which is conveyed as certain is one for which some sane and sensible person holds that there is evidence to the contrary. R.M. Hare responded to this view by questioning just what is meant by "sane and sensible."⁹ If we are to disqualify some people from the ranks of the sane and sensible, who are they, and on what grounds are they to be disqualified? We must be careful about such disqualifications, but, if we are, the ranks of the sane and sensible will be so large as to include challengers for nearly any belief in politics/religion/morality. The implication is that as such beliefs could not be taught as certain, teaching them as being so would be indoctrination. Wilson's answer to this would be that while uncertain beliefs may be taught as certain, they may also be taught as if they are probable or uncertain. Wilson proposes the latter tactic, as well as ensuring that opposing beliefs are given equal consideration. This is the method he terms "rational discussion."¹⁰

Where Wilson would fall back on method to supplement content when explaining indoctrination, Hare follows a different line. He is concerned to show that there are cases where we teach morals dogmatically but where we would not wish to use such a pejorative term as indoctrination to describe that activity. He has in mind the teaching of morals to children before they are capable of thinking for themselves about the issues involved. Here we teach uncertain beliefs as if they were certain, but this should not be called indoctrination since the activity is worthwhile but the term has a negative connotation.

Hare finds the key to indoctrination to be in neither method nor content, but the "purpose" or "aim," or what has commonly come to be termed the intention of the teacher.¹¹ In sum, the intention thesis is this: "education" or "teaching" occurs when the intention of the teacher is to help the learner to come to think for himself, to think critically about the beliefs he is confronted with; indoctrination occurs when the intention of the teacher is to stifle critical thinking and to instill blindly accepted beliefs. By relying on the intention thesis Hare can get around the problem about whether or not the purveying of morals to children is indoctrination. He claims that in most cases it is not, because rather than intending that the learner will accept and hold uncritically the moral beliefs purveyed, the teacher usually intends that when the learner gets older, and his capacity to think for himself increases, he will give critical consideration to those beliefs.¹²

Hare's intention thesis was well received by other philosophers who engaged in analyses of indoctrination. Many have included the intention to indoctrinate as a necessary feature

of indoctrination, although some philosophers have included content and/or method as also necessary. Anthony Flew contends that there are two senses to the term indoctrination. In its primary sense indoctrination is a matter of intention and content, while in its second-ary sense it is a matter of intention and method.¹³ Thomas Green sees indoctrination in terms of intention and how the beliefs come to be held by the students. If they are held without regard for their truth or the evidence which backs them up, indoctrination has occurred.¹⁴ Green's concern for the condition of the learner sets him apart from many other proponents of the intention thesis, and indicates the recognition that in an analysis of indoctrination we must be concerned with something beyond the activity of the teacher.

For other philosophers, the combination of two features from among method, content, and intention is insufficient to describe indoctrination. All three features are held to be necessary. I.M.M. Gregory and R.G. Woods claim that, "the components of content, method, and aim are necessary and conjointly sufficient conditions for indoctrination."¹⁵ Barry Chazan, after examining each of the three features individually, draws a similar conclusion.¹⁶ I.A. Snook emphasizes intention, but also allows that method and content must be considered when trying to delimit the scope of indoctrination.¹⁷ Brian Crittenden is inclined to emphasize content and method, but does not go so far as to eliminate intention as a necessary feature in indoctrination.¹⁸ Finally, there is Wilson himself, in a revision of his earlier view. Responding to criticism from Flew, he concedes that intention, as well as content and method, may be necessary for the occurrence of indoctrination.¹⁹

The point to be made here is that the intention thesis has been widely accepted among those philosophers whose writings on indoctrination have become well known. If these philosophers are correct, they have provided an understanding about indoctrination which can be of help to educators who want to detect it when it goes on in the schools. One of the first things to look for would be the intention to indoctrinate, and the absence of this intention would be taken to mean no indoctrination. However, if it can be shown that the intention to do so is not an essential feature of indoctrination, then those educators scouting for its presence may have to look far beyond what the teacher intends.

The Intention to Indoctrinate Is Not Necessary for Indoctrination

The connection made by philosophers between the intention to indoctrinate and the occurrence of indoctrination is misconceived. First, it should be noted, though this is not the main point I wish to make here, that there can be the intention to indoctrinate without indoctrination ever occurring. Many proponents of the intention thesis seem to forget this, or at least to make no mention of it. Consider for example a teacher who attempts to indoctrinate his students with the belief that premarital sex is sinful. It is likely that some, perhaps many, of his students will reject this belief. In fact, it is obvious that in many of the numerous instances where indoctrination of this belief has been attempted the students toward whom it was aimed turned deaf ears. The point is that in spite of the teacher's intention to indoctrinate, he may fail to carry it out. Surely we would not want to call an abortive attempt at sex education indoctrination. It should not be said that indoctrination occurs simply because the teacher has intended it and acted to accomplish his intention. To make such a claim would be to forget that the process of indoctrination also required someone who is indoctrinated.

More important for this study than the point that there can be the intention to indoctrinate and yet no indoctrination is the realization that there can be the opposite sort of disjunction

— the occurrence of indoctrination without its being intended.²⁰ In order to explain this, it will be helpful to consider several hypothetical, but not unlikely cases.

Case A

The teacher accepts that a belief is not true, but puts it out to his students as if it were and tries to get them to accept it uncritically. They do. An example might be teaching that one race of people is genetically inferior to another. Although privy to scientific evidence which leads him to reject this belief, the teacher may feel that it is necessary to indoctrinate his youthful citizens and future leaders with it in order to further political stability and the maintenance of political power for the controlling race. This would undoubtedly be a case of indoctrination according to the intention thesis.

Case B

Here the teacher accepts a belief as true and puts it out to the students as if it were, although he is aware that there are contrary or alternative beliefs. The teacher intends that the students accept the belief uncritically — just accept it as true and follow it without asking the teacher any difficult-to-answer questions which might shake someone's (perhaps even his) faith in that belief. An easy example may be found by adverting again to the teaching that premarital sex is sinful. This case differs from case A in that here the teacher actually believes as true the belief he intends and attempts to convey. However, it is still, according to the intention thesis, a case of indoctrination.

Case C

In this case the teacher accepts that a belief is not true, but puts it out to the students as if it were. However, he does not intend the students to accept it uncritically. He is simply playing devil's advocate. The result is that some students uncritically accept the belief as true. For example, a teacher tells his students that one who kills should be killed in return, and; although he does not believe this, convinces his students that he does. If a student accepts this belief on the authority of the teacher, and fails to do what the teacher had intended, namely to subject it to criticism, is it a case of indoctrination? According to the intention thesis, the answer would be "no," since there was no intention to indoctrinate.

Case D

The teacher teaches *about* a certain belief and also *about* alternative or contradictory beliefs, and does not intend that the student will be swayed by his direction to favor one of these beliefs over another. However, unintentionally the teacher gives the impression that one of these beliefs, the one he personally favors (although he does not tell the students he favors it) is the right one. Some of the students are swayed by what the teacher says, and, in awe of his authority, accept the view which they perceive him to favor. Although the teacher has presented alternative beliefs, not all of the students are fully critical of them. Those students who do not make the determination of which belief to accept by trying to emulate the teacher. As an example consider the teacher who presents for consideration the following three positions in regard to stealing: (1) stealing is wrong; (2) stealing is right under certain circumstances; (3) there really is no such thing as "stealing" — this is just a term constructed to protect the interests of those who are too weak to protect them otherwise things are there for the taking and you should try to get what you can. The teacher believes in (1), although he gives consideration to (2) and (3). He intends that the students should decide for themselves which of these beliefs about stealing is correct and does not

try to persuade them that stealing is wrong. However, his prejudice in favor of this view shows through and affects some of the students so that they now accept that stealing is wrong. Is this a case of indoctrination? The intention thesis would say "no".

Case E

In this case the teacher may intend to indoctrinate belief A, or he may intend simply to point it out and discuss it while giving equal time and emphasis to alternatives to belief A. During the course of the lesson the students are led to accept belief B, although it was not the teacher's intention that this happen. Belief B might be accepted as true or right by the teacher, but not necessarily. It would be one which he did not plan on conveying to the students and which he is probably not aware afterwards that he has conveyed. The example here will be a lesson the Civil War in which the teacher discusses the morality of slavery. Perhaps he asserts that slavery is wrong, although he may also acquaint the students with other points of view, i.e., that slavery is sometimes acceptable for economic reasons, or that slavery is the natural lot of the conquered. Or, perhaps the teacher presents these points of view without prejudicing the students in favor of one over the other. As a result of this lesson, the students come away believing that southern whites are bigots. The teacher did not intend to convey this to his students, but nevertheless he somehow did. The question to be asked here is whether or not the students' acceptance of belief B, that southern whites are bigots, is a case of indoctrination. According to the intention thesis, it would not be.

These five hypothetical cases are not the only ones which might have been cited, but they should serve to make the point. Proponents of the intention thesis would claim that only A and B are cases of indoctrination, while I will claim that C, D, and E are as well. Indoctrination has occurred. It has happened to the learner, although not intended by the teacher. The problem for proponents of the intention thesis seems to be that their concentration on the activity of the teacher tends to obscure any real consideration on the activity of the learner tends to obscure any real consideration of what happens to the learner. Indoctrination is an intentional activity, that is, it necessarily involves a teacher who has the intention to affect a learner. This much will not be denied. However, that intention need not be the intention to indoctrinate.²¹ That is, it need not be the intention (typified in cases A and B) to get the learner to accept some belief uncritically. Rather the intention might just as well be that to "teach" or "educate," to get the learner to think for himself — the antithesis of indoctrination.

What Previous Efforts to Define Indoctrination Have Neglected — The Experience of the Learner

The debate over method, content, and intention, although illuminating, can be very misleading for someone who is trying to understand the nature of indoctrination. First, the debate can be misleading if the person following it is led to believe that in looking for indoctrination we need to consider only method, or only content, or only intention. That is, because of the manner in which the debate was at first conducted, with these three features being played off against one another, one might get the impression that a single one of these features must ultimately be chosen as the defining one and the others either disregarded or given very low priority. In fact, each of these features can, at least at times, act as clues to the presence of indoctrination. We may be tipped off by the stated or suspected intention of the teacher, by his chosen method, and/or his chosen content. Recall hypothetical case B. Any one of these features might have tipped us off as to the presence of indoctrination. In

some cases, then, all three features may hint at the presence of indoctrination. In other cases, however, it may be that only one or two of the features suggest it. The point is that none of the three features should be disregarded.

As was explained earlier, some of the later entrants into the method/content/intention debate were well aware of this point. Unfortunately, although they were correct in emphasizing that all three features must be given consideration, this very emphasis can be misleading. It would be a mistake to jump to the conclusion, as those theorists who emphasize the importance of all three features seem to have done, that these features are all that need to be considered when trying to detect indoctrination. While it is true that neither method, nor content, nor intention is the sole defining feature of indoctrination, it is not true that indoctrination is entirely a matter of their combination. After considering all three features we cannot then feel safe in having exhausted all possible clues to the presence of indoctrination. Indoctrination should not be thought of as simply a matter of method plus content plus intention. There is more involved than this. There is another feature which has been obscured by the standard debate, a feature whose recognition will give us a more thorough picture of the nature of indoctrination. Before going on to explicate this feature, however, it seems in order to first summarize the case against placing so much emphasis as many philosophers have on method, content, and intention. When this is done, the necessity for consideration of and emphasis on another feature should become clear.

It was shown earlier why intention is not always an indicator of indoctrination. Neither does the intention to indoctrinate guarantee that the learners are indoctrinated nor does the occurrence of indoctrination in the experiences of the learners require that it was intended by the teacher. There are also difficulties regarding method and content which can inhibit one from spotting indoctrination by relying on a consideration of these features.

Wilson's argument against the method thesis was that although the method being used in a particular case might be one associated with indoctrination, in another case the same method would not be associated with indoctrination. The difference would lie in the sort of content being dealt with. On this point, I believe Wilson is correct, though it is not the only or even (at least for purposes of this study) the most telling difficulty with the method thesis. First let us note that the same form of argument can be backed up in another way. In a case where a potentially indoctrinative method is applied, indoctrination may be absent simply because the learner resists or tunes out the content presented to him. Of concern here is what has happened to the learner or with what has failed to happen to him. Next, and more importantly, it should be recognized that in a case where the method employed is not one usually associated with indoctrination, indoctrination may still occur. Recall hypothetical case D described earlier, where the teachers' chosen method is that which Wilson termed "rational discussion." Indoctrination still occurred because the prejudice of the teacher shone through. To this point, it might be objected that if the teacher had properly applied the method then no prejudice would have been revealed and indoctrination would have been averted. Thus, the method thesis would not be damaged. Technically, this is a correct response, but rather than as an objection it may be used to further strengthen the point at hand. In order to know whether or not the method in a given case is one of indoctrination, it is necessary to look beyond the application of that method and toward what has happened to the learner. We cannot ask simply whether or not the teacher's chosen method is that of rational discussion, but must also ask whether or not the students have ended up being indoctrinated. We must look hard at the experience of the learner to determine whether or

not the teacher is successful in fostering a rational discussion in which he avoids letting his prejudices show through.

So much, then, for method. It should be clear that in order to be sure about whether or not a given application of a given method is indoctrinative, we should pay close attention to what happens to the learner. Now let us again consider content. Wilson makes good sense, I believe, in saying that there is no indoctrination when no one would question the truth of the content. He also makes sense in saying that if uncertain content is put out in the context of a successfully regulated rational discussion, indoctrination with regard to that content may be avoided. However, there is still an important difficulty. The teacher is often responsible for conveying to his students a content which he had not planned on conveying (recall hypothetical case E). While directing a rational discussion about one belief, the teacher may unwittingly indoctrinate students with another belief. There may be "hidden" content transmitted to the students, and they will not have the benefit of also being presented with the viable alternatives and weighing all in a rational discussion directed by the teacher. What should be underscored here is the difference between the content chosen by the teacher and the content assimilated by the learner. We can find out about indoctrination of the latter only by considering carefully the experience of the latter.

The problem regarding both method and content, as I have discussed them, is that they are usually considered only in terms of the teacher's perception of them. A mistake is made similar to that made by the intention thesis. Now it is not the intention to indoctrinate that is in question, but rather the intention to use a certain method and present a certain content. Although a teacher may intend a certain method and content, and believe that he is successfully adhering to what he intends, he may have an inaccurate or incomplete understanding of the results of his activity.

An important key to understanding whether or not indoctrination occurs lies beyond the intention of the teacher to indoctrinate and beyond the method or content chosen by the teacher. Indoctrination occurs when, as a result of the teacher's input into the learning experience, the learner comes to accept uncritically and as certain beliefs which are false or of questionable certainty. This important point seems to have been missed by those philosophers who argue about the relative importance of method vs. content vs. intention. Their arguments are misleading in that they tend to shift emphasis away from consideration of the learner.

Indoctrination is, of course, an intentional activity, though, as was pointed out earlier, that intention need not be the intention to indoctrinate. And, indoctrination cannot occur without the presence of some sort of method and content. In fact, in some cases the intention, method or content chosen by a teacher offers a clue to the presence of indoctrination. But, the final test for indoctrination is in what happens to the learner. Indoctrination may occur despite claims by the teacher that he does not intend it, has chosen method and content to avoid it, and in fact has succeeded in avoiding it.

What must be recognized is that indoctrination has a dual-edge nature. That is, two people are involved in the activity we identify as indoctrination, and they are involved in such a way that we cannot say the activity has occurred unless one has been affected by the content being offered by the other. In one sense we speak of a teacher who is indoctrinating, but to do so we must also conceive of a student who is indoctrinated. The key is that the student has come to accept uncritically some content (which is of questionable certainty) as

a result of the activity of the teacher who meant to convey something to him. Still, the content accepted may be quite different from that which the teacher meant to be accepted.

A Possible Objection and A Rejoinder

So far I have critically examined the debate philosophers have engaged in over the importance of method, content, and/or intention as necessary or sufficient features of indoctrination. Additionally, I have offered a revised view of indoctrination according to which the experience of the learner is emphasized. With this done, it is now time to anticipate an objection which would expectedly be raised against my position, and to answer it.

It is likely to be objected, especially by those who favor the intention thesis, that if the view I have supported is accepted, the term "indoctrination" takes on too broad a meaning. That is, it could be applied to almost any classroom situation in which the teacher is involved. J.P. White, a staunch defender of the intention thesis, responds to opponents who deny that intention is a necessary feature of indoctrination by saying that,

... the term becomes so wide as to become meaningless. For if whenever a person comes to have a false belief 'y' as a result of my acting on intention 'x', I am indoctrinating him, then I may be indoctrinating someone whenever I act on any intention.²²

Another way to put it might be simply to say that it is bordering on paranoia to imply that indoctrination might pop up anywhere without the teacher being aware of it.

The real force behind this position is, I suspect, connected with the notion that indoctrination is a pejorative term in that it describes an undesirable activity. It is quite natural not to want to admit that the occurrence of something undesirable is or even may be widespread and frequent. And, of course, the narrower the terms by which one defines that which is undesirable, the less chance there is of finding it in existence when one goes looking for it. If it is requisite to indoctrination that there be the intention to indoctrinate, then we cannot claim to have found indoctrination when such cases as those described hypothetically in C, D, and E occur. But just what term, then, is to be used to describe cases such as these? It might be permissible to define indoctrination as requiring the intention to indoctrinate, and thus deny that C, D, E are cases of indoctrination — but, only if some other means is available for adequately describing these close cousins. Perhaps they should simply be called cases of miseducation. This however, would tell us very little, as not only such cases as these, but also occurrences of indoctrination (as narrowly defined) and many other occurrences would be thought of in connection with this term. Those who would wish to define indoctrination narrowly so as to include only cases where the intention to indoctrinate is present have not provided terminology for describing events in which the result is the same as those of intended indoctrination even if the intention is not. In response to this, it might be said that no special name is needed for cases C, D, E, and that it is enough to say that they are of an unnamed species of miseducation. Would it not make more sense, though, to admit the close relationship of these cases with other cases where the intention to indoctrinate is present? Must we not say very sensibly that there are two varieties of indoctrination, one intentional and the other unintentional?

Concluding Thought

Let neither philosophers nor the practitioners of education assume that indoctrination has been well understood. The preceding discussion has been designed to emphasize that it has not, and at the same time to point in a direction which shows promise. One important

implication of the view espoused here is that when a better understanding of its nature is affected we will come to suspect the presence of indoctrination in many places where those who accept the intention thesis would not. This in turn leads to other matters which have not been discussed here, such as our capacity to deal with so widespread a classroom phenomenon and how we should go about this, and, perhaps ultimately to a consideration of just how undesirable various instances of it really are. Since success in handling matters such as these rests on an adequate conceptual understanding of indoctrination, more discussion by philosophers should be encouraged.

Notes

1. Two notable exceptions to this trend are Mary Ann Raywid's article, "The Discovery and Rejection of Indoctrination," which appeared in the Winter 1980 issue of *Educational Theory*, and "The Need for and Inevitability of Moral Indoctrination," by Bruce B. Suttle, *Educational Studies* XII (Summer 1981).

2. The two most popular approaches to moral education in the United States today, values clarification and Lawrence Kohlberg's cognitive developmental approach, employ as a major selling point the claim that they successfully avoid indoctrination. See, for instance, Sidney Simon, "Values Clarification Versus Indoctrination," *Social Education* (December 1971); Lawrence Kohlberg, "Moral Development and the New Social Studies," *Social Education* (May, 1973).

3. It should be noted that the term "indoctrination" has not always carried a negative connotation. Neither does it today for all those who use it, although it seems to for the large majority. For a discussion of the change in meaning this term has undergone see Richard H. Gatchel, "Evolution of Concepts of Indoctrination in American Education," *Educational Forum* XXIII (March, 1959), reprinted in I.A. Snook, ed., *Concepts of Indoctrination* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), See also, Raywid, *Educational Theory* (Winter 1980).

4. Willis Moore, "Indoctrination and Democratic Method," in Snook, *Concepts of Indoctrination*.

5. R.F. Atkinson, "Instruction and Indoctrination," *Philosophical Analysis and Education*, R.D. Archambault, ed. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), reprinted in Snook, *Concepts of Indoctrination*.

6. John Wilson, "Education and Indoctrination," *Aims in Education: The Philosophical Approach*. T.H.B. Hollins, ed. (Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1964).

7. P. 26.

8. Pp. 28-29.

9. R.M. Hare, "Adolescents Into Adults," *Ibid.*, p. 48.

10. Wilson, p. 31.

11. Hare.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 51.

13. Anthony Flew, "What is Indoctrination?" *Studies in Philosophy and Education*, IV (Spring 1966), reprinted in Snook, *Concepts of Indoctrination*.

14. T.F. Green, "A Topology of the Teaching Concept," *Studies in Philosophy and Education*, III (Winter 1964-65), reprinted in Snook, *Concepts of Indoctrination*.

15. I.M.M. Gregory and R.G. Woods, "Indoctrination," *Proceedings of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain*, IV (January 1970), reprinted in Snook, p. 171. Gregory and Woods, while accepting the notion of intention supplied by Hare and that of content by Wilson, deepen the discussion by expanding upon them. Three possible varieties of intention to indoctrinate are noted. Also, indoctrinative content is identified as those beliefs which, in addition to being the sort which are not known to be true of false, "are intimately related to action and purposive activity in a way which

many other beliefs are not; they have a scope and generality. Thus, our believing that the milkman will come in the morning might well bring about action (we put the milk bottles out at night), but the limited 'field of force' of this belief stands in sharp contrast to our belief in God, or our belief that economic considerations are at the root of man's behavior."

16. Barry Chazan, "Indoctrination and Religious Education," *Religious Education* (July 1972). Before offering his own view, Chazan gives a very readable summary of the arguments for and against method, content, and intention as features of indoctrination. However, he mistakenly implies that Gregory and Woods view indoctrination as a matter of content, when, in fact, they preceded him in asserting this to be only one of three necessary features.

17. I.A. Snook, "The Concept of Indoctrination," *Studies in Philosophy and Education*, VII (Fall 1970). The last part of this article is reprinted in Snook, *Concepts of Indoctrination*.

18. Brian Crittenden, "Teaching, Education, and Indoctrinating," *Education Theory*, XVIII (Fall 1968), reprinted in Snook, *Concepts of Indoctrination*. Although Crittenden criticizes Hare's concern for the intention of the indoctrinator, he seems to imply, rather than that intention is not necessary, that it is intimately connected with method.

19. John Wilson, "Comments on Flew's 'What is Indoctrination?'," *Studies in Philosophy and Education*, IV (Summer 1966), p. 392, reprinted in Snook, *Concepts of Indoctrination*.

20. Other critics of the intention thesis have also taken this line. See Leslie Smith, "Indoctrination and Intent," *Journal of Moral Education*, III (1974); A.G. Davey, "Education or Indoctrination?" *Journal of Moral Education*, II (1972); Henry Rosemont Jr., "One the Concept of Indoctrination," *Studies in Philosophy and Education* (Spring 1972). While the present discussion draws upon or agrees with certain points made in these articles, it is meant to go beyond what has been said there in that, among other things, it both provides a series of hypothetical cases to exemplify the point about the insufficiency of the intention thesis, and, beyond criticizing other definitions of indoctrination prefers an alternative.

21. For a concise statement supporting the notion that the intention involved in the activity of indoctrination must be the intention to indoctrinate see J.P. White, "Indoctrination," *The Concept of Education*, R.S. Peters, ed. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967), p. 181, reprinted in Snook, *Concepts of Indoctrination*.

22. P. 181.