federal-provincial cash and tax point transfers which are vital to post secondary education and hold implications for the schools as well.

The section concerning political processes draws on a range of literature somewhat beyond that of the education specialists and somewhat deeper into the recent past. The influence of interest groups and the basis for local school board activity provides some useful insights. The vital focus "where politics and expertise collide" provides an important if brief discussion by Coleman concerning the opportunities in Canada for improving the effectiveness of schooling.

The sixth section, concerning working administrators, includes an advocacy of administrative roles in developing systems of education. It also acknowledges the problems of constraints in resource flows, including the commitment of administrators to their roles as practical, perhaps detached, actors who do get dissatisfied at times.

The final section concerns university professors of educational administration and includes a disparate set of works. Of particular value are the observations which urge looking beyond the standard confines of the education or Canadian context to find conceptual and empirical strengths and problems to address. Finally, a personal essay provides a vicarious insight into the problems faced by one immigrant American academic back in 1974, and a possible stimulus for the collection.

Overall, one is reminded of the stages of ego development or analogous stages of moral and intellectual development. One wonders if the state of the sub-discipline which may be called Canadian educational administration has achieved one or another degrees of reliance on knowledge and information as a vehicle for theory and practice. Regretably, such a question is neither posed nor answered in the present collection. Of course, the collection is offered as a text, rather than a research piece and professors will find various elements of it useful for introductory course reading and discussion pieces. Overall, however, one must conclude that the collection is limited in its ability to provide major direction for the scholarship of its readers.

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R.S. Peters, *Moral Development And Moral Education.* London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981. 192 pp. $8.95.

Moral Development and Moral Education is not a book which contains anything new; rather, it is a collection of the writings of R.S. Peters on this topic over the last twenty years or so. The first seven chapters are contained in his *Psychology and Ethical Development* (Allen & Unwin, 1974) although, as Peters himself notes, that is a rather expensive and not well known volume. The remaining chapter first appeared in the *Journal of Moral Education* (vol. 7, No. 3, May 1978). As is perhaps inevitable in a series of articles written on similar topics over a period of years, there is a certain amount of repetition in the ideas. More interestingly, however, despite the time involved, there is a remarkable consistency in the arguments presented and in the position developed. Peters is a man whose own background gives him a sympathetic and insightful understanding of psychological procedures and findings together with the concepts and perspectives of normative and analytic philosophy. The result, then, is a systematic philosophical treatment of a series of psychological writings in the area of moral development and moral education by such figures as Freud, Hartshorne and May, Kohlberg, Piaget and Skinner. Thus, Peters has given us a convenient compilation of his ideas and a useful volume to have to hand: it is well worth $8.95, and I shall be making good use of my copy. It will be especially valuable to those of us who have, over the years, looked to R.S. Peters for ideas, insight and direction. Though not always recent, Peters' ideas are still well worth reading — and worth reading with some care.

In spite of his work in both psychology and ethics, Peters is probably best known in educational circles as an exponent of the analytic approach to philosophy. The focus of his attention, then, is frequently the way in which quite common concepts would ordinarily be used. This seems a particularly appropriate approach for a subject which is a matter of frequent public debate and concern, and it perhaps enables Peters to address the interests of parents and teachers in a straightforward and helpful way. He is able, so to speak, to make sense of a lot of the things we commonly think or find ourselves wanting to say. For Peters, of course, this is not simply a matter of studying words or how they happen to be used. Rather, for him, it is a question of exploring the conditions which are logically and conceptually necessary for undersanding and making sense of one form of human acitivty — "an argument of a Kantian form which attempts to arrive at what is presupposed by our use of different linguistic expressions." (p. 46) So, for example, he reminds us of the different ways in which we think of teaching — from

instructing and imparting information to helping someone to see the point of an argument for himself — and faults Kohlberg for neglecting the breadth of meaning in the concept. Equally helpful is his discussion of virtue and habit, where he distinguishes.

> (a) highly specific virtues, such as punctuality, . . . (b) virtues, such as compassion, which are also motives for action . . . (c) more artificial virtues, such as justice and tolerance, which involve more general considerations to do with rights and institutions [and] (d) virtues of a higher order, such as courage . . . which have to be exercised in the face of counter-inclinations. (p. 94)

His suggestion here is that the notion of habit is more appropriate in the consideration of some types of virtue, while rational deliberation is central to others. Similarly, he attempts an analysis of the concept of emotion with an eye to reconciling apparently differing views about the role of reason.

Contrary perhaps to what one would expect in a philosophical treatise, Peters' account is rich in its references to empirical studies. In an informed way, then, the volume addresses a series of specific topics including the nature of habits, the variety of content in moral education, the place of feelings, the importance of rules and social roles, and the concepts of authenticity, autonomy and will, and attempts a reconciliation of the views of Kohlberg, Skinner and Freud. Moreover, he stresses our need to learn more of, for example, parental, linguistic and "general social influences on the early development of the preconditions of a rational form of morality." (p. 149)

Though philosophically and psychologically sophisticated, the book has a reassuring aura of common sense about it. Peters' emphasis on the importance and inevitability of teaching young children good habits and the traditional virtues will surely gladden the hearts of many teachers and parents! His parody of reasoning with children too young to understand the arguments and his picture of the resulting moral and behavioural vacuum have the ring of good common sense; so also must his solid scepticism about both philosophical and psychological findings sound healthy:

> Utilitarians, for instance, who have usually been decent people with developed moral sensitivities, have invented highly dubious, and quite untested empirical speculations to demonstrate that their conviction that they should be just and truthful, which they would never really dream of giving up, rests on alleged consequences to human welfare. (p. 83)

> It may well be that some generalizations have been established about certain aspects of moral development; but these may be peculiar to the limited range of phenomena studied. It would be unfortunate if these generalizations were erected into a general theory of moral development. (pp. 83-84)

Perhaps then this would be an ideal book for those who would like a general understanding of the field but do not wish to be swept away with half-baked theories.

In the course of reviewing a series of relevant empirical studies, sorting out our common sense notions of moral education and moral development, and presenting a distinctively philosophical role in the discussion, the book provides Peters with an opportunity to articulate his own view of morality and moral education, and to respond to some of his critics, such as those who would suggest that his approach emphasizes rationality unduly and fails to do justice to the emotions. He wishes to bring together in his account of morality four elements: rational deliberation, the conventions and rules of society, emotions and feeling for one's fellow man, and fundamental principles rich in their content. In this way, his position attempts to reconcile Kohlberg's emphasis on the development of moral reasoning, Skinner's emphasis on the cultivation of habits and correct ways of responding, the recognition that the proper subject matter of ethics is the well-being and appropriate treatment of other people, and the evident fact that fundamental moral principles are a subject of dispute and disagreement among well informed and reflective people. On the other hand, Kohlberg's developmental stages and his conception of justice are found inadequate, and conditioning techniques are presented as both inadequate and inappropriate to the nature of moral action and deliberation, while Freudian explanations are best understood as accounts of perverted or stultified development. Instead, Peters sees moral education as beginning with conventional virtues and moral values (as both something the child needs to acquire and the basis for further moral reflection) from which develop later not only deliberately held principles and a disposition to reflect but also appropriate feelings (both natural and artificial) for others and motivations for action.

In presenting his own position, Peters is giving voice to a decidedly British tradition of reflection on empirical studies, our common sense understandings of our moral experiences, and the logical interrelations of our moral concepts. Ryle, Oakeshott and Wittgenstein are very much in the background, though Aristotle can frequently be found in the foreground. Whether those in other traditions would be satisfied with his treatment of their concerns remains for me an open question, especially when we find "the peculiar phenomenon of American academics

who took what sociologists said about moral relativism so seriously that they would never say that anything was right or wrong" described as an "Existentialist type of reaction." (p. 48)

Perhaps too any analytic philosopher (or anyone emphasizing, as Peters does, the primacy of deliberation and rationally held moral principles) can expect to be accused of ignoring emotions and feelings. Peters seems sensitive to this charge, making a point of responding to it in his Preface on the dual grounds that "the use of reason is not a dispassionate business" and that there is a necessity "of the development of concern for others to supplement Piaget's cognitive stages" (p. 8) and indeed to make sense of our concern with moral questions at all. Reading the book, there can be no doubt that Peters has consistently included in his writings discussions of feelings, emotion and motivation; his emphasis on the point, however, is a helpful balancing of the position of a man who has commonly been associated with the importance of having higher-order principles and character in the sense of consistency. Whether his references to the virtue of benevolence and to sympathy as a condition of moral understanding, or his contention that ethics is fundamentally concerned with consideration of people's interests will suffice to convince his critics that he has not entirely missed the place of emotion in ethics is a point about which I remain sceptical.

But to stop the critique at this point would be unfair, for Peters recognizes in his analysis of Kohlberg's conception of justice both that this is not simply a formal principle and that a further account of value is required:

> In its minimal form of impartiality, it holds that no exceptions are to be made to a principle unless there are relevant grounds. In its more full-blooded form it demands impartial consideration of people's claims and interests. The point is that it cannot be employed unless something *else* of value is at stake. (p. 172)

But where are we to get that "something *else* of value"? I sense here that Peters and I would be agreed that this is why moral education cannot intelligibly be separated from the rest of a child's education — from general education — and that programmes of moral education *per se* are perverse.

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Charles Vert Willie. *The Ivory and Ebony Towers.* Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1981. Pp. xii, 173. $24.95.

This is a dreary, preachy, disjointed book composed of a plethora of parts and brief chapters covering a wide range of topics; too wide, in fact, to permit of any but a semblance of thoroughness.

The *Ivory and Ebony Towers,* the author tells us, "is a comparative analysis of the adaptations of black students to each other and to their teachers and administrators in institutions of higher education" (p. xi). "It provides," he says, — whether further or equivalently is not clear — "an extensive analysis of the educational value of diversity in learning environments and of the benefits of the minority status" (p. xi). But claims to analysis notwithstanding, the prevailing style of the book is far more declarative and prescriptive than it is analytic. Slogan-like, or presumably exoteric, expressions such as "the minority status" or "the black experience," crucial to the work, are left unexplained, and notions such as indoctrination and liberation are not only set adrift, as it were, from their usual renderings in specialized literature, but are given uncomfortably glib characterizations.

The first part of the book presents the author's view of an inclusive philosophy of education. But the case for inclusiveness reads suspiciously like a defense of mediocrity — in particular the mediocrity of black institutions of higher education. This peculiar philosophy of education derives, we are told, from "the black experience," and as such, extols adequacy over excellence. "Excellence," says the author, "is fine and beautiful," but "adequacy is good enought." He reasons that policies based on the former are inherently exclusive while those based on the latter are inlcusive. However, to fill out the argument, one is obliged to take note of the suppressed, negative premise; something to the effect that black institutions of higher education either are not or cannot become places of excellence. Moreover, what is good for black institutions is also good for white ones; hence adequacy, not excellence, is the particular objective to be realized. "Education for adequacy," Professor Willie declares, "is the contribution of the black experience to the emerging American Philosophy of education of inclusiveness." (p. 12).

Whatever the merits of the foregoing argument, the case for its academic integrity remains to be made.