who took what sociologists said about moral relativism so seriously that they would never say that anything was right or wrong" described as an "Existentialist type of reaction." (p. 48)

Perhaps too any analytic philosopher (or anyone emphasizing, as Peters does, the primacy of deliberation and rationally held moral principles) can expect to be accused of ignoring emotions and feelings. Peters seems sensitive to this charge, making a point of responding to it in his Preface on the dual grounds that "the use of reason is not a dispassionate business" and that there is a necessity "of the development of concern for others to supplement Piaget's cognitive stages" (p. 8) and indeed to make sense of our concern with moral questions at all. Reading the book, there can be no doubt that Peters has consistently included in his writings discussions of feelings, emotion and motivation; his emphasis on the point, however, is a helpful balancing of the position of a man who has commonly been associated with the importance of having higher-order principles and character in the sense of consistency. Whether his references to the virtue of benevolence and to sympathy as a condition of moral understanding, or his contention that ethics is fundamentally concerned with consideration of people's interests will suffice to convince his critics that he has not entirely missed the place of emotion in ethics is a point about which I remain sceptical.

But to stop the critique at this point would be unfair, for Peters recognizes in his analysis of Kohlberg's conception of justice both that this is not simply a formal principle and that a further account of value is required:

> In its minimal form of impartiality, it holds that no exceptions are to be made to a principle unless there are relevant grounds. In its more full-blooded form it demands impartial consideration of people's claims and interests. The point is that it cannot be employed unless something *else* of value is at stake. (p. 172)

But where are we to get that "something *else* of value"? I sense here that Peters and I would be agreed that this is why moral education cannot intelligibly be separated from the rest of a child's education — from general education — and that programmes of moral education *per se* are perverse.

Michael J.B. Jackson
Memorial University of Newfoundland

Charles Vert Willie. *The Ivory and Ebony Towers.* Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1981. Pp. xii, 173. $24.95.

This is a dreary, preachy, disjointed book composed of a plethora of parts and brief chapters covering a wide range of topics; too wide, in fact, to permit of any but a semblance of thoroughness.

The *Ivory and Ebony Towers,* the author tells us, "is a comparative analysis of the adaptations of black students to each other and to their teachers and administrators in institutions of higher education" (p. xi). "It provides," he says, — whether further or equivalently is not clear — "an extensive analysis of the educational value of diversity in learning environments and of the benefits of the minority status" (p. xi). But claims to analysis notwithstanding, the prevailing style of the book is far more declarative and prescriptive than it is analytic. Slogan-like, or presumably exoteric, expressions such as "the minority status" or "the black experience," crucial to the work, are left unexplained, and notions such as indoctrination and liberation are not only set adrift, as it were, from their usual renderings in specialized literature, but are given uncomfortably glib characterizations.

The first part of the book presents the author's view of an inclusive philosophy of education. But the case for inclusiveness reads suspiciously like a defense of mediocrity — in particular the mediocrity of black institutions of higher education. This peculiar philosophy of education derives, we are told, from "the black experience," and as such, extols adequacy over excellence. "Excellence," says the author, "is fine and beautiful," but "adequacy is good enought." He reasons that policies based on the former are inherently exclusive while those based on the latter are inlcusive. However, to fill out the argument, one is obliged to take note of the suppressed, negative premise; something to the effect that black institutions of higher education either are not or cannot become places of excellence. Moreover, what is good for black institutions is also good for white ones; hence adequacy, not excellence, is the particular objective to be realized. "Education for adequacy," Professor Willie declares, "is the contribution of the black experience to the emerging American Philosophy of education of inclusiveness." (p. 12).

Whatever the merits of the foregoing argument, the case for its academic integrity remains to be made.

The principle of complementarity which the author makes much of as the basic theme of the book and which he defines as "the principle that the majority population that is educated in a setting that excludes the minority receives a deficient education, and vice versa," seems to be a sort of free translation or application of the adequacy-excellence idea. It is thus all too easy for one to get the feeling that much too frequently ideology has usurped the place of analysis.

In concluding part two of the book which deals with recruitment, admission and retention of black students, the author tells us that standardized testing "is a disguised way of legitimizing institutional elitism" (p. 54). (Emphasis on minimal competencies had already been accorded culprit status). With quixotic seriousness he urges that "it is important to *analyze* [italics mine] the standardized testing movement as a form of status politics and social control" (p. 14). Can analysis assume that posture and still be bona fide analysis? Or is this insistence, as well as the data mustered in its support, another ideological thrust by the heavy hand of adequacy?

No less perplexing are the author's self-righteous claims made on behalf of blacks and black insitutions. In part four we read: "To put it bluntly, black colleges and universities have kept alive interest in the pursuit of honesty, justice, and altruism or sacrifice as goals of higher education. They have helped the nation recognize a range of desirable characteristics in students and the difference between information and knowledge, on the one hand, and virtue and wisdom on the other . . ." (p. 106). Or again: "Whites ought to know as much about honesty, justice, and altruism or sacrifice as blacks. They can learn these things that they ought to know by experiencing the status of a minority" (p. 110).

In sum, the tone and substance of the book seem better, if not ideally, suited to audiences of the late sixties and early seventies than to later, that is more recent ones. And this is perhaps its main shortcoming, the fact that it is addressed to a now practically empty room — the audience having long gone and found other matters of more consuming interest. Published in 1981, the book is of dubious merit.

Hollibert E. Phillips
Walla Walla College

Anthony O'Hear. *Education, Society and Human Nature: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education*.London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981, pp. 173. $25.00.

With so much false currency in circulation in the realm of philosophy of education, it is good to be able to identify, and welcome, an instance of the genuine article. Perhaps a shade advanced and ambitious for use in an introductory course at the pre-service level, this book will be most useful in Diploma and Master's level courses for experienced teachers. O'Hear has a good sense of which issues are really fundamental, deploys logical and conceptual argument clearly and effectively, and shows how the questions raised are related to more basic issues in general philosophy. In a book which is generally well-written, I was surprised, and many will be disappointed, that some such word as "person" failed to replace the word "man" in several places where such substitution would not have produced any awkwardness.

The approach taken is not, however, as novel as claimed in the introduction. The fact that O'Hear views the philosophy of education as having a concern with educational aims can hardly seem bold in the light of recent work on autonomy, critical thinking, rationality and open-mindedness, to mention just a few aims of an intellectual kind. Many philosophers, including Barrow, Bridges, Flew and Strike, have shown how philosophical argument can indicate educational directives, and not just at a very high level of generality. It is true that Peters criticised the framing of high-level directives by philosophers, but this needs to be seen in historical context as an important corrective to wooly-mindedness, and also as an objection to the practice of deriving very detailed, practical decisions from general principles. The link which O'Hear manages to insinuate between the activity of analysis and the acceptance of the claims of so-called educational experts about aims is, of course, a false one, since conceptual analysis can indeed undermine the claims of educational experts, as O'Hear himself goes on to show.

The opening chapter is concerned to explain and defend a certain interpretation of liberal education, that is, an education which is not primarily vocational or practical but which involves an open-minded study of the various disciplines. O'Hear reviews, and rejects, a number of fashionable objections to this view of education, specifically that it is unnatural, irreligious, undemocratic, irrelevant and entails class-conditioning. His discussion of these points is sensible and balanced, and has the additional merit of showing that what may seem to be an unlikely objection is indeed seriously advanced and has sufficient initial plausibility to warrant consideration.