The principle of complementarity which the author makes much of as the basic theme of the book and which he defines as "the principle that the majority population that is educated in a setting that excludes the minority receives a deficient education, and vice versa," seems to be a sort of free translation or application of the adequacy-excellence idea. It is thus all too easy for one to get the feeling that much too frequently ideology has usurped the place of analysis.

In concluding part two of the book which deals with recruitment, admission and retention of black students, the author tells us that standardized testing "is a disguised way of legitimizing institutional elitism" (p. 54). (Emphasis on minimal competencies had already been accorded culprit status). With quixotic seriousness he urges that "it is important to *analyze* [italics mine] the standardized testing movement as a form of status politics and social control" (p. 14). Can analysis assume that posture and still be bona fide analysis? Or is this insistence, as well as the data mustered in its support, another ideological thrust by the heavy hand of adequacy?

No less perplexing are the author's self-righteous claims made on behalf of blacks and black insitutions. In part four we read: "To put it bluntly, black colleges and universities have kept alive interest in the pursuit of honesty, justice, and altruism or sacrifice as goals of higher education. They have helped the nation recognize a range of desirable characteristics in students and the difference between information and knowledge, on the one hand, and virtue and wisdom on the other . . ." (p. 106). Or again: "Whites ought to know as much about honesty, justice, and altruism or sacrifice as blacks. They can learn these things that they ought to know by experiencing the status of a minority" (p. 110).

In sum, the tone and substance of the book seem better, if not ideally, suited to audiences of the late sixties and early seventies than to later, that is more recent ones. And this is perhaps its main shortcoming, the fact that it is addressed to a now practically empty room — the audience having long gone and found other matters of more consuming interest. Published in 1981, the book is of dubious merit.

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Anthony O'Hear. *Education, Society and Human Nature: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education*.London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981, pp. 173. $25.00.

With so much false currency in circulation in the realm of philosophy of education, it is good to be able to identify, and welcome, an instance of the genuine article. Perhaps a shade advanced and ambitious for use in an introductory course at the pre-service level, this book will be most useful in Diploma and Master's level courses for experienced teachers. O'Hear has a good sense of which issues are really fundamental, deploys logical and conceptual argument clearly and effectively, and shows how the questions raised are related to more basic issues in general philosophy. In a book which is generally well-written, I was surprised, and many will be disappointed, that some such word as "person" failed to replace the word "man" in several places where such substitution would not have produced any awkwardness.

The approach taken is not, however, as novel as claimed in the introduction. The fact that O'Hear views the philosophy of education as having a concern with educational aims can hardly seem bold in the light of recent work on autonomy, critical thinking, rationality and open-mindedness, to mention just a few aims of an intellectual kind. Many philosophers, including Barrow, Bridges, Flew and Strike, have shown how philosophical argument can indicate educational directives, and not just at a very high level of generality. It is true that Peters criticised the framing of high-level directives by philosophers, but this needs to be seen in historical context as an important corrective to wooly-mindedness, and also as an objection to the practice of deriving very detailed, practical decisions from general principles. The link which O'Hear manages to insinuate between the activity of analysis and the acceptance of the claims of so-called educational experts about aims is, of course, a false one, since conceptual analysis can indeed undermine the claims of educational experts, as O'Hear himself goes on to show.

The opening chapter is concerned to explain and defend a certain interpretation of liberal education, that is, an education which is not primarily vocational or practical but which involves an open-minded study of the various disciplines. O'Hear reviews, and rejects, a number of fashionable objections to this view of education, specifically that it is unnatural, irreligious, undemocratic, irrelevant and entails class-conditioning. His discussion of these points is sensible and balanced, and has the additional merit of showing that what may seem to be an unlikely objection is indeed seriously advanced and has sufficient initial plausibility to warrant consideration.

O'Hear's bibliography is very thin on references to other significant attempts to respond to similar objections. Certainly, some reference to Flew and White on the "new" sociology of education, and to Flew and Phillips on "democratization" would have been valuable. It is a pity too that O'Hear did not deal with the difficulty, suggested by Montefiore among others, that the liberal's attempt to *discuss* something may itself distort what is discussed. With respect to the claims of relevancy, O'Hear might have made the point that liberal education rejects the suggestion in the notion of relevancy that an extrinsic justification is always necessary.

O'Hear proceeds to develop a fuller account of what a liberal education would involve, and offers a justification of it in which, predictably, but properly, the views of Mill and Popper loom large. It will be tempting perhaps, though I think misguided, to pour scorn on such suggestions as the provision of "a reasonable understanding of the nature of man and the world" and "a certain amount of general knowledge of a practical kind". Are these not as innocuous as they are vague? The point is, however, that the details will vary from one context to another, and, in any case, they cannot responsibly be drawn from the armchair. Nevertheless, general guidelines and supporting considerations do admit of philosophical argument. One can agree with O'Hear that the important thing is to decide how to bring up our children without, however, agreeing that the distinction between "upbringing" and "education" is trivially verbal. If we have articulated a distinct concept of education, this is not something to be lightly discarded if we take the matter of upbringing seriously. Some useful, critical points are raised in this context against Peters' transcendental justification of education, and it is a pity that occasionally the discussion degenerates into what might be called "potshots at Peters". It is perfectly obvious, for example, that Peters does not presuppose that what is good in itself could not also be good as a means.

Anyone who sets out to identify, and endorse, particular learning goals in schooling will have to evade the twin-edged sword of relativism and indoctrination. O'Hear, following Wittgenstein, analyses the concept of understanding as an achievement, the ability to engage in a *public* performance of some sort. This enables him to answer the relativists by showing that our very awareness of cultural differences presupposes a measure of basic agreement. After all, translation was possible. But in this case, we do have common ground to appeal to in order to settle our theoretical differences. The same public criterion is also valuable in considering the threat of indoctrination. We clearly need the aid of teachers in coming to master the public standards present in the various disciplines, but the standards can be challenged and are open to revision. In view of the persistent confusion in this area, it might have been useful to point out that in calling understanding an *achievement*, it is not implied that it is necessarily the outcome of a task-performance. Before anyone concludes that here we have a conceptual proof of the discovery method or problems approach, we need to remember that understanding is something which can happen to us. It can come when we were not trying to find it, or as a result of good teaching.

In discussing the curriculum, O'Hear presents a detailed critique of Hirst's forms of knowledge thesis, and is concerned to point out that, even if Hirst's analysis were correct, no substantive educational conclusions would follow. But Hirst, in fact, confined himself to "certain very general comments" about the content of liberal education, and could surely insist that the thesis is *relevant* to the issue of breadth in education. In O'Hear's own argument for specific, curricular recommendations, there is an echo of White's distinction between activities which can, and those which cannot, be understood without engaging in them. Not surprisingly then, training in artistic and musical skills is relegated to the voluntary area. But O'Hear, like White, neglects the fact that unless one acquires certain skills early on, it is extremely difficult to acquire them, with the result that many are deprived of a source of great satisfaction.

The concern to redress an imbalance, which leads O'Hear to emphasise the crucial role of literature in teaching human values, explains the emphasis in his account of moral education on feeling and sensitivity. In passages reminiscent at times of Hume's second enquiry, O'Hear finds contemporary approaches unduly stressing autonomy and rationality. But those who seek to redress an imbalance are always in danger of over-stating the neglected side, and O'Hear goes further than he needs to when he claims that moral education is *above all* a matter of training in perception and feeling. And in his own account of the place of reason in moral development, he neglects the point, which we owe to developmental psychologists, that moral *discussion* can stimulate a more mature moral outlook.

In his final chapter, O'Hear is at pains to point out that, although only a few may be able to achieve excellence in the kind of education he has outlined, it is neither necessary nor morally acceptable to draw the elitist conclusions of Bantock, for example, who would have the working-class child study folk culture. All can, and should, be given a reasonable exposure to the disciplines, and there is no reason to think that this policy will threaten the very existence of high culture. O'Hear is a defender of equality of opportunity, which is not to be confused with equality of outcome. But even the principle of equality of opportunity must be reconciled with other moral demands, such as the right of parents to raise their own children. There are, however, morally acceptable ways in which various disadvantages can be addressed, and O'Hear would endorse certain compensa-

tory schemes. But he expresses serious reservations about the practice of discriminating in favour of disadvantaged groups. Perhaps O'Hear's careful, yet sympathetic, review of the issues will help to bring about a situation in which it is possible to question the received view without being dismissed as unconcerned or worse. The argument leads O'Hear to conclude that it is inappropriate "to attempt to redress social inequalities by educational, as opposed to political, means." In terms of the cases discussed, this conclusion is sound enough, but it is worth noting that education can quite properly seek to remedy those social inequalities which arise from prejudice and intolerance. One's greatest handicap may be the attitudes one finds in others, and education can attempt to show that certain attitudes are unreasonable.

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Geoffrey H. Bantock. *Studies in the History of Educational Theory, Vol. I: Artiface and Nature, 1350-1765.* London, George Allen & Unwin, 1980. pp. 304. $25.00.

It is important to state what this thoughtful and difficult book is *not*. It is not a history of education in the broader sense: it never touches upon educational institutions, or the sociology or political economy of the educational structure and the 'education business'. It is not concerned with literacy rates, nor with who — of what sex, class, or locale — went to school, nor what particular type or level of school they attended, nor what they studied.

It is, rather, a series of essays in which the 'educational theory' of a number of major thinkers is held up for examination and criticism. The volume is divided into two parts. The first part runs from the Italian humanists (treated collectively) to the beginnings of modern science and empiricism in the seventeenth century. It looks in detail at the theories of the humanists, Erasmus, Castiglione, Sir Thomas Elyot, Vives and Montaigne. The second section treats Bacon, Comenius, Descartes, and Locke, and ends with the romantic confusion of Rousseau.

The volume is not easy reading and its complicated argument merits examination at three levels: by chapters, by sections, and as a whole. The chapters offer an advanced *vade mecum* for each thinker and the movement of which he was part and for which he was — implicitly or explicitly — a major spokesman. The definition of educational theory expounded is quite precise. Bantock's real concern throughout is in the epistomology and developmental psychology these men espoused: what their positions were, and how (and why) such views changed. At one polarity, western philosophers, including but not confined to our heroes, have seen the young as miniature adults, programmed through some theory of recollection and only in need of proper instructions to unlock the memory bank. At the other extreme they have seen youth as a *tabula rasa*, waiting to be imprinted, or perhaps as a kind of prelapsarian 'natural man', to be protected so his natural goodness will flourish as the educational process weeds the rank crop of civilization and society from each youthful garden. And along the way we pass some who look to education to counter the innate sinfulness of the human condition, to fashion the beast so it is fit for society and salvation.

To present each man's position on this aspect of education and educational philosophy-cum-psychology is no easy task. Philosophers can be almost as reticent about their basic presuppositions of rational man as historians are about their methodology. Thus much of the theory expounded for us is really a theory of learning. The two sections of the book elucidate the bifurcation of European thought and epistomology between the position of the fourteenth-sixteenth centuries and that of the seventeenth-eighteenth. The critical line is that marking the shift from a search for a metaphysic based on words — the world of rhetoric — to one in search of a reality in the 'objective' or empirical world of nature, the world of things. The educational theory of the Italian renaissance had accepted the scholastic (and classical) preoccupation with reality-in-words, though it shifted the emphasis from the theological to the civic and urban. Man — or, rather, an upper class boy — was seen to be perfectible by dint of an education that cemented his psychological and linguistic ties with the best of the western past. The northern humanists, personified by Erasmus and Elyot, altered this approach by emphasizing an internal morality and individualization that put man in touch with nature, rather than with the courtly orientation of Castiglione. Montaigne — while still in the older camp — reflects a detachment or disengagement that we might read as an indication of the exhaustion of the old metaphysic, though no historian likes to talk in such presentist terms for fear a student might read his words.

With Bacon and Galileo the world changed. Seventeenth century thinkers began to argue that reality lay in external nature, of which we were but a part and which we only learned to master by first learning to serve. The