tory schemes. But he expresses serious reservations about the practice of discriminating in favour of disadvantaged groups. Perhaps O'Hear's careful, yet sympathetic, review of the issues will help to bring about a situation in which it is possible to question the received view without being dismissed as unconcerned or worse. The argument leads O'Hear to conclude that it is inappropriate "to attempt to redress social inequalities by educational, as opposed to political, means." In terms of the cases discussed, this conclusion is sound enough, but it is worth noting that education can quite properly seek to remedy those social inequalities which arise from prejudice and intolerance. One's greatest handicap may be the attitudes one finds in others, and education can attempt to show that certain attitudes are unreasonable.

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Geoffrey H. Bantock. *Studies in the History of Educational Theory, Vol. I: Artiface and Nature, 1350-1765.* London, George Allen & Unwin, 1980. pp. 304. $25.00.

It is important to state what this thoughtful and difficult book is *not*. It is not a history of education in the broader sense: it never touches upon educational institutions, or the sociology or political economy of the educational structure and the 'education business'. It is not concerned with literacy rates, nor with who — of what sex, class, or locale — went to school, nor what particular type or level of school they attended, nor what they studied.

It is, rather, a series of essays in which the 'educational theory' of a number of major thinkers is held up for examination and criticism. The volume is divided into two parts. The first part runs from the Italian humanists (treated collectively) to the beginnings of modern science and empiricism in the seventeenth century. It looks in detail at the theories of the humanists, Erasmus, Castiglione, Sir Thomas Elyot, Vives and Montaigne. The second section treats Bacon, Comenius, Descartes, and Locke, and ends with the romantic confusion of Rousseau.

The volume is not easy reading and its complicated argument merits examination at three levels: by chapters, by sections, and as a whole. The chapters offer an advanced *vade mecum* for each thinker and the movement of which he was part and for which he was — implicitly or explicitly — a major spokesman. The definition of educational theory expounded is quite precise. Bantock's real concern throughout is in the epistomology and developmental psychology these men espoused: what their positions were, and how (and why) such views changed. At one polarity, western philosophers, including but not confined to our heroes, have seen the young as miniature adults, programmed through some theory of recollection and only in need of proper instructions to unlock the memory bank. At the other extreme they have seen youth as a *tabula rasa*, waiting to be imprinted, or perhaps as a kind of prelapsarian 'natural man', to be protected so his natural goodness will flourish as the educational process weeds the rank crop of civilization and society from each youthful garden. And along the way we pass some who look to education to counter the innate sinfulness of the human condition, to fashion the beast so it is fit for society and salvation.

To present each man's position on this aspect of education and educational philosophy-cum-psychology is no easy task. Philosophers can be almost as reticent about their basic presuppositions of rational man as historians are about their methodology. Thus much of the theory expounded for us is really a theory of learning. The two sections of the book elucidate the bifurcation of European thought and epistomology between the position of the fourteenth-sixteenth centuries and that of the seventeenth-eighteenth. The critical line is that marking the shift from a search for a metaphysic based on words — the world of rhetoric — to one in search of a reality in the 'objective' or empirical world of nature, the world of things. The educational theory of the Italian renaissance had accepted the scholastic (and classical) preoccupation with reality-in-words, though it shifted the emphasis from the theological to the civic and urban. Man — or, rather, an upper class boy — was seen to be perfectible by dint of an education that cemented his psychological and linguistic ties with the best of the western past. The northern humanists, personified by Erasmus and Elyot, altered this approach by emphasizing an internal morality and individualization that put man in touch with nature, rather than with the courtly orientation of Castiglione. Montaigne — while still in the older camp — reflects a detachment or disengagement that we might read as an indication of the exhaustion of the old metaphysic, though no historian likes to talk in such presentist terms for fear a student might read his words.

With Bacon and Galileo the world changed. Seventeenth century thinkers began to argue that reality lay in external nature, of which we were but a part and which we only learned to master by first learning to serve. The

chain that ran from Galileo to Bacon and Comenius to Descartes and Locke is well forged here: I would have preferred to see Rousseau left for Vol. II, since there are too many missing links between Locke and Rousseau and because so much of the latter's importance rests upon his subsequent influence. As Bantock properly unravels the material of the two sections of the book, the gulf between renaissance-baroque Europe and early modern Europe is deeper, if less flamboyant, than that between the medieval and renaissance articulation of the questions at issue. Our view of human nature and of man's role within the larger world of nature were irrevocably altered. If knowledge was always power, in a new world of celestial mechanics and the calculus it was a different sort of knowledge; perhaps more arrogant because less anthropocentric, and asking different kinds of questions about a different reality and a changing social structure. Locke's educated middle-class man, able to follow the proceedings of the Royal Society and to share its Baconian-Franklinesque acquisitive curiosity, was literally a world away from the renaissance courtier or the literary progeny of the Erasmian vision. Furthermore, this new man was *meant* to be a world apart.

As a whole the volume follows an intellectual odyssey of some 400 years. Like the Arthurian legends, like Dante's great travelogue, like the Tolkien stories, Bantock takes us on an engaging and complicated quest. And the grail we seek is a definition or a comprehensive view of man's nature, and of his relation to nature, as it has been mulled over by a serious group of serious thinkers. It is to the author's credit that he takes men we are inclined to think of as slightly frivolous, e.g., Castiglione, or as rather narrow and belonging to an arcane priesthood, e.g., Comenius and Elyot, and showing the common thread that links them with such giants as Erasmus, Bacon, Descartes and Locke. The concern with 'what is reality' and 'how do we know' it must lie behind any theory of what children are and of how they are trained and cultivated. We are prone to ignore these problems, in our daily lives and our daily thinking. Only if we ponder such a marvel as the education and literacy of Helen Keller are we inclined to bump against the nasty metaphysical edges of the common world of perception, observation, and communication.

Bantock's essays are not easy to read. His desire to say complicated things sometimes allows him to excuse himself for saying them in a complicated way. There are drawbacks to the fact that the book is not a history. To take major historical figures without social and economic context is perhaps permissable by the canons of intellectual history, but such practices have made many of us wary of those very canons. We wonder if the trail from one great stepping stone of educational theory to the next is a little too straight here, too well marked. Though I think this book to be largely correct (and very provocative) in what it does say, I still maintain there is something remote about a treatment of major intellectual and philosophical transition in these years that — in its index — mentions Luther but once, Calvin not at all. As I read I grew curious to discover if anyone paid attention to the theories being expounded. Whether we measure the influence of ideas by the popularity of titles, sales, and editions, or by the creation of model and experimental schools, or by the reform of the mass curriculum, or by court patronage, we can at least attempt to measure it. Sometimes the book is too rarified, the text frustrating for the questions it neatly begs. But for what it is, a chronicle of 'a changed image of the educated man', many thanks to its thoughtful, judicious, reflective author.

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Richard A. Brosio. *The Frankfurt School: An Analysis of the Contradictions and Crises of Liberal Capitalist Societies.* Munice, Indiana: Ball State University, 1980. Pp. 50.

The title of Richard A. Brosio's monograph, *The Frankfurt School: An Analysis of the Contradictions and Crises of Liberal Capitalist Societies,* may be judged pretentious for it suggests that the entire Institute is its subject. This is not so. The purpose of the monograph, states the author, ". . . is to set forth and analyze the ideas of Herbert Marcuse," primarily his ideas that ". . . explain the problems, contradictions, and inadequacies of societies which can be described as bourgeoisie, democratic, liberal, advanced, industrial, and monopoly capitalistic" (p. 1) These are Marcuse's ideas on the one-dimensional society which he judges to be ". . . inimical to authentic democracy and community" (p. 1).

The author divides his monograph into three sections, titled I. Philosophical Basis, II. Application of Philosophical/Theoretical Tools to an Analysis of a Decadent, Liberal Capitalist Society, and III. Possibilities and Problems Involved in Constructing a Democratic Community. Now for a brief summary of these sections, followed by their implications for schooling/education, and a short critical comment on the monograph itself.

Section I stresses the point that the human being, given his reason and analytical ability, is not at the mercy of things as they are around him. Such societal conditions are historical (human made) realities and not eternal