chain that ran from Galileo to Bacon and Comenius to Descartes and Locke is well forged here: I would have preferred to see Rousseau left for Vol. II, since there are too many missing links between Locke and Rousseau and because so much of the latter's importance rests upon his subsequent influence. As Bantock properly unravels the material of the two sections of the book, the gulf between renaissance-baroque Europe and early modern Europe is deeper, if less flamboyant, than that between the medieval and renaissance articulation of the questions at issue. Our view of human nature and of man's role within the larger world of nature were irrevocably altered. If knowledge was always power, in a new world of celestial mechanics and the calculus it was a different sort of knowledge; perhaps more arrogant because less anthropocentric, and asking different kinds of questions about a different reality and a changing social structure. Locke's educated middle-class man, able to follow the proceedings of the Royal Society and to share its Baconian-Franklinesque acquisitive curiosity, was literally a world away from the renaissance courtier or the literary progeny of the Erasmian vision. Furthermore, this new man was *meant* to be a world apart.

As a whole the volume follows an intellectual odyssey of some 400 years. Like the Arthurian legends, like Dante's great travelogue, like the Tolkien stories, Bantock takes us on an engaging and complicated quest. And the grail we seek is a definition or a comprehensive view of man's nature, and of his relation to nature, as it has been mulled over by a serious group of serious thinkers. It is to the author's credit that he takes men we are inclined to think of as slightly frivolous, e.g., Castiglione, or as rather narrow and belonging to an arcane priesthood, e.g., Comenius and Elyot, and showing the common thread that links them with such giants as Erasmus, Bacon, Descartes and Locke. The concern with 'what is reality' and 'how do we know' it must lie behind any theory of what children are and of how they are trained and cultivated. We are prone to ignore these problems, in our daily lives and our daily thinking. Only if we ponder such a marvel as the education and literacy of Helen Keller are we inclined to bump against the nasty metaphysical edges of the common world of perception, observation, and communication.

Bantock's essays are not easy to read. His desire to say complicated things sometimes allows him to excuse himself for saying them in a complicated way. There are drawbacks to the fact that the book is not a history. To take major historical figures without social and economic context is perhaps permissable by the canons of intellectual history, but such practices have made many of us wary of those very canons. We wonder if the trail from one great stepping stone of educational theory to the next is a little too straight here, too well marked. Though I think this book to be largely correct (and very provocative) in what it does say, I still maintain there is something remote about a treatment of major intellectual and philosophical transition in these years that — in its index — mentions Luther but once, Calvin not at all. As I read I grew curious to discover if anyone paid attention to the theories being expounded. Whether we measure the influence of ideas by the popularity of titles, sales, and editions, or by the creation of model and experimental schools, or by the reform of the mass curriculum, or by court patronage, we can at least attempt to measure it. Sometimes the book is too rarified, the text frustrating for the questions it neatly begs. But for what it is, a chronicle of 'a changed image of the educated man', many thanks to its thoughtful, judicious, reflective author.

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Richard A. Brosio. *The Frankfurt School: An Analysis of the Contradictions and Crises of Liberal Capitalist Societies.* Munice, Indiana: Ball State University, 1980. Pp. 50.

The title of Richard A. Brosio's monograph, *The Frankfurt School: An Analysis of the Contradictions and Crises of Liberal Capitalist Societies,* may be judged pretentious for it suggests that the entire Institute is its subject. This is not so. The purpose of the monograph, states the author, ". . . is to set forth and analyze the ideas of Herbert Marcuse," primarily his ideas that ". . . explain the problems, contradictions, and inadequacies of societies which can be described as bourgeoisie, democratic, liberal, advanced, industrial, and monopoly capitalistic" (p. 1) These are Marcuse's ideas on the one-dimensional society which he judges to be ". . . inimical to authentic democracy and community" (p. 1).

The author divides his monograph into three sections, titled I. Philosophical Basis, II. Application of Philosophical/Theoretical Tools to an Analysis of a Decadent, Liberal Capitalist Society, and III. Possibilities and Problems Involved in Constructing a Democratic Community. Now for a brief summary of these sections, followed by their implications for schooling/education, and a short critical comment on the monograph itself.

Section I stresses the point that the human being, given his reason and analytical ability, is not at the mercy of things as they are around him. Such societal conditions are historical (human made) realities and not eternal

verities. Our day-to-day societal experiences and existences are not, therefore, immediately and already rational. The task for humanity is to construct and reconstruct societal ordering as it ought to be, that is, facilitating of the development of authentic individual freedom which is inextricably part of general or public freedom. But before this can be brought about there is the need to expose the irrationalities, contradictions, and discrepancies that obtain in our historical/societal existence and in our lives. Hence, the need for critical theory.

Section II describes the forces within western society which militate against the development of a democratic community. These forces constitute the condition of a one-dimensional society characterized by the following: (1) a productive capacity which is used too often for the production of non-essential goods, gadgets, luxuries, etc. (2) inclusion of nearly everyone into the consumer market, (3) a great concentration of economic and political power in a privileged few, (4) an active government which safeguards corporate hegemony, and (5) "scientific" control and manipulation of both groups and private behaviour during work and leisure hours (p. 27). This is society controlled by monopoly capitalism ". . . through corporate organization and through its integral relationship with the liberal constitutional state . . ." (p. 3). Western Europe and the British Commonwealth have these characteristics. But the one society that seems to stand out as the exemplar of the one-dimensional society is the United States.

In what way do the above characteristics constitute a one-dimensional society? Briefly, it may be said that such a society has the uncanny ability to absorb everyone into the superculture built by monopoly capitalism. With consumer goods readily available to everyone and designed to include everyone, such a society has created a nature in human beings the needs of which nature are tied to the commodities they buy. In the one-dimensional society, everyone is a consumer of goods not by his own design but by means of manipulative tactices of industries and slick propaganda of media, the control of which is concentrated in the hands of a few multi-national corporations. The concentration of power renders total society easy to manage especially when questions such as the following are asked: (1) What should be produced? (2) What is more and more productivity for? (3) Who decides on how societal and material affluence should be divided? But the afforded expediency could also suggest that a potential for fascism lurks behind. "Liberal democracy," Brosio quotes Guiliani, "is the face of the propertied classes when they are unafraid, but it becomes fascistic when frightened" (p. 25). Liberalism, the constitutional form and dominant ideology of one-dimensional society, has failed to translate itself into economic and social rights.

In such a society, then, everyone's focus is one-dimensional because it is limited to and integrated with the focus of society. The individual has been reduced not only to a consumer of goods but also to an object to be manipulated, or, consumed, if you will. There is only one dimension and, therefore, there are no counterprevailing forces. Hence, the need for such thinkers as Marcuse and the Frankfurt School which insist that ". . . a rational man is one who tests human practice by the standard of truth which goes beyond the contemporary status quo" (p. 6). It is to develop a verifiable point of reference outside of any status quo and from which to pass normative judgements upon the status quo, even if only by means of critiques or negative thinking.

Section III considers the possibility of developing a democratic community. At the same time it poses the difficulties that militate against it. What is needed is the creation or emergence of a new person who is capable of going beyond the givenness of things as they are and envisioning how things ought to be, of uniting the particular and universal truths, and reconciling one's private wants with the public good.

What have these ideas to do with schooling/education? In the nine scattered comments on schooling/education (pp. 3, 5, 11, 30, 33, 37, 39, 40 and 45) three suggestions may be made out: (1) that schooling/education by itself is incapable of transforming society; (2) that schooling/education, wittingly or unwittingly, has been responsible for preserving the status quo and supporting the one-dimensional society; (3) that pragmatism, closely identified with the physical and natural sciences, tended to conform to rather than be critical of facts as they are. Indirectly, John Dewey and his followers are indicted for supporting social control of the masses by means of psychological manipulation.

The first point is fairly obvious. If schools are bound to their social/political setting, it seems reasonable to say that societal values characterize and regulate the schools. It may be countered that there have been attempts at reforms/innovations in schooling, if they could be considered as such, such as the free school movements, alternative schools, classrooms without walls, etc., which may be taken as challenges against the societal values that schools support. These, however, hardly constitute social criticism of the society that schools serve. Many of these agitated reforms/innovations concentrated on internal matters of schooling, often restricting themselves to problems in the classrooms, further specifying them to refinement of one's teaching techniques, to establishing emotional ties with the students, or creating ecstasy in learning. These reforms may have been inspired by a theory of teaching known as love, care, and devotion but, surely, not by a philosophy of society that sensitizes

both teacher and learners to the contradictions of society and that enables them, hopefully, to become intellectual critics of that society. Likewise, the recent and popularized competency based teaching performance or the highly regarded programmed instruction show no interest in examining the values/ideology implicit in them. On the whole, recent school reforms/innovations show no attempt at making any organic connection between them and social criticism.

If such reforms could be said to be instances of educational theorizing, then the one main criticism of educational theorizing is that it is empty of theoretical import, innocent of social and political philosophy and long on emotional vehemence. In restricting theorizing on teaching and schooling to the activities inside the classroom, it misunderstands the realities of formal education/schooling. It minimizes their social significance, hence, the suggestion in point (2) above.

To conclude with a brief critique on the monograph. The monograph suffers from its being primarily informative, drawing heavily from secondary sources, e.g., Martin Jay's *The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research* and some works of Max Horkheimer. More critically, these sources are not employed to penetrate more thoroughly into the workings of Marcuse's ideas. Rather, they are presented as independent summaries of the thinking of the Institute, those involved in it, and of Critical Theory. There is no thorough critical development of them. They are assertions presented not for argumentation but for acceptance.

Nowhere in the monograph is there an attempt to analyze Marcuse's ideas, in the sense of rendering each idea apart from others and from the whole for clarification and relating them together again so that the whole aids our understanding and enlightenment. If this were done, we could have had a clearer picture of what the critical theory is about because we could see its inner logic, the workings of the activity itself, as it is employed. Not having done this, we also fail to see the working of Marcuse's mind. Not that understanding Marcuse is easy, considering that the effect of Marcuse's assertions on his readers has been said to be "incantatory" and "magical" rather than philosophical. But the author, in keeping with his stated purpose in writing the monograph, could have at least attempted to analyze Marcuse's ideas. The monograph merely ". . . sets forth . . ." Marcuse's ideas and the setting forth is uninspired, unconvincing and flat.

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