

Abstract

This article is an investigation in applied philosophy. It argues that the traditional ideas that philosophy directly empowers practice is misleading and unhelpful. Using educational administration as a starting point, the author addresses the question of how theory, in this case philosophical theory, might be applied to practice in the realm of ethics and/or values. A methodology for this addressing of ethical and/or value questions in educational administration is constructed using examples from legal reasoning and Bunge's discussion of technology. In the closing sections of this paper, an outline of applied philosophy is offered. It is argued that in the realm of morals or in any of the other traditional areas of philosophical thought, philosophy can be applied to the practice of educating (although not directly). This methodology is called "bracketed neglect".

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LEGAL REASONING, RECIPES, ETHICS, VALUES, EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION AND APPLIED PHILOSOPHY

Assonance is a matter of not getting the rhyme quite right. Discussions of ethics and educational administration are often a matter of not getting the question quite right. Educational administrators and educational philosophers cannot decide if their discussions are about metaphysics or about schools. As a result, they tend to talk past each other.

An explanation for the ill-formed discussions that often occur between educational philosophers and educational administrators can be found in the fact that they are about different kinds of things. Educational administrators and educational philosophers ask different kinds of questions about different *kinds of events*.¹ In the realm of philosophy *qua* philosophy, educational philosophers attend to technical questions of metaphysics constitutive of philosophy. In this realm questions of philosophy are paramount and the concerns of schoolmen and administrators are misplaced. In the realm of educational administration the questions of schoolmen and administrators are paramount and the questions of philosophy are misplaced.²

To put the matter succinctly, educational administrators do not have time for prior questions and educational philosophers have time for nothing else.

The first step toward getting the question right (insofar as we are concerned with improving the contribution of philosophy to educational administration) would seem to be, then, the development of a methodology (logic in use) that would redirect questions of ethics and/or value away from questions pertinent to philosophy alone and toward the practice of education.

Self Indulgence and the Problem of Getting the Questions Right

In the attempt to get the question right, a most promising clue can be found in the idea that there are two types of educational research questions: there are those kinds of research questions pursued for money and there are questions pursued for all kinds of other reasons.³ Research

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conducted for money answers questions in such a way so as to be useful to the conduct of the funding agency, i.e., the source of money. In other words, commercial research must answer the questions of time and history in such a way that the affairs of the world can continue and confident activity, once arrested, can be rewardingly continued. Research conducted for all other kinds of reasons, upon inspection, (and despite the statements of university handbooks) is conducted first, to get a degree; secondly, to get an advanced degree; thirdly, for tenure; and last, though not least, to become the least pecked of one's respective pecking order.⁴ That is,

those who do research for reasons other than money... have great freedom to interpret and assess the value of their own findings. Implicitly, the competence of those who do research for reasons other than their money lies not in solving real human or social problems, but in doing their research in such a way that they cannot be faulted by their peers.⁵

The point is, in an eminently practical profession like education, educational philosophy has become unfortunately introspective and self-indulgent. The belief that philosophy is its own excuse has had the unfortunate consequence of isolating the practice of educational philosophy from the practice of education in general and administration of education in particular. Indeed, the belief has discouraged the attempt to service the questions of educational philosophy's natural audience — the profession of education.

The enduring notion that philosophy directly enlightens the conduct of men through some general abstract process, or that educational philosophy directly enlightens the conduct of the practice of educating through some general amorphous process⁶ is so old, so unconvincing, and so uninteresting that there is no point in pursuing it.⁷ The study of ethics gives us important insights into the nature of morals or even metaphysics in some cases; but when it comes to human conduct, philosophers are no better or wiser than anyone else.⁸ Similarly, the study of 'education' as a normative term⁹ gives us some information about the nature of morals, but it grants no special wisdom about the practice of educating or its administration. If it did, by now, all administrators would be philosophers and all philosophers — given the employment prospects within the field — would have become educational administrators.

The Invention of Applied Philosophy

The question of redirection is really a matter of inventing something called "applied philosophy".

Applied philosophy accepts goals outside of the internal purposes of philosophy and because it does accept those goals, the focus of investigation is controlled, not by the internal purposes of philosophy (e.g., the construction, invention and refinement of inference licenses), but by the purposes and goals of its natural audience, i.e., the institutions and codes it purports to service. In the case of educational philosophy's contribution to educational administration, the scope of investigations must be confined to the philosophically interesting (not trivial) questions generated by the practice of schooling (i.e., the institutions, management, systems, politics, demography, sociology, etc., etc., of the social practice known as educating). Thus, the starting point for all investigations in applied philosophy begins in the reservoir of questions, or difficulties, if you will, generated by real acts, of real persons in real situations.¹⁰ These questions provide the focus, or brackets, to generally control the scope of the investigation. Questions and difficulties generated by existential factors and practices point toward real anomalies in moral thought and practice. Real questions supply a *prima facie* relevance to philosophical investigations that have been, historically speaking, marked by an irrelevance generated by a surfeit of "X-ing" and "Y-ing".

Applying philosophy to the practice of schooling means applying it to practical, not metaphysical questions; it means being responsive to the philosophical questions of a natural audience; it means providing philosophical data in a form that will have *obvious* usefulness to the practitioners who have requested it.

Applied philosophy requires, almost invariably, the sacrifice of philosophically sophisticated answers for the sake of operational simplicity. In this regard what Bunge wrote about technological rules applies equally appropriately to morals in the realm of applied philosophy. He wrote this:

In this domain of action, deep or sophisticated theories are inefficient because they require too much labour to produce results that can as well be obtained with poorer means — that is, with less true but simpler theories. Deep and accurate truth, a desideratum of pure scientific research, is uneconomical.... Low cost will compensate for low quality. Since the expenditure demanded by the truer and more complex theories is greater than the input required by less true theories — which are usually simpler — the technological efficiency of a theory will be proportional to its output and to its operational simplicity.¹¹

(The former probably explains why the work of A. S. Neill, or P. Freire is more interesting to educators than the work of Freud or Marx, which Neill and Freire used extensively).

The Real Thing (With Apologies to Coca Cola)

In the practical world, investigations into the realm of ethics and/or values are investigations of impacted questions. In the realm of complex social problems, values never occur singly; they always occur within a complex matrix of social, anti-social, moral and immoral relations. When taking up the investigation of social issues, one quickly discovers the first difficulty: questions of value are never straightforward. In attempting to accomplish any non-trivial policy objective, one finds disagreement over what critical values pertain. Even in cases where there is some agreement on the values that pertain, the rank ordering of values inherent in that policy is hardly a matter of universal agreement — even among the policy's authors. The first difficulty is that there is less than universal agreement among "publics", "politicians", "administrators", "clients" as to which values are to be realized first, which values are more important than others, and which values may be sacrificed in a situation in which all values cannot be realized. Furthermore, the issue is not merely a matter of majority preference; the intensity with which some values are held (e.g., religious or perhaps ecological values) often out-weighs questions of majority preference.¹² Nor is it the case that said groups are able, or in some cases even willing, to order or describe their values, — even when requested to do so.¹³

Impacted value questions can be simplified by focusing upon the actual policies that administrators choose or are forced to take up. In reference to a methodology for simplifying value questions Lindbom wrote,

Somewhat paradoxically, the only practicable way to disclose one's relevant marginal values even to oneself is to describe the policy one chooses to achieve them. Except roughly and vaguely, I know of no way to describe — or even to understand — what my relative evaluations are for, say, freedom and security, speed and accuracy in governmental decisions, or low taxes and better schools than to describe my preferences among *specific policy choices* that might be made between alternatives in each of the pairs.¹⁴

Thus, insofar as educational philosophers are concerned with questions of educational practice, if as it is argued here the scope of investigations cannot be controlled by the questions of philosophy *per se*, then the methodological technique required will focus upon the questions of value called to attention by particular policy choices.

Impacted value questions are simplified (bracketed) by focusing upon actual policy choices, because within the methodology of "bracketed neglect" values must be taken as given, and as given in particular policy choices.¹⁵ That is, only moral questions disclosed by social action are open to investigation. Thus, methodologically, important values are neglected, as are important possible consequences, and important alternative policies.

Most philosophers, I suspect, would argue that this method of simplification is unacceptably blunt. Following Kant's principle of autonomy and his description of the failure of heteronomy¹⁶ they would argue that a decision about "Value" and "Good" can only be shown to be acceptable if it is apodictic and without reference to ends beyond itself. But at this point, it is time for educational philosophers *who choose to engage questions of practice* to admit that in the absence of a demonstration of any such apodictic "value" or "good" one must be silent, or at least should be silent, about that about which nothing can be said. It is of no assistance to those engaged in the practice of educating to be told that a final, or even widely accepted resolution of the question of "Value" or "Good" is still to be found in the "pending basket".

In essence, then, ethical and/or value questions are simplified by the principle of "bracketed neglect". Nevertheless, "bracketed neglect" is not the same as malicious indifference to questions of value. Educational practice, administrative and otherwise, that is concerned only with expedient action is either trivial or malicious. "Bracketed neglect" attends to questions of value, but only to those questions of value that are highlighted by the policy under scrutiny or to those values that are conspicuous by their absence.

The method "bracketed neglect" is a matter of opting for the belief that ethics and/or values cannot be supported except conversationally. It is a matter of accepting the contingent starting-points of ethical principles. It is also a matter of not trying to evade that contingency. Accepting the fact that moralities, like institutions, have evolved through the human offices of patience, genius, pain and struggle, and realizing that morality is what we make it, is at the core of "bracketed neglect" as a methodology. Within this method morality comes without any guarantee. Virtue may or may not be triumphant and moral progress is a matter of faith. Within this game, the duty to continue the "moral debate" is merely a human penchant and a bet that it will somehow "payoff". And the course of this conversation has no defense against "human stubbornness" except the refusal of those who are engaged in this common project to succumb to the psychological impact of purely negative polemic, hyperbole, or criticism which counsels us to abandon our own game in favor of some "other-worldly" moral truth. The view of morality in this methodology is nothing more and nothing less than what 'morality' means to those who have read Plato, Aristotle, Bradley, Hume, Kant, Milton, James, Marx, Dewey, and Toumlin, and have lived through or historically reviewed the Western experience from Rome to Vietnam. In this view we know the merit of our morality and moral practice in comparison and in contrast with other communities and in terms of the difference between the ideals we espouse and the practices we see around us.¹⁷

"Bracketed Neglect" in Action

The best examples of "bracketed neglect" involve legal reasoning. Probably the most widely known example of "bracketed neglect" in the realm of education is *Brown v. The Board of Topeka et. al.* (347 U.S. 483 (1954)). The Justices of the Supreme Court debated the question of whether the values evident in the policy of "separate but equal" schooling for persons of different races were marginally more or less consistent with the goal of the elimination of discrimination on the basis of race than would be a policy of "integrated access".

In their decision the Court considered only the values evident in the question of the doctrine of "separate but equal" access to educational facilities — it said nothing about the appropriateness of said doctrine when applied to restaurants, railway carriages, churches and all and sundry other public and private institutions. In other words, *important alternative consequences* of the practice of racial discrimination outside of the realm of education were "neglected". The Court restricted its consideration to discrimination on the basis of "race" in the institutions of education. It did not, for example, consider the implications of the decision to abolish the doctrine of "separate but equal" and the implementation of a policy of "intergrated access" to educational institutions for admission policies based upon merit. That is, *important related values* were "neglected". It was only years later that the Court would address the question of the implication of "integrated access" for admissions policies based upon merit.¹⁸ In addition, policies that exist only as contingent possibilities were "neglected". For example, the Court made no attempt to deal with the implications of what would come to be known (at the point of time well in the future), as "affirmative action" for the disestablishment of "separate but equal" access and the implementation of "integrated access".

Legal reasoning shows that a drastic simplification of value questions occurs because it is methodologically unnecessary to consider all logically possible or all contingently possible pertinent questions. The instantiation of "bracketed neglect" recognizes that the intellectual capacity, rules of calculation, and sources of information required for a rigorous rational determination of the ultimately best policy to maximize value "A" simply do not exist, and, even if they did, their use would quite probably be too cumbersome and too expensive for any general application to the questions of the educational practice.¹⁹

"The Right Stuff" (With Apologies to Tom Wolf)

Despite the gasps of dismay likely to be generated by the remarks that are to follow, the analysis of questions of ethics does not leave some indefinable residue which will only respond to some deontic logic. Nor is there some arbitrary residue called "value" that floats in some metaphysical protoplasm known only by philosophers.²⁰ Moreover, for all intents and purposes, there is little or no difference between the form of moral rules and technological rules.

If legal reasoning provides a philosophically interesting example of "bracketed neglect" then technology, by analogy, explains its logic. In technology, as in ethics (insofar as ethics is concerned with human conduct), rules are fashioned as rules of conduct.

A technological rule boils down to a formula of the form: To get G do M, or To avoid G refrain from doing M, where 'M' stands for means to a goal abbreviated 'G'.²¹

A moral rule boils down to a similar formula: *To be G do M; or To avoid being G refrain from doing M*, where 'M' stands for a means to a "good" abbreviated 'G'. Both technological rules and moral rules are statements of recognized relationship. In technology and morals a rule is a rule only when we have a technique for producing 'G' which in some circumstances, but not all, also produces 'B'.

Although there is some distance between the desired and the desirable²² in this analysis, the distance causes no confusion. Desire is a psychological state; the desirable is the basis of ethical questions. The desirable is held fast by the "form of life" in which it appears. Thus, "equality of educational opportunity" is held fast by the "form of life" that we in the West know as schooling; just as "nuclear disarmament" is held fast by the "form of life" we know as peace movement;

just as the commandment "honor thy father and mother" is held fast by the "form of life" we know as Christianity. The point is that the meaning of "equality of educational opportunity" like "nuclear disarmament", or "honor thy father and mother" is not self-evident. The meaning of these ideas is part of the evolution of thought in each of these respective forms of life. Insofar as they exist, values are held fast by the matrix of discourse. Thus, in each of these respective forms of discourse there is a core agreement that is not monolithic, but it is uniform enough to let the discourse of these forms of life continue in some sort of orderly fashion — these core values are known as the "desirable".

On the other hand, the reduction of moral rules to a technological format does have some interesting consequences. Consider the idea of moral progress. By reducing moral rules to a technological format it is in principle granted that the idea of "progress" in the moral realm measured against some single ultimate criterion (the Good) is fundamentally obscure, and therefore of little or no interest to the realm of practice. On this interpretation, within the realm of human conduct the standards of reference for moral rules are multiple and many. Although experience is chronologically prior to these "goods", once constructed from the repetitions and rhythm of experience, those "goods" become logically prior to what we say, and therefore discursively think, about moral conduct. And yet, as experience is chronologically prior to the grammar of "goodness", it provides a contingent standard outside of the language of morals against which we can assess the adequacy of our moral concepts. Thus, the idea of moral progress is always open, it is always tentative, it is always subject to any new evidence the world may bring to bear upon our ideas of conduct. The former argument, of course, does not affirm any particular set of moral criteria, but it does assert that moral standards are contingent constructs and therefore are subject to worldly determination and worldly analysis.

The Role of Applied Philosophy in the Method of "Bracketed Neglect"

The role of philosophy in all of this is not altogether clear. The usual conclusion at this point is that the good offices of philosophy might be employed to make moral denouements for educational administrators. Unfortunately, philosophy does not accomplish denouements.²³ If value questions are ever resolved in an institutional framework, that resolution is a function of the sociology of organizations, not philosophy.

From the point of view of society "the function of ethics is to reconcile the independent aims and wills of a community of people",²⁴

From a sociological viewpoint ethics plays two basic roles. In one role:

those in effective control... 'freeze' the moral code and institutions: to assert their absolute authority, to legislate for every possibility, to isolate the community from outside influences, to discourage independent speculation and the airing of grievances, and to provide a communal aim which the citizens must like — or lump.²⁵

Again, from a sociological perspective, in this second role the function of ethics

is to encourage criticism, and to modify the code and institutions, wherever it is reasonable to believe that, by a possible change, unnecessary strains could be removed and new opportunities created or exploited; in fact, to organize the institutions of the society that they develop naturally in this way, taking into account every citizen's aims and grievances.²⁶

Philosophy has a role to play in both cases. In the first, it is the handmaiden of authoritarianism and despotism. In the second, philosophy at least appears to have a role in nurturing "a self-developing open society in which individuals are free, and encouraged, to make their own moral

decisions".²⁷ To make a parochial parallel, on an institutional level, philosophy at least appears to have a role in nurturing a self-developing open educational institution moving in the direction of decentralization and individualism and away from centralization and collectivism,²⁸ a society in which individuals are free, and encouraged, to make their own moral choices.²⁹

But if philosophy's contribution is outside of the realm of passing judgement, and not a matter of abstract enlightenment, what is it? Again we take a clue from the realm of legal reasoning. Levi wrote,

In an important sense legal rules are never clear, and, if a rule had to be clear before it could be imposed, society would be impossible. The mechanism (of legal reasoning) accepts the differences of view and ambiguity of words. It provides for the participation of the community in resolving the ambiguity by providing a forum for the discussion of policy in the gap of ambiguity.³⁰

The same can be said about moral rules. In an important sense, moral rules are never clear and if they had to be, in some ultimate sense, before they could be put to social use society would be impossible. The mechanism of moral reasoning, at least in "open" societies, is a part of a "social debate" over rules of conduct (moral rules), in light of experience that questions or affirms the adequacy of existing moral rules.

In a sense, society is cursed by the fact that it must always function within a set of "half-baked" moral rules that are never presented in a final form. Both moral rules and legal rules are continuously evolving, developing, unfolding and being supplanted, changed, and discarded; both respond to the demands of time and history, and must come to have *new meanings*. The contribution of philosophy in the realm of moral choice concerns the construction and presentation of data (the grist for the mill) which individuals are then free, and hopefully encouraged, to use as part of discourse about moral rules.

But Where are the Philosophically Interesting and the Administratively Important Questions?

But where are the philosophically interesting and important questions in all of this? They are, in some sociological *cum* philosophical sense, to be found in the social and historical tension generated by conflicting ideals in an ambiguous present and a potentially problematic future. It is the inability of particular values and/or ethics to meet the demands placed upon them by time and history that generates a demand for philosophical comment. At the very best, values and ethics are temporary resting places, standpoints, when something must be done and further comment or investigation cannot be permitted. Once established they are more or less secure, more or less enduring, and more or less consistent with and representative of the community that embraces them. Insofar as we are interested in the practice of educating, the demand for philosophical comment is found in the contradictions and continuities between our dearly held hopes and fears and the institutions which do or do not instantiate those hopes and fears.

In these times the tensions generated by conflicting ideals in an ambiguous present and a potentially problematic future are keenly felt by conservatives and radicals alike. One group believes that these tensions can be resolved if only everything that counts could be returned to some putative or real earlier time when things were simpler — when values and institutions were more closely in agreement. The other group believes that these same tensions can be resolved if everything that counts could be divorced from its corrupt present and projected into a new, but discontinuous, temporal present in which society could have a "fresh start". These keenly felt beliefs are the predicate for philosophical comment. But philosophical comments, like statements

of common sense, must have a focus. Without such a focus or object the tensions generated by an ambiguous present and potentially problematic future are beyond philosophical comment; questions generated by the tensions of modern times that exist without focus or object are like anxieties that can find no object, and like free floating anxieties, questions without focus or object are constitutive of the realm of neurosis, not philosophy.

The distance between our hopes and fears in the world we see around us may be the predicate for philosophical comment, but our hopes and fears do not provide an adequate focus for the development of a meaningful line of discourse. This, of course, is the point of asking where are the philosophically interesting and administratively important questions to be found. One line of argument suggests that they are to be found in the realm of practice. There is no noncircular method with which to choose between these two suggestions. All one can do is read the history of educational philosophy's contribution to educational administration and draw a moral.³¹

The negative moral drawn here is that philosophically interesting and administratively important questions cannot be found in some metaphysical, epistemological or semantical high ground. The positive moral is that philosophically interesting and administratively important questions are to be found in the world.

But, unfortunately, the world is only slightly less self-evident than the realm of metaphysics and to argue that important and interesting questions are to be found in the world is, for all intents and purposes, opaque — in and of itself. Without a method for isolating real questions, from those which are "manufactured", too much time is spent philosophically scratching in an area where nothing itches.

Lindblom³², it is suggested, has offered, albeit in a slightly different context, a methodology that might be adopted for the purpose of isolating philosophically interesting and administratively important questions in the realm of practice. It was suggested by Lindblom that value questions can be disclosed by focusing upon the actual policies that administrators choose or are found to take up. There is nothing magic about using policy as a method for isolating real questions. But, insofar as policy is not seen as a set of "dead" rules, but as a rather large, non-impact set of ideas, data and values concerning how society works, what happens when society goes right, what happens when society goes wrong, and most importantly, how society can be set to rights again,³³ it is a rather powerful vehicle for disclosing the marginal utility of values that are being asserted in certain social and institutional practices. Thus, focusing upon policy as an installation of value or ethic provides the brackets for isolating worldly questions that turn upon philosophical data from manufactured questions that turn upon nothing more than the relative elegance of this or that metaphysical story. Important questions that may respond to philosophical data are highlighted or bracketed; they nicely represent themselves as questions worthy of investigation. It is at this point that the questions generated by the hopes and fears of individuals and groups of individuals are revealed against the instantiation of value in policy, or are disclosed in the inability of policy to reflect important individual and/or community values.

Conclusion

Policy is a matter of a succession of incremental changes. Insofar as we are concerned with values or moral rules in all of this business, we are faced with a system of moving classification in which ambiguous moral rules and values are applied to shifting situations.³⁴ As a part of an on-going discourse, moral rules are not made once and for all, they are made and re-made

endlessly. Moral rules are aspects of social life that are ceaselessly debated. It is a rough and tumble debate, in which all elements of society have some say. Philosophy is just one among many elements of society that offer contributions to that debate. And, although philosophy would like to think that it makes some primary contribution to this debate, there is little reason to believe that there is a tight connection between philosophical investigations and the form or reform of moral codes and institutions. Moreover, even when applied philosophy's methods have been properly invented, there is little reason to believe that applied philosophy will be any more authoritative than sociology or common sense.

Individuals who cling to the belief that philosophy must have some superordinant role in the affairs of men will undoubtedly be disappointed by the realm of applied philosophy. Assuming that it is safe to leave philosophy to take care of itself,³⁵ the best that can be said for applied philosophy is that at least the approach is off on the right foot. By addressing and not ignoring the reservoir of philosophically interesting questions generated by its natural audience, philosophy of education, as one element of applied philosophy, can generate an interesting and important mode of professional discourse.

The thing to remember in all this has to do with the contribution of philosophy to the practice of educating. Put bluntly the traditional idea is that philosophy directly empowers practice. Thus, by knowing more about Truth, Justice, Goodness, Democracy or Education one's practice is empowered. This view is patently misleading. Knowing more about Goodness, like knowing more about Education, does not necessarily empower practice. But more to the point, philosophical discussions of Goodness or Education have to do with the construction, invention, and refinement of inference licenses that are useful in the conduct of philosophy. While these inference licenses directly inform the conduct of philosophy, they do not *directly* inform the conduct of any social practice — educational or otherwise. To be useful in the realm of practice the inference of philosophy (or physics for that matter) cannot be brought to bear without the assistance of enabling rules. (Practice is a contingent affair that may or may not be informed by theory.) These enabling rules in technology, as in ethics, take the form: *To get G do M, or To avoid G refrain from doing M*; where M usually but not in all conditions produces G and bi-product B. The "produced by means of relation" described by said enabling rules is the realm of investigation of applied philosophy. If philosophy has any contribution to make to the practice of educating in general and the practice of educational administration in particular, its contribution has to do with the conversation directed toward the construction, invention, and refinement of these enabling rules.

Résumé

L'auteur de cette investigation dans le domaine de la philosophie appliquée soutient que l'idée traditionnelle que la philosophie donne directement pouvoir à la pratique induit en erreur et s'avère de peu d'utilité. En utilisant l'administration scolaire comme point de départ, l'auteur creuse la question suivante: comment la théorie — en ce cas la théorie philosophique — peut s'appliquer au domaine de l'éthique et des valeurs morales. A l'aide d'exemples puisés à la fois au raisonnement juridique et à l'apport de Bunge eu égard à la technologie, l'auteur met au point une méthodologie pour les questions d'éthique et de valeurs morales en administration scolaire. A la fin de l'article, l'auteur offre une synthèse de la philosophie appliquée. Il soutient que dans le domaine de la morale aussi bien que dans tout autre domaine traditionnel de la pensée philosophique, la philosophie peut s'appliquer — quoique indirectement — à la pratique de l'éducation.

Notes

¹ John C. Smart, and Gerald W. McLaughlin "Education Speciality Areas," *Educational Research*, v.11, (1982).

² James S. Kaminsky, "Kaminsky's Reflections on the *Freedom and Authority Addendum*; or, Returning Smithson's Philosophy for his own Use," *The Journal of Educational Administration*, v.XXI, (1983) p. 94.

³ Lee Thayer, "On 'Doing' Research and 'Explaining Things,'" *Journal of Communication*, Summer, (1983) p. 80.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 82.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 80.

⁶ Contra., Plato, *The Republic*, Trans. Francis MacDonald Cornford, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968). (Probably first appeared some time within two decades after the founding of the Academy.)

⁷ Richard Rorty, *Consequences of Pragmatism*, (Great Britain: The Harvester Press, 1982), pp. xiii-xvii.

⁸ cf., Stephen Toumlin, *The Place of Reason in Ethics*, (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1970), p. 163.

⁹ R.S. Peters, *Ethics and Education*, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1966).

¹⁰ James S. Kaminsky, "Kaminsky's Reflections on the *Freedom and Authority Addendum*; or, Returning Smithson's Philosophy for his own Use," p. 94.

¹¹ Mario Bunge, "Towards a Philosophy of Technology," *Philosophy and Technology*, eds. Carl Mitcham and Robert Mackay (New York: The Free Press, 1972), p.65.

¹² Charles E. Lindblom, "The Science of 'Muddling Through'," *Public Administration Review*, Summer, (1959).

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 182. (emphasis added)

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 81. Note: This description of practical difficulties often generates the response from educational philosophers that such confusion points out, if it does not actually prove, the importance of philosophy for the practice of education in general and educational administration in particular. The philosopher's response (The requirement that we "know" what we are talking about in some *final* sense of the term. Philosopher: "It may just be a quirk of mind but I would like to know what I am talking about before I talk about it!"), predictably enough, generates a rather icy response from educational practitioners and administrators. Educational practitioners know scholasticism (in the worst sense of the word) when they see it. They know scholastic blustering is unrelated to any methodological (logic in use) question that concerns them. Furthermore, they know that such scholasticism is *in principle* beyond application to the questions of practice, and therefore *in principle* of no utility to them.

¹⁵ Prior and collateral questions: (Is 'X' really good? etc.) are inadmissible for the immediate purposes of the given investigation. However, they may be admissible at some later point in time *if* it can be demonstrated that fundamental principles need reformulation before the practical question at issue can be resolved.

¹⁶ Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*, Trans. H.J. Paton (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1956), p. 98-111. (First published 1797)

¹⁷ Richard Rorty, *Consequences of Pragmatism*, pp. 160-175.

¹⁸ viz. Regents of the University of California, v. Allan Bakke, 98 S.Ct. 2733 (1978); cf., James S. Kaminsky, "The Bakke Decision, 98 S.Ct. 2733 (1978): Positive Discrimination and the Practice of Racially Non-discriminatory Education," *Education Research and Perspectives*, v. 8, (1981).

¹⁹ The argument that a powerful new computer might make such calculations possible is unhelpful. It is about as helpful as arguing that quantum scattering theory might be useful to predict automobile accidents —

the cost and labor of such domestic use. The argument confuses a question of cost with a question of technical possibility.

²⁰ Mario Bunge, "Towards a Technoethics," *Monist*, v.60, (1977).

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 103.

²² cf., John Dewey, *The Quest for Certainty*, (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, pp. 254-286 (first published in 1929); Kurt Baier, *The Moral Point of View*, (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 13.

²³ James S. Kaminsky, *Kaminsky's Reflections on Freedom and Authority Addendum*," p. 95.

²⁴ Stephen Toumlin, *The Place of Reason in Ethics*, (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1970), p. 170.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 171.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 171.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 171.

²⁸ James S. Kaminsky, "The Freedom and Authority Memorandum: A Philosophical Addendum in Educational Administration," *The Journal of Educational Administration*, v.XIX, (1981), pp. 188-190; James S. Kaminsky, "Kaminsky's Reflections on the *Freedom and Authority Addendum*," p. 94-95.

²⁹ Stephen Toumlin, *The Place of Reason in Ethics*, p. 171.

³⁰ Edward H. Levi, *An Introduction to Legal Reasoning*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press (1949), p. 1.

³¹ Richard Rorty, *Consequences of Pragmatism*, p. 174.

³² Charles E. Lindblom, "The Science of 'Muddling Through'."

³³ David K. Cohen, and Michael S. Garet, "Reforming Educational Policy with Applied Social Research," *Harvard Educational Review*, v.45, (1975) p. 21.

³⁴ John Dewey, *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*, (London: Allen and Unwin 1939), Ch. 6.

³⁵ Richard Rorty, *Consequences of Pragmatism*, p. xxxix or, 19-36.