Abstract

Recently morality and values education has re-emerged. Many public schools have instituted specialized curricula originating at university departments of education. This paper discusses two such curricula (the values clarification method of Sidney Simon and the cognitive moral development method of Lawrence Kohlberg). It suggests that their emphasis on single class, isolated instruction necessarily leaves the affective, unconscious elements of character formation out of account. In contrast, John Locke's belief that the essence of all education is character formation may serve as an alternative context within which to structure the teaching of morality and values.

Résumé

L'éducation aux valeurs et au sense moral reprend de l'importance depuis quelque temps. En effet, plusieurs écoles publiques ont établi des programmes spécialisés dans ce domaine, élaborés pour la plupart par des départements d'éducation universitaires. L'article traite de deux de ces programmes: la méthode de clarification des valeurs de Sidney Simon et l'approche cognitive à la formation morale de Lawrence Kohlberg. L'auteur soutient que l'enseignement isolé, limité, au groupe qui les caractérise, fait que les éléments affectifs et inconscients de la formation du caractère en sont absents. Par contraste, l'opinion de John Locke selon laquelle l'essence de l'éducation repose sur la formation du caractère pourrait servir de nouveau contexte pour l'enseignement des sciences morals et l'iniation aux valeurs.

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EDUCATION FOR CHARACTER:
AN ALTERNATIVE TO VALUES CLARIFICATION AND
COGNITIVE MORAL DEVELOPMENT CURRICULA

I

A concern for moral education is not new in the United States. What is new is the concept of morality and values as a specific curriculum for a specific course. Only recently would it be possible to hear a public school student say, ''I have values clarification and morality right after gym.''

Throughout most of the nineteenth century the relative homogeneity of the American population and traditionalism bred of rural life meant that a common set of values, derived from scripture and the major branches of Protestantism, was accepted implicitly by interested public school teachers, school administrators, and the writers of school texts. Teaching morality and values in school was not problematic and so was naively, unselfconsciously diffused throughout the curriculum. Consider this excerpt from a reading primer published in 1830:

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See that little boy creeping softly along on tiptoe towards his mother's tea table. See him lift the cover of the sugar pot and as quickly as possible, put one piece in his mouth, and another in his pocket. His name is William Morton. His kind mother is sitting at the fire place mending his clothes, with his little baby sister asleep on her lap. She does not think that William is thus taking what is not his own. William goes on from day to day, taking apples, and cakes, and sugar without leave; and what is worse, he tries to conceal it, and even tells lies about it. Does William know that this is stealing? Does he remember that this is breaking the EIGHTH COMMANDMENT of the Lord his God? [1]

According to school text historian Clifton Johnson, such homiletic material was the rule and not the exception. If somewhat quaint and intellectually constricting, this generalized, diffuse approach had the virtue of creating a moral atmosphere. The whole school with its curriculum and its affective tone was the moral educator. The emotional life of the child, where moral behavior is rooted, could thus be reached with both a subtlety and directness which eludes isolated, academic instruction. [2]

The latter nineteenth century saw the beginning of a vast immigration from southern and eastern Europe along with a simultaneous movement of native rural populations (Black and White) to rapidly growing cities where all these cultures mixed, and sometimes clashed. This, and the rise of an urban based scientific humanism, shook the foundation of common religious belief and cultural homogeneity that made an implicitly acknowledged value structure possible and unproblematic in schools. [3]

Recently juvenile crime, drug use, truancy, family disorganization, concern about the effects of explicit sex and violence in the media, and the ubiquitous sense that a generation is emerging with no firm moral convictions have caused a new interest in teaching morality and values in the public school. But now we no longer have the self assurance to almost unconsciously include moral themes throughout the curriculum. Instead, we isolate the teaching of morality and values to a single class period and use curricula prepared by academic experts from major departments of education. A belief in a "science of education" which can provide an objective, value free basis for educational philosophy and pedagogy has also contributed to a trend which has seen these experts replace the Anglo-Protestant clergy as ultimate sources of moral wisdom in the schools.

In this paper I discuss the weakness inherent in two approaches to morality and values education that essentially limit themselves to such curricula. I suggest an alternative, holistic approach based on John Locke's concept of all education as education for character development. This approach, I stress, would allow us, in a more liberal age, to return to the early nineteenth century concept of the whole school and curriculum as effecting moral education. It would also permit us to acknowledge in our practice that moral behavior stems from deeper roots than can be reached by isolated discussion and intellectual exercises.

II

Two important methods of morality and values instruction have emerged from academic sources: the values clarification approach of Professor Sidney Simon (University of Massachusetts) and the cognitive moral development approach of Harvard's Lawrence Kohlberg. First we will consider Professor Simon's values clarification approach.

Professor Simon is opposed to all moral inculcation by authority. Indeed, since according to Simon the traditional idea that there are right and wrong ways of thinking and acting is obsolete, there are no final moral authorities. "None of us," he says, "has the 'right' set of values to pass

on to other people's children.'' Thus, it is the ''process of valuing,'' not the values themselves that is central. [4]

Students should freely discover their values for themselves through open, uninhibited discussion of hypothetical situations called ''choice exercises'' or ''simulations.'' They are asked to develop value ''strategies'' in response to these situations. Eighth graders might be asked, ''Which would you prefer to give up if you had to? A. Economic freedom? B. Religious freedom? C. Political freedom?'' or ''Do you think there are times when cheating is justified?'' Practice in decision making strategy is thought to help students arrive at a clear formulation of their values. [5]

Simon's method permits criticism of the rational process of choice once certain premises are accepted. The final decision is not questioned if the process that led to it is sound. The decision maker has made a choice to be valued. He/she has arrived at a value preference rationally and can truly call it his/her own. [6]

Having thus clarified his/her values the student will be ''positive, purposeful, enthusiastic, and proud'' rather than ''apathetic, drifting, flighty, and inconsistent.'' This vigorous, healthy state of mind and action is the goal. Clarified values are the means. [7]

Aside from the superficiality of an approach which raises value problems but provides no way of reaching their resolution at a philosophical level, the most serious objection to Simon's method is moral relativity. The substance of values no longer matters, only the ''healthy'' condition of mind that results from having clarified values. Can, then, a common criminal be ''positive, purposeful, enthusiastic, and proud''? When asked if it is possible to clarify one's values according to the best methodology and arrive at a decision to, for instance, shoplift, one follower of Simon replied, ''You have to respect that decision if they have reached it intelligently . . . at least in this approach you are respecting the person as a decision maker.'' [8]

Bennett and Delattre note that the exercises and simulations of the values clarification method are designed to help the student discover and attain the self gratifications that would make him/her happy. Thus, they are exercises in refined selfishness. [9]

But this emphasis on self and its concomitant exclusion of final moral imperatives may be at the core of the sense of moral crisis that called values education in the public school into being. A society in moral crisis cannot convince its members of the moral-ethical meaningfulness of their everyday lives while also making it vital that they contribute to and support the whole. It is a society, as Emile Durkheim defined social egoism, where individuals can find no meaning outside of themselves, no basis for belief in anything but ''self actualization,'' ''rich experience,'' ''a rewarding life style,'' ''realizing personal values,'' and so on. It would seem that with its focus on the individual and his/her needs that the values clarification method, far from being a step toward the easing of crisis, is founded on the notions of self-centeredness that fuel it. [10]

Lawrence Kohlberg, while also denying the role of traditional authority, cannot be accused of moral relativity or philosophical shallowness. He accepts the Platonic ideal of an ultimate, unchanging good (although Kohlberg's ideal good does not flow from a divine source). Relying on anthropological studies and the stucturalist psychology of Jean Piaget, Kohlberg claims that knowledge of this final good is gained by logical-cognitive progress through six increasingly advanced stages of moral reasoning in an invariable sequence. The sequence begins at a stage one punishment and obedience orientation (where only the painful or pleasurable consequences of action matter) and ends at a stage six universal-ethical principle orientation (where moral

reasoning is guided by logically consistent, universal principles of justice, equality, and respect for the human dignity of all). Development may stop at any of the five stages short of the final sixth, but students can be helped to move further by a series of uninhibited discussions of moral dilemmas led by a Socratic style teacher-questioner who has presumably reached level six consciousness. [11]

Based on Platonic philosophy, anthropology, and the prestigious work of Piaget, while avoiding the moral relativity of the values clarification method, it would appear that Kohlberg's cognitive-moral development approach is both less in conflict with traditional standards and more sophisticated. However, these different methods have something very basic in common. Both consider logical-cognitive processes primary and minimize the importance of the affective and unconscious in human behavior. (And, after all, morality *is* behavior). One has clarified values and can act vigorously and purposefully because of a rational process of self scrutiny induced by simulations and exercises. A series of discussions of moral dilemmas exposing participants to progressively higher stages of reasoning will lead some to a level six orientation toward universal, logically consistent principles.

Not only are the emotional-affective, unconscious determinants of moral growth and behavior slighted but so is the related element of will, self-discipline, steadfastness of purpose, or, in short, strength of character. Can a person with logically clarified values gather the inner strength to consistently act according to them? Given what we know about the typical subject's need to meet the questioner's expectations and so appear "right" and about the distance between verbalized attitudes and behavior, can we be sure that someone who scores level six on Professor Kohlberg's interview instrument (the Moral Maturity Score) is a *good* person with the instincts, innocence, decency, compassion and will to act ethically in everyday life as well as in the face of moral crisis? [12]

The duality of merely learned responses and beliefs and the intuitive, emotional bases of action and conviction has often been treated in literature. There is no finer treatment than the exquisite moment in *The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn* when Huck tears up the letter that informs Miss Watson of Jim's whereabouts and so consciously chooses Hell. The passage should be read at length to sense its powerful evocation of the unconscious, intuitive, affective foundations of moral behavior.

> Once I said to myself it would be a thousand times better for Jim to be a slave at home where his family was, as long as he'd *got* to be a slave, and I'd better write a letter to Tom Sawyer and tell him to tell Miss Watson where he was. But I soon give up that notion, for two things: she'd be mad and disgusted at his rascality and ungratefulness for leaving her, and so she'd sell him straight down the river again; and if she didn't, everybody naturally despises an ungrateful nigger *, and they'd make Jim feel it all the time, so he'd feel ornery and disgraced. And then think of *me!* It would get all around that Huck Finn helped a nigger to get his freedom; and if I was to ever see anybody from that town again, I'd be ready to get down and lick his boots for shame. That's just the way: a person does a low-down thing, and then he don't want to take no consequences of it. Thinks as long as he can hide it, it ain't no disgrace. That was my fix exactly. The more I studied about this, the more my conscience went to grinding me, and the more wicked and low-down and ornery I got to feeling. And at last, when it hit me all of a sudden that here was the plain

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* This is an unfortunate, distasteful word. Among other aspects of Twain's portrait of Jim, its frequent use in the novel has prompted many educators to recommend that *Huck Finn* be excluded from high school and college literature classes. Others counter that *Huck Finn* is an American classic whose basic thrust is anti-racist, Twain's personal history regarding racism and slavery is excellent, and once he began to write in the *persona* and language of a poor, uneducated, vagrant white child born in the pre-Civil War South he could not, realistically, use another word, or even another less offensive word. [13]

hand of Providence slapping me in the face and letting me know my wickedness was being watched all the time from up there in heaven whilst I was stealing a poor old woman's nigger that hadn't ever done me no harm, and now was showing me there's One that's always on the lookout, and ain't agoing to allow no such miserable doings to go only just so fur and no further, I most dropped in my tracks I was so scared. Well, I tried the best I could to kinder soften it up somehow for myself, by saying I was brung up wicked, and so I warn't so much to blame; but something inside of me kept saying, "There was the Sunday school, you could a gone to it; and if you'd a done it they'd a learnt you, there, that people that acts as I'd been acting about that nigger goes to everlasting fire."

It made me shiver. And I about made up my mind to pray; and see if I couldn't try to quit being the kind of boy I was, and be better. So I kneeled down. But the words wouldn't come. Why wouldn't they? It warn't no use to try and hide it from Him. Nor from *me*, neither. It was because my heart warn't right; it was because I warn't square; it was because I was playing double. I was letting *on* to give up sin, but away inside of me I was holding on to the biggest one of all. I was trying to make my mouth *say* I would do the right thing and the clean thing, and go and write that nigger's owner and tell where he was; but deep down in me I knowed it was a lie—and He knowed it. You can't pray a lie—I found that out.

So I was full of trouble, full as I could be; and didn't know what to do. At last I had an idea; and I says, I'll go and write the letter- and *then* see if I can pray. Why, it was astonishing, the way I felt as light as a feather, right straight off, and my troubles all gone. So I got a piece of paper and a pencil, all glad and excited, and set down and wrote:

> Miss Watson your runaway nigger Jim is
> down here two mile below Pikesville and
> Mr. Phelps has got him and he will give him
> up for the reward if you send.

HUCK FINN

I felt good and all washed clean of sin for the first time I had ever felt so in my life, and I knowed I could pray now. But I didn't do it straight off, but laid the paper down and set there thinking—thinking how good it was all this happened so, and how near I come to being lost and going to hell. And went on thinking. And I got to thinking over our trip down the river; and I see Jim before me, all the time, in the day, and in the night-time, sometimes moonlight, sometimes storms, and we a floating along talking, and singing, and laughing. But somehow I couldn't seem to strike no places to harden me against him, but only the other kind. I'd see him standing my watch on top of his'n, stead of calling me, so I could go on sleeping; and see him how glad he was when I come back out of the fog; and when I come to him again in the swamp, up there where the feud was; and such like times; and would always call me honey, and pet me, and do everything he could think of for me, and how good he always was; and at last I struck the time I saved him by telling the men we had small-pox aboard, and he was so grateful, and said I was the best friend old Jim ever had in the world, and the *only* one he's got now; and then I happened to look around, and see that paper.

It was a close place. I took it up, and held it in my hand. I was a trembling, because I'd got to decide, forever, betwixt two things, and I knowed it. I studied a minute, sort of holding my breath, and then I says to myself:

"All right, then, I'll *go* to hell" -and tore it up. [14]

Whatever the South, the Widow Douglas, Miss Watson, Judge Thatcher and mischievous, romantic, but really very conventional Tom Sawyer have taught him about right and wrong, truth and falsehood, Heaven and Hell, will not withstand the rush of Huck's love for Jim and his belief in Jim's goodness and human dignity. He "knows" that he is wrong. His conscious mind accepts no higher morality than that which would send a runaway slave back to his rightful owner. His emotions, his involuntary convictions, his inner decency and innocence, his simple goodness, if you will, his *character*, don't care. And, of course, his character leads him to the right choice, a

"level six" choice that embraces the highest principles of justice and respect for the inviolable dignity of all.

III

Character, or to use the post-psychoanalytic term, personality, is what we know a person to *be* beneath transitory moods and occupations. An individual can assume many roles, guises, and activities but character or personality is unitary, solid, and intractable. It changes, if at all, only slowly and often painfully. Even such changes as do gradually occur are really not much more than variations on a theme. It is this essential character that holds the disposition to act morally, justly, "according to a level six orientation", or "purposefully and proudly". [15] According to Peck and Havinghurst:

> . . . whatever pattern of moral behavior and character a child shows at ten years of age, he is far more likely than not to display into late adolescence; and, our belief is, for the rest of his life . . . While there is *room* for change in later life . . . prolonged, deep-going influences would be necessary to effect such change, and . . . such influences are not likely to occur in the average person's life. [16]

It is unlikely that isolated and abstract discussions of moral dilemmas and/or value choices qualify as "prolonged and deep going influences."

Much psychological research indicates that character is formed by early, mainly familial influences and that a strong character, capable of self discipline, compassion, a sense of personal honor, and love (and thus, of moral-ethical behavior) grows from affectionate treatment, including the gradual acceptance of responsible freedom, tempered by reasonable and consistent discipline. The English philosopher, John Locke, when he turned his mind to education in a series of letters of advice to his friend Sir Edward Clarke collected as *Thoughts Concerning Education* (1692) acknowledged these early influences and recommended that young Edward receive instruction at home. He also believed that the formation of character is the foremost goal of education. Once attained all other learning will follow and, what is more important, find its place in a healthy balance. Lacking good character, prudence, for example, becomes mere shrewdness and academic accomplishment, pedantry. And without the benefit of a psychoanalytic tradition that uncovered the unconscious and affective roots of our thoughts and actions (with not much more than a rather simplistic pleasure versus pain psychology) Locke held a more realistic view of character formation than the modern proponents of values clarification and cognitive moral development. Certainly, he would have been puzzled by the idea that character could form and develop through abstract classroom discussions.* [17]

Good character is the inner strength and desire to behave virtuously and Locke thought that virtue could be objectively defined by virtuous, cultured adults. It lay in Christian reverence for every human soul as an emanation of the divine soul and an innate, because early instilled, ability

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* Research on the effects of these methods is very equivocal. Even on their own limited terms they do not seem to exert a clear influence. Furthermore, several writers note that the accepting, warm, non-judgemental, gently guided classroom tone that both Kohlberg and Simon recommend may be the most important factor in promoting the slight attitude changes they have been able to measure. Of course, a good teacher of any subject can provide this atmosphere which is, after all, only a very modest replication of the moral environment of a supportive family. [18]

to manifest that reverence graciously in a highly stratified society. In a belief in an objective good that encompasses respect and compassion for all humanity, Locke is not different than Kohlberg. But Locke (certainly more than an accomplished amateur in the study of the nature, functions, and capacities of the human intellect) did not think that one arrives at this state of feeling and behavior by the rational acceptance of moral precepts or levels of reasoning as one accepts geometric proofs because of their logical inevitability and elegance.

Careful early training combining love and reasonable discipline, at all times considering the child's very individual natural tendencies, using affection and respect for his/her parents and teachers, their humane example, and, most important, his/her desire for their approbation and dread of their disapproval as emotional levers, will develop the honesty, balance, habits, attractions, aversions, the strength of purpose, the cast of mind and spirit or character that manifests itself in virtuous action. [19] An intuitive, early instilled, habitual aversion to dishonesty will always be more assurance against dishonest behavior than any rational acceptance that dishonesty is wrong or logical ability to nicely reason out the subtleties of a moral conflict. Locke anticipates the essence of Huckleberry Finn's moral struggle in this passage:

> But if an ingenuous detestation of this shameful vice be but carefully and early instilled into them, as I think it may, that is the true and genuine method to obviate this crime, and will be a better guard against dishonesty than any considerations drawn from interest; habits working more constantly, and with better facility than reason, which, when we have most need of it, is seldom consulted, and more rarely obeyed. [20]

Moreover, it is not the substance of subject matter that is most important, but the habits, attitudes, and dispositions that study of a particular subject, using particular methods, implies:

> For that which I cannot too often inculcate, is that whatever the matter be about which it is conversant, whether great or small, the main (I had almost said only) thing to be considered in every action of a child is what influence it will have upon his mind; what habits it tends to, and is like to settle in him; and if it be encouraged, whither it will lead him when he is grown up. [21]

For example, the formal art of debate is to be avoided. It inspires contentiousness, uses techniques designed to confute every statement rather than to verify the truth of any statement, and reduces language to trickery. A child is by no means to be exposed to such training as it will only lead him/her to become a petty, socially offensive wrangler over doubtful phrases and away from the proper use of reason which is "to have right notions and a right judgement of things, to distinguish between truth and falsehood, right and wrong, and to act accordingly . . . " [22]

On these premises, the self conscious study of morality and values, no matter how carefully pursued, is not central, but rather the habits and dispositions that all study, indeed, all education in the broadest sense and including familial influences, instills. This will determine whether or not a youngster learns to *feel* and *behave* morally, whether he/she develops the strength and sensitivity of character to *live* by certain basic moral principles which, after all, we need not argue very much about and which do not require exquisite, level six reasoning powers to discern.

One of Kohlberg's dilemmas involves a father's crisis of decision before an imminent nuclear attack. The Jones family has enough air in their bomb shelter to last exactly five days if no one else enters. After this time it will be safe to leave, but before that the fall-out will be fatal. Neighbors are trying to break in. If they are successful all will die. Mr. Jones gets his rifle and threatens to shoot, but the neighbors won't stop. "What should Mr. Jones do? Give your reasons." [23]

But is the basis of morality to be reached by exercising the mind over tricky problems and situational puzzles? When, as here, two moral imperatives (loving and caring for one's family and

compassionate concern for all humanity) conflict, is there any satisfactory theoretical solution? Probably not. Rather, in actuality, in the material, horrifying moment, the person of weak moral character would not think or feel twice about shooting his neighbors (or his family too, if it came to that) in order to save himself, while the person of strong moral character would suffer terribly no matter what he did.

In life, where morality is lived and only occasionally thought about, there is no moral "dilemma" where there is no inner disposition to feel compassion, duty, love, respect, etc. "Strong moral character" may even be defined as the capacity to experience the urgency of these emotions and ideals. Such character is not formed by intellectual wrangling over insoluble moral puzzles. [24]

IV

How, then, can we apply Locke's notion of education for character to the modern school? It would seem that a separate curriculum in values clarification or cognitive moral development would not answer. Rather, we should pay attention to the general atmosphere and tone of the school and to the demeanor and methods of all teachers of all subject matters. [25] A fifth grade elementary school teacher or a secondary school teacher of English, Art, Physical Education, or Science is just as likely or unlikely to provide the treatment, example, and classroom tone that will help a child toward moral growth as a teacher of values clarification or cognitive moral development. Teaching "virtue" through example, through the whole school curriculum, and the day-to-day social life of the school, rather than through direct instruction, is not a new idea, as this excerpt from an 1884 New York City Board of Education manual shows:

> Children do not comprehend virtue in the abstract; but they soon learn to understand it when they see it in the actions of their teachers and parents and of the others around them. Let the teacher utilize the reading and other lessons, as well as school incidents, in leading the children to admire honesty, truth-speaking, unselfishness, true courage, and all right doing, and thus sift in and mingle the moral with the mental, as Nature does in her teaching. [26]

But while it is possible to return to the nineteenth century idea that the whole school is the agent of moral education, it is not possible to return to the more homogeneous society of that century. Schools will continue to educate children from various cultures, ethnic groups, and religions. There will continue to be controversies over prayer, sex education, text books, etc. that reflect clashing value structures.

Yet schools, in their attempt to educate for character, may still assume a common moral heritage specific to no one culture or religion. This heritage, derived from all major religions and cultures, comprises a set of moral beliefs and practices that Plato called "the good," C.S. Lewis "the Tao," and Professor Kohlberg a level six moral orientation. Its theme is respect for the essential rights and dignity of all humanity and the conviction that one's personal worth and well being consists in sincere adherence to this standard. [27]

With this common moral heritage implied throughout the curriculum (especially in the study of literature where the child's affective and unconscious nature is likely to be most involved and where humanity's capacity for moral nobility and failure is poignantly illustrated) and embodied in the school administration's relationship to the students, the school should try to emulate the moral-affective environment of a supportive family. (This, of course, implies the need for smaller schools).

Naturally, the school cannot take the place of the family. And given widespread instance of family pathology like child abuse and wife beating, it is obvious that many families cannot provide an ideal moral environment for character formation. But the school *can* provide, in a modest way, some of the experiences and some of the general tone that a strong family environment provides— warm, accepting but reasonably guiding and disciplining adults, positive role models, privileges and freedoms contingent on the fulfillment of responsibilities to the whole, and a sense of caring and concern for individuals, not simply for grades and achievement test scores. In short, schools can supplement the efforts of strong, supportive families and provide a daily refuge for youngsters from troubled families. (The alternative schools of New York City consider this to be one of their major goals. Accordingly, many of them have instituted emotional support and guidance groups called "family groups").

The students' treatment in all classes and the methods used should manifest that mixture of affection, acceptance, responsible freedom, and reasonable discipline that psychologists claim is most effective in the formation of character. Courses in human relations, psychology, ethics, and the affective aspects of pedagogy should be required of all teachers. If possible, principals should be chosen as much for their capacity to exercise moral leadership as for expertise in curriculum, pedagogy, and administration. [28]

Thus the school would further the development of moral character without any teacher necessarily saying a single word about morality and values. The logical-cognitive ability to piece out moral puzzles and value choices need not be a matter of concern if, as Locke teaches, and the psychoanalytic tradition proves, the springs of moral action lie deeper than rational thought in the partly unconscious and early instilled complex of emotions and convictions that make up human character.

NOTES

[1] Clifton Johnson. *Old Time Schools and School Books.* (New York: Macmillan, 1904; Dover Books, 1963), pp. 245-246.

[2] Ibid. , pp. 11-18.

[3] John Bodnar. *Immigration and Industrialization.* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), pp. 3, 14, 18, 241; Marcus Lee Hansen. *The Immigrant in American History* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940), p. 21; David Purpel and Kevin Ryan. "Moral Education: Where Sages Fear to Tread," *Phi Delta Kappan.* 56 (June, 1975): p. 659; Diane Ravitch. *The Great School Wars.* (New York: Basic Books, 1974), pp. 173-174.

[4] William J. Bennett and Edwin J. Delattre. "Moral Education in the Schools." *Public Interest.* 50 (Winter, 1978): p. 81; Martin Eger. "The Conflict in Moral Education: An Informal Case Study." *Public Interest.* 63 (Spring, 1981): p. 64; Alan L. Lockwood. "A Critical View of Values Clarification." *Teacher's College Record.* 77 (September, 1975): p. 37; M.F. Maples. "Values Clarification: Some Critical Questions." *Counseling and Values.* 26 (July, 1982): pp. 264-269.

[5] Bennett and Delattre. "Moral Education," p. 83; Eger. "Conflict in Moral Education." p. 64.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Lockwood. "A Critical View." pp. 39-40; John S. Stewart. "Clarifying Values Clarification: A Critique." *Phi Delta Kappan.* 56 (June, 1975), p. 686.

[8] Eger. "Conflict in Moral Education." p. 65.

[9] Bennett and Delattre. "Moral Education." p. 86.

[10] Emile Durkheim. *Suicide.* (New York: The Free Press, 1951), pp. 249-257.

[11] Bennett and Delattre. "Moral Education." pp. 87-88; Lawrence Kohlberg. "The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Moral Education." *Phi Delta Kappan.* 56 (June, 1975): pp. 670-675; Lawrence Kohlberg. *The Philosophy of Moral Development.* (New York: Harper and Row, 1981), p. 16.

[12] Brian Crittenden. "A Comment on Cognitive Moral Education." *Phi Delta Kappan.* 56 (June, 1975), p. 696; Alan L. Lockwood. "The Effects of Values Clarification and Moral Development Curricula on School Age Subjects: A Critical Review of Recent Research." *Review of Educational Research.* 48 (Summer 1978), pp. 345-346; John J. Ray. "Authoritarian Attitudes Among Recidivist Prisoners. *Personality and Individual Differences.* 5 (Spring, 1984), pp. 265, 266.

[13] Donald B. Gibson. "Mark Twain's Jim in the Classroom." *English Journal.* 57 (February, 1968), pp. 196-199; Leo Marx. "Huck at 100." *The Nation.* August 31 1985, pp. 150-152.

[14] Mark Twain. *The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn.* (Boston: The Riverside Press, 1958), pp. 178-180.

[15] Weston La Barre. "Personality from a Psycho-analytic Viewpoint." In *The Study of Personality.* eds. Edward Norbeck, Douglass Price Willams, and William M. McCord (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1968), pp. 65-87; Paul Barrett and Sybil Eyesenck. "The Assessment of Personality Factors Across 25 Countries." *Personality and Individual Differences.* 5 (Spring, 1984), p. 617; H.J. Eyesenck. *The Structure of Human Personality.* (London: Methuen and Company, *1971), p. 2;* Calvin S. Hall and Gardner Lindzey, *Theories of Personality.* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1970), pp. 44-45.

[16] Mary Ellen Goodman. "Influences of Childhood and Adolescence." In *The Study of Personality.* p. 177.

[17] Ibid., pp. 51-56; Kohlberg. "The Cognitive-Developmental Approach." p. 675; John Locke. "Some Thoughts Concerning Education." In *John Locke: On Politics and Education.* ed. Howard R. Penniman (Roslyn, New York: Walter J. Black, 1947), pp. 257, 297, 357.

[18] J.B. Engel and L. Seyfarth. "Teaching Values: Does It Make a Difference?" *The Educational Forum.* 46 (Summer, 1982): pp. 468-476; Lockwood. "The Effects of Values Clarification and Moral Development Curricula." pp. 331, 341, 344, 355, 356, 357; Lockwood. "A Critical View." p. 45; R. Plante and M.A. Myrant. "Education for Values." *Chronical of Higher Education.* 25 (October 13 1982): p. 136.

[19] Locke. *Some Thoughts.* pp. 229-233, 247-248, 258, 272,277, 286-288.

[20] Ibid., p. 296.

[21] Ibid., p. 291.

[22] Ibid., pp. 363-364.

[23] Moshe Blatt, Anne Colby, and Betsy Speicher. *Hypothetical Dilemmas for Use in Moral Discussions.* (Moral Education and Research Foundation, 1974), p. 15.

[24] Crittenden. "A Comment." p. 696.

[25] Walter P. Krolikowski, Nancy Hablutzel, and Wilma Hoffman. "'Symmetry, Independence, Continuity, Boundedness and Additivity: The Game of Education." *Educational Studies.* 15 (Fall, 1984): pp. 219-220.

[26] New York City Board of Education. *A Manual of Discipline and Instruction for the Use of the Teachers of the Primary Schools Under the Charge of the City of New York.* (New York: J.S. Babcock, 1884), p. 16.

[27] Eger, "Conflict in Moral Education." p. 68.

[28] Krolikowski, Hablutzel, and Hoffman. "'Symmetry'. " p. 220.