Abstract

This paper traces the development of analytic philosophy of education during the last three decades. It identifies the two major stages of its development (1950-1964 and 1964-1985), the characteristics of these stages, and the criticisms launched against analytic philosophy of education. It is argued that the recent criticisms of analytic philosophy of education are outdated and somewhat misdirected and have thus misrepresented the nature of contemporary work in the field.

Résumé

L'article retrace le développement de la philosophie analytique de l'éducation pendant les trois dernières décades. L'auteur identifie les deux périodes importantes de son développement (1950-1964 et 1964-1985), en donne les caractéristiques et relève la critique défavorable dont elle a été l'objet. Il soutient que les critiques récentes de cette philosophie de l'éducation sont démodées et en quelque sorte mal dirigées, et qu'elles ont contribué ainsi à déformer la nature des travaux contemporains dans ce domaine.

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ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION: DEVELOPMENT AND MISCONCEPTIONS

As a distinct area of academic study, philosophy of education is a recent development. However, if one seriously reviews the abundant publications in this area, as Mary Warnock (1977, p.9) has rightly observed, one cannot doubt that there is such a thing as the philosophy of education. Contrary to the unsupported view put forth by Ted Honderich and Myles Burnyeat (1979, p. 3) — that philosophy of education "has not since John Dewey been in touch with the mainstream of philosophy" — work in philosophy of education during the last thirty years has been predominantly influenced by analytic philosophy which has been the major mode of doing philosophy in "mainstream" or "general" philosophy. The work of the late 50s and early 60s has established philosophy of education as a branch of philosophy almost on a par with philosophy of religion, philosophy of law and philosophy of politics. If one focuses on the work in and about philosophy of education during the last decade one can observe two phenomena: (i) A rather harsh, and in my view, extreme and somewhat misdirected criticism of the recent work in analytic philosophy of education due to a lack of recognition of the second phenomenon to be identified. (ii) The mode of doing analytic philosophy of education has changed. Evident in the work of philosophers of education and educational theorists is a preoccupation with the nature, role and method of doing philosophy of education. This paper traces the development of analytic philosophy of education in order (a) to identify the various stages of the development of analytic philosophy of education, and (b) to show how recent criticism of analytic philosophy of education has failed to take new developments in this area into account and thus has misrepresented the nature of contemporary work in analytic philosophy of education.

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Traditional Philosophy of Education

Philosophers since the time of Plato have been interested in education although the nature and scope of this interest has varied. Although not all wrote treatises on education, Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Locke, Rousseau and Kant all considered the topic. The question that arises is whether, until Dewey, there has been a body of writings which one can identify as philosophy of education distinct from ethics, epistemology and metaphysics.

With Dewey one can identify a new approach. As a result of Dewey's philosophical writings on education, more and more philosophers became involved in educational philosophy. Philosophy of education from 1900 to the mid-50s (Dewey died in 1952) centered on his thought. While those who were in accord with his perspective sought to develop elements of Dewey's philosophy of education, others sought to re-establish or re-enact a "conservative" view of education.

Just as philosophical problems can be discussed in different ways, so philosophy of education has taken various forms. Two general conceptions of philosophy of education are distinguishable: the traditional and the more recent, largely analytic approach. The role of the former was primarily to propose and defend a substantial view — a set of principles from which guidelines or prescriptions for the practice of education were deduced. Philosophy of education was viewed as a field of inquiry which helped resolve practical educational problems. The philosopher of education was expected to make value judgments and to propose educational practice. This mode of doing philosophy of education coincides with the synthetic-synoptic and prescriptive-programmatic dimensions as characterized by Soltis (1966).

By 1950, this mode of doing philosophy of education was in question. A number of charges were brought to bear on traditional work in philosophy of education. It was held to be too broad in its aims, to lack clarity, to be eclectic, to lack philosophical rigor, and to identify philosophy of education with educational theory (Archambault, 1972, pp. 2-5; Burns, 1962; Hirst, 1967; Soltis, 1975, pp. 16 and 19). These criticisms, together with the feeling that work within this mode was divorced from the trend toward an analytic approach in the rest of philosophy, impelled philosophers of education to begin to apply conceptual analysis to issues in the field of education.[2]

Analytic Philosophy of Education: 1950-1964

The origin of the analytic mode in philosophy of education is twofold. It reflects both reaction to criticism of the traditional approach and a desire on the part of philosophers of education to apply to the field of education the analytic approach which had dominated the rest of philosophy for more than three decades.

Initially, interest in analytic philosophy of education came from philosophers in mainstream philosophy and was evident in English rather than North American work. Only in the late 50s and early 60s did the work of philosophers of education begin to show serious interest in the analytic approach within the discipline.

Truth and Fallacy in Educational Theory (1942) by C.D. Hardie represented the first application of the analytic approach to the field of education. Hardie, who explicitly stated that his work followed that of the Cambridge analytic school, made no attempt to *defend* any extant theories. He desired only to *examine and clarify* these theories by the application of analytic techniques. In *The Concept of Mind* (1949), Gilbert Ryle urges philosophers to analyze key concepts in education such as 'learning', 'teaching', and 'examining'. "This," says Ryle, "might be called 'the philosophy

of learning', 'the methodology of education', or more grandly, 'the grammar of pedagogy''' (Ryle, 1962, p. 318).

The first North American to show any interest in the analytic approach was Israel Scheffler who presented a paper, "Toward an Analytic Philosophy of Education", at a meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science in December, 1953. Scheffler expressed concern about the ambiguity of the terms 'philosophy' and 'philosophy of education', noting that "philosophy of education is rarely, if ever, construed as the rigorous logical analysis of key concepts related to the practice of education" (Scheffler, 1973, p. 9). His aim was twofold: to identify the characteristics of the analytic approach and to show how this approach could be applied to philosophy of education.[3]

Another British philosopher to promote analytic philosophy of education was D.J. O'Connor. O'Connor's position is very similar to Scheffler's. He repeatedly insists that the role of the philosopher of education is the analysis of educational concepts, in order to clarify difficulties confronting the educator. O'Connor (1957) felt that "traditional philosophers promised more than they were able to deliver . . ." (p. 17) and that "one of the philosopher's jobs is to try to elucidate such theories and assess their logical worth and their explanatory function" (p. 13).

The first analytic philosophers of education emphasized method. Although refuting a position on the grounds of inconsistency may have indirectly committed them to *some* position, they did not aim to defend any *particular* position. These philosophers felt that the philosopher of education should take a neutral stance and that his role as philosopher was not to make practical suggestions. These two characteristics are reflected both in D.J. O'Connor's book and in Scheffler's early work.

Early analytic work in philosophy of education has a common thread — the importance of elucidating concepts and theories. However, not all the features distinguished in early analytic work appear together in all such work.

By 1960, analytic philosophy of education had begun to gain ground. This was reflected in the increasing number of articles written in the analytic style and the publication of a number of good books on analytic philosophy of education.[4] Criticism of the analytic approach seemed to arise almost immediately. Early criticism of the analytic approach to educational issues was somewhat misdirected in that it tended to ascribe any feature distinguishable in any analytic work to all analytic work.

The major complaints about the analytic approach[5] were overemphasis on the importance of method and the lack of defending any substantial position. Other criticisms raised included (a) the lack of concern with prescription[6] and the lack of emphasis on the speculative character of philosophy, and (b) the misconception that clarification of concepts or language used by educationists solved major educational problems, and the misconception that philosophy had nothing to do with educational practice.

Main exponents of analytic philosophy of education until 1964 were, in addition to Scheffler, O'Connor and Hardie, B.O. Smith, R.H. Ennis, James E. McLellan, B. Paul Komisar, P.H. Hirst, R.S. Peters, and Archambault (the last three most influential after 1965). Most, if not all of these philosophers, would have agreed *at that time* that analytic philosophers of education should emphasize *method*, that it was not the role of the analytic philosopher to *defend* any position. However the picture of the analytic philosopher of education which arises from the other criticisms

mentioned above would fit only the work of those who held an extreme position. The critics of early analytic philosophers of education misrepresented the overall position or attitude that proponents of the analytical movement in education expressed. This misrepresentation gave the impression of a serious rift within the field.

Even O'Connor (1957) whose position was quite extreme, said with regard to the relation between analytic philosophy of education and ethics, that "the nature of value judgments and the logic of their justification is . . . the most important and most obvious point of contact between philosophy and education . . ." (p. 13).[7]

Maxine Greene (1960) maintained that "analysis and the clarification of concepts plays . . . a therapeutic role . . .", a view also held by John P. Strain (1964) and Harry S. Broudy (1964, p. 60). This is one of the most serious misinterpretations of the role of analytic philosophy of education. Some mainstream philosophers *had* argued the therapeutic function of analytic philosophy. But such a role was neither put forth nor defended by *analytic philosophers of education*. They did believe that some problems in education arose from a misuse of language, from lack of clarity or from logical carelessness. They did not believe these to be the only causes of such problems. They also believed that conceptual clarity would put philosophers of education in a better position to consider and solve some of these problems. While they believed that lack of conceptual clarity and faulty arguments increased the complexity and hindered solution of problems, they did not feel that if misuse of language or logical mistakes in arguments stopped, philosophical problems about education would disappear. As Smith and Ennis (1961) stated: "Analysis is not a nostrum, not a therapy, and not a remedy for all our ills, problems, confusions and conflicts. However, it is an indispensable means to achieve clarity in our thinking . . ." (p. iv).

The charge that analytic philosophers of education were mistaken in holding that philosophy should stop speculating is rather vague. Some early analytic philosophers of education such as O'Connor, objected to the speculative mode because they believed it promised more than it could produce and was superficial. This does not mean they opposed all speculation or were disrespectful of *all* earlier theories. For example, according to McLellan and Komisar, "rational construction" was an essential feature of the analytic approach.[8] The same general approach is evident in Hirst (1967) and Frankena (1965).

The final criticism involved the relation between philosophy and practice. It attributed to analytic philosophers of education the view that conceptual analysis was not relevant to educational practice. This criticism is misdirected. It shows a focus on a selected number of writings and/or an overemphasis of certain aspects of the analytic position. Some analytic philosophers of education, Scheffler for one, did hold that in doing conceptual analysis one is directly concerned with intellectual difficulties. Such a statement taken on its own suggests that Scheffler propounded an extreme position. This vision is misleading because it ignores the context within which the statement occurs. Scheffler admitted an indirect relation between conceptual analysis and educational practice. In "Toward an Analytic Philosophy of Education" he explicitly stated that one application of the analytic approach "consists of the direct analysis of concepts related to the practice of education"[9] (1973, p. 15).

Analytic Philosophy of Education: 1964 to the Present

Notwithstanding these early criticisms, by the mid-1960s this "new mode" of doing philosophy had gradually become the predominant approach in philosophy of education. The most prominent

and influential figure in philosophy of education from the second half of the 1960s through the 1970s has been R.S. Peters. Peters was trained in the analytic tradition and became interested in philosophy of education in the late 50s. His earlier work included three books: Hobbes (1954), The Concept of Motivation (1959) and Social Principles and the Democratic State (1959) (this last with S.I. Benn). In 1959 he published Authority, Responsibility and Education, his first work in philosophy of education. The most influential chapter in this book is "Must an Educator have an Aim?". The questions he raises, his style and the role he attributes to the philosopher of education indicate Peters' distaste for the way philosophy of education had been done until it came under the influence of analytic philosophy. Three aspects of his work can be described which establish Peters as a central figure in philosophy of education. His work has prompted many responses both for and against his positions and has inspired other philosophers to become interested in philosophy of education. This has contributed to the development of philosophy of education as a field. Peters held the position of Chairman of the Department of Philosophy of Education at the Institute of Education, University of London from 1963 to 1982. This has attracted many philosophy graduates to do work both in analytic and in normative philosophy of education. Although Peters has favored the analytic approach he had not disregarded the normative approach. This is crucial. It has helped to bridge the differences between the two approaches — differences which have seemed insoluble.

By 1970, analytic philosophy of education was established as the dominant way of doing philosophy of education. This was evident in the numerous books, anthologies and articles published by 1970, and in the work by 1970 both at annual conferences of the American Philosophy of Education Society and its British counterpart. Then in the early 70s analytic philosophy of education was once more under attack. Criticism came both from non-analytically oriented philosophers of education and from philosophers of education who had until this point been engaged in analytic work and who had agreed for some time with the position of early analytic philosophers of education. Some of the criticisms put forth by the latter group were very constructive and by the late 70s some analytic philosophers of education were to follow their suggestions.

In the Twenty-Seventh Annual General Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society (U.S.A.), 1971, Soltis, by then a prominent analytic philosopher of education, presented a paper entitled "Analysis and Anomalies in Philosophy of Education." One of the aims of the paper was to point out two anomalies that had arisen from the analytic approach, in his view. He made some suggestions aimed at counteracting these defects. The first anomaly Soltis described hinged on the results of the various analyses of the concept 'learning'. He felt that these analyses had not had the intended effect of being clearer about the concept 'learning'. While some philosophers of education had distinguished between various forms of learning, many of these distinctions had turned out not to be helpful in evolving a clearer picture of the concept. As Abraham Edel (1972) put it: "the anomaly is that analytic procedures intended to produce distinctions end up with distinctions that do not distinguish" (p.135). With respect to this matter Soltis (1970) believed that philosophers of education should consider theories in philosophy of mind as well as cooperate with "philosophically-minded social scientists or psychologists" (p.40). The second anomaly, which Soltis felt was external to the analytic paradigm, was that conceptual analysis had not been very helpful in solving questions about values or social issues in education. He suggested that philosophers of education should start serious investigation of theories of value. According to Soltis, analytic philosophers of education had not shown much interest in theories of value because the approach they took called for procedural neutrality and discouraged both prescription and value judgments.

Soltis was not proposing that analytic philosophy of education should no longer be done. He believed the approach had an important part to play since "the language of education is still full of analytic-type puzzles waiting to be solved" (1971, p. 35). However, he emphasized that analytic philosophers should be aware of the problems arising from applying strict analysis without keeping in mind the context from which central educational issues arose.

Soltis' position was very similar to that of both Frankena and Edel. Frankena encouraged the analytic approach but insisted that the philosopher should be considered a "complete man" and should not abandon normative concerns. Frankena expressed this position in various articles. He was most explicit in the introduction to *Philosophy of Education* (ed. 1966).

Edel (1972), discussing the development of analytic philosophy of education in "Analytic Philosophy of Education at the Crossroads," argued that the gap between analytic philosophy of education and normative philosophy of education must be bridged. He did not believe investigation of major concepts in philosophy of education should stop, but that other considerations such as ethical, educational issues which are still of primary importance in education should also be taken into account.

These issues persist. Edel's position is more forceful than that of either Soltis or Frankena. He suggested that the empirical, the normative and the socio-cultural dimension should be integrated in analysis of educational issues. For Edel, education in itself represents a large domain of experience. Analysis should keep in mind the lessons of this educational experience. Unless philosophers of education follow this broader, more moderate approach, Edel believes the lack of faith in the analytic approach to philosophy of education will increase.

Several questions arise: Did the work of analytic philosophers of education in the late 1960s and early 1970s analyze concepts in education without considering the other, i.e., normative, contextual dimensions? Did the analysis of these concepts ignore the consideration of major educational issues? Was this work still being done within the framework that the early analytic philosophers had encouraged?

I contend that in the mid-1960s, particularly with the work of Peters and his followers, an important shift took place in the way conceptual analysis in education was done. This new approach which is more moderate and closer to Soltis, Frankena and Edel, seems to be that which analytic philosophers of education have followed in the 1970s.[10]

My contention is that although during the last fifteen years philosophers of education have maintained their interest in the analytic approach their attitude and larger goals have changed. Edel and Soltis exemplify this change in attitude. In "Analytic Philosophy of Education at the Crossroads," Edel (1972) refers to Martin's elaboration of the distinction between 'knowing how' and 'knowing that' when applied to education. This, Edel takes to be an example of the proper way of doing analytic philosophy of education. In her analysis, Martin makes various distinctions to clarify the concept under consideration. But as Edel remarks, she does not produce unnecessary distinctions which cloud the issue. Edel (1972) remarks approvingly: "Martin the analyst profits from Martin the educator and the analytic products are steered precisely along those distinctions that are important to educational experience"[11] (p. 138).

Another example Edel mentions is a paper by Martin entitled "Basic Actions and Education" (OISE, 1970).[12] In this paper Martin analyses the concept of 'actions' with reference to educational

problems. In doing so she raises normative questions. She does not regard the analytic procedure as autonomous, but as related to normative issues in education.

As stated earlier, Peters' first major work in philosophy of education was *Authority, Responsibility and Education* (1959), a collection of essays written in an analytic framework. For example, in "Must an Educator have an Aim?" he criticized: (i) the view that education has aims or ends, and (ii) the view that education is a means to an end extrinsic to it. Peters' purpose was not to give detailed advice or to guide educational practice but to clarify the language of education. Peters felt that it was not the function of the philosopher of education to make practical educational judgments. He did not feel that the philosopher of education should not be concerned with moral or normative judgments, but rather that to be concerned with or to make such judgments and to seek a justification for them was different from giving detailed practical advice on the practice of education.

In the well-known paper "Education as Initiation" (1964, Inaugural Lecture) Peters' aim was to clarify the term 'education'. He believed that "to get clearer about the concept of 'education'. . . . is an urgent necessity at the present time" (1972, p. 88). Early analytic philosophers of education had been criticized for analyzing concepts for their own sake and out of context. Peters insisted that analysis had to be carried out with reference to context, to "the questions under discussion" (p. 89). While criticizing other established positions, he raised normative questions and defended a normative position. In the introduction to this paper he wrote:

> I often think that a conceptual scheme such as that employed by behaviorists is not simply intellectually mistaken; it is also morally dangerous (p. 88).

In the final section of the same paper he wrote

> 'Education' involves essentially processes which intentionally transmit what is *valuable* in an intelligible and *voluntary* manner and which create in the learner a desire to achieve it, this being seen to have its place along with other things in life (my emphasis, p. 102).

One could find other examples but these should suffice to show that Peters, while promoting conceptual analysis, was not uninterested in the normative dimension. This is a characteristic feature of Peters' work, signalling a departure from earlier analytic work in philosophy of education.

Some contemporary philosophers view Peters' position differently. R.J. Haack (1976) claims that in Peters' article "The Philosophy of Education" (1966) he holds that "it is not for the philosopher *qua* philosopher to make normative judgments, such as, 'corporal punishment should not be used in schools' and 'streaming is undesirable,' about educational practices and policies" (p. 161). Haack also claims that the article implies "there can be a neutral philosophy of education" (p. 162). If this were a proper interpretation of Peters one would have to admit him to have contradicted himself, since by 1966 he defended the view that education is an initiation into worthwhile activities, and in *Ethics and Education* (1966) he argued for the inclusion in education of certain worthwhile knowledge and normally acceptable activities.

Peters' position in the article Haack refers to is almost identical to that expressed by Hirst (1967). Peters was arguing here that philosophy of education should not be identified with "principles of education," that these principles depended on philosophical as well as psychological, sociological and historical considerations. He concluded, as did Hirst, that "it is important to

realize that the philosopher, *qua* philosopher, cannot formulate such principles . . . any more that he can formulate principles of medicine or politics'' (Peters, 1966, p. 63). Such principles depend on both value and empirical considerations, and the latter do not fall within the realm of the philosopher *qua* philosopher. In this context Peters (1966) said that the philosopher ''is not in a position *qua* philosopher, to pronounce on the truth of principles [i.e., educational principles]'' (p. 63). He did not say there was no place for such principles, that the philosopher of education should not make value-judgments or seek to justify them, that philosophy of education should be or could be value-neutral. In another section of the article Haack refers to, Peters encouraged philosophers of education to apply ethical principles to educational situations. The philosopher of education should address himself to such questions as: What are educationally worthwhile activities? Why should certain subjects and methods be included in the curriculum? How are certain educational activities to be justified? What do we mean by 'authority', 'discipline', 'punishment', 'autonomy', 'liberty', and 'respect for persons' in the educational context? How are these terms to be justified? He added: ''I myself, in my *Ethics and Education* have tried at least to provide signposts for more rigorous discussion in this sadly neglected area of the philosophy of education'' (Peters, 1966, p. 73). While this area might have been neglected due to the emphasis on value-neutrality in some early analytic philosophy of education, by the mid-1960s, the issue of value neutrality had been scrutinized, and its primacy abandoned.

This new trend in analytic philosophy was well established by the mid-1970s and is the dominant approach to analytic philosophy of education today. While philosophers of education are still interested in analyzing concepts in education since (i) certain concepts have not yet been fully investigated and (ii) certain concepts are still being misused, this analysis is no longer done out of context or in a neutral manner. Once analysis is carried out a certain position or theory is established and/or defended in the work of analytic philosophers. In the introduction to *The Philosophy of Education* (ed., Peters, 1973) Peters writes:

> Most of the articles in the collection present a point of view. They are not just a neutral map of the possible contours of concepts. This is as it should be; for what is the point of conceptual analysis unless it is connected with further questions that require answers. And can analysis be neutral? Is it separable from arguable assumptions and deep-seated presuppositions? (p. 4).

To establish my claim with regard to this shift in analytic philosophy of education I have referred to the work of Martin and Peters. Examples are also found in the work of Hirst, R.F. Dearden and Robin Barrow.[13]

Conclusion

Analytic philosophy of education is still criticized, at times rather harshly, despite this shift. Most, if not all, of the criticisms are echoes of criticism aimed at the early work. The work of later philosophers is treated as if it were identical to the work in the 1950s and early 1960s. Among others, R. Pratte (1980) adduces the following characteristics of ''analysis'': (a) it fosters ''decontextualization of the spoken or written word.'' This, he says, promotes ''neutrality rather than, say, struggle against the 'errors' of opposing views . . . . it [analysis] is an approach lacking in reflexivity'' (p.9); (b) it strongly opposes ''speculative or metaphysical philosophy of education as well as denying it a normative dimension'' (p. 9); (c) it treats philosophy of education ''as an endeavor to dissolve a set of educational problems through an analysis of language'' (p. 10).

From what I have shown of the development of analytic philosophy of education, it is clear that these characteristics are not an adequate representation of the work of analytic philosophers of education in the last fifteen years. This is crucial since analytic philosophers are most often criticized on precisely these grounds. Analytic philosophers of education in the last fifteen years, have never maintained that analysis has a therapeutic function. All they claim is that by getting clearer about certain concepts we will be in a better position to adequately tackle education issues.

But it is historically untrue to say that analytic philosophers have had no interest in normative philosophy of education. Peters, a most prominent philosopher of education, has raised and discussed normative issues in philosophy of education for twenty years. Commenting on Peters' work, Dearden (1982) remarks: "Far from just recording 'uses', he articulated a comprehensive ethical and social philosophical position and extensively worked out its educational implications" (pp. 61-62). It is also false that recent work in analytic philosophy of education fosters neutrality.

The recent criticism of analytic philosophy of education is outdated. This criticism focuses on a trend in analytic philosophy of education which no longer exists. It does not recognize that analytic philosophers have reflected on the early work, realized certain mistakes and broadened their approach to analysis. As George F. Kneller (1984) has observed:

> During the last decade . . . analysts have become less obsessed with ordinary language and readier to engage in moral and social criticism. Some have begun to evaluate education institutions and recommend reforms. They are tackling such controversial issues as the right to equal education, the rights of children, affirmative action, and reverse discrimination. They are speaking out on such practical problems as desegregation, moral education, curriculum choice, and teaching as a profession (pp. 25-26).

NOTES

[1] The synthetic-synoptic dimension, which Frankena (1956, p. 94) calls the synthetic-speculative approach seeks to establish a world-view (including the conception of a human being and the place of this conception in a world-view). The second dimension or normative approach, deals with value judgments, i.e., judgments about what is worthwhile and justifications of these judgments. From these, recommendations about what is worthwhile in education are derived.

[2] It is important to note that these criticisms were not directed against all traditional philosophers of education.

[3] Scheffler was fully aware that interest in clarification and analysis was not new to philosophy. Three features distinguished the analytic mode from others according to Scheffler: 1) A rigorous approach (following "the example of the sciences"), 2) An objective stance, 3) The use of symbolic logic. As Bernard Williams and Alan Montefiore note in *British Analytic Philosophy* (1966), analytic philosophy is distinguished by its mode of discussion, ". . . certain styles and methods of thought, certain types of questions and certain sets of terms and ideas of discussing them . . ." (p. 2). There was no common doctrine that analytic philosophers wanted to defend, their aim was "critical precision." What unified them was their desire for conceptual clarity and their agreement (generally) on method.

[4] Such as I. Scheffler, (Ed.), *Philosophy and Education* (1958) and B.O. Smith, and R.H. Ennis (eds.), *Language and Concepts in Education* (1961).

[5] The two main critics of analytic philosophy of education at this time were J.P. Strain (1964) and H.S. Broudy (1964).

[6] As R. E. Mason (1961) put it, "they place the ethical outside the domain of intellectual method . . . Moral judgments as such, they seem to hold, are amenable to critical treatment" (p. 50).

[7] A similar point was made by McLellan and Komisar in the introduction to the second edition of Hardie's *Truth and Fallacy in Educational Theory* (1962). After mentioning various ways "analysis" could help education, they wrote that "many of these services are patently prescriptive," and that "analysis has a place in guiding and goading educational changes" (p. xiii). In the preface to *Language and Concepts in Education*, Smith and Ennis (1961, p. v) took a similar approach.

[8] According to McLellan and Komisar, "Rational construction" consisted of (i) "abstracting essential elements from some specific intellectual activity", (ii) establishing relations among these elements which resulted in a model or scheme, and (iii) applying this schema as a guide to certain activities. Two examples of rational reconstruction they offered are: 1) Jane R. Martin's attempt to elucidate the concept "Explanation" and, 2) Chapter Four — "The Basis of Any Educational Theory" — of Hardie's *Truth and Fallacy in Educational Theory* (Preface to American edition of C.F. Hardie's *Truth and Fallacy in Educational Theory*, 1962).

[9] In the Introduction to *Philosophical Analysis and Education* (1965), Archambault maintained that the role of philosophy of education was not to solve immediate practical problems. This did not mean the philosopher of education had no interest in these problems. Archambault reminded us that most theoretical-educational studies were inspired by practical issues. He was aware of immediate educational problems and believed that "analysis and clarifications that emerge from the philosophical investigation of central educational issues must necessarily affect and inform educational decisions" (pp. 8-9).

[10] A similar shift in the method and aim of analysis occurred in mainstream philosophy at almost the same time. Just as the approach taken by ordinary language philosophers in the 50s and early 60s was different from that of the logical positivists, so the approach of philosophers such as Bernard Williams, Nozick and Rawls was different from that of ordinary language philosophers. The dictum that "conceptual analysis leaves everything as it is" does not apply to these philosophers. While they still adopt an analytic approach, *these* philosophers are interested in defending substantial positions. They are interested in analysing, clarifying *and* defending positions (ethical, political, etc.).

[11] Martin discusses this distinction and its application to education in "On the Reduction of 'Knowing That' to 'Knowing How'" in B.O. Smith and R.H. Ennis (1961, pp. 59-71).

[12] This paper is now published in *Educational Theory*, Vol. 24, No. 1, 1974.

[13] P.H. Hirst, Professor of Education at Cambridge, is one of the prominent English philosophers of education who in the early 1960s favoured the analytic approach. In "Philosophy and Curriculum Planning" (Hirst, 1974, pp. 1-15) Hirst stated that one of the primary roles of philosophy was the investigation of central terms and expressions to point to the logical relations between terms and the presuppositions they involve. He was aware that too much emphasis on analysis might be detrimental (See, Hirst, 1968, p. 40) and was careful not to commit this error in his own work. Hirst's work usually starts with investigation of a concept and proceeds to explain and defend a particular position. In one of his earliest (and most influential) papers, "Liberal Education and the Nature of Knowledge" (originally published in 1965 but included in Hirst, 1974, pp. 30-53) he began with an analysis of the concept of 'liberal education' and went on to defend the position that one can distinguish between various forms of knowledge and that certain forms of knowledge should be reflected in *all* curricula. This theme is also the focus of both "Realms of Meaning and Forms of Knowledge" and "The Forms of Knowledge Re-visited". (In Hirst, 1974, pp. 54-68 and 84-100). Hirst has also investigated such key concepts in curriculum theory as 'objectives' and 'curriculum integration'. Here he raised central questions pertinent to curriculum theory, and then offered his own position.

R.F. Dearden, Professor of Education at the University of Birmingham since 1979, was one of the first philosophers of education in England whose work followed that of Peters. Dearden was principally interested in philosophical problems in primary education. In his book on the subject, *Problems in Primary Education* (1973), he analysed such concepts as 'aims', 'objectives', 'teaching' and 'learning'. The result of these analyses he applied to such problems in primary education as that of who should determine aims, integration, streaming, and competition. That Dearden is following the newer, less rigid approach to analytic philosophy of education is particularly evident in one of his later articles "Controversial Issues and the Curriculum" (1981). His aim in this article was to show that with regard to what to include in a curriculum the attitude deriving from a logical positivist view is not tenable. This approach, he feels, would exclude what is 'controversial' and points out implications it has for the curriculum. He then proceeds to defend the view

that is is wrong to insist on 'procedural neutrality', and that the 'controversial' must be included in the content of the curriculum. This approach is also found in his book *Theory and Practice in Education* (1984).

Robin Barrow, formerly Reader in philosophy of education at Leicester, and currently Professor at Simon Fraser University, British Columbia, has published on moral philosophy and education, the history of educational thought, and philosophical problems related to the content of the curriculum. In the opening pages of *Introduction to Philosophy of Education* (Robin Barrow and R.G. Woods, 1975) we read: "Readers must not . . . . be surprised to find that we engage in a certain amount of linguistic analysis in this book" (p. 4). In *Common Sense and the Curriculum* (1976) Barrow admits that "one of the concerns of philosophy is with clarity and coherence of argument, with specific reference to the precise meaning of concepts which, if left unexamined, serve to obscure argument or, perhaps, carry it unwarrantably as a result of their emotive overtones" (pp. 19-20). That Barrow is interested in conceptual analysis in education is clear. In *Common Sense and the Curriculum* one of his aims is to clarify what we mean by 'worthwhileness' in an educational context, (specifically, with reference to the curriculum). He also examines the related concept of 'intrinsic value'. Barrow criticizes the conception of worthwhileness found in the work of Peters, J.P. White and other philosophers of education. He offers his own interpretation and applies it to the issue of justifying the curriculum, suggesting a content and a modified utilitarian justification. This approach — the analysis of a concept(s) and the application of the result(s) to a practical problem is applied once more in Barrow's book *Happiness and Schooling* (1980). First he discusses the notion of 'happiness', then he examines how happiness relates to the needs and aims of education, and finally he makes some practical suggestions as to how happiness can be achieved in education. The same approach is found in his book *The Philosophy of Schooling* (1981).

For other examples see: William Hare, *Open-Mindedness and Education*, (1979), *Controversies in Teaching* (1985) and *In Defence of Open-mindedness* (1985); J.P. White, *Towards a Compulsory Curriculum*, (1973); Pat White, "Education, Democracy, and the Public Interest," in *The Philosophy of Education*, (1973) Ed., R.S. Peters, pp. 217-238; Mary Warnock, *Schools of Thought*, (1977) (In the Introduction to this book M. Warnock points out some weaknesses of analytic philosophy of education, however, some parts of this book, for example, the treatment of the concept of "equality" in Chapter 2, "Equality as a Curriculum Aim," are clear examples of the most recent mode of doing analytic philosophy of education); Kenneth A. Strike, *Liberty and Learning* (1982); John Kleinig, *Philosophical Issues in Education* (1982).

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