

given expression. Reading aloud is of especial value here. As for the encouragement of the higher emotions, this is seen in terms of the transforming of concern for self into concern for transcendent objects progressively more removed from the self. (The moralist's position is in agreement here.) This is particularly difficult for adolescents because self-centredness is ascendent in their peer group and encouraged by commercial pressures. A sense of community must also be developed, and this, for Dunlop, cannot be in the purely impersonal terms of contractual obligation but must include common feelings. The culmination of the education of emotion is emotional autonomy. This requires teaching the young that their worth is simply in what they are, not in their achievements; also they have a nature and an obligation to develop it. The temptation to deny feelings is to be resisted; ultimately, what is within is what counts.

Factors promoting such enlightenment include the presence of teachers who are themselves emotionally autonomous and not prone to inhibition. The succumbing of the school to management methods is a factor working against this enlightenment. Rituals and ceremonies lacking an instrumental purpose are sadly no longer understood or respected. On the matter of curriculum subjects, a disparaging word is offered on the social sciences for purporting to provide a scientific treatment of human affairs. Democratisation is also criticised for pandering to drives for power and social recognition.

As is usual for writers on the topic of emotion, Dunlop does not in his arguments address a strong position for reason against emotion, despite the fact that his position in favour of emotion is one he sees as in need of the substantial support he gives it. Apparently he thinks that it is among the general public that emotion is disparaged and suppression of feelings enjoined. To me it seems the opposite; all manner of fatuous, mewing nonsense is excused and even praised for being the expression of how someone feels. A reader informed of any hard rationalist position in the literature will find some of Dunlop's arguments question-begging: the fact that denial of one's feelings is denial of one's self (if, indeed, fact is what this is) is no commendation of emotion unless it is already agreed that all parts of the self, including feelings, are important. And if it were true that we do not reach the world in perception but only in feeling (a highly dubious proposition) then the thinker might choose to ignore the world. The claim that without feeling we are prisoners of a conceptual scheme and unable to see anything in a fresh light is not convincing and can be countered by arguments from Kant and Sartre. Lastly, the idea that what matters is what people are, not what they achieve, is at variance with the project to educate. People matter, not because of what they are inside, but because they can engage in impersonal activities, such as solving equations, and because their thoughts, words and deeds can be rational, as contrasted with understandable.

The writing is, from start to finish, of high quality. The chapter on the education of the emotions would be of particular value in the teaching of a course in the philosophy of education. It contains a clear statement of a point of view on a variety of curricular and institutional issues in schooling, and could be used to initiate a number of class discussions. The earlier parts of the book are philosophically competent and a pleasure to read, but sometimes difficult. This is perhaps a drawback, since the aim of books in this series is to provide competent philosophical treatment of topics relevant to students of education and accessible without prior philosophy. For a beginner, the book would be tough, and the earlier chapters are more involved than is needed for what follows. The relevance of the topic is first said to be that it connects with educational literature on the affective domain. This literature is barely spoken of. This is no error, since the bulk of it is, in any case, best left aside; and there is plenty else of relevance to teachers in the book. Finally, a most welcome feature of works in this series is a classified bibliography as guide to further study, and Dunlop's list is excellent.

Richard Barrett  
Concordia University

Bowers, C.A., *The Promise of Theory: Education and the Politics of Cultural Change*. New York: Longmans Inc., 1984, 116 pp., \$11.95 (U.S.).

Perhaps the most apt characterization of this book comes from the author himself — 'thinking against the grain.' Although this phrase is used for different purposes in a article published prior to the present work, it is suggestive of both the thrust of *The Promise of Theory* and some of the contradictions that surface from within it. 'Thinking against the grain' calls for a methodological commitment *and* a thorough search for substantive

content. C. A. Bowers, in *The Promise of Theory*, an elaboration of the 1982 Dewey Lectures, almost inverts Dewey's project in education by once again exploring the relationship between tradition and modernism. While Dewey, with his well-known essays on "What is Thinking?" laboured against the power of tradition, Bowers in his exploration of modernism asks us to think against the grain and thereby touch our roots in tradition.

Fundamentally, the book is a challenge to educators to transcend the ideology of modernism and its attendant relativizing tendencies — a call to reaffirm traditional continuities which give us the necessary analytical tools to unpack modern culture and avoid the pitfalls of a relativized, culturally destructive, individualism as basis for authority. In Bowers' view, the "modernizing mode of consciousness" avoids challenging the 19th Century tenets which have formed the conceptual basis of contemporary thought: (1) acceptance that change is normal, (2) refusal to accept limits, and (3) secularization of a world view.

As change became part of the natural attitude toward everyday life, a new attitude toward authority had to be formulated. Authority, as the collective pressure to preserve traditional patterns and beliefs, gave way to the idea that the individual could be the center of authority.

At issue, then, is whether or not our contemporary world view and the educational theory that has grown out of it give us the abilities necessary to understand the genesis of our common heritage (and sustain some communal fabric) and allow the individual freedom to understand critically the taken-for-granted elements that determine his or her relationship with culture. To invest authority solely in the individual has the potential to destroy our sense of community.

Specifically, I want to examine how the relativizing of the foundations of taken-for-granted beliefs lead to politicizing more areas of everyday life and to identify the ideas and values that contribute to this propensity of modern society.

Here Bowers really is beginning to refine the sociology of knowledge perspective and curriculum proposals that he began with *Cultural Literary for Freedom* in 1974. This is a much more academic presentation of these ideas with greater depth of analysis. There is also a new emphasis — the power of language in the socialization process of education and the presentation of the need for communicative competence (a term borrowed from Habermas). Bowers 'translates' Habermas' understanding of communicative competence as "the individual's ability to negotiate meanings and purposes instead of passively accepting the social realities defined by others." This is not unlike Dewey's recollection of Plato's statement "a slave is a person who executes the purposes of another." Of course, history (particularly in schools) is always defined by others — educators and students are called to exercise their understanding of the roots of their culture and to overcome them without developing an incipient and insidious sense of cultural nihilism. Therefore, the "politicizing" of more areas of our everyday experience that Bowers suggests is taking place, provokes us to reconsider language with its culturally embedded meaning and to understand how it forms a fundamental part of the socialization process in schools. John Berger, in his book, *Ways of Seeing*, develops a similar argument,

The art of the past no longer exists as it once did. Its authority is lost. In its place there is a language of images. What matters now is who uses that language for what purpose . . . A people or a class which is cut off from its own past is far less free to choose and to act as a people or class than one that has been able to situate itself in history. That is why — and this is the only reason why — the entire art of the past has now become a political issue.

But, before presenting the theoretical framework which would lead to communicative competence, Bowers renders criticism of contemporary educational theorists. He suggests that the dominant school — the liberal-technocrats, as well as the romantics and the neo-Marxists — has failed to comprehend the ideology of modernism that underpins their theory and practice. All have accepted the conventional wisdom that schools are fundamentally conservative institutions. The liberal-technocrats, with their rationalization of procedures and emphasis on abstract thought, work within the metaphor of modern technocracy and promote its "change is progress" ideology. The romantics, often viewed as an alternative to the mainstream, have maintained

the view that no body of knowledge possessed inherent authority or could be judged more worthy than any other body of knowledge. Before the tribunal of the autonomous student all forms of knowledge and artistic expression existed at the same level of banality until the student's choice invested it with significance.

The neo-Marxists have also accepted a "change as progress" epistemology — the result, a formula-like

reverence for resistance that will liberate the individual and thereby promote socialist social progress. It seems remarkable to suggest that the neo-Marxists have lost touch with the importance of history. Bowers contends that the relativizing tendencies of modernism invests individuals or groups who have the greatest skill in using and manipulating language with the power to determine how others will view reality.

The tension and inherent contradictions between the individual and society remain; the educators' project is to ensure that the individual develops communicative competence. "But in order to exercise communicative competence the individual must possess a knowledge of the culture that is being renegotiated." In a sense, this resurrects tradition as a radical force and suggests a conservative function for the schools.

The main substance of this book builds from the sociology of knowledge framework with its associated socialization theory. Bowers recognizes the dual potential of socialization — that it is both binding and potentially liberating (granting the concept of intentionality in human consciousness). The theoretical foundations for communicative competence are presented in the form of five major propositions about the nature of consciousness, communication, and our natural attitude, among others. Bowers makes an important distinction based in the power of language — the distinction between the "functional knowledge of culture" and the "symbolic knowledge of culture." Here we get some connection with one of Dewey's central concepts.

When learning was based on what teachers interpreted to be the 'experience' of the student there was a general lack of understanding of the relationship between culture (as reflected in the curriculum), language (the communication process going on in the classroom), and consciousness (the student's conceptual framework). Because the metaphor of 'experience' lacked explanatory power to illuminate the teacher's influence on the role of language in reproducing the collective culture in the consciousness of the student, there was a shift in educational thought to consider 'behaviour' as the primary indicator of learning.

What does the teacher need to know, given this relationship between culture, language and consciousness? With this in mind, Bowers explores seven questions about the nature of curriculum knowledge. In essence, these questions are the integration of a number of sociologists; notably, Berger and Luckmann, Gouldner, Bernstein and Habermas. Recognizing that knowledge is not neutral and, joining this concept with that of the progressive de-skilling of the teacher, he recommends that the traditional craft of the teacher can be "rescued and strengthened by understanding the connection between the content areas of the curriculum and how it will be understood by the student."

For many educators, Bowers' commitment to content (curricular knowledge) and its linguistic and epistemological underpinnings will be perceived as neglect of the problem of *how to teach!* The focus of teacher competency seems so widely accepted as a problem of methodology or technique that a reaffirmation of the relationship between students and knowledge denies the interventionist approach where the focus is *on what teachers will do to students*. To some, the chapter entitled, "A Sociology of Knowledge Approach to Curriculum Development" will provide the necessary connection. This chapter is a reiteration and tightening of the proposals of his earlier, *Cultural Literacy for Freedom*. With the foregoing theoretical implications for culture, language and consciousness the curriculum development approach described integrates "the student's phenomenological culture;" an "historical perspective to de-objectify knowledge;" and "a cross-cultural perspective." These three moments in development of curriculum demand recognition of a dialectical relationship between the student's consciousness and the knowledge forms of the culture. Again, we wonder what the teacher needs to know to attempt this approach to curriculum. This question is partly addressed in his concluding chapter.

Bowers initiates a self-critical approach to his sociology of knowledge theory and curriculum proposals in the final chapter. The critical reflections deal with the problems of relativism, social inequality, the limited ability of teachers and the intolerance of pluralistic communities. It is also of interest because it explores the difficulty students of education have had in working within the sociology of knowledge framework -particularly given the orthodoxy of behaviourism in so many faculties of education. It is an intellectual challenge to teachers to transcend the technical problem of merely transmitting to students whatever seems to stand for cultural content in any given historical period. Bowers, having established the political nature of the educational process suggests ways we might overcome travelling through the dislocations that modern life has brought. Dewey certainly played a crucial part in politicizing the school environment as well as relativizing the nature of knowledge. But, he also noted that the choice between traditionalism and progressivism was not an either/or proposition.

In a sense, Bowers' *The Promise of Theory*, is a call to reaffirm history, both in culture and in our educational processes. At times, one wonders what traditions he affirms. The book could certainly use more concrete

examples to help establish the vision that is projected. There's almost an existential angst or mistrust that surfaces when attempting to explore the realities of modernity. The mistrust, at times, seems directed at those classical traditions which have weathered the test of time but seem to be losing authenticity and power in the modern arena of thought and practice. The behaviourist suggests a change of circumstances and our responses to them; Bowers suggests a change of relationship to our symbolic worlds or, at least, a recognition of them. The difficulty of this position is that it implicates us intellectually, politically and psychologically. It renews the educator's purposes — to help students recognize their place *in* history and to examine their genesis throughout it in a much more demanding sense than our modern modes of consciousness command. In a sense, today, "thinking against the grain" may mean touching wood again to recognize its metaphorical impact. But, as Northrop Frye noted in *The Educated Imagination* "there are no courses in remedial metaphor." C. A. Bowers', *The Promise of Theory*, urges us to explore the liberating possibilities of such a project.

Gordon A. Bailey  
University of Victoria

Hirst, Paul, H. (Ed.), *Educational Theory and Its Foundation Disciplines*. Routledge: Kegan, Paul, Boston & London, 1983, 145 pp., \$11.50 (paper).

If one were to ask the resident experts in Britain what was happening there in the Foundation disciplines of education and hope for a concise and summary reply, one could not do better than read Hirst's collection. In the opening chapter Hirst provides his own statement on the progress of British scholarship with regard to the relationship between theory and practice. The other four contributors — Richard Peters, Brian Simon, John Nisbet and Brian Davies — each present a chapter reviewing the state of the art in their particular disciplines. The reader is treated to brief and personal analyses of the philosophy, history, psychology and sociology of education, with both the strengths and shortfalls that accompany brief and personal statements. But none were intended to be exhaustive and complete. Rather, they were gathered together to provide a general but scholarly glimpse. All but one of the papers published in this volume originated as public lectures at the University of Cambridge.

In Chapter One, Paul Hirst carries on his continuing debate with D. J. O'Connor with his argument that we must develop a kind of educational theory that is pertinent to the educational enterprise itself. He speculates that this kind of educational theory will involve not only the sciences, including the social sciences, but also beliefs and values. This does lead educational theory into the confusion surrounding values and the uncertainty of practical reasoning but so it must. That is the nature of the educational enterprise.

In the search for educational theory which will develop rational principles for educational practice we must draw upon theoretical knowledge from educational psychology and the sociology of education, as well as from history and philosophy. As a consequence educational theory is a composite, but a coherent composite, with its unity provided by a focus on a consistent set of principles for educational practice. Hirst's contention is that there are practical policy questions facing educators and there is both the need for, and the possibility of, developing principles of educational theory which enlighten these questions of practical policy. In this context he argues that the disciplines provide the reasons for the principles and, as such, the disciplines are "crucial for the justification for what is claimed in the theory" (p. 6). But the progression from the disciplines to the principles to particular educational activities is not a simple one and Hirst tackles the critics of this relationship for ignoring its very complexity. He does recognize John Wilson's criticism of his approach as only a methodology for educational theory, but claims he was proposing an "outline of the logic of the theory" (p. 9) and not a methodology. His paper carries this concern for the nature of educational principles and their justification beyond a simple appeal to the disciplines and into a "complex pragmatic process that uses its own appropriate practical discourse" (p. 26). Hirst sees this new territory as somewhat uncertain but outlines how it might be approached. He concludes his quest for the appropriate relationship between theory and practice with the speculation that practice may indeed precede theory and if that is the case then what is needed is much more "self-critical, reflective and reconstructive analysis and judgment by . . . practitioners . . . using the disciplines to maximum degree" (p. 28). Although he presents a persuasive appeal for this shift to a practitioner's locus in order to make more explicit the structures underlying practical, pre-theoretical know-how, he nevertheless envisions practitioners returning to