

Two Liberal Trajectories of Civic Education: The Political and Educational Thought of Hobbes and Winstanley

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The moment of the English Civil war marks a historical turning point toward the establishment of modern liberal democratic institutions. The authors argue that at this juncture there were two political and educational alternatives offered by Thomas Hobbes and Gerrard Winstanley respectively, which constitute two liberal trajectories. The Hobbesian trajectory is based upon negative liberty and state sovereignty which renders an educational approach in comparative tension between the demands of liberty and those of conformity. The Winstanley trajectory is premised upon positive liberty and a communitarian and democratic notion of sovereignty which renders an educational approach devoted to the cultivation of independent civic judgement grounded in community life. The authors argue that while both trajectories have flaws Winstanley's thought is pregnant with greater democratic possibility.

Le moment de la guerre civile anglaise a marqué un point tournant historique vers l'établissement d'institutions modernes, libérales et démocratiques. Dans cet article, nous soutenons qu'à ce moment, il y avait deux alternatives politiques et éducationnelles présentées respectivement par Thomas Hobbes et Gerrard Winstanley et que ces alternatives constituaient deux trajectoires libérales. La trajectoire de Hobbes est basée sur une liberté négative et sur la souveraineté de l'état; à ce moment, une approche éducationnelle crée une tension entre les demandes de la liberté et de la conformité. Par contre, la trajectoire de Winstanley est basée sur la liberté positive et sur la notion de souveraineté communautaire et démocratique; à ce moment, une approche éducationnelle facilite l'émergence d'un jugement civique indépendant issu de la vie en commun. Les auteurs montrent que les deux trajectoires ont des limites mais que celle de Winstanley est davantage créatrice d'une plus grande démocratie.

Most scholars agree that there are "moments" in history when circumstances fall together in such a way as to present opportunities for fundamental, far-reaching change. Sometimes such change occurs in directions that seem negative from a contemporary vantage point. The French revolution represents a historical moment infused with possibilities, but few today regard the autocratic regime that emerged as a positive step for humankind. Other moments, such as the populist movement in the United States in the 1890s, fail to bring about any obvious changes (Goodwyn, 1976). There is considerable scholarly agreement, however, that the moment of the English civil war in the middle of the 17th century was the fertile ground from which modern forms of liberal democracy emerged. In fact most historians would agree that the English revolution served indisputably as a catalyst for the rediscovery of classical liberal notions concerning humans and their social institutions.

The purpose of this essay is to analyze the political and educational thought of two careful observers, Thomas Hobbes and Gerrard Winstanley, who stood on the periphery of those tumultuous decades in England, 1640-1660. The English civil war and its aftermath mark the transition from feudalism to liberalism and with it the emergence of a fully developed concept of sovereignty, the emergence of government by consent (Hinsley, 1986). It will be argued that Hobbes and Winstanley offer two different trajectories of liberalism. Hobbes and Winstanley share its basic tenets: basic concern with liberty, advocacy of natural rights, and a theory of government based upon the consent of the people. They disagree, however, concerning the nature of liberty: Hobbes adheres to a *negative* conception of liberty whereas Winstanley posits a *positive* conception. They also disagree concerning the nature of consent, resulting in different conceptions of sovereignty. Hinsley (1986) demonstrates that sovereignty is best defined as the existence of final and absolute authority within the political community, wherein no higher authority exists above the given community. The emergence of sovereignty in the 17th century constitutes a fundamental redefinition of political power in that it shifted ultimate authority away from particular individuals with preordained claims to legitimacy (e.g., the Divine Right of Kings) to the people as a whole, thereby rendering government by *consent* the only form of legitimate

political power. However, within the framework of consensual government there are fundamental differences between these theorists regarding the nature of sovereignty. As we will see, Hobbes maintains that the people should transfer complete power to the state (state sovereignty), whereas Winstanley believes that ultimate authority should reside with the people (popular sovereignty).

These differences concerning liberty and sovereignty constitute different liberal trajectories which have profound implications not only for politics but for educational theory and practice as well. As Aristotle (1962) pointed out in the *Politics*, civic education is relative to particular political "constitutions" (*politeia*), the particular political morality inherent in the culture of various polities. Thus, while simultaneously adhering to the basic tenets of liberalism, different liberal trajectories will result in different conceptions of civic education. It will be argued that the Hobbesian trajectory, based upon negative liberty and state sovereignty, yields, on the one hand, a civic education primarily based upon the transmission of, and conformity to, official state doctrine; on the other hand, what follows simultaneously from Hobbes's liberal ideals is an education devoted to critical literacy; these two imperatives lead Hobbes into a liberty/conformity paradox. The Winstanleyan trajectory, based upon positive liberty and popular sovereignty, yields a civic education devoted to the cultivation of individual civic judgment and rationality. The adequacy of each of these trajectories will be evaluated below and it will be argued that each has significant problems, although the Winstanleyan trajectory centered in positive liberty does provide at least a foundation for a democratic conception of politics and civic education.

The Historical Setting

The forces which led up to the English Civil War were numerous; however, the rise of both a merchant middle-class and an underclass of "masterless" men were the primary forces which undercut the hegemony of the feudal order. Both of these classes sought to establish a new set of political and economic freedoms which would provide a foundation for a free market economy and independence from servitude.

The reaction of King Charles and the royalists to these freedoms led to civil war, and the exigencies of this war produced undreamed of results. Indeed, Hill (1972) refers to this episode as the moment when "the world turned upside down." Temporarily empowered by various liberties, including freedom of the press, a large range of political, economic, and religious issues were widely read and discussed for the first time. Antimonarchialism and anticlericalism abounded, especially in the ranks of masterless men. There was a burning sense of freedom moving about the country and as a result, as Hill (1972) put it, the late 1640s were "a terrifying time for the men of property" (p. 109).

While many Members of Parliament (MPs) from the new industrial districts were in favor of sweeping reforms, a combination of wealthy merchants and the few reform-minded landed aristocrats held Parliament to a moderate line. Still, Charles was forced to submit to many distasteful reforms passed by the Long Parliament in 1641-1642. When he had enough he opted for a military solution; Parliament responded by creating an army to counter Charles. With the power to conscript peasants, the King was able to keep a royal army in the field until 1648. Throughout this period, however, there was a great deal of communication between the King and parliament. Most MPs, at least until 1647, felt that a compromise could be reached and that the monarch would eventually be reestablished.

By the fall of 1644 it had become apparent that Parliament needed a stronger, more disciplined fighting force (Kishlansky, 1979; Morrill, 1990). It responded by levying taxes to support the creation of the New Model Army. Thomas Fairfax and Oliver Cromwell were primarily responsible for the development of this harshly disciplined and yet surprisingly democratic institution. All regiments, even those belonging to Cromwell and Fairfax, took their turn in undesirable assignments. Cromwell appointed officers by merit rather than by birth and, as a result, commoners ascended to high positions. It quickly became a very professional army and tipped the scales in favor of Parliament in the English civil war. Yet the rank and file soldiers quickly grew suspicious of the Presbyterians in Parliament who constantly advocated moderation and compromise with the King.

The months of close association coupled with the pamphlets that blossomed in numbers due to a new freedom of the press led to a great deal of dialogue in the New Model ranks concerning civil, political, religious, and economic freedom. The various divisions of this army elected "agitators" who frequently spoke of such things as the break up of landed estates; short, fixed terms for MPs; and limiting the income of noblemen to 2,000 pounds annually. Parliament watched the developments within the New Model Army with increasing alarm. As Lindsay (1954) put it, "the true-blue Presbyterians were increasingly horrified whenever they got a glimpse of the vital discussions going on in the ranks" (pp. 143-144). After the New Model victory at Naseby in 1645 Charles ceased to be a potent military threat. The battle then, in many ways, became a struggle for power between the Independents of the New Model Army and the Presbyterians in Parliament. Charles steadied himself on a conciliatory course hoping the Independents and Presbyterians would destroy each other.

Cromwell and the army entered London in 1647 and dismissed 11 members of Parliament. After the purge, the army became the most effective power in the land. Charles was brought to trial for treason in January, 1649 and was beheaded. Cromwell became the "Lord Protector" of the new English Free State. A critical moment in history had arrived.

As alluded to in the introduction, the two radical observers of interest discussed in this essay represent alternative visions of a kind of liberalism that might appeal to those in competition for political power in the new state, in turn launching political and educational theory along two different liberal trajectories.

Thomas Hobbes

Thomas Hobbes was born in 1588. He studied at Oxford in the first years of the 17th century and later became a tutor for an aristocratic family. This gave him the opportunity to travel and study broadly. He eventually carved out a career for himself as a classical scholar and became acquainted with Francis Bacon during the 1620s. While traveling through

Europe he met Galileo and this acquaintanceship seemingly led to Hobbes's desire to come to understand the dynamics of human society scientifically, quite apart from the theological suppositions of scholasticism.

Hobbes's (1682/1990) political project has a twofold purpose: to establish a political science "built around sure and clear principles" (p. 159), principles which were not philosophically idealistic but grounded in empirical reality; and to establish a commonwealth conducive to peace and commodious living. Hobbes's political science is fundamentally anthropological. It is premised on a conception of human nature stripped of philosophical idealism. The classical Greek notion of politics devoted to the cultivation of human virtue is rejected by Hobbes in favor of a politics grounded in a realistic conception of human nature. Human nature is composed, for Hobbes, of a number of impulses, three of which, fear of violent death, desire for power, and a desire for felicity, form the core of our nature. On the one hand, we possess a natural desire for felicity, for peace and commodious living. This desire is given impetus by our fear of a violent death. On the other hand, we are simultaneously driven by a "perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death" (Hobbes, 1651/1962, p. 80). This is the "general inclination of all mankind" (p. 80). This desire for power is not based simply upon a desire to increase our pleasure per se, but on our desire for peace and fear of violent death; only by increasing one's power over others can one hope to maintain one's state of felicity. It is at base the fear of violent death and the concomitant desire for peace that fuels the flame of power. Hobbes (1651/1962) points out, however, that ultimately these desires are in conflict, for the desire for power will ultimately undermine peace: These conflicting desires lead to a war of all against all, rendering life "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short" (p. 100). Thus, if we are left to our own devices, in a state of nature, we will face endless civil war and a violent death.

Although by nature we are asocial and apolitical, the above conflict will ultimately lead us to the establishment of civil government. The establishment of a political society out of our inherently apolitical state of nature must, however, in keeping with Hobbes's anthropological

perspective, be based upon rights emanating from our basic desires and fears. Hobbes collapses the desires for peace and power and the fear of violent death into the right of self-preservation. According to Hobbes (1651/1962), one has a natural right to do or refrain from doing whatever one deems necessary for self-preservation. Hobbes maintains that self-preservation will, when viewed from the dictates of reason, compel men to enter into contracts with each other designed to guarantee civility. Rational beings, according to Hobbes, will be willing to divest their liberty, their claim to all things and unlimited power, in exchange for order and peace. This is the essence of the social contract.

If the social contract is to mean anything, however, we must keep our promises, obligations, and duties defined by the contract. Hobbes maintains that fidelity to contracts can only be reasonably assured when there is trust; when there is fear that the other party will not live up to the contract trust is undermined and with it the binding effect of the contract. In turn, given our desire for power and gain, Hobbes maintains that we will not live up to our contracts out of adherence to higher moral principles, but only out of fear of punishment. Therefore, in order to ensure fidelity to contracts a coercive power is needed, a sovereign, who is capable of wielding power in greater proportion than the individual, thereby ensuring fidelity. This is the Leviathan, the sovereign power which acts to uphold the social contract. Within the dictates of the contract the people are free to pursue their desires, but their freedom in this case is not unlimited; it is confined by the limiting covenants of the contract guarantee by the coercive power of the state. Here we have a conception of sovereignty wherein ultimate authority resides in the people but is transferred to the state via the social contract. The people in essence hand over power to the state in the interests of social order. Here we have negative liberty and state sovereignty with lexical priority to state sovereignty.

Although Hobbes stresses the fear of punishment to insure compliance to the social contract, the regulation of public opinion is also important to Hobbes. He is deeply afraid of the spread of seditious doctrine which could undermine the legitimacy of the sovereign. To this end he stated that "the power of the mighty hath no foundation but in the opinion and

belief of the people" (Hobbes, 1682/1990, p. 16). Thus, Hobbes was not only concerned with, to use Antonio Gramsci's phrase, "domination," but also with "hegemony", the construction of public belief and opinion (Femia, 1991). As Hobbes (1651/1962) states:

The actions of men proceed from their opinions; and in the well-governing of opinions, consisteth the well-governing of actions It belongeth therefore to him that hath the sovereign power, to be judge, or constitute all judges of opinions and doctrines, as a thing necessary to peace. (p. 137)

For Hobbes the central role of the sovereign is to enforce order and a primary element of that enforcement is the control of doctrine and opinion.

Although Hobbes is not concerned with the educational implications of his political theory and consequently says little about education, he does maintain that the universities, which constitute the central educational institutions of his society, are the fountainheads of civil and moral doctrine. It follows that if the universities are the fountains of opinion, and if opinion is central to the preservation of social order, then the Leviathan would assume control of these institutions, dictating the doctrines emanating from them. It follows in turn that education, publicly controlled by the sovereign, would essentially be devoted to the transference of official doctrine. Conformity would be the educational aim.

There is a paradox, here, however, in that the liberal in Hobbes believes that the people possess the natural right to break the contract with the sovereign if and when the sovereign tyrannizes over them (Hobbes, 1651/1962). The people retain a right to revolution. The capacity, however, to enact a revolution entails an ability to critique, and articulate dissent to, official doctrine. It entails critical literacy. From this perspective, education would be devoted to intellectual freedom and the cultivation of critical literacy. However, this purpose is diametrically at odds with the goal of conformity: Hence the paradox. This paradox follows logically from the combination of negative liberty and state sovereignty. Critical literacy is essential for preserving freedom from coercion, while, as discussed above, conformity is an inherent part of state

sovereignty as Hobbes conceives it. An alternative liberal trajectory was, however, offered by Gerrard Winstanley.

Gerrard Winstanley

Gerrard Winstanley was born in 1605 in Lancashire, the son of a cloth merchant. He finished studies at a local grammar school but was unable to attend a university. In 1630 he was apprenticed to Sarah Gater and seven years later he was admitted to the Merchant Taylors Company, a free citizen of London.

During the tumultuous first years of the 1640s Winstanley's business suffered from the prevailing economic instability. In 1643 he was forced to give up and move his family to Surrey where he stayed with friends and earned his keep as a cattle herder. His writing career spanned only four years, but during this time he distinguished himself as a leading social critic. In 1652 he published *The Law of Freedom* which, like Hobbes's *Leviathan*, was a blueprint for Oliver Cromwell's consideration as Lord Protector of the new English republic. Winstanley is best known, however, for his role as England's leading "digger" or "true leveller." He earned this distinction during the spring and summer of 1649.

Five harvest failures between 1645 and 1650 combined with the exigencies of civil war rendered conditions in the English countryside most tenuous. Whereas many merchants profited from scarce goods farmers, in general, suffered throughout the decade. These conditions took their toll on England's country people and contributed to the atmosphere of instability and uncertainty across the land. Many poor people began to rebel. One contemporary observer noted that "the poor did gather together in troops of 10, 20, 30 in the Roades, and seized upon Corne as it was carrying to market, and divided it among themselves before the owners faces telling them that they could not starve" (Wolfe, 1944, p. 71). Winstanley and several of his followers took a more moderate course. A small group of masterless men met at St. George's Hill in Surrey on an unenclosed commons. It was poor land, little used by the neighborhood,

and consequently Winstanley and company began digging the sod and planting beans, parsnips, and other staple crops.

Local landlords were incensed by the implications of what the diggers were doing. They called upon the Council of State to chase them away. Thomas Fairfax himself spoke with Winstanley but was not able to convince him to give up the venture. However, local landowners soon took matters into their own hands. They staged night raids, burning huts that served as temporary housing and severely beating several diggers who, pledged to nonviolence, did not resist. And they continually harassed the diggers with legal action. Winstanley, for example, was arrested and charged with trespassing on a couple of occasions. Several diggers spent time in jail on trumped-up charges because they refused to employ a lawyer in their defense. With their numbers reduced, the diggers suffered through more night raids resulting in more houses burned and crops destroyed until at last they removed to Cobham Heath a few miles away. There the legal and physical harassment continued until the experiment was abandoned in April 1650 (Petegorsky, 1945).

Winstanley was devastated by the failure of the digger movement. He dropped out of the public eye until he published *The Law of Freedom* in 1652, his last attempt to change England for the better. Winstanley had been a free citizen of London, a cloth merchant familiar with the Puritan theology of his peers. When he was forced to move to the country in 1643 he experienced another world. It was the world of poor country people and over the course of the 1640s Winstanley came to the conclusion that these people were not depraved "vulgar masses." They were not damnable by virtue of their character. Nevertheless they had internalized these views, according to Winstanley, as a result of the actions of others interested in the perpetuation of power.

To expose the psychological elements of oppression Winstanley wrote about the "Norman Yoke" as the scourge of British history. He wrote about the flaws in a theology that legitimized the election of a few through the damnation of many. Winstanley believed that if he could entice the poor of England to throw off the legacy of Normanism (which he often

referred to as "Kingly power") and the idea that their material poverty was an indication of their religious depravity, the poor might then, as they had in 1607, articulate a political agenda of their own. The concept of digger communities was designed with this end in mind.

Clearly the period in England between 1640 and 1660 was a historical moment ripe with possibility. The feudal order crumbled and the execution of Charles serves as symbolic evidence of this. The ascendancy of mercantile power in the state, as Hobbes ordained, opened up the world to a new economic order, yet it perpetuated, in Winstanley's (1965) view, the exercise of "Kingly power."

While this Kingly power reigned in one man called Charles, all sorts of people complained of oppression, both Gentry and Common people, because their lands, enclosures, and copyholds were entangled, and because their trades were destroyed by monopolizing patentees ... thereupon you called upon the poor common people to help you, and cast out oppression; and that top-bow is lopped off the tree of tyranny, and Kingly power in that one particular is cast out; but alas oppression is a great tree still, and keeps off the sun of freedom from the poor commons still. (p. 357)

Winstanley was not alone in this assessment. John Lilburne, disappointed by the failure of Cromwell to attend to the agenda of the constitutional levellers, published a scathing attack called *New Chains Discovered*. "Several former soldiers" of the New Model Army wrote and published *The Hunting of the Foxes* wherein they maintained that monarchy "had lost its name but not its nature, its form but not its power, they making themselves as absolute as ever the King in his reign, dignity, and supremacy" (cited in Petergorsky, 1945, p. 145). The Hobbesian conception of a state based upon the centralization of power was the ascendent liberal vision.

Yet there was another possibility. Another liberal vision was placed before the English people though it was soundly rejected by those who came to power after the civil war. This vision was for a democratic, community-oriented, agrarian society based on positive liberty and popular sovereignty. In turn, this society was premised on the inherent rationality of the common man cultivated through education.

Like Hobbes, Winstanley believed that reason allowed man the ability to live a life with attention to natural laws as a force suggesting principled human behavior. However, the principles of natural law did not emanate from self-preservation but from common preservation, cooperation in the order of nature that assures preservation of the commons. For Winstanley human nature was essentially social and ecological. True freedom was not conceived as the pursuit of self-interest free from coercive interference, but "true freedom lies in the free enjoyment of the earth" (Winstanley, 1965, p. 250). For Winstanley the possession of the land by a few impedes access to the means of labor for the many, and thus it impedes the commoners' capacity for self-determination. It is self-determination which constitutes freedom for Winstanley, a positive rather than a negative conception of liberty, and self-determination is in turn contingent upon land ownership, common preservation, and popular sovereignty.

While Hobbes prescribed education as a way to legitimate the presence of a sovereign and subordinate the people to it, Winstanley believed this function was already in place in 17th century England. Indeed, the "teachers" of feudal society were often chastised by Winstanley: "And hereupon the earth (which was made to be a common treasury of relief for all, both beasts and men) was hedged into enclosures by the teachers and rulers." He wrote further that "ruling and teaching power" dams up "the spirit of peace and liberty." Indeed, "landlords, teachers, and rulers," he contended, were "oppressors, murderers, and thieves" (Hill, 1972, p. 78). Most of Winstanley's antipathy for teachers in British society is due to the fact that the expansion of petty schools and grammar schools during the first half of the 17th century was accomplished under the auspices of the Anglican church. In 1603 an act was passed in Parliament which stated that "no person should keep a school or be a schoolmaster except in some public or free grammar school or in the house of a nonrecussant, unless licensed by the Archbishop, Bishop, or guardian of spiritualities of that diocese" (Vincent, 1950, p. 12). The penalty was 40 shillings a day for violation of this act. On the surface Winstanley's disdain for teachers is merely an expression of his anticlericalism. But the fact that he uses the term teachers rather than ministers indicates that he was not blind to the

hegemonic power of the educational enterprise, the very sort of psychological suasion that Hobbes delineated in his science of politics.

Winstanley was an advocate of educational reform and in this regard he was not alone. Comenius, for instance, was summoned by Parliament to visit England and report on the status of schools. Shortly after arriving he wrote home, "They are eagerly debating on the reforms of schools in the whole kingdom in a manner similar to which, as you know, my wishes tend, namely that all young people should be instructed, none neglected" (Young, 1932, p. 65). In fact, the idea of educating "the poor as well as the rich in every parish" spread rapidly in the wake of new freedoms in the 1640s. Samuel Harnar offered a bill before Parliament in 1642 that would have taxed large estates to support local schools. "The want of a schoolmaster in every parish," wrote Harnar, led to "the poorer sort of children playing in the streets the better part of the day; rather desiring to beg than to work" (Vincent, 1950, pp. 32, 37). Most British educational reformers in the first half of the 17th century, men like Harnar, William Dell, John Drury, William Petty, and Samuel Hartlib, were all faithful to Puritan ideology regarding schooling. The idle needed to be converted to industriousness. The poor needed guidance in God's word in order to marshal the inner discipline required for proper living. What is more, the value of literacy in an increasingly commercial world was already self-evident (Maynes, 1985). Winstanley, however, envisioned a liberal system of education imbued with more substantive, far-reaching goals. He saw education as a political institution that on the one hand had the potential to indoctrinate but on the other hand could help individuals acquire the skills and understandings necessary to be informed concerning political deliberation and to maintain a sort of democratic surveillance over policy makers, if not directly participate in deliberation. In order to infuse schools with the opportunity to define the parameters of a democratic society, Winstanley believed that schools needed to operate on a life-long basis. He suggested that one day a week be devoted not to the church, but to genuine intellectual exchange in a community forum.

Early schooling was to be for all children, male and female, and it was to be designed to provide the opportunity to study arts and languages.

While glimpses of Puritan ideology frequently emerge in Winstanley's thoughts about education, the more significant issues are abundantly clear. He recommended the study of history and languages as well as extensive discussion of current events in order to cultivate the capacity of a critical, civic judgement (Greaves, 1969).

Winstanley (1965) distinguished himself as perhaps the first opponent of curricular tracking. He maintained that

one sort of children shall not be trained up only to book learning and no other employment, called scholars, as they are in the government of monarchy; for then through idleness and exercised wit therein they spend their time to find out policies to advance themselves to be lords and masters above their laboring brethren. (p. 577)

To prevent this, Winstanley advocated a practical education and always stressed the convergence of theory and practice. Each child could choose between advanced study in one of five areas: husbandry (including agriculture, spinning, weaving, baking, rope and harness making), metallurgy, animal husbandry, silviculture (carpentry, shipbuilding, plowmaking, etc.), and natural sciences (astrology, astronomy, navigation, natural sciences). Small girls, while receiving instruction in reading, sewing, knitting, and spinning, would not have been offered the same opportunities as boys. Still, Winstanley advocated more education for girls than his peers.

Winstanley's educational prescriptions were designed to maximize the potential for positive human freedom by pulling citizens into, rather than away from, politics and political discussion. Education for Winstanley was thus a preparation for participation in public, political spaces wherein positive liberty would become a reality. As Arendt (1963) has demonstrated, self-determination is only meaningful when there are public forums for political deliberation. In the context of human association, wherein individuals influence each other in the course of their lives, self-determination is only real when collective deliberation can occur; if decisions that affect the individual's life are made collectively then,

although one is being determined in some sense by others, one is party to that determination, thereby preserving a significant degree of freedom. In turn, in order for collective deliberation to be a reality, popular sovereignty must exist. Education for the cultivation of civic judgement and deliberation is thus preparation for the exercise of both positive freedom *and* popular sovereignty. Further, in Winstanley's thought education is designed to point a way to human fulfillment through work performed well rather than through the accumulation of material goods. Thus, education for Winstanley is both political and pragmatic, blending an interconnection with the social and material world.

Discussion

Hobbes and Winstanley share common elements of liberalism: liberty, natural rights, and consensual government, while providing distinct trajectories of that liberal vision. The distinction centers on the differences between self and common preservation, negative and positive liberty, and state and popular sovereignty. On the one hand, Hobbes maintains that self-preservation, founded on the fear of violent death and the desire for felicity, dictates the formation of political authority in terms of state sovereignty based upon a social contract wherein sovereignty is exchanged for the protection of a limited negative liberty (i.e., protection of a zone of privacy from coercive interference by other individuals but not from interference of the state). On the other hand, Winstanley maintains that freedom consists in the common preservation of community and the earth, for such preservation enables each individual to exercise his or her natural right of self-determination in conjunction with others.

These distinctions result in fundamentally different educational purposes. Hobbes is caught in a paradox between an education devoted to conformity to official civil and moral doctrine and education devoted to the cultivation of critical rationality. However, the stress here is clearly on the former. In contrast, Winstanley's adherence to positive liberty grounded in common preservation suggests an education devoted to the free cultivation of reason and civic judgement so that popular sovereignty can be exercised in the form of public, deliberative forums. Here the focus

is not on the transmission of official doctrine but the unfolding of the capacity to determine one's own fate.

From a democratic perspective, the Hobbesian conception of state sovereignty and its resultant emphasis on educational conformity is problematic. Although Hobbes begins with the consent of the people, he ends up transferring sovereignty to the state. This transfer leaves open the limits of state action in the lives of individuals, seriously calling into question the degree to which even negative liberty can be achieved (Held, 1989). A conformist education is one consequence of this transfer. By adhering to a positive conception of liberty Winstanley avoids this democratic shortcoming. If individuals are conceived as possessing a right to self-determination, then popular sovereignty, wherein ultimate political authority remains with the people, logically follows. Popular sovereignty in turn necessitates the establishment of democratic forums. Here liberty is made real through democracy. This constitutes a different kind of social contract, not a contract which transfers sovereignty, but one wherein sovereignty is retained through a process of mutual pledge and covenant. Individuals in this case mutually agree to govern their community collectively, and this mutual covenant defines a social contract which preserves positive liberty. In this sense, Winstanley is a precursor to Rousseau (1973). The education that follows from this trajectory is one devoted to the cultivation of critical rationality and civic judgment, for these capacities are necessary for the achievement of positive liberty and participation in the exercise of popular sovereignty.

Historically, the objection to popular sovereignty has been that it is open to majority tyranny, in that there are no provisions for the protection of minority rights (Held, 1989). There is a potential danger in the Winstanleyan trajectory that minorities, those who dissent or are different from the majority, will be discriminated against and exploited, for there are no formal guarantees to protect them.

Three decades later, John Locke attempted to solve both the defects of state and popular sovereignty by articulating a third alternative: constitutional sovereignty, wherein the people are retained as the source of

sovereignty while the state becomes the instrument of the exercise of sovereignty, including constitutional protections of individual rights (Held, 1989; Hinsley, 1986). The state's *raison d'être* becomes the protection of individual right, in particular, negative liberty. Locke's theory is, however, grounded in an atomistic, mechanistic view of society, wherein individuals are discrete entities existing in isolation from one another. If the society is to remain intact, there is the need to create a degree of social cohesion. Locke advocates the creation of a civil theology for this purpose, and we find in Locke a significant advocacy of conformity to official doctrine. He advocates the use of state power to enforce the liberal creed, which, in spite of his devotion to empirical rationality and an education devoted to that end, results in a conformist education (Gay, 1964; Germino, 1972). Thus, Locke is also caught in the liberty/conformity paradox. Locke's inclusion in the paradox is not based upon an adherence to state sovereignty, as is Hobbes, but on his conception of human nature and society. However, there is a commonality between Hobbes and Locke in this regard: Both are atomistic, concerned with self-preservation. This atomism leads both of them to rely on state power to ensure order and cohesion, leading in turn to hegemony and hegemonic education.

Winstanley, on the other hand, is grounded in common preservation and a view of society as interconnected, leading to popular sovereignty based in positive liberty. Social cohesion is based upon the realization of commonality through collective deliberation rather than generated through conformity based in indoctrination ("noble lies" which preserve order but violate the integrity of liberty). Winstanley thereby escapes the liberty/conformity paradox, which renders his theory more consistent with the imperatives of democracy and democratic education. In fact, in Winstanley we have a precursor to the tradition of strong democratic education running through Rousseau, Jefferson, Dewey, Barber, Gutman, Giroux, among others. The earlier problem concerning rights protections remains, however, which makes this conception less than acceptable. The Winstanleyan trajectory is strongly democratic, yet it lacks a theory of justice, a common shortcoming in the strong democratic tradition. If a theory of justice, entailing rights protections, is added to popular sovereignty, then we enter the Lockean realm of constitutional sovereignty.

However, the difference here would be that sovereignty would be founded upon positive rather than negative liberty, thereby avoiding the need to artificially create social cohesion, and that it would ground self-determination as a fundamental human right, thereby morally grounding popular sovereignty. What follows educationally from this integration is an education devoted to both critical literacy and the cultivation of a sense of justice. This would result in a truly liberal, democratic education. It is in Winstanley that we can locate the origins of this more democratic liberal trajectory.

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