Conventional Systems of Classroom Discipline (The Patriarchy Speaks)

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Classroom discipline systems are considered as patriarchal moral systems focused on hyper-individuality and dependent upon rules, consequences, and principles focused through authoritarian structures. Three example systems (Assertive Discipline, Glasser's Control Theory, and Discipline with Dignity) are critiqued using Noddings' analysis of evil and Welch's liberation theology. As an alternative grounding, *freedom of responsibility* is proposed, moved foward through Noddings' mediation and care and Welch's dangerous memory and solidarity with oppressed peoples.

Les différentes approches à la discipline dans la salle de classe sont considérés comme des systèmes patriarcaux et moraux qui ont pour but de brimer l'individualité. Ces systèmes ont également comme bases des règlements, des conséquences et des principes imposés par des structures autoritaires. A la lumière de l'analyse de Nodding sur le mal et de la théologie de la libération de Welch, nous critiquons trois systèmes de discipline: "Assertive Discipline, Glasser's Control Theory, Discipline with Dignity." Comme alternative nous proposons plutôt une approche dite "liberté responsable" qui s'inspire des concepts de médiation et de soin de Nodding et des concepts de mémoire dangereuse et de solidarité des opprimés de Welch.

Introduction: Classroom Discipline and Moral Understanding

James Macdonald stated that there are only two questions worth considering in relationship to education: What is the meaning of human existence? and How shall we live together? (Stinson, 1985). All other questions and all educational practice are, implicitly, answers to these questions. In this essay I focus upon his second question which recognizes that the practices of education, including systems of classroom discipline are inevitably moral practices (Purpel & Ryan, 1983). Classroom discipline systems are, in particular, moral systems in that "all ethical systems are relational; that is, all ethical theories say something about how moral agents should relate to external entities" (Noddings, 1989, p. 183). In schools these external entities are the various constituencies with which students interact (administrators,

teachers, staff, fellow students, visitors) as well as the rules and regulations which are presented as symbols of underlying moral principles. While experiencing disciplinary activities, students emerge with a strong sense of who they are in relation to society and what they can expect from that. In other words, students are educated, through these systems, to a particular moral stance. It becomes the official, normative stance against which they can measure their own positions to find themselves in or out of synchrony with the dominant mode of living.

This essay will be engaged in an analysis of documents which promote particular systems of classroom discipline as exemplars of the dilemmas in the present situation. I will argue that the dilemmas center on the patriarchal value of *hyper-individuality* (to be discussed later) and are dependant upon rules and principles focused through authoritarian structures. Given that we live in a patriarchal society such systems persevere, in part, because they well partake of these dominant common sense values and approaches to living. These values, as the exclusive ones, tend to mask suffering, be destructive of community, perpetuate forms of evil not evident to the patriarchal eye and make invisible particular forms of (gendered) experience. We should understand that it is not individuality, rules, or authority which are evil or destructive but, rather, the ways in which the patriarchy has construed them. It is necessary to reveal the dilemmas with the systems in the light of patriarchy in order to lift the common sense notions into a more clear place for thinking and acting.

This exposure must go beyond the usual reform talk. It must be shown that these systems cannot respond to significant reform because of their dependence upon patriarchal ideology. Reform usually means to rectify a form, to correct the errors in it or to remove faults (*Webster's Third International Dictionary*, 1986). This implies that the structure is fundamentally sound and only requires readjustment. However we must consider seriously the feminist adage that you cannot take the master's house apart with the master's tools. Reforming classroom practice with a few new features would not suffice to orient practice away from patriarchy because the structure itself would bend reforms to patriarchal purpose.

In addressing these issues, I will not only be critiquing what is but also suggesting, via the critique, some dimensions of a different approach to classroom discipline. However, I will not be presenting a fully-developed program for several reasons. First, as will be seen, such universalization would be antithetical to the critique. Second, I prefer for curricula to be developed in conversation with teachers and I consider it hubris to suggest concrete programs without them. Third, and in the same vein, curricula and

disciplinary programs ought to be local, responding to specific conditions. To propose a program would ignore this perspective. In sum, this critique is meant to open up other ways of thinking upon which classroom practice can be rethought, thus implying practical responses without mandating them.

More specifically, through the critique I argue for developing a *freedom of responsibility*. This freedom may be accomplished in two ways. First, through an attention to relationship as the *sine qua non* of a different system, a fundamentally different standpoint from the present situation can be developed. This development of attention can come about through experiences of connection, solidarity (Welch, 1985), mediation (Noddings, 1989), dangerous memory (Welch), and communion (Buber, 1965a). Hopefully, attention will extend beyond the classroom walls into local communities and beyond. The beyond means not only humanly constructed communities but nature as well. Second, through the students having a significant role in creating these relationships rather than those relationships being entirely mandated by the teacher, the teacher's work would have to be enabling the students to effectively select from the world so that all the people in the room could interact with each other through the selection. In so doing the teacher becomes removed from the center of attention and critical education can proceed. This, of course, is not new thinking. Shor (1987) writes of the "withering away of the teacher" (p. 98) in which eventually "the initiating/organizing function [of the teacher] has become generalized in class, distributed to the group rather than an expertise possessed by one person" (p. 100). However Shor and other critical educators rarely, if at all, write on classroom discipline. Given the conventional split between discipline and learning (Blumenfeld-Jones, 1994), it seems necessary to specifically explore the discipline side of the split, if only for the sake of dissolving it.

Classroom Discipline as a Gendered Moral System

Conventional systems of classroom discipline are marked, in varying degree, by a number of similarities, including emphasizing *clear rules* articulating desired behaviors, favoring teacher *authority* to establish and maintain classroom order, insisting upon the student's acceptance of *personal, individual responsibility* for both appropriate and inappropriate behavior, and *consistently responding*, on the part of the teacher, to positive and negative behavior by using material consequences, both positive and negative. In addition these systems rely upon rationality, abstract logic, and the manipulation of symbols to represent behavior and are generally informed

by the value of teacher control. I have chosen three of these systems to examine this in more particularity: Lee and Marlene Canter's "Assertive Discipline Program" (1976), William Glasser's "Control Theory" and "Quality Classrooms" (1985, 1991), and Allen Curwin and Richard Mendler's "Responsibility Model" (1988a).[1]

Some of the feminist literature on morality (in particular Gilligan, 1982; Noddings, 1988; Welch, 1985) informs us that the values of rules and consistent consequences (the value of law and principle), authority of the teacher (the value of authority), and individual responsibility for behavior (the value of autonomy) are particularly associated with a masculine perspective. According to Gilligan (1982) and Noddings (1988), women's experience fosters a different set of values which have been lost to view as the patriarchal values are promoted as everyone's values. The conventional, having the status of common sense, disguises the partiality of the perspective and hides experiences of more than half the population, denying the possibility of developing alternative values for use.

These alternative values are the feminine perspectives of process, caring, connection, and mediation (all of which will be elaborated upon later in the essay). To state the case in masculine/feminine terms does not, from two perspectives, make an essentialist argument about the differing values. First, such masculinist values are a cultural formation in which both men and women can and do participate. Indeed, given the preponderance of women in the teaching profession, especially in the preschool, primary, and elementary levels, who utilize such conventional views, patriarchal values, understandings, processes, and products cut across gender lines. Second, everyone might be able to develop feminist values. Experience, rather than genetics, is promoted as the foundation for the feminine and masculine characteristics of women and men. As Noddings puts it, the culture contains "an inversion of monumental importance," the making of

> female experience a product of feminine nature rather than feminine nature a product of female experience. The latter view is of crucial importance because it holds open the possibility for both men and women to develop the best of the feminine. (1988, p. 70)

Further, however, there is something specific to women's experience which may be labeled the "feminine nature" which should promote the cultural legitimacy of feminine values (p. 70).

With the above in mind I will now proceed to detail both the patriarchal characteristics and feminist critique of those characteristics. The structure of the argument will be to focus upon the categories of analysis rather than the systems themselves. The systems will not be discussed as discrete entities

but, rather, will be interwoven with each other as they pertain to the issue at hand. Interwoven with discussions of the systems will be a salient critical analysis based on the work of Noddings (1989) on evil, Welch (1985) on communities of solidarity and resistance, and Buber's communal ethic (1965a, 1965c). This rhetorical approach attempts to position these systems more as exemplars of the problem rather than specifically wrong-headed approaches. It is the patriarchy which is under scrutiny, not these particular representatives of the patriarchy. We will begin with hyper-individuality.

Hyper-Individuality

Hyper-individuality describes the overwhelming emphasis upon the individual as the basic unit of analysis and ultimate test of the validity of the system (a validity reflected in how the system enables greater academic learning for the individual). Disciplinary prescriptions are structured around the individual, focusing powerfully, almost exclusively, upon the rights, privileges, and responsibility of those individuals as isolates.

Glasser who promotes cooperative forms of learning, focuses upon the individual as the ultimate source of understanding and behavior. His "control theory," posits five fundamental genetic needs as the basis both for human existence and consequently for classroom behavior: all behaviors are an individual's attempts to "try to gain control of people or ourselves" (1985, p. 47) so that the five needs can be satisfied. Because "*none* of what we do is caused by any situation or person outside of ourselves," (p. 17) it is always more accurate to say that "I choose to be angry" rather than "You have angered me" because there are always a variety of possible responses from which a person chose to be angry.

The Canter and Canter (1976) "Assertive Discipline" system equally emphasizes the individual in three ways. In this case the source of individuality is social rights for the purpose of good mental health (a prerequisite to good teaching and learning). First, their system is based upon assertion training which

> enables individuals to stand up more effectively for their wants and feelings, while at the same time not abusing the rights of others ... enabl[ing] an individual to develop as much positive influence in relationships as is possible .... When a teacher takes seriously her own needs, wants and feelings that she (sic) will be in a position to feel good about herself as an individual and as a teacher. (Canter & Canter, 1976, p. i-2)

This will produce the ability to positively influence from which, in turn the student will positively benefit from the teacher focusing upon him or herself. Second, they, like Glasser (1985), emphasize the responsibility of the individual for her or his behavior. Children may have problems which seem to prevent them from behaving according to the rules of the teacher, but these children "*can* behave ... they *choose* not to behave. In other words, they won't behave" (Canter & Canter, 1976, p. 49). Disruptive children control their behavior when strangers are in the classroom, not knowing who these strangers are and, thus, not knowing how these strangers will respond to misbehavior. This proves that children willfully choose to behave appropriately or inappropriately. As with Glasser, mitigating, external circumstances are not allowed as excuses for misbehavior. Third, their prescriptions for active disciplining recommend a series of escalating disciplinary consequences for misbehavior which progressively separate the student from her or his group. The consequences begin in time-out, proceed to the student's name on the board with an increasing number of check marks next to it which will bring about detention from group activities (such as recess and lunch), followed by the school principal intervening, parent-principal-teacher conferences, and finally, school suspension and expulsion.

Curwin and Mendler (1988a) also disallow excuses for misbehavior in their "Responsibility Model" for classroom discipline. Both the teacher and the individual students must take autonomous responsibility both for their actions and the consequences of those actions. Having clearly articulated rules and consequences of rule breaking, no excuses can be allowed for breaking the rules. "No excuses" teaches students to recognize that for all actions there are consequences and that should the individual student not like a particular consequence, he or she must choose a different action. Their maxim is: "Be responsible for yourself [the teacher] and allow kids to take responsibility for themselves" (Curwin & Mendler, 1988a, p. 16).

This responsibility system stresses developing a strong internal "locus of control" (Curwin & Mendler, 1988a, p. 29), the sense a person has of either being in charge of his or her destiny or being acted upon by powerful external forces. They favor the former locus over the latter, centering their prescriptions strongly around an individual radically free from external considerations or connections. In such a state of freedom the student has the ability to correctly choose behavior based on clear knowledge of the consequences of such choosing and to learn from such choices. In turn, the teacher is exonerated from feeling responsible for the student.

The above forms of hyper-individuality partake, I would argue, of what Noddings (1989) terms separation as an important category of human evil and

what Welch (1985) calls contemporary sin, a lack of solidarity with oppressed people. This hyper-individuality ignores Gilligan's (1982) assertion that, for women, the maintenance of connection with others takes precedence over issues of abstract, principled action. That is, when a relationship is threatened due to taking a stand upon principle, girls and women will tend to move away from the principled action in favor of maintaining the relationship. Noddings (1989) and Welch (1985) will be used to detail a critique.

Noddings asserts that the evil of separation has three levels: natural evil, moral evil, and cultural evil. Hyper-individuality may be understood as *culturally* evil separation because the individuality focus is usually posited as a necessary fact of life, as the common sense of our culture. This fact of life, however, results in evil when it hinders "*life-sustaining* and *life-enhancing* activities and relations" (Noddings, 1989, p. 108) which flow from being in relationship. The evil of separation can occur when those cared for have left us and we feel deserted or we have left them prematurely and when separated from the activities of life (as in being ill and bed-ridden).

To be sure, not all forms of separation are evil. Noddings points out that "when our children go off to college or marry or take positions that carry them away from home" (1989, p. 95) there is simultaneously the sorrow of separation and the joy of our children's success. We welcome such separation as the just results of mature actions. If a person, long suffering the pain of illness should die, we value this separation as freeing the person from suffering.

In these discipline systems emphasis upon personal responsibility, sundering of connection with the circumstances of one's life, and direct use of separation as a punitive measure for gaining the obedience of the student, the cultural evil of separation arises. For instance, Canter and Canter (1976) prescribe an escalating set of punitive measures which begin with putting the student's name on the board. This can bring about a nearly irredeemable separation from group-life. To have one's name on the board is to be publicly marked as different and separate from and a problem for the group. To have increasing check marks is to increase the experience of being marked as different or separate. A further escalation of being held out of group life (such as recess) increases the marked form and increases the evil in the situation.

These measures of separation make special unfavorable cases of specific people over and over again with the same names consistently appearing on the board (Jones, 1989). The Canters do not discuss these separations in terms of Noddings's values of growth, joy, or life-enhancement but only in terms of the teacher having his or her needs and wants met in the classroom,

thus promoting the value of the individual over the group. In this case we may be tempted to use Noddings stronger term of moral evil (knowingly imposing evil upon another) in that the teacher is encouraged to directly and knowingly impose separation upon the student, but as stated at the outset, given that these separations have the status of common sense, we must be careful to understand them in their cultural guise. The culture encourages teachers to see correction of behavior centered in punitive, isolating measures. Prisons (institutions for separating evil-doers from the community in a punitive manner) are exemplars of the state rectifying behavior and although schools may not be prisons, they appear to parallel those practices (Foucault, 1979).

Further, the value of individual responsibility (freedom to choose and freedom from connections with anyone or any circumstances) is neither posed in terms of growth, joy or life-enhancement nor is there an emphasis upon living in connection with others. Rather, the student is to made either more obedient (Assertive Discipline), more responsible (Curwin & Mendler, 1988a) or more personally satisfied (Glasser, 1985, 1991, n.d.). Glasser's perspective is ironic in that he insists that a fundamental need is being with others, that satisfaction of needs, such as being with others, is fundamental to understanding human motivations and yet he focuses upon freedom from others in insisting upon autonomous decision making.

Separation from circumstances can be seen in Canter and Canter's (1976) dismissal of emotional illness, brain damage, ignorance, inadequate parenting, socio-economic background, or classroom environment as salient explanations of misbehavior.

> These ... *real problems* ... do not prevent the teacher from being able to influence the child's behavior, given the proper methods. Children with these problems *can* behave, when they want to do so: they *choose* not to behave. In other words, they won't behave. (Canter & Canter, 1976, p. 49)

Both teachers and students are discouraged from remembering the problems and from experiencing solidarity with the students' circumstances. Each individual should have sufficient self-control to defeat these evils internally by simply declaring freedom from them.

Missing is the recognition of our connections with each other. Martin Buber (1965c) states the value of connections very strongly when he writes, "there is no state in which the individual merely leads his (sic) own existence without contributing his part, just through living in this state, to the life of his human environment and to the world in general" (p. 90). Buber is referring, here, to the "task of establishing in common a common reality [for] ... it is only a cosmos to the degree in which we experience it together" (p. 91). In

like fashion, the classroom is more than an assemblage of people and things but is a common reality established by the participation of each in the building of the whole and the classroom is one community among many (other classrooms, other schools, the neighborhood, the municipality, and so forth). How, then, to ask a student to recognize his or her own blameworthiness free of the such context when that context is so woven into the fabric of his or her life?

Welch (1985) makes the case that teaching people to ignore connection with their immediate community becomes extended to the more general lesson of nonconnection with and nonresponsibility for all communities. This social blindness ignores the inter-penetration of and involvement with all other communities. This must be countered by a solidarity with those who suffer based in "dangerous memory" which reveals that, historically, not everyone is equally well-served by the extant economic or political system (p. 37). "Solidarity breaks the bonds of isolated individuality and forgetfulness ... and enables the creation of community and conversion to the other" (p. 45). This conversion is:

> to the neighbor, the oppressed person, the exploited social class, the despised race, the dominated country .... Conversion means a radical transformation of ourselves .... To be converted is to commit oneself to the process of the liberation of the poor and oppressed, to commit oneself lucidly, realistically, and concretely. (Welch, 1985, p. 45)

The isolation taught through these discipline systems undermines the possibility of this sort of substantive social thinking and action. And, obviously, the patriarchy for whom this memory is dangerous, benefits from this undermining. Both Welch and Noddings attempt to forward a pedagogy which will allow those who benefit from the status of the oppressed to learn their intimate connection with them and act in socially responsible ways toward and with them.

Rules, Consequences, Principles

Within the systems of Canter and Canter (1976) and Curwin and Mendler (1988a), rules explicitly emanate from principles. For Curwin and Mendler, good rules are based on sound principles which "define attitudes and expectations for long-term behavior growth" (p. 21). The rules are only "guidelines for enforcement" which must not "sacrifice the higher levels of learning that principles provide" (p. 22). "Good principles ... place rules in a larger context that helps students understand why each rule is selected and needed" (p. 50). Rules not based on principles teach obedience to authority,

a bad form of discipline. For the Canters, the fundamental principles underlying the rules are teacher authority, in the form of the paramount importance of the teacher's needs and wants and the moral authority of influencing the child into proper behavior. The teacher must be enabled to be appropriately assertive in responding to student behavior.

For both systems, rules are best when behaviorally oriented, clear, and disseminated by public disclosure. In this way everyone is aware of the possible choices which both the teacher and student can make. The purpose of rules is to communicate "clearly and specifically ... the standards of acceptable behavior *before they are violated* and what will happen when these standards are violated" (Curwin & Mendler, 1988a, p. 8). The teacher's job is to "*let the students know what you need.* To run the classroom, you must establish clear and specific guidelines that define rules and consequences for both you and your students" (p. 13). Different activities require different sets of behaviors, so there should be different sets established (Canter & Canter, 1976). When a new activity is entered, the new rules are posted. "Most teachers assign a student monitor to do this" (p. 66).

The student is, thereby, better able to choose whether or not to break a rule, under full knowledge of the consequences. As has already been said, both systems take the freedom of full personal responsibility as a central teaching point. The Canters aphorise this learning as "providing him with the opportunity to learn the *natural* consequence of his inappropriate actions and that he is responsible for his behavior" [italics added] (Canter & Canter, 1976, p. 93). Natural mystifies the fact that the teacher generated the rules, constructing them in the light of his or her perceived legitimate needs based on his or her right to teach. This naturalization belies the effort the Canters expend instructing the teacher how to choose among needs and wants from the perspective of personal proclivities.

Teacher control is no less central to Curwin and Mendler ("Rules maintain order," 1988a, p. 21) but is also more subtle since they explicitly argue against such obedience. For instance, they assert that the students should be part of a school's policy-making committee to prevent the "major risk of widespread dissatisfaction with rules that are perceived as arbitrary and unfair" (p. 8). But they fail to recognize that those who are already "discipline problems" will not be represented on such a committee. Only those students who have demonstrated a willingness to accept the adult version of appropriate behavior will be invited to make school policy.

These systems are, ostensibly, responses to the possibility of misbehavior but misbehavior may be a result of the rules and principles. Both Noddings and Welch argue that, in the patriarchy, the ultimate misbehavior or sin is

disobedience of the Father. Rules and principles specify what passes for the real misbehavior, disobedience. The rule defines the limits of behavior, thus misbehavior is only a consequence of the rule. Indeed, Curwin and Mendler (1988a) admit to this possibility when they write of unacceptable behavior which the teacher cannot stop, suggesting that the teacher should "legitimize misbehavior that you cannot stop" (p. 15). Misbehavior is turned into an activity so that the fun of disrupting disappears. But this also effectively removes it from the list of violations. The teacher is using rules to reconstruct the behavior within bounds. Given that Curwin and Mendler provide no guidelines for determining what sorts of misbehavior can be reconstructed, it appears that there is no misbehavior which is not possible of reaggregation into the acceptable whole.

Principles and their coordinate rules may be contrasted to Noddings' (1989) focus upon relations between people. "When principles encourage the infliction or maintenance of pain" they must be "reject[ed] ... in favor of persons and their needs" (p. 43). "Principles are discerned and formulated under the guidance of Logos ... [which] sets man free to define himself through rational thought and action" (p. 64). Classroom rules and consequences, inflexible once established, are the Logos of the classroom and admit only to the rational choice of obedient action (or acceptance of fate upon disobedience). This entirely discounts the persons living under the Logos, the care which might be extended to them, and the conditions under which they are living which may not be of their own making (as discussed above in Hyper-individuality). As Noddings (1989) writes, "Nowhere does the Bible really extol the love between women, the unconditional love of mother for child, the steady insistence on relation over principle" (p. 85). Principle is divorced from feeling and so, in these systems, no matter what the feeling of the teacher for the student, he or she must invoke the rule. But, "it is not enough to act according to principle ... the response of the other must demonstrate that the caring has been received" (p. 172). Nowhere in Canter and Canter (1976) or Curwin and Mendler (1988a) do we encounter this tone of interrelationship.

Noddings' mediation may also be contrasted to the primacy of principles. It refers to the historical protective function of a mother against the wrath of the father. Noddings writes,

> Women have ... learned to interpret father to children and children to father ... learned that human beings thought evil by the world at large nevertheless have lovable qualities .... From the feminine perspective mediation is a task of the loving peacemaker. It is not primarily judgmental, but rather aims at restoring a loving balance ... in such a way that reconciliation will result. (1989, p. 167)

Relational virtues arise in the presence of relationships which are always simultaneously formed and in the process of being formed and are related to relational tasks, two of which are teaching and mediation. A radical separation of "teacher and student into treatments and outcomes inadvertently ratifies the evil of separation and helplessness" and denies that "teaching-learning is relational, not just interactive" (Noddings, 1989, p. 238). A reliance upon rules interferes with the ability to be in relation by substituting an abstraction for the concrete, everyday processes of relation.

In a similar fashion Welch focuses upon particularities and rejects, as does Noddings, "address[ing] the problem of suffering and evil in the abstract" (Welch, 1985, p. 36) or "articulat[ing] the imperative of human dignity or justice from a universal base, say, natural law" (p. 65). Rather we should "focus on concrete memories of specific histories of oppression and suffering ... declar[ing] that such suffering matters; the oppression of people is of ultimate concern" (p. 36) for "the challenge is to establish just conditions in reality" (p. 65). All three discipline systems must be found wanting as they invoke principle of one sort or another and never attend to the specific human beings (gendered, racialized, aged, ethnicized, humanized) before them but, rather, homogenize difference in the student.

Authority

I have already pointed out that all three systems obviously stand on the side of adult authority, even when student interests are asserted as of central importance to the system. For Canter and Canter (1976) only in the presence of authority can the students "grow educationally, socially, and emotionally" (p. 7). Indeed, "[a] child's inappropriate behavior is often a plea by the child for someone, that is the teacher, to care enough about him to make him stop" (Canter & Canter, 1976, p. 7). The importance of the teacher is overarching as the teacher is

> the decisive element in the classroom. It is my personal approach that creates the climate. It is my daily mood that makes the weather ... it is my response that decides whether or not ... a child is humanized or de-humanized. (Ginott, cited in Canter & Canter, 1976, p. 174)

The teacher is the only person that really matters in the classroom, everyone else being merely reactive to her or his actions.

Even Curwin and Mendler (1988a), who argue against the obedience model, focus their approach upon teacher actions: "let students know what you need," "provide instruction at levels that match the student's ability," "listen to what students are thinking and feeling," "offer choices," "refuse to

accept excuses," and "be responsible for yourself and allow kids to take responsibility for themselves" (pp. 13-16). Ultimately the teacher administers a negotiated plan and decides which rules and consequences to invoke. In fact, the teacher is enjoined to only allow student voice on those issues which *are* negotiable and in all cases the teacher must maintain discretionary powers so that his or her judgment can be invoked (p. 29).

A good discipline system, for Curwin and Mendler (1988a), controls the 15% who are regular although not chronic rules breakers "without alienating or overly regulating" those who rarely break rules or violate principles and without backing chronic rule breakers and generally out of control most of the time "into a corner" (p. 28). "Only within the framework of the teacher's internal strength and the development of a hopeful and caring classroom environment can a discipline plan be effective" (p. 29).

Glasser's (1985) authority value is more subtle as he focuses upon individual genetic needs, making these the authoritative source of educational decisions. This makes it appear as if authority flows from nature. Nevertheless, he, too, asserts human adult authority over student determination as he defends the basic value of the school curriculum (an anonymous and authoritative construction given to both the teacher and the students) which is abrogated only by poor teaching. This is a Foucauldian authority both in the anonymous curriculum and in the prescription of student patience.

Patience with unsatisfying situations is an important value for Glasser marked by waiting for the situation to pass. Patience is mature:

> giving ... time to find a more effective behavior .... Students ... need to learn to look for more effective behaviors while they wait .... If we can restructure schools so that they are more satisfying, we can expect many more students to be patient when they are frustrated. (Glasser, 1985, p. 55)

Glasser targets poor teaching of curricular material as the stumbling block, asserting that standard curricular material can be very satisfying. The teacher is central to both making someone else's curriculum interesting and attending to the genetic needs of the students. By valuing the ability of the student to internalize, monitor, and sustain reasonable levels of frustration as he or she waits patiently, Glasser forwards an anonymous adult upon whom to wait.

Both Noddings (1989) and Welch (1985) point out that patience as a cultural value is imposed upon all subordinate groups both as a way of emphasizing the need for obedience and as a way of stifling rebellion against authority. Subordinate groups, accepting the need to wait as if in their own interests, have also accepted that the Father's needs and ideas must take

precedence over their own. They will even see the thought of rebellion as a fault to be corrected rather than as an impetus to seek greater justice and secure their rights. The ideology of passivity in the face of authority in all three classroom discipline systems echoes the patriarchy's need for subordinating and diverting resistance in order to maintain power.

One way to understand the power of the patriarchy is to analogize guilt to the feelings one has when transgressing against authority. Paul Ricoeur (1967) describes guilt as "the anticipated chastisement ... internalized and already weighing upon consciousness" (p. 101) which enables us to be "capable of answering for the consequences of an act" (p. 102). This ability, according to Ricoeur, is linked with the laws which govern our behavior. Guilt may be at work in both Assertive Discipline and Curwin and Mendler's (1988a) Responsibility Model. In both cases, all rules, consequences for both rules breaking and rules obeying (clearly spelled out), and the authority for meting out both punishment and praise are the responsibility of the adult. Significantly, there should be no consequence which the teacher does not invoke in the face of misbehavior. If the teacher fails to follow through with the consequence, then both the teacher's authority and the rule are undermined. Carrying out consequences, what Canter and Canter assert must be a promise and not merely a threat, instills in the student the desire to, next time, not break the rule. The consequence creates a memory which is guilt.

This makes guilt purely a socially constructed memory. Buber (1965b) asserts that there is an ontic possibility of guilt, an objective existence of guilt which transcends specific social conventions. This guilt is based in the basic fact that

> each man (sic) stands in an objective relationship to others .... It is this relationship, in fact, that first makes it at all possible for him (sic) to expand his environment (*Umwelt*) into a world (*Welt*). It is his (sic) share in the human order of being, the share for which he bears responsibility. An objective relationship ... can rise ... to a personal relation; it can be merely tolerated; it can be neglected; it can be injured. Injuring a relationship means that at this place the human order of being is injured. No one other than he who inflicted the wound can heal it. He (sic) who knows the fact of his guilt and is a helper can help him try to heal the wound. (Buber, 1965b, p. 132)

Guilt results from the act of injury and does not function as a predecessor or deterrent to failure. Those who see themselves as helpers should intervene and "help him try to heal the wound." The three systems, on the other hand, seem to construe guilt as a deterrent and, further, do not include opportunities for the one who was injured to heal the wound.

Conclusion

What may be said, then, about rethinking classroom discipline? If we are to break the patriarchy's hold upon thinking then we must move away from hyper-individualism and its attendant reliance upon exclusively individual responsibility, rules, principles, consequences, and dominating adult authority.

In the first part of this essay I wrote of a freedom of responsibility and that, to accomplish this, we must learn how to attend to relationships and give students a significant role in creating these relationships. Three constructs for such attending are Noddings' (1989) idea of mediation (acting as a "loving peacemaker ... not primarily judgmental ... aims at restoring a loving balance ... in such a way that reconciliation will result," (p. 167), her idea of care (Noddings, 1988) and Welch's (1985) assertion of the need for solidarity with oppressed peoples. These actions can only take place in an environment in which the connections between people are not made by a figure of authority (for who can legislate such connections?) but are worked on in the concrete circumstances of developing and ongoing relationships, thus creating the circumstances for students' significant roles.

This is not to say that the teacher no longer has a role. Displacing the ultimate authority of the teacher does not mean that there will be no difficulties with which the teacher would have to contend. Hyper-individuality being central to the cultural context in which the classroom functions (in terms of the following dyads: individuality/community, ethical-rules/ethical- processes, authority-figure/authority-of-knowledge-on-the-part-of-all) always creates the possibility for friction and disagreement. The question is: can the teacher enable a fruitful situation to address the difficulties without resorting to patriarchy? As Buber (1965a) puts it, education is "*a selection by man (*sic*) of the effective world* ... through the educator, the world for the first time becomes the true subject of its effect" (p. 89). The educator waits for the need of the student for the teacher. Melding this with notions of caring and dangerous memory can point the way for us, moving us beyond a mere liberalizing of the classroom and calling for a quite different set of relations to prevail.

Finally, the idea of freedom is central to this approach and can thoroughly recast the notion of responsibility. Noting that responsibility is the ability to respond we can ask what is it to which a person is able to respond and how is this connected to freedom? Freedom is conventionally opposed to constraint. This concept of freedom is disastrous for education for its opposite, "compulsion ... means disunion, it means humiliation and

rebelliousness" (Buber, 1965a, p. 93). This creates exactly the opposite of even what I believe the patriarchal educators discussed in this paper would desire. Buber forwards a very different conception: "Communion in education is just communion, it means being opened up and drawn in. Freedom in education is the possibility of communion" (p. 93). Thus, freedom of responsibility means the ability to respond to being in communion, being opened up and drawn in to others, recognizing our fundamental dependence on others and the interdependence among all. This is, indeed, a very different ground of understanding from that of conventional classroom discipline through which the patriarchy speaks.

NOTES

1. While I have gathered these three systems under the same umbrella, it should be noted that they assert disagreement among them. Specifically, Curwin and Mendler have been directly critical of Canter and Canter (Curwin & Mendler, 1988b, 1988c). Canter and Canter have also been criticized by other educationists (see Hill, 1990; Hitz, 1988; Osborne, 1984; Render, Padilla, & Krank, 1989). Glasser (n.d.) has disavowed connection with the classroom discipline field. Nonetheless, I would argue that these differences are superficial and that all three systems are based upon similar patriarchal ideologies.

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