

Salter, L. & Hearn, A. (1996). *Outside the lines: Issues in interdisciplinary research*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 212 pp. (Hardcover).

Originally a report undertaken at the initiative of the authors with the support of the then President (Dr. Paule Leduc) of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, this well written text seeks to explore the nature and potential of interdisciplinary research. The authors argue that too many academics promote interdisciplinary research without being aware of the problems associated with this form of knowledge creation, and in this regard the authors let several practitioners express in their own words the experience and practice of interdisciplinarity. However, to its credit, the text is more than a collection of differing viewpoints, for the authors present, not only a history of both disciplinarity and interdisciplinarity, but also a review of the major problems confronting interdisciplinary research as well as some possible solutions.

Interdisciplinarity itself is defined as any challenge to the limitations or premises of the prevailing organization of knowledge or its representation in an institutionally recognized form (p. 43). Despite this definitional broadness, the authors delineate two major variants: instrumental and conceptual interdisciplinarity, where the former is characterized by a pragmatic, nonsynthetic, problem-solving approach, and the latter by unity-seeking with respect to all areas of knowledge or by a critical attitude toward disciplines as dominative upholders of different power structures. In any case, each of these variants have their problems, and the authors make a significant contribution to interdisciplinary research by clarifying these difficulties.

With respect to instrumental disciplinarity, there is the problem of bringing together the insights of different disciplines when terms and the significance of terms are differently perceived in each discipline. For example, it takes years to learn the language of law and how that language is used. Thus, sociologists, who wish to make use of legal terminology, can easily fall into misunderstandings, and the same is true for those in law who wish to make use of sociological concepts (p. 141). Yet here the authors fail to consider the possibility of texts designed to overcome such difficulties. In other words, it is by no means proven that a text on sociology for lawyers or on law for sociologists could not be written and be used to cut short the time required to familiarize scholars with key

differences in interdisciplinary usage. It is true that many such prolegomenas to interdisciplinary usage have yet to be written, but that does not mean that they cannot be. If there were such aids, then the authors' solution to the problem of interdisciplinary misunderstanding or even incomprehension could be mitigated without overly lengthy periods of immersion in the literature of the other discipline.

Considering the problem of hostility to interdisciplinary initiatives on the part of older disciplines, the authors suspect that such hostility is at a maximum when the older discipline is tightly bound in terms of its methods, or protocols and driven more by empirical investigations than theoretical speculation. In response to this problem, the authors do little more than emphasize the importance of a self-reflective attitude (p. 157), an attitude which interdisciplinarity seems to embody. Here, I think, is a point where one can go much deeper. For hostility is not just a matter of narrowly defined protocols and an empirical emphasis. It is also a matter of the existence of different, but unrecognized, forms of knowing that might underlie tensions within and between disciplines.

What the authors might have considered in greater depth is that most academic knowledge is dominative, that is, characterized by an emphasis on power over the known. While the authors do talk about the need to integrate other approaches to knowledge (p. 167) as a key theme of conceptual interdisciplinarity (e.g., women's ways of knowing, native forms of understanding), they fail to characterize this form of knowing in a positive way or to relate it to the tensions within a given discipline. For example, to the extent that a native approach to knowledge is oriented to closeness to the known as opposed to domination of the known, such closeness or intimacy might also be linked to forms of humanist psychology forms which are in tension with a more academic psychology that is dominative to the extent that it strives to reduce the phenomena of consciousness to brain events (subsequently to be reduced to electro-chemical processes).

This review is certainly not the place to develop a typology of ways of knowing, but the point to be considered with respect to the problem of resistance to interdisciplinary research is that a greater degree of consciousness with respect to different ways of knowing might mitigate hostility to other approaches whether or not these be interdisciplinary. The authors' call for more self reflectiveness on the part of all scholars (p. 172) is more likely to take place if one has a method by which this self-reflection can take place, and the possibility of developing a typology of

ways of knowing might be useful in this context. While one can agree with the authors that so-called core disciplines (e.g., psychology or sociology being 'core' with respect to the more derivative and hence interdisciplinary forms such as criminology) might be forged in conflict and have less in the way of consensus than is usually assumed (pp.175-177), there nonetheless might be disciplines that articulate core ways of knowing. Thus, the hard sciences might reflect in more fundamental ways the dominative approach to knowing than do aesthetic disciplines which feature an approach based on intimacy with respect to the known. Understanding disciplines from that fundamental perspective can only broaden one's understanding of the potentials of interdisciplinary research; and while the authors have provided us with a valuable introduction to the problems as well as the values of this kind of scholarly activity, the text would have been much strengthened by some consideration of the nature of knowledge itself.

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Morris, R.W. (1994). *Values in sexuality education: A philosophical study*. New York: University Press of America, pp. 108 (Softcover).

"Lieben und arbeiten" (i.e., love and work) Freud said, are the essential tasks of life. It is in the context of intimate love relationships that sexuality becomes a way of expressing care and desire. How can we foster an ethic respect, mutuality, and responsibility in our sexuality and sexual education? In struggling with this question, Morris offers several observations. First, the values clarification approach which has dominated sexual education over the past decade has proven insufficient. Second, the assumption that teachers can take a neutral objective stance outside of language and history, and free of prior value commitments is a myth. And finally, that sexual education has been hampered by a reductionistic and instrumental approach that views it primarily as a solution to the problems of teenage pregnancy and sexually transmitted disease.

Morris believes values clarification represents a significant advance in its affirmation of the subjectivity and integrity of the valuing object and