by Kneller on the basis of this acquaintance. There is much heady stuff about Being, anxiety and other notions, but it is surely significant that elsewhere in the book Kneller never finds it necessary to invoke these concepts in trying to understand or appraise a movement. Like many others, Kneller finds "immense promise" in phenomenology, but there is little indication that the promise is about to be fulfilled. It is fine to be told that we must try to identify common and essential elements in experience. But *how* is this to be done? And what are the criteria of *success*

Generally, the level of discussion is appropriate for an introductory work, but the standard of argumentation is uneven. At his best, as in the critique of romantics like Kohl and Illich, one of the more successful chapters, Kneller can be concise and penetrating. Though rarely original, his criticisms have the merit of being sensible and clearly expressed. But there are many lapses from this standard. For example, Kneller employs the well-known self-referential objection against the relativism espoused by the "new" sociologists (p.60); but later, in discussing Kuhn, he maintains without any attempt at justification that relativism is a defensible position (p. 94). In his comments on Peters on authority, Kneller objects to the distinction drawn by Peters between authority and power on the grounds that authority involves the right to ensure by *force* that others comply. But this objection does nothing to answer Peters' point that this *right* may exist though one is *powerless* to enforce it. No doubt such inconsistencies and weaknesses arise in part from the fragmentary and sketchy character of the book.

Kneller's concern to reach out to other traditions is certainly commendable, but with no attempt to discern a direction or current, the movements in question are as ships passing in the night. Many teachers of philosophy of education will continue to prefer to begin with educational problems and issues and then to proceed directly to the leading voices in various traditions for arguments and suggestions. A competent summary of an argument is no substitute for the argument itself.

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Huppert, George, *Public Schools in Renaissance France*. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1984, pp. 159, $19.95.

Public Schools in Renaissance France adds to our understanding of the development of French secondary schooling, but it is a flawed book. It demonstrates that social demand, rather than State or Church leadership, encouraged expansion of education. Laymen prodded reluctant clerical and state authorities to increase educational opportuntiy. This same process has been demonstrated for the eighteenth century by Furet and Ozouf and for the nineteenth by Grew and Harrigan in revision of republican historiography that had claimed initiative emanated from above. Huppert shows too how control of schools became a matter of dispute between town councils and diocesan authorities. There are interesting discussions of the problems of financing expansion of schools, of how money was raised, and of the beginnings of standardization of curriculum and classes before there was a national authority over schools. When the Church, notably the Jesuits, reentered the educational arena forcefully it was in part at the behest of the King who wanted to promote religious and educational hamageneity.

The book has many faults. Exaggerating its own originality, it emphasizes its differences from Dainville, Chartier, Julia and Compère, criticized by name but never quoted. It never refutes, however, their thesis that the Jesuits were the dominant figures in secondary education of the ancien regime and were the ones to establish a "system" of schools. And, if there was important lay involvement in fifteenth-century schooling, laymen more often increased their influence in existing Church schools than they founded new ones. Many of Huppert's descriptions of later secondary schools are wrong; e.g. labelling them as "the special preserve of the bourgeoisie until well into the twentieth century" (p.x), assuming that the nineteenth century "banish[ed] all daring thoughts in favor of self-interest" (p. 142), claiming that "after the Revolution only one path remained to ambition, a path that led, necessarily, through the secondaire" (p. 143). exaggerating the importance of the Revolution (p. xi). He neglects important studies of the later direction of the colleges - articles by Bailey,

chapters in *The Making of Frenchmen*, and histories of the Orders. Prost seems his main general source for the later period, although Moody's work is a decade more recent and far superior. Strangely, he calls "primaire relatively unimportant" (p. x), although it had many more students and had links with secondaire in the looser organization of the ancien regime.

The tone of the book is biased. The Third Republic histories of towns, a major source for this work, were often anticlerical, and Huppert seems to have adopted their assumptions. The author decides that "the bourgeois . . . had penetrated the clergy's secrets long ago" (p. 63), refers to "clerical arrogance" toward his heroes, and imagines that all bishops believed that "there could be . . . no learning other than that meant for clerics" (p. 3). We hear that things were "commonly suspected" and "city officials were bound to . . ." (both p. 62) when there is little evidence. "Bourgeois" is a mystifying term that seems, in different places, a synonym for town counsellor, city-dweller, and well-to-do non-aristocrat. There is indecisiveness if not outright confusion about whether schools were more or less socially restricted in different periods. The chatty prose is both imprecise and too cute.

Attempting to emphasize innovation during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the author denigrates prior and future efforts. Claiming originality for his book, Huppert fails to give other historians their due. If one concentrates on the development of municipal schools during Renaissance France, the book makes a contribution but it need be read judiciously.

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Vandenberg, Donald. *Human Rights in Education*. New York, New York: Philosophical Library, Ltd., 1983, 272 pp., US $15.00 (cloth).

Though numerous published materials have attempted to show the relationship between human rights and education, Vandenberg's book is the first ambitious effort to explore it with the intensity and seriousness it deserves. Clearly, such an effort is long overdue. By and large, available works on the topic espouse human rights in education by simply assuming that they are everyone's entitlement, by reading into constitutional provisions and legislative documents, by appealing to international convenants, and/or by invoking popular public sentiment. However, the underlying justification behind such assumptions, documents and invocations has remained largely untouched. Thus, if only because it addresses the ethical and moral considerations associated with human rights in education, Vandenberg's book is readily to be appreciated. *Human Rights in Education* is valuable because, among other things, it succeeds in showing us that such rights are not reducible merely or wholly to political and legalistic demands by groups and individuals.

Rightly, Vandenberg sets his espousal of human rights in education in the context of societies dominated by technological consciousness and competing ideologies. The educational task, as he sees it, is to enable individuals personally to understand and tame our technicist culture with knowledge and perspectives which transcend ideology. His first chapter thus argues against some current ideologies (e.g., marxism, experimentalism) which, in his view, distort our understanding of contemporary culture. Unfortunately, in the process, he also undermines strategies that could assist thinkers in their search for non-ideological perspectives. For example, he rejects "macrocosmic views" of knowledge - what epistemologists are supposed to develop concerning the nature of knowledge. Allegedly, they induce "skepticism about the validity of knowledge in the arts, crafts, trades, sports, professions and disciplines, and this skepticism is an affront to the experts in these domains and contrary to human dignity." In particular, he criticizes philosophers of science for having nothing to contribute to knowledge or its discovery. This assertion is belied, however, by the fact that no less than Nobel prize winners Medawar, Monod and Eccles have publicly acknowledged their indebtedness to Karl Popper for their conception of science and their approach to scientific research. Moreover, one could wonder why Vandenberg accepts unquestioningly the legitimacy and integrity of the various forms of human thought and activities (e.g., disciplines, crafts, arts) despite the spirited debate on the "forms of life" and "forms of knowledge". If