

chapters in *The Making of Frenchmen*, and histories of the Orders. Prost seems his main general source for the later period, although Moody's work is a decade more recent and far superior. Strangely, he calls "primaire relatively unimportant" (p. x), although it had many more students and had links with *secondaire* in the looser organization of the ancien regime.

The tone of the book is biased. The Third Republic histories of towns, a major source for this work, were often anticlerical, and Huppert seems to have adopted their assumptions. The author decides that "the bourgeois . . . had penetrated the clergy's secrets long ago" (p. 63), refers to "clerical arrogance" toward his heroes, and imagines that all bishops believed that "there could be . . . no learning other than that meant for clerics" (p. 3). We hear that things were "commonly suspected" and "city officials were bound to . . ." (both p. 62) when there is little evidence. "Bourgeois" is a mystifying term that seems, in different places, a synonym for town counsellor, city-dweller, and well-to-do non-aristocrat. There is indecisiveness if not outright confusion about whether schools were more or less socially restricted in different periods. The chatty prose is both imprecise and too cute.

Attempting to emphasize innovation during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the author denigrates prior and future efforts. Claiming originality for his book, Huppert fails to give other historians their due. If one concentrates on the development of municipal schools during Renaissance France, the book makes a contribution but it need be read judiciously.

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Vandenberg, Donald. *Human Rights in Education*. New York, New York: Philosophical Library, Ltd., 1983, 272 pp., US \$15.00 (cloth).

Though numerous published materials have attempted to show the relationship between human rights and education, Vandenberg's book is the first ambitious effort to explore it with the intensity and seriousness it deserves. Clearly, such an effort is long overdue. By and large, available works on the topic espouse human rights in education by simply assuming that they are everyone's entitlement, by reading into constitutional provisions and legislative documents, by appealing to international covenants, and/or by invoking popular public sentiment. However, the underlying justification behind such assumptions, documents and invocations has remained largely untouched. Thus, if only because it addresses the ethical and moral considerations associated with human rights in education, Vandenberg's book is readily to be appreciated. *Human Rights in Education* is valuable because, among other things, it succeeds in showing us that such rights are not reducible merely or wholly to political and legalistic demands by groups and individuals.

Rightly, Vandenberg sets his espousal of human rights in education in the context of societies dominated by technological consciousness and competing ideologies. The educational task, as he sees it, is to enable individuals personally to understand and tame our technicist culture with knowledge and perspectives which transcend ideology. His first chapter thus argues against some current ideologies (e.g., marxism, experimentalism) which, in his view, distort our understanding of contemporary culture. Unfortunately, in the process, he also undermines strategies that could assist thinkers in their search for non-ideological perspectives. For example, he rejects "macrocosmic views" of knowledge - what epistemologists are supposed to develop concerning the nature of knowledge. Allegedly, they induce "skepticism about the validity of knowledge in the arts, crafts, trades, sports, professions and disciplines, and this skepticism is an affront to the experts in these domains and contrary to human dignity." In particular, he criticizes philosophers of science for having nothing to contribute to knowledge or its discovery. This assertion is belied, however, by the fact that no less than Nobel prize winners Medawar, Monod and Eccles have publicly acknowledged their indebtedness to Karl Popper for their conception of science and their approach to scientific research. Moreover, one could wonder why Vandenberg accepts unquestioningly the legitimacy and integrity of the various forms of human thought and activities (e.g., disciplines, crafts, arts) despite the spirited debate on the "forms of life" and "forms of knowledge". If

nothing else, that debate should have warned Vandenberg that uncritical acceptance of their legitimacy or integrity without consideration of external standards or criteria makes it difficult for us to deny legitimacy to activities and knowledge claims found in witchcraft, astrology and the like. To discover relevant standards, discussion of macrocosmic views is a necessity, Vandenberg's views notwithstanding. In any case, whether he realizes it or not his rejection of macrocosmic views presupposes his own unexamined, unargued macrocosmic views on the nature of knowledge.

Chapter Two looks like a pivotal chapter because it not only presents the methodology needed to formulate the theory of human rights in education but also argues the foundations of these rights and the moral principles associated with them. For his methodology, he adopts Kohlberg's sixth stage reasoning as one which satisfies commitment to reasonableness. This may be unexceptionable if it is understood that the stage is accepted simply in terms of its procedures and criteria (e.g., consistency, impartiality, universalizability) for arriving at moral judgments. Acceptance should be guarded, however. Kohlberg has associated the structure of stage six reasoning with Rawls' theory of justice and claimed that it is better than structures of reasoning based on other theories like social contract and utilitarianism. This issue, of course, is wide open. Yet Vandenberg's inclination against utilitarianism is evident, even as he professes that his task does not call for a direct incursion into questions of value or axiology.

Despite his hesitation to deal with axiology, Vandenberg is forced to do so even if briefly in several places because of his view that human rights and associated moral principles are based eventually on axiological values. He finds that the ultimate value, the intrinsically good, is living. The intrinsic value of *human* living is a special case of the intrinsic value of living. Insofar as human living involves human beings who possess human dignity and in that respect are persons, and insofar as the moral domain is distinctively the interhuman domain, the most basic moral principle for Vandenberg is respect for persons.

Vandenberg leaves us not entirely satisfied. His assertion that living, by itself, unqualified by "happy" or "beneficial", is intrinsically good sounds hollow as we think of the life of viruses, animal carriers of diseases and criminals. Moreover, he does not bother to ask whether his argumentation succeeds in bridging the alleged gap between factual human condition and moral values/principles. And he assumes that "One learns to value things by becoming aware of their qualitative characteristics on the level of perceptual consciousness." This, despite his recognition of the limitations of intuitionism.

Surprisingly, Vandenberg postpones the most explicit discussion of human dignity until Chapter Seven although he regards it as the fundamental principle upon which the principles of human right and morality (such as respect for persons, freedom, equality and fraternity) depend. He equates human dignity with human beings' possession of reason and moral agency. Human rights in education arise insofar as the latter is concerned with the development of individuals in full possession of human dignity because capable of reason and moral agency. For Vandenberg, human dignity requires the implementation of moral principles which are consistent with, and which serve to determine the conduct and conditions in schools conducive to, that dignity.

Once the general thrust of this argument is accepted, the full value of the volume emerges. From the third chapter to the last, Vandenberg convincingly elucidates certain educational questions, analyses the moral terms or principles relevant to them, justifies these terms or principles as human rights, and then resolves the questions. Each chapter reflects the courage of Vandenberg's convictions guided by the logic of his arguments. His understanding of educational and philosophical issues raised is admirable. His conclusions and suggestions concerning the conduct of the teaching-learning process, borne of moral insights, lucid reasoning and practical common sense, are frequently quite unexceptionable.

Undoubtedly, *Human Rights in Education* advances considerably the state of our understanding of a sensitive educational issue today. It is a book that requires careful reflection and thus may not commend itself to harried practitioners in the field. Nevertheless, in my view, it is a book which every educator, and everyone else interested in education, ought to read.