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CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION PRACTICES AND APPROACHES WITHIN UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS

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Introduction

Over the last two decades the *civil-military coordination* concept has developed on two levels, the strategic level and the operational/tactical level. When it is used at the strategic level it refers to a type of mission construct and when it is used at the operational and tactical level it refers to a specific function within the military force. These multiple identities and meanings have caused considerable confusion.

At the strategic level *civil-military coordination* is used to suggest a multidimensional, whole-of-government or comprehensive approach, where various civilian and at least one military entity are engaged in a joint initiative or mission. From the military perspective it is understandable that all possible missions, e.g. UN integrated missions, NATO comprehensive approach, national PRT-type whole-of-government missions or AU multidimensional missions, are viewed as military-civilian relationships, because they all represent, from the military perspective, some form of military mission that requires them to have a relationship with one or more civilian entities. Peacekeeping used to be a military affair, but more and more civilian roles were added after the end of the Cold War when UN peace operations started to change from being cease-fire observation operations to becoming multi-dimensional missions that

were meant to support the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements. To reflect the fact that these military operations now had to manage a new type of mission that included civilian entities, these kinds of missions were sometimes referred to in civil-military coordination terms. As the civilian dimension of the post-Cold War peace missions grew in scope and number, however, the bi-polar civil-military concept no longer adequately described the new multi-polar coordination challenges of contemporary UN peace missions. In the UN integrated missions context, for instance, the focus is instead on country-level system-wide coordination across the political, security, development, rule of law, human rights and humanitarian dimensions.

The point is that whilst 'civil-military coordination' may thus still be a meaningful term to describe the relationship between a NATO-type military operation and its civilian counterparts at the strategic level, the term is no longer meaningfully applied at the strategic level to UN peace missions, because in these missions the military component is embedded in a new multi-dimensional reality, where the emphasis has shifted from 'civil-military coordination' to mission-wide coordination in the integrated mission context.

At the operational and tactical levels, 'civil-military coordination' is used to refer to the specific policies, modalities, structures and tactics that are used to manage the relationship between the military and other components of an operation. At this level the focus has predominantly been on the humanitarian-military relationship, and two distinct sets of policies have developed over the years: one policy-set that deals with the relationship from a military perspective, e.g. NATO Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) doctrine, and another dealing with it from a humanitarian perspective, i.e. UN

Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN CMCoord). Civil-military coordination beyond the humanitarian-military relationship, for instance in the context of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR); Security Sector Reform (SSR); Rule of Law (RoL); electoral support; etc. has, from a policy perspective, not been adequately dealt with at the operational/tactical level. In this vacuum, the policies developed for the very specific needs of the humanitarian-military relationship, where the independence of the civilian partners are emphasized and safeguarded, is often misapplied in a peacebuilding context, where there is no need for such emphasis on separate identities and guarded coordination.[1]

This paper will focus on the way the civil-military coordination concept is used in contemporary United Nations (UN) peace operations. It will reflect on the civil-military coordination policy debate, and place it in the context of contemporary thinking about UN peace operations. The paper will deal with civil-military coordination at both the strategic- and operational/tactical-levels in the UN context, it will address a number of factors that are unique to the UN mission context, and it will describe and discuss the operational and tactical manifestations of the civil-military coordination function in contemporary UN missions.

The paper aims to further our understanding of civil-military coordination by clarifying how the concept is understood, shaped and applied in contemporary UN peace operations. In so doing, those familiar with the concept in other contexts, for instance in the context of national doctrine, or with the way it is being used in NATO, the European Union, or the African Union, should be in a better position to understand the

[1] For a discussion on the need to develop civil-military coordination policies for the peacebuilding context, see: Cedric de Coning, 'Civil-Military Coordination and UN Peacebuilding Operations', in Langholtz, H. Kondoch, B. and Wells, A. (eds), *International Peacekeeping: The Yearbook of International Peace Operations*, Volume 11, (Koninklijke Brill N.V.: Bruxelles, 2007).

different contexts within which the concept can be understood and applied. This should assist in avoiding or clearing-up misunderstandings and contribute to improved coherence and coordination when and where people from these different entities plan and operate together.

NAVIGATING THE CONCEPTUAL CONFUSION

When analysing specific civil-military coordination definitions, policies and doctrines it should first be noted that these have all been developed for the operational/tactical level. There seem to be two main conceptual streams, i.e. 'cooperation' and 'coordination', and an acronym soup of specific functions and titles: CIMIC, CIMCO, CMO, CMA, CMCoord, CML, CMLO, etc.

Before we unpack *civil-military coordination* as it is used in the UN context, it should be noted that there are several other concepts in use outside the UN context, of which "Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)" as used by NATO[2], most countries in Europe, as well as Canada, Australia and New-Zealand, is the best known and most widely used. The European Union (EU) also uses a slightly different CIMIC[3] concept, and is now also developing a new "Civil-Military Coordination (CIMCO)" concept. The United

[2] The NATO definition of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) is the co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil populations, including national and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies . See NATO, *Military Policy on Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC)*, CIMICWG 001-00, WP(MC411), (NATO: Brussels, 2000), p. 1.

[3] The EU definition of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) is the co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between military components of EU-led Crisis Management Operations and civil role-players (external to the EU), including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies. See EU, *Civil-Military Cooperation* (EU: Brussels, 2002), p. 9.

States of America (USA) has its own terminology and doctrine, and they use the term Civil Military Operations (CMO)[4] to describe their overall concept.

UN peace operations differ from most NATO, EU and coalition peace and stability operations in that: (a) they are typically consent-based operations, i.e. they are deployed after a cease-fire or peace agreement has been signed, at the request of the parties to the conflict, to support them with the implementation of the peace agreement, and (b) the military force is deployed as part of an integrated peace mission under overall civilian direction, and in so doing becomes embedded in the UN mission.

From a UN military perspective, the civil-military relationship between the military component and the other multidimensional components of a UN peace operation, and between the military component and the rest of the UN System[5], will already be pre-determined, to a large degree, by existing UN policies[6], and by the mandate and organisational structure[7] of the specific UN peace operation. There is thus no need, in the UN context, to motivate for the establishment of mission specific civil-military coordination mechanisms to manage this relationship, as there would already be

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[4] CMO is the activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and non governmental civilian organisations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. See US military publications: JP 3-57, FM 41-10 & JP 1-02.

[5] In this paper, 'UN system' (not capitalised) is used to refer to all the members of the UN family in a general sense, whilst 'UN System' (capitalised) is used in the context of an UN Integrated Mission where there is a systematic effort to achieve system-wide coherence through various policies, procedures, mechanisms and processes.

[6] See for instance the UN Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC) Guidelines on the Functioning of the Resident Coordinator System, 24 September 1999; the UN Secretary-General's Note of Guidance on Relations between Representatives of the Secretary General, Resident Coordinators and Humanitarian Coordinators, dated 11 December 2000; the UN Secretary-General's Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions, dated 17 January 2006; and DPKO's Policy Directive on Joint Operations Centers and Joint Mission Analysis Centres, dated 31 May 2006.

[7] See for instance the different types of integrated missions (separate, partial and full integration) identified in Barth Eide, E., Kaspersen, A.T., Kent, R. & von Hippel, K., *Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations* (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI): Oslo, 2005) , p. 9.

several mission-wide coordination mechanisms built into the mission design[8], and an expectation that further mechanisms will be established as the need arises.

NATO, EU, AU and coalition type operations, in contrast, are typically deployed in a more contested environment as stability (peace enforcement) operations, either to secure a cease-fire, or to support a cease-fire or peace agreement in situations where there is still considerable hostility by some factions against the peace agreement, e.g. as is the case in Afghanistan, Sudan (Darfur) and Somalia in 2007, when this article was written. They are deployed as essentially military operations that exist as a separate legal and organizational entity from the UN or other international or regional groupings that may be active in the conflict-prevention, peacemaking or peacebuilding spheres in the same country. There is thus a need for these operations to establish liaison and cooperation arrangements between themselves and their civilian counterparts, including with the UN mission and agencies that share the same theatre of operations.

Whilst in many cases such NATO, EU, AU and coalition operations act under a UN Security Council authority, and are thus meant to be part of the international communities' larger strategic comprehensive approach to the conflict in question, the relationship between the military and civilian entities in a UN integrated mission and a NATO-type military mission is fundamentally different. The point is that whilst there is a need to establish strategic-level civil-military cooperation linkages in NATO-type military operations, no such need exist in the UN integrated mission context where the military

[8] Such as the Joint Operations Centre (JOC), the Joint Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC), the Integrated Mission Planning Team (IMPT), etc.

component is embedded in the mission and participates in several mission-wide coordination mechanisms.

The use of cooperation vs. coordination is somewhat related to this distinction. From a UN perspective, coordination refers to a spectrum of relations that range from coexistence to cooperation. This UN coordination concept has been developed in the context of humanitarian civil-military coordination, where coexistence refers to a situation where the minimum necessary information is being shared between the humanitarian community and a military combatant force. This would typically include sharing of information about security, movement of humanitarian convoys and the management of shared resources, e.g. a port or airport. Cooperation refers to a maximum state of civil-military coordination where there is a range of cooperative relations between the humanitarian community and a military force that is not regarded as a combatant force, typically including joint planning, division of labour and sharing of information.[9] The UN and NATO understanding of cooperation and coordination seem to be reversed, because in the NATO context, cooperation is understood to imply a less binding relationship than coordination, and NATO argues that the humanitarian community will be willing to cooperate, but not coordinate, and therefore they use cooperation.[10]

[9] OCHA, *Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies* (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs: Geneva, 2004), 5.
[10] NATO, *Military Policy on Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC)*, footnote 2.

UN Terminology and Concepts for Civil Military Coordination

The UN peace operations and humanitarian community has agreed on the common use of the term *Civil-Military Coordination*. There are, however, several abbreviations and at least two distinct approaches within the UN context.

There are two compatible, but different approaches to civil-military coordination in the UN context, namely a humanitarian and a peace operations approach. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has, under the authority of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), facilitated the development of a series of UN humanitarian civil-military coordination policies and guidelines. These include:

- the 'Guidelines on the use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief' (the so-called Oslo Guidelines first adopted in May 1994 and re-launched in 2006);
- the discussion paper and guidelines on the 'Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys' of September 2001; and
- the 'Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies' of March 2004.

In addition, in June 2004, the IASC adopted a reference paper on *Civil-Military Relations in Complex Emergencies* that complements and expands the principles and guidelines previously developed on the use of military and civil defence assets and armed escorts. It also provides guidance of a more general nature for civil-military coordination in humanitarian emergencies.

The complex emergency guidelines and the reference paper also introduced a new concept into our vocabulary, namely UN Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN CMCoord), which is defined as: "The essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimise inconsistency, and when

appropriate pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training".[11]

Taken together, the three humanitarian civil-military coordination guidelines and the reference paper represent the UN policy on humanitarian civil-military coordination.

The UN guidelines for humanitarian-military coordination can be summarised in the following six operating principles for the use of military assets in humanitarian operations:

1) Decisions to accept military assets must be made by humanitarian organisations, not political authorities, and based solely on humanitarian criteria;
2) Military assets should be requested only where there is no comparable civilian alternative and only if the use of military assets can meet a critical humanitarian need. The military asset must therefore be unique in nature or timeliness of deployment, and its use should be as a last resort;
3) A humanitarian operation using military assets must retain its civilian nature and character. The operation must remain under the overall authority and control of the humanitarian organisation responsible for that operation, whatever the specific command arrangements for the military asset itself. As much as possible, the military asset should operate unarmed and be civilian in appearance;
4) Countries providing military personnel to support humanitarian operations should ensure that they respect the code of conduct and principles of the humanitarian organisation responsible for that deployment;
5) The large-scale involvement of military personnel in the direct delivery of humanitarian assistance should be avoided; and
6) Any use of military assets should ensure that the humanitarian operation retains its international and multilateral character".[12]

From a UN peace operations perspective, it is important to understand that these UN humanitarian policies and guidelines for civil-military coordination are

[11] OCHA, *Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies*, footnote 8.

[12] These six general operating principles for the use of military assets in support of humanitarian operations was adopted when the 'Report of the Task Force on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Support of Humanitarian Operations' was approved by the XIXth Meeting of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Working Group on 27 September 1995 in Geneva.

focused on, and limited to, the humanitarian dimension of civil-military coordination, i.e. between humanitarian actors and the military. Humanitarian actors are those motivated by the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence and who act to save lives and alleviate suffering by meeting the most basic needs (water, sanitation, health, food, shelter, etc.) of people.

At the operational/tactical level in UN peace operations, civil-military coordination takes place between the military component and all the civilian components of the UN mission, other members of the UN system and all the other external[13] and internal[14] actors in the mission area. Thus, apart from liaison with the independent (from the UN) humanitarian actors, civil-military coordination in the UN peace operation and peacebuilding context is likely to include interaction with mission civilian functions such as: political affairs, civil affairs, public information, human rights, DDR, rule of law and/or judicial affairs, SSR, elections, recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction, return and resettlement of refugees and IDPs, civil- and child protection, etc. and the various entities that make up the mission support component, as well as various civilian actors outside the UN mission such as UN agencies, donor agencies, international development NGOs, private contractors, the local civilian authorities, the local civil society, etc.

The civil-military coordination concept in the UN peace operations context has to cover all possible mission scenarios, and has to be relevant to the whole life-span of a peace operation, i.e. from the stabilisation phase, which will typically be focussed on achieving a safe and secure environment and on providing support to humanitarian

[13] External actors are all international actors engaged in undertaking humanitarian assistance, conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities in a given country or conflict system.
[14] Internal actors are all local actors in the country or conflict system where peacebuilding activities take place.

action, through the transition and consolidation phases, which will typically be more peacebuilding focussed.[15] The point is that civil-military coordination in the UN peace operations context thus has to address a series of relationships, and a range of mission scenarios and mission phases, which extend beyond the humanitarian dimension.

The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has developed a civil-military coordination policy specifically for UN peace operations that was released in September 2002. The DPKO definition of civil-military coordination is: "UN Civil-military coordination is the system of interaction, involving exchange of information, negotiation, de-confliction, mutual support, and planning at all levels, between military elements and humanitarian organisations, development organisations, and the local civilian population to achieve UN objectives."[16]

Because of the confusion caused by the number of acronyms already in use in the civil-military coordination/cooperation field at that time, the 2002 DPKO policy has refrained from using a specific acronym for civil-military coordination. However, in practice, DPKO has been using the abbreviation 'CIMIC' in most of its mission plans, mission structures and staff appointments to date, with two exceptions. The term 'CIMCOORD', that has no definitional or policy reference, is currently being used by the military component in the UN Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)[17]. In the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), the term 'Civil-Military Liaison Officer (CMLO)', which is the term allocated for UN peace operations military personnel in the 2004 IASC reference paper,

[15] For more information on the phases (stabilisation, transition and consolidation) referred to here, see de Coning, footnote 1.
[16] DPKO, *Policy on Civil-Military Coordination* (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO): New York, 2002), 2.
[17] The exact history behind the use of 'CIMCOORD' in MINUSTAH is unclear, but it would seems as if there used to be a civilian OCHA 'UN CMCoord' post that was incorporated into the DPKO mission at some point and became 'CIMCOORD' in the process. The military component used to have a CIMIC branch, but at some point in the mission's history the civilian CIMCOORD position was not renewed and the military took over the CIMCOORD designation.

has been used to describe the staff function, while the branch at headquarters is still being referred to as CIMIC.[18]

At the time of writing, DPKO was considering a revised civil-military coordination policy, and a debate was underway as to whether DPKO should adopt the CMLO terminology proposed for UN peace operations use in the 2004 IASC reference paper, or whether is should continue to use CIMIC. Those in favour of the 'Civil Military Liaison (CML)' terminology argue that the term CIMIC is inappropriate in the UN context because it is generally accepted to refer to interaction that is purely related to the achievement of a military commander's mission.[19]

This article takes a more pragmatic approach based on the recognition that 'CIMIC', as an acronym, is now so entrenched in the military culture that it would take a disproportional effort to dislodge it. The focus on the acronym 'CIMIC' makes this an unnecessarily confrontational or negative debate. A more pragmatic approach would be to capitalise on the fact that most military officers should be familiar with the 'CIMIC' acronym, and probably understand it broadly to refer to civil-military relations. DPKO should focus on how 'CIMIC' is different in the UN integrated mission context, rather than on trying to stop the use of the 'CIMIC' acronym. By using 'UN CIMIC' as the acronym for the UN peacekeeping definition of 'civil-military coordination', DPKO will make it easier for Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) to merge the 'UN CIMIC' concept with their own national, regional or alliance CIMIC doctrinal approaches when

[18] At the time UNMIS was established DPKO has already develop the first drafts of its new civil-military liaison and coordination policy. Whilst the Force Generation service of DPKO planned and structured the Force Headquarters with a CIMIC branch, the OCHA CMCoord Officer on the ground convinced the mission that it should adopt the CMLO terminology reserved for peace operations in the 2004 IASC reference paper and in the draft DPKO policy.

[19] DPKO, *Civil-Military Liaison in UN Integrated Missions* (Final Draft Version 8), (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO): New York, 2007), 4.

preparing staff officers and units for service in UN peace operations. It will also make it easier for the UN, AU and others to manage transitions between missions, or to work alongside each other, as in the UN/AU hybrid mission in Darfur, or with the EU co-deployments with the UN in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

UN Civil-Military Coordination (UN CIMIC) in Practice

UN Civil-Military Coordination is the function within the military component of a UN peace operation responsible for facilitating liaison and coordination between the military component of the UN mission, other civilian UN mission components, UN agencies[20], non-UN external actors (including NGOs, etc.) and the host community (including national and local authorities, civil society, traditional and community leaders, etc.). For the sake of using a specific acronym for civil-military coordination, as a function within the military component of a UN peace operation at the operational/tactical level, this article will use 'UN CIMIC'.

The primary role of the military component of a UN peace operation is to ensure a safe and secure environment within which the rest of the external and internal actors can operate. A secondary role of the military component is to make its resources available to external and internal actors in support of the overall mission objectives. For instance, in the context of a DDR programme, the military component, over and above its security function, may be in a position to provide transport, medical services, camp building, weapons storage and/or weapon destruction services to the civilian DDR unit within the mission and the various agencies and actors that support the national DDR

[20] For ease of reference, 'UN agencies' is used here in the generic sense to cover all UN agencies, funds, programmes and departments.

coordination mechanism. In such a scenario the military component is likely to second liaison officers and subject experts to the mission's DDR unit, provide military observers to assist with the verification of combatants and weapons, provide military units to secure the area where DDR activities are being undertaken, provide experts to manage the storage and or destruction of weapons, provide engineers to assist with camp building and maintenance, etc.

The fact that UN CIMIC is a secondary role within the military component of a UN peace operation is reflected in the scope of the human, financial, and operational resources dedicated to the UN CIMIC function in comparison to those dedicated to the core operational or security function of the military component.

For example, in 2006 in the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) there were ten UN CIMIC staff officers at the Force and Sector headquarters.[21] Of these, three were at the Force HQ and one each at seven Sector HQs. The total approved force strength for UNMIS in 2006 were approximately 10,000 troops, so the UN CIMIC component represents only 0.001% of the total force strength. Similarly in 2007 in the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), there were seven UN CIMIC staff officers at Force HQ and one UN CIMIC staff officer at each of the four Sector HQ, that is, eleven UN CIMIC staff officers in total. The UN CIMIC compliment in UNMIL thus represents 0.007% of the approximately 15,000 approved force strength.

The ratios for UNMIS and UNMIL given here are representative of the ratios found in the other contemporary UN integrated missions. The point is that CIMIC

[21] As referred to earlier, in UNMIS these staff officers have been designated as 'Civil-Military Liaison Officers (CMLOs)', the terminology identified for UN peace operations in the 2004 IASC Reference Paper.

remains a small specialised staff function that represents a very small percentage of the overall effort of the military component of a UN peace operation.

In all current UN peace operations, the UN CIMIC function is the responsibility of two different types of UN CIMIC officers, namely staff officers and unit-level officers. In UN missions the UN CIMIC branch consists of staff officers at the Force HQ and Sector HQ levels. At unit level there are usually liaison officers of some kind, but these are not officially part of the UN CIMIC branch of the mission. In practice, however, the Force HQ and Sector HQ UN CIMIC staff will work closely with the liaison officers at unit level, as that is where most of the UN CIMIC mission support and community support tasks are performed.

At Force HQ there is typically a small UN CIMIC cell. The Force HQ UN CIMIC cell is usually either a sub-section of the operations branch, or in some cases it may be a separate command function. In the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), for instance, the CIMIC cell is located within a larger operational support branch alongside engineering and medical support. The UN CIMIC HQ cell is usually organised around a UN CIMIC Chief at Colonel or Lieutenant Colonel level, and a Deputy UN CIMIC Chief at Lieutenant Colonel or Major level. The other UN CIMIC staff at FHQ are usually organised as liaison officers for the sectors as in UNMIL, or around thematic areas, for example those responsible for dealing with humanitarian agencies (mission support), local authorities (community support) and Quick Impact Projects. A UN CIMIC cell at Force HQ can range from three (UNMIS) to seven (UNMIL) and will rarely be more than ten.

At Sector HQ there is usually at least one UN CIMIC officer at the rank of Major or Captain. In some missions there may be a team of two or more UN CIMIC officers per sector organised around team sites or UN CIMIC houses (UNMEE). The UN CIMIC Sector officer serves as the link between the military units and the HQ, maintains sector level UN CIMIC information, and serves as a coordination point between the military component and civilian partners at sector level.

Most military units, which are typically infantry or mechanised infantry battalions, but which may also include specialised units such as engineering battalions, transport units, medical hospitals, and air wings, do not deploy into a UN peace operation with a separate UN CIMIC officer. Soon after deployment, however, they realise the need to have some kind of liaison officer that can serve as a focal point for contact with civilian partners. Unfortunately, in most cases, this means that someone that already has a given staff function is tasked to also serve as the UN CIMIC officer. This is typically the 2nd in Command, the Adjutant to the Commander, the Intelligence Officer or the Military Information Officer. The latter two options are problematic and are not advisable, as the UN CIMIC function should be seen to be carried out as independently as possible[22]. Even although the liaison officer at unit level may not be appointed as such, we can regard this person as the unit-level UN CIMIC officer for the purposes of this article.

[22] An intelligence officer who is double hated as a CIMIC officer will tend to use his/her CIMIC role as a cover to gather intelligence, and this is likely to cause tension between the unit and humanitarian counterparts. The same would be true for military information officers who would tend to use their CIMIC role as a vehicle for psychological operations as opposed to an end in itself.

Key UN CIMIC Roles and Functions

One can identify three distinct UN CIMIC functions in UN peace operations, namely liaison and information management, mission support, and community support.[23]



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Liaison and Information Management lies at the core of coordination and refers to a wide range of activities involving the exchange and management of information at all UN CIMIC levels. Depending on where one finds oneself on the coexistence-cooperation spectrum, these activities can include, for example, participating in joint assessments, joint planning, and attending or hosting coordination meetings. In most

[23] Cedric de Coning, *Civil-Military Coordination in UN and African Peace Operations* (ACCORD: Durban, 2007), pp. 119-145, and Cedric de Coning (ed.) *CIMIC in UN and African Peace Operations* (ACCORD: Durban, 2006), pp. 189-216, which is also available on http://www.accord.org.za/cimic/manual.htm

[24] de Coning, Cedric, *Civil-Military Coordination in United Nations and African Peace Operations*, (ACCORD, Durban ,2007), p.122.

cases in UN peace operations, UN CIMIC officers will be attending liaison meetings rather than hosting them, as the focus is on liaison with others and not on coordinating others. In some cases, where relevant and needed, UN CIMIC officers may host or provide briefings on the security situation to their civilian partners.

Mission Support refers to those actions a military component undertakes in support of an external civilian partner, for instance providing transport, providing specialised equipment or expertise, or providing a security escort for a humanitarian convoy. The range of activities covered by the Mission Support function can be divided into two categories, namely the provision of military assets and the provision of security services. As introduced earlier, the UN humanitarian community has developed specific policies and guidelines for the use of military assets, on the one hand, and the use of military escorts on the other, and these policies and guidelines are used to steer the role of UN CIMIC Mission Support in the context of humanitarian-military relations. Most contemporary UN peace operations have a range of peacebuilding mandates as well, and a number of new mission support activities are emerging in the context of DDR, SSR, RoL, etc.

Community Support refers to those actions military units undertake to support local communities and to build confidence in the peace process. Such actions can include rehabilitating infrastructure such as roads and bridges, supporting social services such as schools and clinics, and supporting national reconciliation and nation-building initiatives, such as national and cultural celebrations and sports initiatives. Community Support activities can be funded in a variety of ways. A military unit, like any other component within a UN mission, can apply for the use of Quick Impact (QIP)

Projects.[25] In some cases UN CIMIC officers will be involved in identifying potential QIP projects, facilitating applications and supervising and monitoring their execution, but the actual projects will be carried out by local contractors (e.g. school and water point rehabilitation by UNMEE). In others military units may actually carry out the work and QIP funds are used to purchase the material (e.g. minor bridge and road rehabilitation by UNAMSIL). In some cases military units are provided with national funds for UN CIMIC Community Support projects (e.g. Spain in UNIFIL and Finland in UNMEE) or with medical and other supplies (e.g. Egypt in UNMIS). In others the military units themselves collect funds among the soldiers for community support activities (e.g. Nigeria in UNMIL) or share some of their own stores with the communities where they are deployed (e.g. Pakistan in UNMIL & MONUC). In some cases a country will deploy specialised personnel with its units with the sole purpose of Community Support activities (e.g. India with the deployment of a veterinary doctor in UNMIS).

These types of Community Support projects have the potential to be confused with, or to be wrongly reported as, humanitarian activities, and this is a source of tension with the humanitarian community.[26] It is thus important that military units receive clear guidance as to what are considered appropriate Community Support activities, and that their Community Support activities are closely coordinated with their civilian counterparts through the UN CIMIC function.[27] It is the responsibility of the Force Commander, on the advice of his CIMIC staff, and in close coordination with the

[25] See DPKO's Policy Directive on *Quick Impact Projects (QIPs*), dated 12 February 2007.
[26] Stuart Gordon, 'Unintended Consequences of Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace Operations', pp. 109-130, in Chiyuki Aoi, Cedric de Coning and Ramesh Thakur (eds.), *The Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations*, United Nations University Press, 2007, Tokyo.
[27] See the *Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the Review of Military Involvement in Civil Assistance in Peacekeeping Operations*, dated 13 December 2005.

DSRSG/RC/HC to provide such guidance to the military units serving in a specific mission, and it is the responsibility of DPKO to provide generic principles and guidance for all UN peace operations.[28]

It is important to note that the work of the UN CIMIC staff officers at Force and Sector Headquarters will focus primarily on liaison and information management. The mission support and community support UN CIMIC activities will typically be carried out by the appropriate tactical military unit that has the requisite resources and expertise. UN CIMIC officers will channel the requests for mission and community support, advise their commanders on the appropriateness of the support, and coordinate among the various stakeholders involved, whilst the actual tactical execution of the mission and community support tasks will be the responsibility of the unit selected and tasked to execute it. In some cases, however, especially at unit level, it cannot be ruled out that the UN CIMIC officer may be tasked to carry out specific UN CIMIC operations, such as commanding a military escort for a humanitarian convoy or supervising a specific community support project – such as rehabilitating a local school. Whilst UN CIMIC officers should have received specialised training in UN civil-military coordination policy and practise, either prior to deployment or in-mission, it is unlikely that the tactical units executing mission support and community support tasks would have been exposed to such training or policies. It is thus important that the CIMIC officers provide adequate briefings to the tactical units in question, and monitor their performance with a view to arranging additional training, where necessary.

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[28] Paragraph 12 of the Secretary-General's *Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions*, dated 17 January 2006, deals with the potential for tension between military 'hearts and minds' type actions and humanitarian assistance, and states that such military actions need to be coordinated with the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC).

UN INTEGRATED MISSIONS & CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION

The mixed findings of a number of recent peacekeeping, humanitarian and peacebuilding evaluation reports[29] and related research[30], and the poor sustainability of peacebuilding activities undertaken to date[31], have resulted in a renewed focus on efforts aimed at improving our ability to undertake meaningful, coherent, coordinated and sustainable peace interventions. For example, the Joint *Utstein* Study of peacebuilding, that analyzed 336 peacebuilding projects implemented by Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Norway over the last decade, has identified a lack of coherence at the strategic level, what it terms a 'strategic deficit', as the most significant obstacle to sustainable peacebuilding.[32] The *Utstein* study found that more than 55% of the programmes it evaluated did not show any link to a larger country strategy.

The UN system has responded to this challenge by commissioning a series of high-level panels and working groups[33] that considered various aspects of this dilemma,

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[29] Amongst others: Dahrendorf, N. *A Review of Peace Operations: A Case for Change* (King's College: London, 2003); Porter, T. *An External Review of the CAP (*UN OCHA: New York, 2002); Sommers, Marc. *The Dynamics of Coordination (*Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute of International Affairs: Occasional Paper #40, Providence, 2000); Stockton, N. *Strategic Coordination in Afghanistan (*Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU): Kabul, 2000); and Donini, A. *The Policies of Mercy: UN Coordination in Afghanistan, Mozambique and Rwanda*, (Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies: Providence, 2002).

[30] For instance, Stedman, S.J, Cousens, E. & Rothchild, D. (eds.) *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements (*Lynne Rienner: Boulder, 2002); Chesterman, S. *You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building (*Oxford University Press; Oxford, 2004); Fukuyama, F. *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (*Cornell University Press: Ithaca, 2004) and Paris, R. *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict (*Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2004).

[31] See Paul Collier et al., *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy (*Oxford University Press and the World Bank: New York, 2003) and Licklider, R. 1995 'The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars 1945-93', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 89, No. 3, pp. 681-690.

[32] Smith, Dan. *Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: the Synthesis Report of the Joint Utstein Study on Peacebuilding (*PRIO: Oslo, 2003), 16.

[33] See for instance the 2005, *In Larger Freedom: Towards Security, Development and Human Rights for All*, Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations (www.un.org/largerfreedom), and the 2006, *Delivering as One*, Report of the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on System-wide Coherence, United Nations, New York. (www.un.org/events/panel).

and by experimenting with a number of strategic and operational coordination models.[34] These efforts culminated, over the last half-decade, in the development of the Integrated Missions concept. Integrated Missions refers to a specific type of operational process and design, where the planning and coordination processes of the different elements of the United Nations (UN) family is integrated into a single country-level UN System, when it undertakes complex peace operations.

The former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan released a Note on Integrated Missions that describes the concept as follows:

> "An integrated mission is based on a common strategic plan and a shared understanding of the priorities and types of programme interventions that need to be undertaken at various stages of the recovery process. Through this integrated process, the UN system seeks to maximize its contribution towards countries emerging from conflict by engaging its different capabilities in a coherent and mutually supportive manner."[35]

The Integrated Missions concept thus refers to a type of mission where there are processes, mechanisms and structures in place that generate and sustain a common strategic objective, as well as a comprehensive operational approach, among the political, security, development, human rights, and where appropriate, humanitarian, UN actors at country level.[36]

The Note of the Secretary-General on Integrated Missions, establishes the Integrated Missions concept as the guiding principle for future complex peace operations. It states that: "Integration is the guiding principle for the design and

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[34] For example, the Integrated Mission Task Force concept for mission planning, the Strategic Framework concept in Afghanistan and the Results Focused Transitional Framework (RFTF) in Sierra Leone.

[35] United Nations, *Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions*, Issued by the Secretary-General on 9 December 2005, paragraph 4. See also the Revised *Note of Guidance on Integrated Mission*s, dated 17 January 2006, and released under a Note from the Secretary-General on 9 February 2006, paragraph 4.

[36] United Nations, *Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP)*, Guidelines endorsed by the Secretary-General on 13 June 2006, p. 3.

implementation of complex UN operations in post-conflict situations and for linking the different dimensions of peacebuilding (political, development, humanitarian, human rights, rule of law, social and security aspects) into a coherent support strategy."[37]

However, one needs to be mindful that there is at least one other way in which the integrated missions terminology is being used within the UN. The primary usage of the concept, as reflected in the Note on Integrated Missions released by the UN Secretary-General, refers to *system-wide* integration and is linked to a specific type of mission structure. Through UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 of 1991, the UN has been given the role of coordinating humanitarian assistance through the Emergency Relief Coordinator internationally, and the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) system at country level. The UN plays a similar role in development coordination through the UN Development Group (UNDG) and the Resident Coordinator (RC) system at country level. The UN is present in almost all developing countries, and the various UN agencies, funds and programmes in these countries are coordinated by the RC/HC. In the UN peace operation context, a mission becomes an 'integrated mission' when the RC/HC function is integrated with the peace operation through the appointment of a Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG/RC/HC). The Secretary-General's Note on Integrated Missions states that it applies to all missions that fall in this category.[38]

The second way in which the integrated missions terminology is being used refers to *multi-dimensional* integration. In this context it refers to the 'integration' of the

[37] *Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions,* footnote 25, paragraph 4.
[38] "This updated Note of Guidance applies to all integrated missions in which the SRSG is supported by a RC and HC serving as the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG/RC/HC)." *Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions,* footnote 25, paragraph 3.

various military, police and civilian components of a peace operation in a single office or unit. For instance, when the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)[39] establishes an 'Integrated Mission Training Cell' it is meant to indicate that the military, police and civilian training functions in a particular mission have been integrated into a single unit. This use of the terminology is confusing and should rather be replaced with the 'Joint' concept, as is used by DPKO when it refers to the 'Joint Operations Centre' or the 'Joint Mission Analysis Cell'.[40]

Integration, in the system-wide context of a UN integrated mission is not intended to imply the incorporation of one entity into another, or subsuming one entity under the management control (meaning control over resources) and command of another. Each UN department, programme, fund, office, etc. is meant to maintain its own mandate, identity, management system, funding lines and financial responsibility. Instead, it refers to the processes, mechanisms and structures that are applied to connect these various UN entities and the peacebuilding dimensions within which they carry out their work, together into a single interlinked, mutually supportive comprehensive UN country-level System. The objectives of this kind of integration are harmonization, alignment and coherence with a view to greater overall efficiency and effectiveness. The assumption of the integrated mission concept is thus that a coherent approach, that manages to produce a comprehensive and coordinated UN system-wide effort, will have a more relevant, effective, efficient and sustainable impact on the peace process.

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[39] Note that as of 1 January 2008 DPKO will be split into two departments, namely the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS). Ref General Assembly Resolution A/RES/61/256 of 22 March 2007.

[40] For DPKO's Policy Directive on Joint Operations Centres and Joint Mission Analysis Centres, see footnote 6. Although 'Joint' has a specific meaning in the military context, e.g. a joint army, air force and navy HQ, it can easily be understood to convey a broader common sense meaning that parts that previously operated separately are now joined together.

Within the UN system there are various semi-autonomous agencies, funds, offices and programmes that have a humanitarian and development mandate, as well as departments of the UN Secretariat that have the responsibility for peace operations. Although the core of the UN integration effort will be aimed at achieving system-wide coherence among these members of the overall UN System, the integration effort is not meant to be exclusively UN. The members within the UN System, and the UN Integrated Mission specifically, will facilitate, and participate in, various other coordination initiatives aimed at promoting harmonization among the external actors, and alignment between the internal and external actors in any given country or regional conflict system. In a number of emerging doctrines, including EU and NATO, this broader strategic coordination process of establishing linkages among all the external actors in a given country or regional conflict system is referred to as the ”comprehensive approach”.

Among some donors there are also initiatives underway to improve coherence internally among the different government departments engaged in international diplomacy, peace operations, development and humanitarian assistance. In the United Kingdom this process is known as the so-called “joined-up” or “whole-of-government” approach. In Canada this initiative was known as the so-called “3D”process, as it combined the defence, diplomatic and development functions of government.

The Integrated Missions concept should thus be understood in a wider international context where coherence[41] is being pursued at national level among

[41] See Robert Picciotto, *Fostering Development in a Global Economy: A Whole of Government Perspective, Introduction: Key Concepts, Central Issues (*OECD: Paris, 2005), pp. 13-14, where he identifies: (1) internal coherence, (2) whole of government coherence, (3) donor coherence and (4) country-level coherence.

government departments, and internationally among donors (harmonization[42]), between donor and recipients (alignment[43]), within the UN development, humanitarian and environment dimensions (system-wide coherence[44]), between the peace, security, human rights, humanitarian and development dimensions of the UN System at country level (system-wide integration), and among the military, police and civilian components of a UN peace operation (multi-dimensional integration).

The Integrated Mission concept has now been officially accepted in the UN System as the mission structure of choice.[45] It will be the dominant management structure for UN complex peace operations in the near- to mid-term, and it is likely that the European Union (EU), African Union (AU)[46] and others will try to apply its core features to their own future missions. However, one needs to be mindful that integration in a non-UN context will necessarily refer to multidimensional integration, rather than system-wide integration. For instance, the AU's 'Integrated Planning Task Force (IPTF)' refers to a mechanism where the military, police and civilian planning functions are combined in one process[47], as opposed to the UN's 'Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF)' that refers to the coming together of planners from the UN Department of

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[42] See the 'Rome Declaration on Harmonization' of 25 February 2003, www.aidharmonization.org (accessed on 12 May 2007).
[43] Note in this context the 'Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness' of 2 March 2005, www.oecd.org (accessed on 12 May 2007).
[44] See the 2006 '*Delivering as One*', report of the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on System-wide Coherence.
[45] *Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions,* footnote 29, paragraph 4.
[46] The African Union has embarked on an initiative to develop an African Standby Force (ASF) in May 2003 when the first ASF Policy Framework was adopted by the 3rd meeting of the African Chiefs of Defence Staff, and endorsed by the Maputo Summit in July 2003. The concept has subsequently been further developed through a series of workshops in 2005 and 2006 that looked at doctrine, training and evaluation, logistics, standing operating procedures, and command, control and communications. The target date for the operationalisation of the ASF is 2010. In the meantime the AU is engaged in peace operations in Darfur (AMIS) and Somalia (AMISOM), and both reflect elements of the multidimensional approach to integration. For instance, the strategic headquarters of the AMIS mission is the 'Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF)' and it consists of various AU military, police and civilian planners and support staff, as well as UN, EU and NATO advisors. The new proposed hybrid AU/UN mission in Darfur would also be an interesting experiment in that it may attempt to combine elements of the system-wide and multidimensional approaches to integration.
[47] "*Draft Policy Framework for the Civilian Dimension of the African Standby Force*" (African Union Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD): Addis Ababa, 2006), p. 7.

Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA), UN Development Group, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and others in the UN system. Non-UN entities such as NATO, EU or the AU would not be able to achieve the same degree of integration with UN development and humanitarian agencies that is possible for a UN peace operation, simply because the former is not part of the United Nations, and can not therefore be part of the UN System. That does not imply, however, that it is not possible to achieve meaningful coherence and coordination between entities like NATO and AU on the one hand, and UN system agencies on the other. It only means that the integrated missions terminology cannot be meaningfully applied when the coherence and coordination being pursued goes beyond the UN System.

Practical Challenges for the UN Integrated Missions Approach

As with any new innovation, the Integrated Mission concept has not been without its detractors, and it has highlighted various technical, administrative, organizational and budgetary challenges that need to be overcome before all aspects of the model can be fully implemented. The most serious concerns raised to date relate to the perceived loss of humanitarian independence when the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) becomes one of the Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (DSRSG). Whilst most humanitarian UN agencies seem to feel that by becoming part of the UN Integrated Mission structure they have more opportunities to influence the direction of the mission and to protect humanitarian space, more independent minded humanitarian NGOs have opted to create their own humanitarian coordination mechanisms that are more loosely

connected to the HC function, than before. This seems to be more acute in situations where OCHA has withdrawn or where the humanitarian coordination function has been incorporated into the UN mission, e.g. in UNMIL/Liberia.

There is also a more generally held view, however, that the Integrated Mission concept will make it more difficult for individual agencies to be associated with their products, and therefore to raise funds on the basis of their perceived visibility in a particular crisis. For instance, whilst a multitude of UN and non-UN agencies have worked together in the DDR campaign in Liberia, and are still working together in Sudan, the overall effects are generally reported as, and perceived to be, UN mission achievements. Whilst the UN Integrated Mission has been accepted as the mission structure of choice at the highest levels within Member States, the UN secretariat and within UN agencies, these problems at country level still bedevils its acceptance at the operational level. The degree of resistance to, and frustration with the integrated mission model at the country-level is in-itself, causing dysfunction and have resulted in the implementation of the concept having unintended consequences.

The Role of UN CIMIC in Mission Wide Coordination

The UN Integrated Mission concept has a number of important implications for UN CIMIC. Firstly, it firmly embeds the military component of the UN peace operation within the larger system-wide functions of the UN System. This moves us away from the structural approach where we used to refer to military and civilian components, and thus civil-military coordination to a new functional or dimensional vocabulary where we talk about the integration of dimensions such as security, political, human rights, rule of law,

humanitarian and development. Within this conceptualisation *security* is not equal to *military* as it could contain a number of functions, such as security sector reform, demining, public order, etc. that are not necessarily the responsibility of the military component of the UN peace operation. Nor is the utility and contribution of the military component limited to the security dimension, as they can contribute to the achievement of objectives in the other dimensions in a wide variety of ways, both through their primary security role (civil protection, etc.) and their secondary roles, including UN CIMIC (making military assets available to achieve or support humanitarian, developmental, RoL, SSR, political objectives, etc. or through direct community support activities).

In order to assess, plan, coordinate and monitor the roles and responsibilities of all the various actors so as to achieve and maintain momentum across the UN System and between the UN System and other internal and external actors, a new type of coordination is necessary. The *civil-military coordination* concept is no longer adequate to describe this level of system-wide coordination. Within the UN Integrated Mission there is now a range of coordination systems that are interlinked and that provide a network of coordination processes, that when taken together, represent the mission coordination system. Civil-military coordination, in the form of UN CIMIC, i.e. the function of coordinating between the military component and other civilian partners in the context of mission and community support, is one of the instruments of mission coordination. Others include processes such as the senior management team, security management system, logistical coordination systems, the joint operations centre (JOC), the integrated missions planning process (IMPP), the joint analysis centre (JMAC), etc.

The point is that although *civil-military coordination* has not been used as an overall operational level coordination tool, the concept has often been used in the past to suggest multi-dimensional cohesion and coordination. The UN Integrated Mission concept has now developed sufficient momentum to dislodge that kind of misapplied use of the civil-military coordination concept at the strategic level, and replaced it with a new understanding for the need for mission coordination, understood as a loose network of a number of specialised or functional coordination mechanisms that, once sufficiently connected, provide an overall mission-wide coordination system.

Blurred Lines between Military vs. Civilian Mission Assets

Civil-military coordination essentially deals with two aspects of military support to civilians, i.e. the provision of security, e.g. a military escort for a humanitarian convoy, or the provision of military assets, including skills, knowledge and manpower, e.g. equipment such as trucks or helicopters, and skills and knowledge such as medical and engineering expertise. The existing body of humanitarian civil-military coordination policies and guidelines introduced earlier deal with these two areas of military support. A key difference between UN and non-UN missions is, however, the confusion that arises as to what constitutes a military asset in a UN peace operation. On the one end of the spectrum you have equipment that are owned by a troop contributing country (TCC) and deployed into a UN mission. On the other end of the spectrum you have equipment owned by the UN. One problem is that in most cases there is no visual distinction between the two because they are all painted white with UN markings in black. Equipment that is obviously military, such as an APC or an attack helicopter is

probably less of a problem, but transport trucks and general purpose helicopters, engineering equipment, etc. are more difficult to identify as military or civilian. In some situations you may have a UN owned (civilian) asset, like a commercially chartered transport helicopter, that is being used for military tactical purposes, such as placing or extracting soldiers into an operational, or even combat, situations, as in eastern DRC where the UN mission (MONUC) is engaged in collaborative offensive operations.[48] It is thus not necessarily obvious in UN peace operation context, from the perspective of a humanitarian actor, or the local civilian community, or even the soldiers in question, whether a specific UN asset is a civilian or military asset, and that makes the application of the UN humanitarian civil-military coordination guidelines, that are designed around this distinction, problematic to apply.

One can further complicate the issue by arguing that all UN peace operation assets are in fact operated under a political-security-strategic mandate issued by the UN Security Council and can thus, for the purposes of the humanitarian civil-military policies and guidelines, be regarded as military assets, in that they are not neutral and impartial in the way that humanitarian actors would use these concepts. According to this line of reasoning there are, from a humanitarian perspective, thus no 'civilian' assets or personnel in UN peace operations. The issue becomes even further complicated, however, in the UN Integrated Missions context, where the security and coordination systems of the UN humanitarian- and development agencies and that of the UN peace operation, including the military component, are integrated.

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[48] Cedric de Coning, *Peace Operations in Africa: the Next Decade (*Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI): Oslo, Working Paper, No. 721-2007, July 2007), p. 8.

The point is that it is not possible to arrive at a clear distinction between military and civilian assets in the UN peace operations context, and even less so in the case of UN Integrated Missions. Both the UN peace operation community and the humanitarian community, including the UN humanitarian community, need to give careful thought as to how to maintain the principles of humanitarian independence, neutrality and impartiality without getting caught up in debates as to whether a specific piece of UN equipment is military or civilian.

This confusion creates an opportunity to re-focus on the intent of the humanitarian principles, instead of getting caught up in trying to apply outdated military and civilian identities. The distinction becomes irrelevant if its use will not have an impact on the perceived neutrality and impartiality of the humanitarian actor. And when the use of an UN asset will have an impact on the perceived neutrality and impartiality of a humanitarian actor, or otherwise cause a security risk for the intended beneficiaries or humanitarian workers, it should not be used.

Civil-Military Coordination outside UN CIMIC

It is also important to remind ourselves that whilst UN CIMIC, in its rightful context within a UN peace operation, including UN Integrated Missions, is responsible for facilitating liaison and coordination between the military component and other civilian actors, this coordination is limited to the Mission Support and Community Support functions introduced above. In other words, UN CIMIC is not responsible for all potential civil-military coordination roles in a UN peace operation context. There are many areas in which liaison takes place between the military component and other civilian actors

that are not channelled through the UN CIMIC function. These include, amongst others, functions such as:

- military support to UN Security (security of UN personnel and assets) that are coordinated between the military component and UN mission- and UN Country Team security units in coordination with the UN Department of Safety and Security (DSS),
- military support to UN civilian protection objectives, that are coordinated by the DSRSG/RC/HC and the Force Commander and in some missions through a system of Protection Working Groups;
- military participation in mission planning, that are coordinated through the Integrated Mission Planning Team (IMPT);
- military participation in conflict and situational analysis, that are coordinated through the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC):
- military participation in day-to-day mission-wide operational coordination, that are coordinated through the Joint Operations Centre; and
- military support to UN logistics that require the close coordination and integration of military logisticians and those within the mission support component; etc.

The point is that UN CIMIC should be understood within the context of its liaison function in the areas of mission support and community support. It should not be misunderstood as a gatekeeper for all civil-military coordination and liaison.

Conclusion

This paper focussed on the way the 'civil-military coordination' concept is being used in the context of contemporary United Nations (UN) peace operations. It reflected on the policy and doctrinal debates and developments in the field of civil-military coordination, both at the strategic- and operational/tactical-levels.

The paper argued that the bi-polar civil-military coordination concept, at the strategic level, is no longer adequate to describe the system-wide coordination needs of contemporary UN peace operations in the context of the UN Integrated Mission model.

The civil-military coordination concept is still appropriate and meaningful at the operational and tactical levels, both from a humanitarian (UN CMCoord) and military (UN CIMIC) perspective, but it is important to understand how operational and tactical civil-military coordination is unique in the UN peace operations, and especially the Integrated Missions, context.

UN Civil-Military Coordination (UN CIMIC) is the function within the military component of a UN peace operation responsible for facilitating liaison and coordination between the military component of the UN mission and its civilian counterparts and partners. In the UN peace operations context the military component is one of many UN mission components, and function as part of the overall UN System, in the UN Integrated Missions context. As such it participates in a wide network of coordination mechanisms that, taken together, constitute mission-wide coordination.

UN CIMIC is one of the elements in the wider coordination network that contribute to overall or system-wide coordination. It is not responsible for all aspects of civil-military coordination, but it has a very specific and important role to play in the context of Mission Support and Community Support, and the overall Liaison and Information Management function required to sustain these two types of military support to civilian partners in a UN peace operations context.

The point is that civil-military coordination, within its rightful place at the operational and tactical levels in the UN peace operation context, does have a meaningful role to play in the management of civil-military relations. However it is important to understand the particular dynamics that will influence the scope of civil-military coordination in the UN Integrated Mission context, and the role of the military

component of the UN peace operation, and thus UN CIMIC, within the larger UN System.