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CANADA AND CONTINENTAL SECURITY: POLICIES, THREATS AND ARCHITECTURE

In May 2006, the governments of Canada and the United States agreed to reconfirm the NORAD agreement. Commentators took this act as a final step, and then largely ignored it. In fact, this agreement does not end a process, but continues one. It is significant but little known.

To understand where we are, it helps to know where we have been. Lucien Bouchard once said that Canada was not a real country. When it comes to foreign policy, he was almost right: Canada is not a normal country. Canadians never have had to be responsible for their own security. We have not needed to defend our vital interests through our power alone, nor could we ever have done so. Our military forces sometimes have been great but rarely, since the Riel Rebellion, have we used them in direct service of our narrow interests, not even in the emblematic case of 1939. Instead, we have loaned our power to some international organisation, the British Empire, the United Nations or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, so to help it maintain a liberal political and economic order across the world. That is the Canadian way of war. We define our interests as being general, those of the world, but this is not entirely so. We have particular interests of our own. We believe power is bad and strategy un-Canadian. In fact, they have been central to our survival.

Canadian security and continental defence are not synonymous. The relationship between these matters has varied with world orders. Always, they have been shaped by power in North America and the world. During the nineteenth century,

our only potential threat was the United States, while Britain remained our shield. [1] A world threat to the continent provided our security on it. Canada survived because of its politics and demographics, British power and strategy, and the gradual rise of a liberal peace across the Atlantic. In the War of 1812, British seapower and ability to threaten or destroy the greatest of American cities negated their strength on land. For decades after 1815, the Royal Navy deterred aggression while the British defensive system on land made invasion impossible save by armies too large for Americans to feed: it was in reference to Ontario that the Duke of Wellington observed Spain was a country where large armies starve and small armies are beaten. By 1850, however, the development of railways increased Canada's vulnerability to overland invasion, while the American Civil War demonstrated that the United States could create overwhelming power on the continent. Britain met this change in power by one in strategy. It decreased the likelihood that the United States would wish to invade Canada by reducing the provocation, its very means to defeat such actions, British garrisons, and by strengthening its colonies through political means, the encouragement of Confederation. Meanwhile, Britain continued to protect us in ways we never saw, through management of relations with Washington, combined with the latent ability of the Royal Navy to demolish every port on the eastern seaboard of the United States. Until 1890, the United States spent less money on its navy than on coastal fortifications, i.e. for defence

[1] The best accounts of these issues are Andrew Lambert, "Winning Without Fighting: British Grand Strategy and its Application to the United States, 1815-1865", in Bradford Lee and Karl Walling (eds), Strategic Logic and Political Rationality, Essays in Honour of Michael I. Handel, (London, 2003) , and Barry Gough, The Royal Navy and the Northwest Coast of North America, 1810-1914: A Study of British Maritime Ascendancy, (Vancouver, 1971). Kenneth Bourne, Britain and the Balance of Power in North America, 1815-1908, (Berkeley, 1967) remains useful, though it overstates the decline of British power in North America, as do many Canadianists. For British power between 1840-1945, cf. the articles by John Ferris, Gordon Martel, Brian McKercher and Keith Neilson in The International History Review, Vol. XXI/4, November 1991.

against Britain. Even better, most of its regular army was needed to man these fortifications in war, hence unavailable to attack Canada.

From 1890 to 1930, power shifted between the great Anglophone states, but British strength continued to inhibit American ambitions. Both countries developed war plans against each other, in which world power bolstered Canadian security, and both prepared to fight on its soil. Some of these plans carried the world threat to continental security further than ever before, or since. The Canadian army was supposed to defend the country by seizing St. Louis, and crippling American logistical networks. Other British analysts thought Canada might or should declare neutrality in such an event. American strategists feared that the land power of the British Empire would surge south toward their heartland via Churchill, Manitoba. They saw attack on or neutralization of Canada as their natural blow against a world power, while politicians and diplomats believed that mere threat could hold British policy hostage. [2] Yet these plans were just paper. The real point was the disappearance of reasons or willingness for war between the United States, Britain and Canada. So long as Britain provided a stable order across the world which suited American strategic or economic interests, the United States had no objection to the British empire, nor to an independent Canada.

From 1930, however, Britain rapidly lost its ability to maintain such an order, which other powers began to shake. This forced Canada and the United States to rethink their strategic position in the Americas and the world. Modern American and Canadian foreign policy both are post-imperial phenomena, as are the relations

[2] James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, From the Great War to the Great Depression, Volume One, (Toronto, 1964); Christopher Bell, "Thinking the Unthinkable: British and American Naval Strategies for an Anglo-American War, 1918-31, The International History Review, ", Volume XIX/ 4, (November 1997) pp. 789-808.

between them. [3] Britain's decline drove the United States to become a world power, and Canada to become a medium one. Americans had to defend their world interests through their own means and to maintain their security against other powers, like Japan, Germany and later the USSR. In this context, they ceased to see Canada as the weapon against them of a world power or as a means to lever the latter. Instead, they viewed Canada as a weak spot in or a glacis to their own defence. 1929-30, meanwhile, were pivotal years for Canadian policy. The Treaty of Westminister marked the end of our colonial status, as the London Naval Conference did for British maritime supremacy. British decline removed Canada's check on the United States, and more. No longer could support from the world shelter us on the continent; we could be threatened from both areas. Canadians had to face the possibility of external dangers, and find means to support an acceptable international order and to manage the United States by ourselves; and do so without the lever of power and potential threat Britain always had held over Washington and the world. Ultimately, Canada replaced those levers by bilateral relations with the United States and multilateral ones abroad.

Out of the blue, in a hurry, Canadians and Americans soon faced some of the greatest threats in their history. They made good decisions against hard enemies in confusing times. They concluded that cooperation at home was necessary to their survival and interests. From 1940 to 1990, Canadian governments joined every American effort at continental defence, because that protected us from external threats, and them. [4] Such partnership let us keep the United States from compromising our interests, whereas to stand aloof was to lose any influence over actions they might well

[3] J. L. Granatstein, How Britain's Weakness Forced Canada into the Arms of the United States, (Toronto, 1989)

take anyway. In order to manage this bilateral relationship and to shape events in the world, Canadians turned to multilateralism. They approached these issues through a combination of realism, liberal internationalism, a colonial mentality carried over to the United Nations and the United States from experiences with Britain, and applied Christian idealism, the social gospel, which survives today in a displaced and secular form.

This approach met our needs. Indeed, the postwar order suited us admirably, because for the only time in our history, between 1940 and 1956, when our power was at its peak, Canadian governments effectively used it to serve our interests, and those of the world. They made the world safe for Canada, and gave us leading roles in international diplomatic and strategic institutions, which we retained throughout the cold war, even as our hard and soft power eroded. This happened in so indirect a way, however, that we often forgot what we were doing and why, or even that we had power and interests. When it came to thinking about power, interests and strategy, and linking them, Canada had a comparative disadvantage compared to virtually any other advanced state. Because Canadians did not think in these terms, we let our foreign and military policies drift apart. [5] We came to treat multilateralism not as a means but an end. Groucho Marx said he would not belong to any club that would have him as a member. Canadians wanted to join every club that would. We liked the UN because it was a forum where we could pretend to be equal to the US but better, and differ with Washington over issues of process while supporting it in substance. We adopted a pose

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[4] James T. Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, Peacemaking and Deterrence (Toronto, 1972); Joseph T. Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs (Vancouver, 1987).

[5] For a useful commentary, see the essays in David Carment, Fen Hampsen and Norman Hilmer (eds), Canada Among Nations, Setting Priorities Straight, (Montreal, 2005).

of moral superiority toward the United States on issues of power and interest. We indulged the pleasures of irresponsibility and honed our great invention. The United States' contributions to world culture are bourbon and the twelve-bar blues; ours is anti-Americanism.

Few Canadians questioned the pledges of mutual assistance by Mackenzie King and Franklin Roosevelt of 1938 or the creation of an alliance in 1940. External threats were obvious. So too, with continental defence during the 1950s, ranging from the creation of early warning lines to NORAD in 1958; the Canadian public and elite were cold warriors, and Soviet bombers threatened them as well as Americans. Later developments in continental defence roused more opposition, especially because they made Canada a nuclear power, and committed it to the offensive use of such weapons. Here, as ever, Canadian opposition to cooperation with the United States at home was driven by concern about its policy abroad. In the traumatic clash of 1963, differences over continental defence led an American government to act openly against a Canadian one during an election campaign, and drove its Liberal successor to abandon their preferences and follow American policy. From that time, however, NORAD and continental defence became less important to both countries, with the rise of Soviet nuclear power, intercontinental ballistic missiles and the concept of mutually assured destruction. Meanwhile, Canadian nationalists and internationalists became increasingly anti-American. They held that Canada was a moral superpower on a hill, while cooperation with Americans would pollute our precious bodily fluids. From 1968, Liberal governments took a peace dividend during the cold war, slashing their hard power and pulling away from Washington. Even so, Ottawa was careful never to take steps in

defence which threatened vital American interests. Thus, in 1984 Pierre Eliot Trudeau let Ronald Reagan test cruise missiles over Canada, despite protests from the peace movement and the obvious contradiction with his campaign to abolish nuclear weapons.

With the end of the Cold War, Canada and the United States moved apart in foreign and defence policy, driven by distinct internal politics and pursuing different new world orders. An ideological rift opened on international relations between their dominant parties at that time, the Canadian centre-left and the American right. Continental defence seemed a quaint cold war legacy; leading academic specialists to discuss "The End of the Canada-U.S. Defence Relationship". [6] The Canadian government slashed its armed forces again while aggressively pursuing liberal internationalist ends through multilateral means. It challenged what the United States government described as vital interests on issues such as the land mine treaty and The International Court of Criminal Justice. Meanwhile, American administrations found external relations problematical and partisan. Despite their unprecedented power, they preferred to work multilaterally, leading the world to a new order through old institutions. The results in Bosnia and Kosovo disillusioned even the Clinton administration. NATO and the UN provided coalitions of the unwilling, offering little but words, and as much obstruction as support. Unless the United States acted on an issue, no one would. Friends followed the United States simply to prevent it from leading.

9/11 ended one new world order and started another. Americans faced threats and enemies. They found they were powerful and friends not always necessary. In an emergency unmatched since 1941, continental defence became more central than ever

[6] Joseph T. Jockel and Joel J. Sokolsky, "The End of the Canada-U.S. Defence Relationship", Policy Papers on the Americas, Volume VII, Study 2, The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, 1996.

before, spilling over to international trade and internal security. Americans took immediate and unilateral steps to defend themselves against new threats through their own means. They also asked Canada to join bilateral efforts, and all western countries to enter their ballistic missile defence (BMD) programme. Canada moved hard to match the tightening of American security but on defence issues, for political reasons, especially because of emotions raised by BMD and American actions abroad, it could not move as far or fast as Americans wanted, or were doing themselves. After great confusion and backpedaling, it rejected cooperation with BMD, but entered a renewed version of NORAD in May 2006.

This history has consequences. In law, the renewal of NORAD merely continues an old relationship, but not in reality. The withering of NORAD from 1965, and fifteen years of disagreement between Ottawa and Washington, has changed that relationship. The Rumsfeld doctrine, and the unilateralism of the George W. Bush administration, alienated Canadians. Ottawa's politics did the same to Americans.[7] When resigning as Canadian ambassador to Washington, the Liberal politician Frank McKenna blamed his own government for most recent problems between the two countries. So too, in May 2006, at the conference from which this volume is drawn, American and Canadian officials in the audience blamed Ottawa for most problems in defence policy. Though Americans had their preferences, they would live with virtually any Canadian policy, but did want to know what it would be. Rather than a case of Americans bullying Canada for concessions and misbehaving when the brave beaver refused, Canadian officials sent

[7] For American commentaries on this issue, cf. Dwight N. Mason, "Canada and the Future of Continental Defense, A View from Washington", Policy Papers on the Americas, Volume XIV, Study 10, Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 2003; and Joseph Jockel, "Four U.S. Military Commands, Northcom, NORAD, SpaceCom, StratCom", IRPP Working Paper,

mixed messages, leading Washington to think Ottawa wanted to deal, but reneging publicly on the prospect when Americans followed it up. This was the product not of intention, but of confused process. Officials in the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of National Defence and the Privy Council Office, and many politicians, advocated a deal. Prime Ministers let them pursue it, and then politics and anti-American gestures took over. Perhaps that problem may subside now that defence relations have become essentially a matter for technicians rather than politicians.

Not that technical tasks are easy. In 1958, NORAD was charged with stopping a bomber threat and coordinating large numbers of American and Canadian forces in a common task; by 2001 it was a fossil. Its limits were apparent on 9/11, when hijacked civilian aircraft were used to kill thousands of people. NORAD monitored all aircraft entering North American airspace, but not those within. 7500 aircraft entered continental airspace each day from abroad. 68,000 of them moved in it. Similarly, in 2006, 6500 ships passed into North American waters every day, while 9,000,000 sea containers entered United States ports every year, of which just 1, 000,000 were checked. When civilian platforms had to be treated as potential threats, NORAD's problems mounted by several orders of magnitude. Its command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) system suited its old duties, but not these ones, with requirements normally found only in blockade during war. New C4ISR systems were needed to handle these tasks, to link the increasing number of agencies involved in them, to collect and process data effectively, while overcoming clutter and ambiguity, and to make responses fast and

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automatic. Such developments would be difficult in the best of cases, but NORAD faced two additional problems. Its duties overlapped with those of American combatant commands, powerful entities, not easily disposed to treating others as equal, charged to defend the United States through its own forces. This problem, fortunately, was eased with the central combatant command for continental defence, NORTHCOM, since one officer commanded both organisations, which shared key nodes for intelligence and command. Even more, NORAD involved two national forces which communicated through incompatible systems, blocking basic coordination at a time when military forces rely heavily on densely interlinked systems. [8]

After 9/11, few deny the possibility of threats to continental security, nor the need to prepare for them. This preparation is less a matter of improving forces than their C4ISR. The enhanced treaty centres on giving NORAD the C4ISR needed to provide continental security against all comers. NORAD must be able to acquire and process all necessary information, and provide it to commanders and forces, in real time across national borders. The renegotiated treaty outlines procedures to guide this process, but it is not a finished product, nor is all the work restricted to NORAD. In particular, Canada must find ways to work with American combatant commands. Thus, Canada Command was created largely to create a single counterpart to NORTHCOM, able to work with it as an equal and an all-service provider. Only the active engagement of commands on both sides of national boundaries can overcome NORAD's problems in C4ISR, if these are not solved, NORAD cannot work These problems are technical and political: finding means to harmonise incompatible systems, to have combatant commands cooperate

[8] Bi-National Planning Group, The Final Report on Canada and the United States (CANUS) Enhanced Military Cooperation, Peterson AFB, Co, 13.3.2006, pp. 18- 24 and Appendices C and D.

with Canadian ones, to convince subordinates to share information with foreigners. The report of the Bi-National Planning Group (BNPG) is dry and legalistic because it was negotiated by lawyers, but also because it essentially defines procedures to govern developments in C4ISR—on occasion, arguing for rules explicitly so Canadians can force lower echelons in American bureaucracies to share information. The Treaty is a legal instrument. NORAD is a evolving organisation. It has a long way to go.

This collection synthesises viewpoints on the past and future of NORAD from academics and practitioners. It aims at praxis, the practical relationship between policy and strategy, while avoiding the characteristic Canadian failure to link forces, strategy and policy, or to think about interests and power.

Galen Perras examines the prehistory of continental defence. By 1937, Ottawa and Washington realised that British decline was opening the door to new dangers and forcing changes in their defence policy. Threats emerged to American interests abroad, through the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war and the Panay incident, when Japanese aircraft sank an American gunboat in China. American decision makers, thinking of war with Japan, had to consider their vulnerabilities. For the first time, Canadian weakness seemed a problem to them, which they looked to reduce through a bilateral security relationship. In particular, the U.S. Army and, apparently, Roosevelt, wanted to bring British Columbia under American protection, and therefore command. Canada for the first time faced the problem of unwanted aid, and had to formulate a policy of defence against help. Unlike the state to state links of 1940, from which emerged the Permanent Joint Board on Defence and an alliance, this process was marked by confusion. Politicians, diplomats and soldiers on both sides collided with each other, most bitterly

with their own national colleagues. In Ottawa, soldiers contemplated involvement in world struggles on Britain's side, diplomats preferred isolationism, and Mackenzie King tried to avoid making any decisions at all. In Washington, because simultaneous moves toward London brought all fundamental cleavages over policy to the surface, only the U.S. Army and Roosevelt supported the overture to Ottawa. The Navy was indifferent and the State Department hostile. Roosevelt worked to bring Canada into the American security sphere, but when Ottawa kept its distance and crisis waned, he turned to other issues, for the moment. Meanwhile, fears of the United States drove Canadian defence policy, leading Ottawa to significant military expenditures in British Columbia, aimed less to withstand Japan than to show Roosevelt he had nothing to fear regarding Canada. This incident indicates that American-Canadian defence relations had messier and more politicised origins than suggested by the standard account, with its focus on regular policy directed against great external threats. Instead, from the start, these relations were marked by conflicts of interest within and between the two states, by Washington's concerns with Canadian weakness and Ottawa's fears of unwanted aid. Continental defence and Canadian security always were linked to events across the earth, including the active intervention and commitments abroad of the United States—and Canada.

Brad Gladman assesses NORAD from the perspective of information processing and C4ISR. Since 9/11, he argues, layers of strategic functions have collapsed onto each other in Canada and the United States, while new bureaucracies have emerged. This has confused organisational and command links for continental defence and the flow of information across the system. These flaws may cause failures in continental

security, or leave a Canadian government unable to be well informed or act effectively in crisis. Meanwhile, Canada must understand and respond effectively to shifts in American strategy, which requires "connectivity" between their governments, especially with the "Combined Intelligence and Fusion Center" (CIFC) at Colorado Springs. CIFC, which gathers and assesses intelligence for NORAD and NORTHCOM, is the hub of C4ISR for continental defence. Gladman outlines means to improve the situation, ranging from giving Canadian officers, already fully cleared to receive operationally essential information at NORAD, similar duties at NORTHCOM, to systematising some of the "essentially personality-driven" arrangements involving Canadian officers at CIFC. The BNPG, incidentally, proposed a similar idea. It also noted that the attachment of a Canadian officer to the Joint Operations Center of NORTHCOM, to be the human interface between American and Canadian material passed over incompatible national systems, aided the transfer of information and the process of command in both countries. Such a link, however, one bottleneck between two stovepipes, is labour intensive and cumbersome, and would fail during emergencies. Thus, the BNPG advocated "a national and bi-national netcentric solution" to such problems, including the development of shared and secure computer systems, fully clearing some Canadians for access to SIPRNET, the basic intranet used by the American military, or more widely disseminating "appropriate operational information and/or intelligence from the SIPRNET' to Canadian agencies.[9] If such actions are not taken, NORAD must fail.

Two papers examine the tensions within a heralded aspect of the new agreement, the "Maritime NORAD". This issue, directed primarily to prevent bombs

[9] Bi-National Planning Group, The Final Report on Canada and the United States (CANUS) Enhanced Military Cooperation, Peterson AFB, Co, 13.3.2006, pp. 18- 24 and Appendices C and D.

carried on ships from exploding in North American ports, has broad connotations for surveillance and control of the seas a thousand miles from the continent.

Rob Huebert asks why this maritime adjunct to NORAD emerged in 2006, instead of earlier. NORAD, he notes, was only one part of the architecture of western defence. It was created long after the founding of NATO in 1949, when the Royal Canadian Navy and the United States Navy received the maritime mandate they followed throughout the cold war. For forty years they conducted continental defence under a multilateral and intercontinental umbrella, as they cooperated closely to keep threats far from North America, but as part of NATO, not NORAD. Even more, Canadian governments often have not quite been sure why they maintain a navy, and use it without talking, or thinking, about what they are doing. Thus, during the 1990s, the RCN routinely was used as a flexible armed tool of state in the Indian Ocean, while in the Pacific Ocean it developed unique forms of interoperability with the USN ; yet the Canadian government never acknowledged –indeed, may not have fully understood-- what it was doing. This informal and ad hoc historical relationship between two navies, driven more by service than national levels and by the need to solve problems for which local commanders of both countries lack resources, will affect their new work in continental defence.

Eric Lerhe notes that Canadians assume “maritime security will be managed in a rules-based system whereas Canada enjoys a legal equality in access and decision-making”. Americans do not share that view. The combatant commands involved in maritime security care little for NORAD, though they no doubt want to tap its resources of intelligence. They intend to collect whatever information they need through their own

means, disseminate it or not as they wish to other countries, and act on it with their own forces, primarily under USN control. These commands are close to getting their wish. Between 2001-06, Canada missed the boat on maritime security while Americans unilaterally created the system they wanted through their own resources. NORAD at sea is an unfinished product, but the USN will be the dominant player and Canada could become a small fish, or frozen out, without influence over the system or access to its information. Canadian forces will have to work to gain a position at sea equaling that in the air under the old NORAD. Lerhe describes means to do so. Whatever the USN might intend, its power is limited and it has rivals for resources and roles at home. Canada holds strong cards—a navy uniquely interoperable with the USN and sharing some interests with it, much more so than do most American agencies, valuable sea estate and excellent surveillance capability there, based on first-rate interagency cooperation—which it can use to trade, sailor to sailor.

Peter Archambault offers a rare and intelligent example of Canadian net assessment and strategic analysis. He aims to help policy makers and citizens understand threats to national interests, so to differentiate threats from challenges, and to guide plans. through reasoned assessment . American power, he holds, is our centre of gravity—the source of Canada's security and vulnerability. The issue of threat is defined by the question, "who wants to change the way things are, how they want to do it, whether they will succeed and what it will mean to the broader security environment". Over the past two centuries, Archambault argues, the key factor in any such analysis would have been the power and policy first, of Napoleon, then Britain, Germany, and the United States and the USSR. Today, the key factor is American preeminence in the

world, its turn since 9/11 from being a status quo to a revolutionary power; and the question of which actors might wish to threaten the US, and how—whether really to attack or merely to gain leverage. Archambault discusses possible candidates for threats, but his concern is how we decide what they are—our criterion for threat. Any such assessment must balance imponderables—dangers in 2006 against those which may emerge by 2016; intentions versus capabilities, states and non-state actors. If the criterion for threat is a state willing and able to attack North America now, the danger is small. Though Russia possesses the means, and China to a small degree, neither is likely to do so; while any other actor which might wish to attack really lacks the means for more than a sensational act of terror. The story is different if the criterion is a state or non-state actor able and willing to threaten the continent in ten years time, especially if it aims just to affect American policy elsewhere on earth. The dangers are real, and can be overcome only by preparation in advance. The cost of inadequate analysis and action will be high.

Ralph Sawyer, the outstanding western scholar of classical Chinese strategy and a leading commentator on its current policy, examines the worst case—the rise of a hostile peer competitor to the United States. The most obvious candidate for this role is China. That possibility has received great attention from strategists, journalists and policy makers over the past decade. This discussion, Sawyer argues, is distorted by ignorance of the topic, even of basic matters like the Chinese language or its culture, and by secrecy and deception on the part of the Chinese state. A view popular in the west and Beijing, claims that China always has been uniquely stable, civilian and pacific, and uses this image to forecast the future. This image of China's past, Sawyer

demonstrates, is false, and it distorts assessments of future Chinese behaviour. In statecraft and strategy, China is no more unique than many other countries. As often as not, China has been volatile, militaristic and aggressive toward its neighbours. Power and war—total war—ruthless diplomacy and aggression have been fundamental to Chinese history and statecraft, bloody battle and deception to its warfare. Now as ever, strategic calculation and internal social, political and economic volatility, may drive China toward belligerence. Drawing from Chinese language publications little studied or overlooked in the west, Sawyer shows that Chinese statesmen regard the United States as a competitor and threat, with which its military is preparing to grapple. The latter is doing so, moreover, by adopting traditional Chinese strategy, which has returned to centrality in its military science, fundamental to its new doctrine, "a revolution in military affairs with unique Chinese characteristics". Sawyer describes in unprecedented depth these ideas, and the strategic means which Chinese military academics are suggesting as tools to challenge the United States and "the way things are" in the world.

Many possible threats, of course, never materialise, but challenges are emerging to American power. They will shape continental defence and Canadian security. Some things are certain. Canada will remain the weaker partner in continental defence. The United States will drive the strategy, provide its power, and deter and attract its enemies. We will have them. Threats will emerge from the combination of American power and policy, and the response to them of other states. Thus, the Rumsfeld doctrine may attract threats to America, which it aims to render absolutely secure, so making everyone else subordinate, if Washington wishes. Much recent opposition to the United States stems from fear it has declared itself king of the world, which no one can

restrain. According to the iron law of the security dilemma, the stronger the United States gets, the more other powers will wish to challenge it. Yet even if the United States turned toward isolationism in the world and we from it, other actors abroad would behave in ways that affect or threaten us. We might wish that the United States did not act as it does, or was not what it is, or that it would just be nice, or that everyone would be, but we do not control its actions and cannot escape their consequences. Any use of American power will shake the status quo; its mere existence will create enemies, some of whom dislike us as well as the United States.

Again, we are protected from external danger by the United States, which is our guardian and therefore our greatest threat. Americans would not pose such a threat in a military form and we could not withstand it if they tried, but we are uniquely exposed to a people of unparalleled power, which is determined to protect their interests. American interests are not identical to our own. Their power can be a problem for us. It can be a danger even by being a friend, by trying to help us. It can divide and conquer us without even meaning or wanting to do so. Among our vital interests are the needs always to protect ourselves against help, never to let Americans bully us on major issues or act from fear of them, and never to let ourselves become a security threat to the United States. We cannot let Americans think we are an avenue for anyone to attack them, or that they can disregard our interests. But that is simply to be a good neighbour—here, the right thing to do is the right thing. The Americans have returned that favour. Though they regularly bully us on minor issues, like softwood lumber, they have been fair on matters of our security. If we are a mouse, they have been an elephant, not a cat.

Americans see defence, trade and internal security as parts of one whole. Fears in one area may make them act against those threats in another. If they act unilaterally, we will pay. If we are passive or uncertain, we will be guided and divided—more precisely, we will let Americans manipulate us while we divide ourselves, leaving each element of our state, from municipalities to the military, dealing bilaterally with a stronger and more determined American counterpart, following their national policy.

The problem is not whether Americans are good or bad. It is less what they want than what they are: a far stronger power. As Athenians told Melians in 416 BCE, "the strong do what they will, the weak do what they must". To say power is bad is like saying gravity is evil: yet still, the earth moves. In the world, Canada is quite strong, but we sit next to a hyperpower —a wounded one. The question is how best to manage these differences in power and interests. Americans will use their power to defend their interests; the only question is what we must do about it. The preferred policy of Canadian nationalists and internationalists is isolationism, on the grounds that to touch Americans is to get cooties. Give them an inch and you will lose Canada. Any cooperation must produce capitulation. Anyone advocating it must be an idiot or a traitor. Alas, an isolationist policy will abandon any leverage with Americans and force us to defend ourselves against them far more than ever before, necessarily requiring far greater military forces and expenditures. That policy will treat Washington as an enemy, and turn it into one. It will make the United States a cat, goaded by a mouse.

Canada can best approach these issues through an active policy and a bilateral legal relationship, at a state to state level. This multiplies our bargaining power by creating ground rules in normal times which will restrain actions during emergencies,

when politics are panicky. Such an approach assures Americans of their security, and gives them modes of leverage over us to solve problems, channeling them away from a search for levers we may not like or be able to influence. This approach also gives Canadians some ability to influence American actions. It depoliticizes the situation, so far as possible, and puts the focus on relationships between bureaucracies with common duties, where we can find allies and solve our problems by helping Americans solve their own. This, incidentally, is the approach pursued by the other foreign states most influential in Washington, like Israel and Britain. Oddly enough, Washington is filled not with pro-Canadians or anti-Canadians, but pro-Americans. Yet American soldiers and defence officials often are well disposed to Canada, and open to influence. The more we work with those elements which want to work with us, the stronger they will be and the weaker those who doubt us and wish to pursue aims we may not like; and vice versa. The more we are high minded isolationists, the more Americans will infringe our interests.

NORAD is fundamental to our security. It also is a work in progress. At present, our position in NORAD is weaker than it used to be, but it may rise. Our absence from BMD excludes us from much American planning for continental defence, where we also are playing catch up with combatant commands. Yet their resources are limited; they confront a budgetary crisis, and will need and appreciate help to solve their problems. More generally, in May 2006, well informed commentators like Christopher Sands and Senator Hugh Segal predicted more stable and friendly relations between the United States and Canada in the next few years, and that the failure of the Bush administration's foreign policy will open the prospect for a new bargain between

Washington and all of its allies. In those years ahead, developments in NORAD will shape and reflect a redefinition of relations between its members. As ever, those relations will link the world policies of the United States and Canada, and our security at home.

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