

**Two Solitudes: Quebecers' Attitudes Regarding
Canadian Security and Defence Policy**

By

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Jean-Sébastien Rioux's study on Québec Francophone views on Canadian foreign and defence policy is the first of a series of new research publications that will be published every quarter by the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI).

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This paper provides much food for thought and suggests additional areas of research into the little explored subject of how much of an impact Canada's ethnic, demographic, and regional composition has on the making of Canadian foreign and defence policy. Rioux quite naturally focuses on the prime dichotomy of Canadian life. That dichotomy is based on the founding of Canada on two linguistic groups – English and French-speaking Canadians – and consists of the efforts of those two groups to live together in one nation. In 2005, the French-English dichotomy is not the only ethnic, religious or linguistic division in Canada, but it remains fundamental.

In this paper, Rioux demonstrates that it is no myth that French and English-speaking Canadians think quite differently about major questions of Canadian foreign and defence policy. Though he also demonstrates that this is not the only significant division amongst Canadians, and that regionalism can play an important role as well, it is clear from his research that views held by French-speaking Quebecers are generally different from other Canadians. Quebecers are more internationalist, more "dovish", more antipathetic to American global aspirations, less comfortable with globalization, and much less inclined to sanction the use of Canadian troops abroad, except perhaps for humanitarian reasons.

Rioux's root explanation is that French-speaking Quebecers still echo the plaintive challenge that Henri Bourassa hurled at English-speaking Canadians at the time of the Boer War in 1899. French Canadians, Bourassa noted, had but one mother country – Canada – while English Canadians had two – Canada and Great Britain – and were trying to serve both. That would not do, he warned, because French Canadians had little or no sympathy for British Imperialism. Today, Rioux observes, the United States has taken the place of Great Britain in the minds of many Francophone Quebecers. Their plaint is the same as Bourassa's: are "your" interests Canadian? Or do they simply mimic those of the United States?

The answer that some English-speaking Canadians would now give is that they believe Canadian interests are best served by close ties to the United States. Against the backdrop of recent trends in Canadian foreign policy, especially the decision not to take part in the Iraq war and Prime Minister Paul Martin's rejection of Canadian participation in the US missile defence program, Rioux's conclusions are compelling. The gap between Canada's two prime linguistic groups remains significant.

David J. Bercuson,
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L'étude de Jean-Sébastien Rioux sur l'attitude des Québécois francophones vis-à-vis de la politique étrangère et de défense du Canada est la première d'une série de nouveaux documents de recherche qui seront publiés tous les trimestres par le Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI).

Le CDFAI est un groupe de réflexion établi à Calgary, qui se consacre à la recherche universitaire sur des enjeux propres à la politique étrangère et de défense canadienne. Le CDFAI entend diffuser cette recherche aussi largement que possible aux décideurs, aux dirigeants communautaires, aux dirigeants d'affaires, aux universitaires, aux journalistes et aux Canadiennes et Canadiens qui s'intéressent aux affaires internationales et militaires du Canada. Le CDFAI est un organisme de bienfaisance, approuvé par le gouvernement fédéral, qui subventionne une gamme de projets et de programmes à cette fin. On peut consulter tout l'éventail d'activités menées par le CDFAI sur son site Web (<http://www.cdfai.org>).

Le présent document se penche sur un domaine bien peu exploré et porte sur les façons dont la composition ethnique, démographique et régionale du Canada influe sur la politique étrangère et de défense canadienne. M. Rioux s'attache tout naturellement à la dichotomie première de l'existence canadienne, qui repose sur la fondation du Canada par deux groupes linguistiques — les Canadiens anglais et les Canadiens français. Bien qu'en 2005 la dichotomie entre Canadiens français et Canadiens anglais ne soit pas la seule division ethnique, religieuse ou linguistique au Canada, elle est néanmoins fondamentale.

Dans son texte, l'auteur démontre que la divergence d'opinion entre les Canadiens français et les Canadiens anglais à l'égard des principaux enjeux de politique étrangère et de défense au pays n'est pas un mythe. Bien qu'il ne s'agisse pas de la seule division importante qui distingue les Canadiens et que d'autres facteurs tels que le régionalisme joue également un rôle important, l'auteur établit clairement que les opinions des Québécois francophones sont généralement différentes de celles des autres Canadiens. En effet, les Québécois sont plus internationalistes, partisans de la négociation et du compromis, et ils éprouvent plus d'antipathie envers les aspirations américaines mondiales; ils sont aussi moins à l'aise avec la mondialisation et bien moins enclins à appuyer l'envoi de troupes canadiennes à l'étranger, sauf à l'occasion pour des raisons humanitaires.

L'auteur donne comme principale explication à cette situation le fait que les Québécois francophones font encore écho au reproche lancé par Henri Bourassa aux Canadiens anglophones lors de la guerre des Boers, en 1899. Comme l'avait souligné Bourassa, les Canadiens français n'ont qu'une seule mère patrie — le Canada — tandis que les Canadiens anglais en ont deux — le Canada et la Grande-Bretagne — et qu'ils essayent de servir les deux. Les Canadiens français n'éprouvaient aucune solidarité, ou alors bien peu, à l'égard de l'impérialisme britannique. De nos jours, observe Rioux, les États-Unis ont pris la place de la Grande-Bretagne dans l'esprit de bien des Québécois francophones. Leur reproche est le même que celui qu'avait fait Bourassa : « vos » intérêts sont-ils véritablement canadiens ? Ou ne font-ils qu'imiter ceux des États-Unis ?

Selon la réponse que donneraient maintenant certains Canadiens anglophones, les intérêts canadiens sont, à leur avis, mieux servis en entretenant des relations étroites avec les États-Unis. Face aux récentes tendances de la politique étrangère canadienne, notamment la décision de ne pas participer à la guerre en Iraq et le refus du premier ministre Paul Martin de participer au programme américain de défense antimissile, les conclusions de Rioux sont irréfutables. La brèche entre les deux principaux groupes linguistiques au Canada reste importante.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The purpose of this paper is to examine the “conventional wisdom” of an anti-military sentiment present in the province of Québec which allegedly shapes Canadian defence policy. The results support the conventional wisdom and three dimensions emerge. First, a review of the historical and sociological literature shows that the historical differences of French Canadians on defence issues have their roots in the Loyalist-Nationalist divide in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries; French-Canadians perceived that English Canadians were too quick to support foreign British interests then; and American interests now. The second dimension emerges regarding media coverage: while generally inconclusive, an exploratory analysis tends to support the notion that defence issues are not covered as frequently in francophone newspapers. Finally, an examination of several polls since WWII shows that Quebecers are consistently more likely to support pacific conflict resolution and the United Nations, and to oppose defence spending.

***Two Solitudes : Quebecers' Attitudes Regarding
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***Deux solitudes : l'attitude des québécois face à la sécurité et à la politique de défense
canadienne***

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RÉSUMÉ

Le présent document se penche sur un stéréotype récurrent en politique étrangère canadienne, soit celui du sentiment antimilitariste qui prévaut dans la province de Québec et qui façonnerait la politique de défense canadienne. Or, les constatations de l'étude appuient ce stéréotype et il s'en dégage trois volets. En premier lieu, un examen de la littérature historique et sociologique établit que les différences historiques des Canadiens français en matière de défense trouvent leur origine dans le fossé loyaliste-nationaliste qui s'est creusé à la fin du XIX^e siècle et au début du XX^e siècle. Les Canadiens français étaient d'avis que les Canadiens anglais étaient trop disposés à appuyer, dans le temps, les intérêts britanniques étrangers et, de nos jours, les intérêts américains. Le deuxième volet qui émerge porte sur la couverture médiatique : une analyse préliminaire, bien que de manière générale non décisive, appuie la notion que les enjeux de la défense ne sont pas abordés aussi fréquemment dans les journaux francophones. En dernier lieu, un examen de plusieurs sondages menés depuis la Deuxième Guerre mondiale révèle que les Québécois ont invariablement de plus fortes chances d'appuyer une résolution pacifique à un conflit et les Nations Unies, et de s'opposer à des dépenses militaires.

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Conventional wisdom holds that English and French Canadians have differing views on security and defence issues, with French Canadians being more dovish, isolationist, and anti-militaristic than their English counterparts. This world-view allegedly causes Quebecers² to oppose increases in defence spending; to be against military interventions overseas; and to favour using the Canadian Forces (CF) only in humanitarian or peacekeeping roles. The result is a clash of defence cultures with the “rest of Canada” which paralyzes modernisation and investment in the CF’s traditional war-fighting roles, as well as causing friction with allies due to Canada’s free-riding on security.³ Québec is also thought to exert a disproportionate amount of influence in Ottawa on defence issues; the fact that the Chrétien Government’s decision to not participate in the invasion of Iraq in early 2003 coincided with a provincial election in Québec in which the provincial Liberals were poised to win is often invoked as “proof” of this conventional wisdom. Further “proof” lies in the fact that, between 1968 and 2005, Canada was lead for fewer than five years by Prime Ministers from outside Québec, so the issue of the disproportionate influence of French Canadians in Ottawa has acquired the stature of an urban legend.

While these types of assertions are difficult to prove other than by anecdotal evidence, the purpose of this paper is straightforward and addresses the general question of whether there really is an anti-military sentiment in the province of Québec which shapes Canadian

¹ I thank the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI) for asking me to write this interesting paper and for its subsequent support. I thank especially my very dedicated and helpful research assistants on this particular project (in alphabetical order): Julie Boileau, Francis Cossette, Andréanne Lauzé Jean, and Oana Tranca.

² At the risk of offending English Quebecers, I will use the term Quebecers to denote French *Québécois*.

³ For more on the “conventional wisdom” and on the national myths concerning Canada’s military history and how they have an impact on defence policy-making, see Bland and Maloney, 2004; especially Chapter 3.

defence and, by extension, foreign policy? I therefore evaluate the proposition – based on the aforementioned conventional wisdom – that Quebecers have a traditionally dovish attitude towards military and defence issues, causing them to express more anti-military opinions than English-speaking Canadians. An ancillary task is to explore the possible reasons behind these differences of opinions.

To address these questions, I examine the empirical record of Québec's distinct military culture using a three-pronged approach. First, I review some of the historical and sociological literature on French Canadian views on defence and security, in order to put the conventional wisdom in context. Indeed, it is important to analyse *why* Quebecers are said to hold different views on defence issues. The second step is to look at how these cultural and sociological factors translate into concrete attitudes among opinion leaders – namely, the news media – and I present preliminary results from a study I conducted with a team of graduate research assistants which examines the frequency of newspaper coverage of Canadian foreign policy and defence issues. Finally, to evaluate the extent to which elites' opinions are actually transferred to the public, I look at polling data conducted in Canada since World War II in which long-term differences in opinions between *Québécois* and English-Canadians can be examined and trends adduced. This is useful in assessing empirically how those opinions have evolved over two generations.

It is hoped that this research paper will be a first step in looking at the allegedly anti-militaristic attitudes of Quebecers from an *empirical* perspective, in addition to the socio-historical perspective more common in the extant literature. If the knowledge gained here is to be useful, it will be to give policymakers a better understanding of the factors behind Québec's distinctiveness in defence and security issues. While there is a wealth of published material on Canadian military history, few studies tackle these specific issues from an empirical standpoint.

Historical and Sociological Reasons behind the Conventional Wisdom

If French Canadians hold different attitudes on defence issues, what are the reasons behind this state of affairs? In addition to the religious dimension of Catholicism that sets

Québec apart from English Canada (Cooper, 1955) – which will not be directly addressed here – explanations can be categorised into two broad categories: historical root causes and sociological explanations based on recent political decisions. As for the former, the historical reasons for Québec’s distinct military culture outlined in the fundamental literature can be summed up in two general, and connected, explanations. First, it can be seen as the gradual formation of a unique identity for French Canadians (*Canadiens*) **in opposition to** a dual loyalty among English-Canadians following Confederation. Indeed, French Canadian nationalism (and provincialism) developed in the 19th Century context of opposition to imperialism and to an exaggerated loyalty to Britain displayed by English Canadians (Bergeron, 1960; Nossal, 1997). This English Canadian loyalty constantly lead to a shared suspicion among French Canadians that decisions on defence matters were not calculated with Canadian interests at heart, but rather, with British consideration being paramount (Granatstein and Hitsman, 1985: 17-19). Secondly, this suspicion was “confirmed” by events dating back to the 19th Century and up to World War I: Canadian defence was still dominated by Britain; it was anti-French; and not willing to recognise the interests of one-third of the Canadian population.

Indeed, the events surrounding conscription during WWI are part of Canada’s collective history, but particularly in Québec. Comeau (1999) argues that the Conscription Riots are such an emotional part of Québec mythology that little serious scholarship has been produced to explain the reasons behind them. His view is that a combination of factors can begin to address it: the fact that Quebecers were firmly rooted in American soil and did not feel a special calling for foreign adventurism in Europe; that the Canadian military was extremely British – French-Canadians had little expectations for advancement and would only be used as cannon-fodder; and finally, the general historical conjuncture whereby Quebecers saw repeated anti-French actions throughout Canada ever since 1871, which caused anti-English sentiment to breed for years. In any event, WWI marks the beginning of a shared French Canadian nationalism, where Québec’s Francophones begin standing up to Ottawa (Hereault 2003).

Both World Wars were periods in Canadian history where French and English Canadians had to reassess their “respective conception as to the nature of Canada and their

responsibilities as citizens” (Falardeau, 1957: 318 – translation mine). But therein also lay the roots of Québec anti-militarism. Richard (2000) argues that *Québécois* intellectuals have consistently sought to “silence” the military accomplishments of Quebecers and ignore French Canadian military history and the gallant record of French Canadian units and individuals which participated in Canada’s wars. She believes that an honest accounting of French Canadian military history after the Conquest would have broken an unspoken taboo: that of a vanquished people fighting alongside their conquerors for foreign motives.⁴ Therefore, Québec’s continuing anti-militarism is actually an artefact of the intellectual class’ rejection of the actual record of French Canadian military history.

The sociological explanations in the literature tend to focus on the impacts of the English-dominated military-bureaucratic culture on Québec’s allegedly anti-military attitude. These would include perceived anti-French Canadian decisions such as bilingual policies (or lack thereof) in the Department of National Defence, the closing of the Royal Military College in St-Jean, as well as conspiracy theories still attempting to link the military deployment during the 1970 October Crisis to the War Measures Act.⁵ Although there were great strides in the 1960s and 1970s to accommodate Francophones in the Canadian military (described, for example, in Coulon 1991), and that individuals in the military have generally positive feelings about the other members of the institution, some decisions by previous governments (e.g., closing the RMC at St-Jean), and recurring grumblings in Ottawa about the merits of bilingualism, annoy French Canadians.

In summary, if indeed there is a distinct military and defence culture in Québec, there is no shortage of real and perceived historical grievances against French Canadians to justify it.

⁴ Richard (2000) also argues that English Canadians also tend to downplay military accomplishments, as part of a shared code of silence: Anglophones would be coy about the conquest and their military prowess, and Francophones would not cause trouble and fall into a “silence of the vanquished”.

⁵ I am grateful to Major-General (ret.) Terry Liston for the following point: in fact, the troop deployment was under the “aid to civil power” and requested by a Québec government quite happy to let Trudeau take the blame (or, more unlikely, the credit). Note from personal correspondence between the author and Maj-Gen Liston, 12 January 2005.

Quebecers have, firstly, long perceived that the Canadian military is at the mercy of foreigners who don't have Canadian national interests at heart, be it in Henri Bourassa's time when the Army served British (and their English-Canadian loyalists') imperial interests, or today, with the CF allegedly serving American imperialism in the Gulf region and elsewhere, and other American follies such as costly missile defence projects. Moreover, anti-French sentiment in the Federal ministries – including Defence – and some of the wrongheaded policies emanating from Ottawa continued to fuel these resentments. The next two sections attempt to link this historical conventional wisdom to actual empirical evidence in order to assess the real nature and direction of Québec's differences in attitudes on defence issues.

French and English Newspaper Coverage of Defence Issues: Two Solitudes Indeed

One of the interesting features of having a population constituted in the majority of two founding nations and languages is having the opportunity to analyse the impact of culture on foreign policy attitudes. Scholars have undertaken very interesting analyses comparing differences among English and French Canadian news media content on a variety of subjects, ranging from time series analyses of general world views among the two linguistic communities, to more specific analyses of editorial opinions regarding pressing issues across English and French Canada.

A decade ago, Burton, Keenleyside and Soderlund (1995) undertook an exhaustive survey of media coverage of foreign policy events of six Canadian newspapers over a ten-year period, comparing coverage in 1982 to that in 1992. While they found a general trend pointing to a decrease in international news coverage over that decade,⁶ they found that some of the major differences in reporting between the English and French news papers uncovered in the early 1980s were still prevalent ten years later:

In the treatment given to various themes by English and French-language papers, with the most outstanding example remaining the Quebec press's

⁶ I am not aware if the downward trend in international news coverage continued even after the events of September 11th, 2001, but it would be interesting to study this issue.

tendency to focus on the international role of Quebec while the English language papers continued to look at foreign policy almost exclusively from an overall Canadian perspective (Burton, Keenleyside and Soderlund, 1995: 57).

A major feature of the academic studies is that while the *Globe and Mail* is considered the closest thing to a Canadian national newspaper of record (Stairs, 1976; Soderlund, Lee and Gecelovsky, 2002), the reality is that, mathematically, only a tiny minority of Canadians actually read it. Researchers find that the media markets in English Canada are highly regionally fragmented and have been unsuccessful in creating a truly national Canadian identity, with the French-Canadian media having, by contrast, successfully created a full-fledged *Québécois* identity (Fletcher 1998).⁷ A generation ago, Arthur Siegel noted that there were definite “value differences along linguistic lines” in both the electronic as well as the printed press, which “can be seen as not contributing in any significant way to a shared sense of Canadian identity” (Siegel, 1977: 42). Other studies have consistently supported this observation and continue to find that “French and English news media carry relatively little common material...[t]hey rely on different news services and rarely carry news or commentary originally published in the other official language (...) It is clear, therefore, that English-speaking and French-speaking Canadians are exposed to different news and public affairs reporting” (Fletcher 1998).

⁷ In Québec, “the English service has rarely had the impact on the country that the French service has in Quebec, where some programs attract a majority of the potential audience and become the subject of everyday conversation and debate” (Fletcher, 1998). (Author’s note: as this is an online document, I cannot provide page numbers.) Moreover, “it is widely accepted that CBC French television played a major role in the development of modern Québécois nationalism. According to Balthazar (1997: 47): Because the French network was, for all practical purposes, a Quebec network...the CBC contributed heavily to...making French-speaking Quebecers closer to one another, reinforcing Quebec consciousness and Quebec nationalism. For the first time in their history, French Canadians living in Quebec were watching, from day to day, a picture of themselves transmitted from one end of the province to the other” (cited in Fletcher, 1998). See also: De Bonville and Vermette, 1994 on the question of *Radio-Canada* and Québec’s identity.

What is the nature of these differences in news and public affairs reporting? Generally, studies of Canadian media have supported Wu's (2000) findings resulting from an analysis of 38 countries' news content showing that English-speaking media from Commonwealth countries focus more on trade and commercial news, whereas French-speaking media emphasise cultural news. Indeed, "French [Canadian] reports pay more attention to constitutional and language issues while the English [Canadian] news gives greater coverage to economic issues" (Fletcher, 1998). Moreover, and perhaps shockingly to some, "the major French media in Quebec focus on Quebec provincial politics and generally report on Ottawa and the rest of Canada primarily in the context of Quebec interests, *much as foreign correspondents would report on a neighbouring country*" (*Ibid.*; emphasis mine).

What about coverage specifically focussing on defence and security issues? One of the few studies I found that dealt specifically with this issue was a paper written by Fabrice Blocteur (1998) which compared newspaper coverage between the *Globe and Mail*, the *Toronto Star*, *Le Devoir*, and *La Presse* for a four-month period in 1985 as two important events were unfolding: the American Coast Guard vessel *Polar Sea* entering the Northwest Passage, and the Government's announcement regarding Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). His findings support his hypotheses stating that English newspapers cover more international events; moreover, international events were more likely to be covered on Page One in English newspapers. Finally, he also found that French newspapers rely more on wire reports than on staff writing; however, in spite of all that, there were more editorials on international news events published in the Francophone papers.⁸

In order to gain further empirical evidence on this question, I created a crude but simple experiment to study coverage of defence issues in five Canadian newspapers during the period ranging from 1995 to 2001. Due to time and budgetary constraints, the time frame could not be

⁸ He explains that French papers have lower circulation, thus less revenue to keep the same number of staff as the two English newspapers based in Toronto. As for the higher number of editorials, he ascribes this to a French tradition of intellectual opinion journalism.

extended and the number of newspapers was limited.⁹ We selected two Anglophone newspapers – the *Ottawa Citizen* and the *Gazette* of Montreal, and compared their coverage to three of Québec’s Francophone newspapers – *La Presse* and *Le Devoir* in Montreal, and *Le Soleil* in Québec City.¹⁰ An interesting built-in feature of this design was that this selection would permit us to compare not only English-Canadian and French-Canadian newspapers, but also an Anglophone and Francophone newspapers *inside* Québec.

The research design was kept simple due to time and budgetary constraints. For example, we had to restrain ourselves to a simple count and could not, at this point, perform a thorough content analysis. That being said, we first, we selected papers whose indexes were available electronically through search engines such as *Proquest* and *Biblio branchée*. Secondly, we selected search strings with specific references to Canadian defence or military issues in order to cull the largest number of articles in each paper, which constituted our total population of defence-related articles.¹¹ Finally, to constitute our dataset on local newspaper

⁹ As a long-term project, I would eventually like to study the entire post-Cold War period until today. Due to time and budgetary constraints, I could only look at newspaper coverage for papers accessible by the same databases (*Biblio Branchée* for the French papers and *ProQuest* for the English papers) on the theory that the indexing rules would be the same within each search engine. Other newspapers are available on other electronic and CD-ROM indexes. The time frame was limited to this 7-year period for purely time constraints.

¹⁰ Although these Francophone newspapers are not the ones with the highest daily circulation – they are beaten by the tabloids *Le Journal de Montréal* and the *Journal de Québec* – they are much closer to the “objective” news standard of the others. Moreover, there is an easily searchable database available which covers these papers: *Biblio Branchée*. The *Ottawa Citizen* and the *Gazette* also were easily searchable on *Proquest*, whereas the *Globe and Mail* was not as easily available and was on separate CD-ROMs. A further step in this research project is eventually to add two English dailies to our dataset and expand the time frame: one each from the Atlantic and the West.

¹¹ For example, we used (in French) : (Défense OU forces OU armée OU soldats OU troupes OU militaire OU militaires) ET (Canada OU canadien OU canadienne OU canadiens OU canadiennes) ; and in English (Defense OR Defence OR Forces OR Army OR Soldiers OR Troops OR Military OR CF) AND (Canada OR Canadian OR Canadians).

coverage of defence issues, we eliminated from the total population articles from wire service reports (Canadian Press, Associated Press, etc.) on the theory that we wanted to measure the true “home-grown” coverage of Canadian defence issues. In other words, we wanted to ensure that coverage of defence issues was being decided upon, and written, by the local editor and staff, which was a better measure of editorial interest in defence issues than merely pasting a wire service report.

The results of our (very simple) study appear in Tables 1 and 2. The major findings can be summarised in two major points. First, as expected, English-language newspapers cover defence and security issues to a larger extent than French-language newspapers. Table 1 shows the yearly combined average number of stories in each language’s newspapers. As can easily be seen there are, on average, twice as many news stories on defence issues in the two Anglophone papers we looked at. These are rather crude figures and more data need to be collected to have a truer picture of the national scene; for example, we tried to collect data from a Western newspaper but our library did not own its electronic index. Nevertheless, these numbers do tend to support what we have seen so far, especially Blocteur’s (1998) findings.¹²

The second lesson we learn is that Anglophone Montrealers do not appear to be well served by the coverage of defence issues in the *Gazette*. Indeed, the French-language *La Presse* had, in most years studied, more coverage of defence issues than its English counterpart. Interestingly, we can deduce that coverage of defence issues is therefore much greater in the *Ottawa Citizen*, which certainly drove the higher figures for Anglophone newspapers presented in Table 1. (As a corollary, we can deduce that *Le Devoir* and *Le Soleil* did not offer as much coverage of defence issues as did *La Presse*). Obviously, these results

¹² The results are also puzzling due to the jumps in numbers, such as from 1997 to 1998 in Table 1. There are several possible explanations for situations such as these, yet which we cannot pin point at this time because further research is needed on several fronts. For example, it is possible that international crises could cause spikes in coverage. Moreover, a change in newspaper staff or its editor can also cause these shifts in frequency of coverage, and this is another type of detective work. Another explanation is coding error, but we used two coders at all times and inter-coder reliability remained strong: they were well within 20% of each other 19 times out of 20.

should be interpreted as preliminary and we are in the process of fine-tuning the coding and will soon proceed with actual analysis of the *content* of the coverage. Nevertheless, these are interesting findings for Anglo-Quebecers interested in defence issues; if these numbers hold on further scrutiny, the reason for the *Gazette's* performance may be an interesting area for more analysis: is it due to an over-reliance on wire reports? Is it due to its perceived role as reporting on issues of special interest to the minority English community in Montreal? In this case, how do English-speaking Montrealers view defence and security issues compared to their "rest of Canada" colleagues? These are certainly areas ripe for further study.

In summary, this section sought to explore the English-French cleavage as it manifests itself in the media. I have argued that news coverage of general public interest issues differs in Canada along linguistic lines. As many scholars have pointed out, coverage of political and cultural events is different in Québec as compared to English-Canada as a whole, with Quebecers having a clearly identifiable media culture, while news coverage in English-Canada is fragmented along regional lines. When I conducted a preliminary and very simple analysis of coverage of news events relating to defence and security affairs, I found that while news coverage of defence issues was greater, on average, in Anglophone papers, it is roughly in the same order of magnitude when we looked at two Montreal newspapers, a finding that warrants further analysis. So, while it appears plain that the media elites in Québec do hold different opinions based on shared values, are these media values transmitted to the public? The final section examines this important question by examining polling data on defence and foreign policy issues since World War II.

The Empirical Record: Canadian Opinion Polls on Security and Defence Issues

Scientific polling began in Canada slightly later than in the United States; but in 1941, George Gallup and his student Saul Rae organised the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion

(CIPO), the Canadian arm of the Gallup Poll; in fact, Saul Rae¹³ conducted the first polls for Prime Minister Mackenzie King (Lachapelle, 1995: 202). In 1943, along with Wilfrid Sanders, Rae published a volume of polling results compiled during the Second World War, which compared attitudes about the war among French Canadians and English Canadians (*Ibid.* : 203). Obviously, a recurring challenge for Canadian pollsters – recognised from the very start and still very much an issue today – was the obligation to write questions and instruments in both languages, and select polling samples from both founding nations. Notwithstanding these technical challenges, CIPO enlisted the help of 26 Canadian dailies, of which three were from the province of Québec (of those, two were French dailies: *La Presse* and *L'Action catholique*), to gauge the public's opinion. The results from these early polls support the “conventional wisdom” working hypotheses presented at the beginning.

For example, during the national debate that preceded the April 1942 plebiscite on conscription,¹⁴ Gallup Canada reported in a February 1942 poll that only 6% of French Canadians **approved** of conscription for men for overseas service, compared to 78% of English Canadian, with **90% of French Canadians opposed to conscription** for overseas service and only 15% of English Canadians so opposed (Gallup Canada data, reported in Lachapelle, 1995: 206). Moreover, French Canadians were 48% less inclined to believe that “Canada would have participated in the war if it were completely independent from the British Empire” (only 33% of

¹³ His son, Bob Rae, was Ontario's 21st Premier.

¹⁴ Mackenzie King had promised, in June 1940, that his government would not pass legislation ordering conscripted Canadians to fight overseas – that they would continue to be used for the defence of Canada. As the war in Europe raged and pressure from the Conservative parliamentary opposition mounted, King announced in January 1942 to hold a national referendum on freeing him from his earlier promise. The national plebiscite passed on 27 April 1942 by a national margin of 63.7% to 36.3% **in favour** of freeing King from his earlier promise (thus permitting the Government to introduce legislation permitting sending troops overseas, which in fact happened on 23 July 1942). However, the results in Québec were overwhelmingly against the proposition: indeed, if the English-speaking ridings in Montreal are excluded, the results for Francophone Quebecers were **85% against** and only 15% in favour (Lachapelle, 1995: 205).

French Canadians answering Yes *versus* 81% of English Canadians; *Ibid.*) – putting French-Canadian opinion in closer line with the Latin American republics. But on nationalist questions, Quebecers consistently scored “higher” than English Canadians. For example, on the question of having a Canadian flag *versus* the Union Jack, a July 1942 poll showed Quebecers supporting the creation of a national flag by a margin of 82% to 9% (with 9% “no opinion/don’t know”) compared to only 37% of English Canadians desiring a national flag and 58% desiring the Union Jack (and 5% unsure; data from Gallup Canada, reported in Lachapelle, 1995: 208).

After World War II, Canada became a player on the world stage in its own right; Canada joined several international organisations such as the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and allied with the West against the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, in these heady days following the Second World War that marked the beginning of the Cold War, it appears that “French Canadians had drawn different lessons from the war, seeing only the confirmation of their fears that they did not sufficiently control their own armed forces, and Prime Minister King paid attention to these views – perhaps overestimating their importance in Quebec” (MacFarlane, 2000: 581). The result was that King worked hard to limit automatic troop commitments in all the treaties that were signed in those years. While French Canadians generally were supportive of the United Nations, “support for the UN did not mean support for collective security as [French-Canadian] editorialists complained that Canadian policy was dominated by Anglophones working for the interests of Great Britain” (MacFarlane, 2000: 582). English Canadians were more supportive of committing troops for collective security to the United Nations and to NATO; French Canadians consistently expressed reservations regarding who would control Canadian troops if they were ever requested (*Ibid.*: 583). Indeed, when, in 1950, the government sent troops to Korea, a majority of Anglophone Members of Parliament and editorialists were in favour, whereas the opinion of French Canadians was mixed.

By far the most exhaustive study yet undertaken of public opinion in Québec during these post-World War II years is James Ian Gow’s 1970 article in the *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, adapted from his Ph.D. dissertation titled “The Opinions of French Canadians

in Québec on the Problems of War and Peace” (Laval University, Department of Political Science, 1969). His premise, which is in line with this paper’s working hypothesis, is that French Canadian opinion before WWII was fundamentally isolationist, owing to Québec’s lack of attachment to the British Empire, and thus to geopolitical events in Europe which were thought to affect British more than Canadian interests. Gow analysed Gallup Poll results; editorials in French-language newspapers in Québec; as well as speeches of Québec members of parliament in Ottawa in order to assess the evolution of *Québécois* attitudes on questions of war and peace between 1945 and 1960 (Gow, 1970: 89). His results lead him to discover factors that were either constant in Québec during that time period, or factors that evolved over fifteen years. Summarily, he found that unvarying opinions were the following – note that these elements support the points made earlier and throughout this paper:

- Quebecers were consistently anti-communist and, more importantly, *anti-imperialist*. For example, Quebecers were very much **against** British actions in the Suez in 1956, by a margin of 48% to 28% (Gow, 1970: 112).
- Quebecers were consistently opposed to sending troops abroad, both in theory (*e.g.*, during the 1945 UN Charter discussions for a permanent force) and in concrete situations (Quebecers opposed, to varying degrees, sending troops to Berlin in 1948; Korea in 1950; Indochina in 1954, etc.; *ibid.*, 113.)
- Quebecers were consistently against war in general. Gow found that even when Canadian participation was not even in question, they rejected the use of armed forces to restore international order or for prevention action (*Ibidem*).

Other security and defence issues were found to be variable over time, however. For example, between 1958 and 1962, Quebecers were more likely than other Canadians to fear Soviet nuclear weapons and more inclined to believe that the USSR would win a global war (Gow, 1970: 113). Among other issues that evolved over time:

- Support for the United Nations increased, as did support for sending troops for police actions, after 1955 (*Ibidem*);
- Support for development aid increased after WWII. Many Quebecers were initially against reconstruction aid to Britain after the war; however, after 1959 (and Canadian adhesion to the Colombo Plan to aid poor countries members of the Commonwealth) there was a strong majority in Québec that favoured aid to developing countries – as high as 81% according to one poll (Gow, 1970: 114);
- Canada's (or Ottawa's) defence policy faced growing opposition in Québec in the 1950s. The opposition was split between those who feared that Canada was not well defended, and those who fretted that Canadian defence cost too much. But *Québécois* opposition to nuclear weapons definitely solidified by 1963 (*Ibidem*).

Gow concluded that Quebecers demonstrated a rather unique position on Canadian foreign policy in that period: they favoured alliances in *principle*, such as joining the UN and NATO, but opposed sending troops in *practice*; moreover, support for the UN steadily increased over time (*Ibidem*). He concludes that the French-Canadian press became less strident in the post-WWII era, and was generally very much in tune with public opinion (Gow, 1970: 115). Additionally, based on his analysis of their floor speeches, he concluded that *Québécois* MPs in Ottawa also tended to adequately reflect public opinion in Québec. In summary, Quebecers' attitudes regarding foreign affairs did evolve after WWII, becoming less isolationist (some say less 'provincial') and more internationalist; they were more likely to support an active Canadian role in the world, as long as that engagement was peaceful and did not entail use of force or sending troops abroad (*Ibid.*: 120-121).

Have these attitudes held steady for the generation that came after World War II and the early Cold War? In order to track longitudinal changes or similarities in public opinion and to compare variances in attitudes between English and French Canadians on modern defence and security issues, I needed two elements. Firstly, it was important to find polls that ask questions specifically related to defence or international security issues; secondly, the polls obviously

needed to show some kind of breakdown in opinions among Canadians either on a regional/provincial basis, or linguistically. I collected a sample of over two dozen national polls conducted in the 24-year period between 1980 and 2004 which met both conditions. They come from Gallup Canada, Compas, Polara, Innovative Research as well as from the Canadian government and other secondary sources such as published research by academics. Several patterns appear recurrent.

One obvious fact that emerges with a systematic look at polling data over the years is a consistent split in opinion between French and English Canadians on “hard” v. “soft” power issues that recurs in poll after poll; thus supporting the general proposition examined in this paper. However, modern studies also show that English Canadians exhibit strong regional differences amongst themselves, a fact not much discussed in the works cited previously. A government poll published in 1979, for example, thus supports some of the findings described by Gow for the 1945 to 1960 period (that the *Québécois* usually score higher on humanitarian and “soft” power questions), as well as some of the regional complexities of Canadian public opinion amongst Anglophones. For instance, Quebecers (along with Maritimers) were more inclined than the rest of Canada to support arms control, by a margin of about 7% points; also, French Canadians were by far the most inclined to attach “strong importance” to foreign aid, by margins varying between 17% and 11% (87% in Québec compared to 70% in British Columbia and 76% in the Prairies); and Quebecers were also much more inclined than the other regions to support the promotion and defence of Human Rights (82%, *versus* the national average of 76%, and the low of 68% in B.C.; Government of Canada, 1979: 15). However, on the “hard power” questions such as “the importance of participating in collective security organisations such as NATO,” Quebecers scored within the national average. A 1988 North-South Institute survey also showed that Quebecers were much more likely to support increasing foreign aid (17%, against a national average of only 10%), while they were almost three times less likely to

support increased Defence spending (11%) than Maritimers (29%; North-South Institute, 1988: 4; 14).¹⁵

The late 1980s saw the Mulroney government beginning to reduce defence spending generally, and the Canadian military presence in Europe in particular. A 1987 Gallup Poll showed that only 51% of Quebecers, compared to 61% of English Canadians, wanted their troops to stay in Europe; moreover, only 36% of Francophones would approve increases in defence spending, compared to 54% of English Canadians (Gallup Canada, 1987: 2). These results were supported by a survey conducted in 1988 by the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security (CIIPS): in that poll, 81% of Anglophones **disagreed** with the statement “Canada should **reduce** its role in NATO” *versus* only 75% of French-Canadians; and while 49% of Anglophones **supported** increases in defence spending, only 25% of Francophones – about half! – did (Driedger and Munton, 1988: 85).

The issue of defence spending also consistently split Canadians along English and French lines in the surveys I studied. In addition to the data cited above, a 1989 Gallup Canada poll showed that “54% of Francophones believe too much is being spent on defence, while only 22% of Anglophones concur” (Gallup Canada, 1989: 1). One year later, the trend continued in another CIIPS poll which showed that 34% of English Canadians would support increases in defence spending, while only 11% of Francophones concurred (Munton, 1990: 48). When the data were broken down regionally, Québec was the least supportive of defence hikes with 12%, followed by Western Canada at 30%; Ontario with 36% and the Maritimes being most supportive, at 43% (*Ibid.*, 62; that same poll, by contrast, still showed Quebecers most supportive of giving foreign aid and of UN peacekeeping).¹⁶ In 1991, Gallup Canada asked the

¹⁵ The authors note, however, that the high results found for this question in the Maritimes may be an artefact of the higher concentration of military installations in the region (North-South Institute, 1988: 14, fn8). Generally speaking, systematic analysis of regional differences is rather new and not always satisfactory. For example, the Western provinces are often lumped together so it is difficult to differentiate BC and the Prairies before the 1980s.

¹⁶ The figures for the question “Is it important to give aid?” were 31% for Québec; dropping to 21% in the Maritimes and 20% in Ontario and the Western provinces. The figures for the question “Is it important to support

same question as in the 1989 cited earlier, and 49% of Quebecers still believed that “Canada is presently spending too much on defence,” compared to only 30% in B.C., 29% in the Prairies, 28% in Atlantic Canada and 26% in Ontario (Gallup Canada, 1991: 1).

A decade later, the national dichotomy on defence spending is still evident. A Compas poll prepared for the *National Post* in February 2000 still showed that only 3% of Quebecers would increase its expenditures on defence, while 53% would reduce it; this compares with 8%/(26%) in the Prairies; 14%/(30%) in B.C.; 13%/(28%) in Ontario; and 7%/(13%) in the Atlantic provinces (Compas, 2000: 1).¹⁷ A Gallup Canada survey published in March 2002 also showed that 31% of Quebecers answered that Canadian defence spending was too high, while only 7% of Western Canadians thought so (Rodrigue, 2002: A13). A recent Pollara poll, published in April 2004, asked respondents to “think about various portfolio spending priorities and determine whether the government should spend more, spend the same, or spend less;” while spending on fighting terrorism and defence ranked #1 and #2 of eight items, with 46% and 43% approval respectively, Quebecers were dead last for the item on defence with only 9% approval (Pollara, 2004: 14). However, *Québécois* were the most likely of all Canadians to say that spending on promoting Canadian culture abroad was important, with 19% approval, compared to 4% in the Prairies, 8% in B.C., and about 15% in Ontario and the Atlantic.

Another consistent area of Anglo-French opinion divide in Canada regards when, where and how to intervene in foreign lands. Of course, the nature of UN peacekeeping has changed between 1948 and 1989, a period in which only 16 UN missions were launched, every one of which had Canadian troops involved. But the end of the Cold War and the proliferation of civil

UN peacekeeping missions?” the figures were 62% in Québec; 58% in the Maritimes and the West, and only 55% in Ontario (Munton, 1990: 61).

¹⁷ In fact, Maritimers are consistently more likely to favour national defence issues, a fact uncovered again in a Government of Canada poll titled *Listening to Canadians* published in 2002, where between 70% and 77% of the four Atlantic provinces said the Government should give national defence a “high priority” over “the next 5 years”, compared to a national average of 63%, and only 49% in Québec (Government of Canada, 2002: 14).

conflicts saw a huge increase in the number of peacekeeping missions.¹⁸ With such an active agenda, the United Nations and other collective security organisations need troops to send overseas, and Canada is a frequent donor. Quebecers and English Canadians often disagree on the nature and level of Canadian commitments, with the former clearly favouring action with the United Nations yet not necessarily ready to pony up, while English Canadians generally more willing to send troops abroad.

For example, a 1994 Gallup Canada poll confirms that Gow's observation made almost a generation earlier (in 1970) stipulating that French Canadians agree on collective security *in principle*, but are against concrete military commitments, still held in the post-Cold War era. That Gallup poll found that while a majority of Canadians "favoured either increasing Canada's peacekeeping role or keeping Canada's commitments at the current level," Quebecers were the most inclined to agree with that statement (by 69%, compared to 54% of Prairie residents); yet, when asked if "Canada should increase its presence in the former Yugoslavia," Quebecers were at the bottom with only 39% agreeing, compared to 48% of Atlantic Canadians and 44% across Ontario and the Prairies (Gallup Canada, 1994: 1). Yet, this is not to construe that Quebecers are against *all* interventions; only nine months after the Gallup poll asked about attitudes regarding the former Yugoslavia, another Gallup Poll asked Canadians if they agreed with the deployment of 700 troops to Haiti: Quebecers were much more in favour of that deployment than other Canadians, with British Columbians being by far the least supportive ("Selon 47% des Canadiens...", 1994: C10). Yet, on other issues such as the NATO bombing of Bosnian Serb positions in September 1995, with which 58% of Canadians agreed, Quebecers found themselves in the average (Gallup Canada, 1995: 1). Ten years (and many deployments) later, Pollara conducted a poll for the Canadian Institute of International Affairs (CIIA) which asked if Canadians supported the deployment of troops to Afghanistan. Although support was high for

¹⁸ While only 16 UN peacekeeping missions were authorised between 1948 and 1988, 27 were authorised between 1988 and 1996. Currently, there are 18 active UN missions. See the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations website at www.un.org/Depts/dpko.

the troops throughout Canada, it was again in Québec that it fared lowest (72%, against 77% nationally); this difference, however, is not overwhelming (Pollara, 2004: 12).

There is no obvious pattern or lesson or rule of thumb to allow us to state with empirical certainty that Quebecers are in favour of certain kinds of deployments; for example, depending on if they occur within the UN context or if they involve Francophone countries, although more in-depth analysis is needed to ascertain why some deployments find support in Québec, and why some do not. Yet, recurring empirical patterns do suggest that defence spending **always** splits Canadian public opinion along linguistic lines, as does support for the United Nations and foreign aid. There are other issues that have recently sprung up to divide Canadians along these lines and which have their roots in recent events and global trends: Quebecers are more likely nowadays to oppose the United States and to view Globalisation as a negative force.

Indeed, a recent Innovative Research Group poll conducted for the CDFAI in November 2004 supports the notion that Quebecers are much more likely to feel that they “cannot trust the United States”, that “the US is behaving like a rogue nation” or that “the US is a force for evil in the world” (Innovative Research, 2004: 14-16). Moreover, “Quebecers and Francophones are roughly nine points higher than average in assessing globalisation as a critical threat” to Canada (Innovative Research, 2004: 24). It should be noted that while there is a clear Anglo-French divide on these questions, English Canadians are also divided amongst themselves, along regional lines. Generally, Atlantic Canadians still are the most likely to approve of using troops or of using force internationally (Innovative Research, 2004: 27).

In summary, with the advance in polling techniques and greater attention to survey instruments, Canadian public opinion is shown in its complexity, which encompasses a clear English-French dimension but also a regional dimension among English Canadians. There are always several challenges for the researcher interested in polling data. First, the questions asked by pollsters are rarely the same, even within the same organisation. It is difficult to systematically compare, say, attitudes on defence spending as the question may not be asked systematically every year by any one pollster. Another challenge, mentioned previously in footnote 15, is in assessing regional differences. Modern polls do so but the operationalisation

of Western provinces, for example, is not necessarily consistent. A final challenge is in assessing the actual *meaning* of these polls if one is a policymaker in Ottawa, given that the salience of the issues is rarely measured in polls. Modern pollsters do occasionally attempt to control for relative salience of these issues compared to domestic and social issues such as health care by asking control questions. These may include questions such as asking respondents to rank the most important issues facing Canadians today, to other types of controls such as asking the respondents some knowledge questions, thus enabling pollsters to gage responses with the actual knowledge of the public.

The point is that the issue of salience of foreign policy and defence issues is always difficult to compare from one poll to the next, and controls are not systematically performed in each poll. Moreover, the salience of an issue is dependent on the news context of the day. There is no easy answer, but all these issues are important and represent so many areas ripe for further study; this author does intend to address some of these puzzles in future iterations of this project.

Conclusions

Blanket statements about alleged French Canadian anti-militarism and isolationism tend to irritate many *Québécois* to the highest degree. In a recent email exchange on this very subject, one well-known *Van Doo*¹⁹ wrote that:

Historically, the first volunteers to leave Canada to fight in a foreign war were the Zouaves from Québec, to defend the Vatican from Garibaldi! Indeed our Francophone units of the Regular and Reserve force (that Quebecers know and trust) have traditionally had as good, if not better, support than anywhere else in Canada. Quebec provided one third of the infantry (and casualties) in Korea without flinching. The R22eR currently has long waiting lists of recruits while other units elsewhere are under-manned due to recruiting problems. Same goes for our Reserve units which are limited only by budgets. Quebec also has the best cadet participation in the country. The military was “the most respected institution” in the ice storm, beating Hydro-Quebec, the police, the Church, the media, unions, doctors etc. The use of the brigade from Valcartier “in aid of the civil power” at Oka and Kanasatake had overwhelming public

¹⁹ As members of the famed French Canadian Royal 22nd Regiment (R22R) are called, since “22” in French is spelled “vingt-deux” and sounds like Van Doo.

support. Quebecers readily accept the use of force when it is legitimate, necessary and a last resort.²⁰

General Liston continues the exchange by arguing that “from a Quebec perspective, the ‘military’ problem today is mainly one of foreign policy. Until [Ottawa] can demonstrate that the military will be used to pursue objectives that are consistent with the post-modern view of the world Quebec shares with BC and a good part of the rest of the country...we have little chance of gaining full Quebec support.” Therefore, it can be argued that if Quebecers are consistently wary of defence spending and what they see as military adventurism in some deployments, it goes back to the historical and sociological explanations put forth in the first section of this paper.

Recall that *Québécois* are historically anti-imperialist and more nationalistic than their loyalist Anglophone brothers and sisters, supporting a Canadian flag very early on and also supporting a separate Canadian Air Force during WWII, for example. For Québec, therefore, as long as Ottawa designs defence policy that meet Canadian foreign policy objectives – as opposed to American or European interests – that respects Canadian values and priorities, there may exist ample political capital for supporting defence issues.

It is difficult to ascertain the exact degree to which these attitudes affect policymaking in Ottawa. To be sure, several recent events have tended to support the conventional wisdom, such as the impact of the Québec provincial election on the 2003 decision not to participate in the invasion of Iraq, and the recent Paul Martin government’s decision regarding the American Ballistic Missile Defence programme: are these decisions based on electoral positions in Québec, which is the most fluid owing to the presence of the Bloc? One thing is for certain, however: while opinion in Québec may be important to federal decision makers due to its distinctiveness, modern polls demonstrate that other regional differences will continue to acquire importance.

²⁰ Personal email exchange with Major-General (ret) Terry Liston, 5 January 2005.

Canada is a democracy with very divergent regions and divergent interests. The challenge for any Federal Government is in managing honest differences without compromising Canadian security and national interests. We won't always agree on what that interest is, but with proper leadership some of the negative attitudes prevalent in Québec can be challenged, and old attitudes can be overcome. But Quebecers should not always bear the brunt of wrongheaded policies emanating from Ottawa. Conservatives and Hawks also have some reflecting to do in proposing a proper – and realistic – role for Canada in the world that does not compromise some of the fundamental values that do in fact make us different.

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Table 1

**Comparing Yearly Average Newspaper Coverage of Defence Issues –
Francophone v. Anglophone Newspapers**

Year	English newspapers (average) ²¹	French Newspapers (average) ²²	Proportion English/French ²³
1995	169	110	1.54
1996	158	124	1.27
1997	105	110	0.95
1998	173	84	2.06
1999	195	74	2.64
2000	127	47	2.70
2001 ²⁴	67	20	3.35
<i>TOTAL</i>	<i>994</i>	<i>569</i>	<i>Av. = 2.07</i>

²¹ The English newspapers compiled in this study were the *Ottawa Citizen* and the *Montreal Gazette*. We took the total number of stories appearing in both and divided by 2.

²² The French-language newspapers compiled in this study were *La Presse* and *Le Devoir* in Montreal, and *Le Soleil* in Québec City. We compiled the total number of stories and divided by 3.

²³ This number shows the simple ratio of the averages in English v. French coverage; a positive number tells us how many “times more” English-language newspaper stories appeared on defence topics than in French papers; a fraction would mean that there were more French news stories that year.

²⁴ Partial year only; we had to stop collecting data as of July 2001 for time and budgetary reasons.

Table 2

**Comparing Yearly Average Newspaper Coverage of Defence Issues
La Presse v. *The Montreal Gazette***

Year	<i>La Presse</i> (yearly average)	<i>The Gazette</i> (yearly average)	Proportion Presse/Gazette
1995	110	83	1.32
1996	105	88	1.19
1997	115	70	1.64
1998	101	115	0.88
1999	110	112	0.98
2000	81	75	1.08
2001	31	33	0.94
TOTAL	653	576	Av. = 1.15