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A Special Military Relationship? Canada's Role in Constructing US Military Power

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Introduction

For sixty years, the United States' military strength has surpassed that of all other countries. Since besting the Soviet Union, its superiority became so vast that it has appeared capable of unilaterally shaping the world according to its preferences. Notwithstanding the enormous power disparity that has distinguished the United States from most of the international system since 1945, it is this article's working assumption that other states' assets and policies also serve to encourage or constrain US military capacity and strategy. When allies participate in the United States' collective defence regimes by providing personnel, equipment, or bases they directly bolster US hard power. At the same time, this participation also confers legitimacy on Washington's military stance, bolstering its soft power.[1] The United States currently has military bases in three dozen foreign countries or special territories, from Japan to Kuwait. Allowing the US military to use these bases not only provides it with important stepping-stones around the world, but also signals multilateral support for its undertakings.[2] In contrast, other countries' lack of participation in – or opposition to – such initiatives limits their material effectiveness and constitutes a constraint on US military effectiveness. For instance, during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, long-time NATO ally Turkey refused to permit the use of its territory to add a northern thrust to the effort. Foreign countries' decisions to participate in, abstain from, or oppose the United States' alliances thus determine the real limits of its military might.

[1] Joseph Nye, "The American Colossus" in *The Paradox of American Power* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 8-9.

[2] Office of the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Installations and Environment), Department of Defense, "Summary," *Base Structure Report (A Summary of DoD's Real Property Inventory), Fiscal Year 2002 Baseline,* http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2002/basestructure2002.pdf

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A nation's military strategy by necessity involves both offence – threatening or ultimately fighting potential enemies in distant seas and on or over foreign soil – and defence – protecting its own lands and interests from attack. US military policy has always emphasized avoiding foreign entanglements in favour of a strong homeland defence, a sentiment that persisted even as it assumed the role of the hegemon and ventured occasionally into offensive operations.[3] The focus on defence stems from the geographical fact that the United States is vulnerable in every geographical dimension of modern warfare – sea, air, land, and outer space. While its maritime strength is superior to any rival power, the oceans to the east and west function as direct routes to its coasts. As well, air attacks have been a concern since World War II, first from bomber strikes and then from nuclear missiles – which remain a threat as there is no reliable missile defence system as of yet. Space belongs to no one state, meaning that much of the global potentially has access and could use it to see across the surface of the world's landmasses, locating and identifying military targets.[4] Finally, although their relative military weakness minimizes the threats from its continental neighbours, the Canadian and Mexican borders with the United States potentially allow for land-based attacks by enemies – including terrorists – from other continents.

For over a century after 1776, the United States viewed Canada as an extension of the largely hostile British Empire and, thus, a constant threat. At first, many Americans thought that to ensure their security they needed to annex the dominion of their traditional enemy and unsuccessfully launched three invasions – 1775, 1777, and 1812 – to achieve this objective. Although tension with Canada persisted until the 1870 Treaty of Washington, the shift to an Anglo-American detente reinforced a web of common interests and facilitated the evolution of what became an intimate bilateral security regime.[5] This development was heralded in 1938 when, in the face of the growing Nazi and Japanese threats, US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt proposed a formal military understanding with Canada – the "Kingston Dispensation."[6] Faced with an implicit suggestion that America would be willing to protect the continent alone if necessary, Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King realized that Canada had to bolster its own defences to alleviate its neighbour's concerns. In politically acceptable wording, the new military reality was defined and the basic template of the new

[3] George Washington. *Farewell Address.*
[4] Barry R. Posen. "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony," *International Security* Vol. 28, No. 1 (Summer 2003), p. 9.
[5] David G. Haglund, and Joel J. Sokolsky, eds., *The U.S.-Canada Security Relationship: The Politics, Strategy, and Technology of Defense* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), p. 11.
[6] Michel Fortmann and David G. Haglund, "Canada and the Issue of Homeland Security: Does the Kingston Dispensation Still Hold?" *Canadian Military Journal* (Spring 2002), p. 22.

military relationship was laid out. While the two countries did not establish any joint continental defence measures at this time, Canadian defence policy was nonetheless influenced by American interests.

Given its smaller economy and its supportive but not uncritical strategic assistance, Canada has still made a significant contribution to American offensive capacity at certain historical moments. In the defence of the American homeland, however, that its support is critical. No other country plays a more important role than Canada. By virtue of its geographical contiguity, Canada serves either as a conduit of possible attack to the United States or as a buffer against external threats. Its participation in US continental defence initiatives and the attitudes it adopts towards them directly lower or raise the costs of US security. When Canada operates as a buffer against threats or provides material support for US military undertakings, it reduces the financial, strategic, and political burden to the United States of defending itself, thereby freeing its military resources for their offensive deployment. When it is uncooperative, acting independently of or in opposition to the United States, it increases US defence costs, as when Ottawa declined to support the US invasion of Iraq.

This article will examine Canada's dual contributions to US offensive and defensive military capacity during the three stages through which warfare has progressed in the past seventy years from World War II's industrial war against the Axis powers, to the Cold War with the Soviet bloc, to counterinsurgency and asymmetric warfare against terrorist cells. It is the authors' contention that while Canada's support has often been negligible in US offensive undertakings, it has been absolutely critical to continental defence.

Industrial Warfare: World War II

In the warfare paradigm which prevailed during the first half of the twentieth century, the chief actors were states, which mobilized their assets – troops and industrially-produced arms – in order to engage with those of enemy states in trials of strength.[7] The supreme example of this warfare was World War II, when the belligerents marshalled all their human and industrial resources in a fight to the finish. Although both Canada and the United States participated in the offensive war overseas, the continent was largely untouched by the fighting, due to its geographical separation from the principal theatres of conflict in Europe and Asia. Nevertheless, in addition to mobilizing armies and air forces to fight Germany in Europe and

[7] Rupert Smith. *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern Worl.*(London: Penguin, 2005), p. 182.

launching navies to protect their convoys of ships delivering materials across the Atlantic for the war effort, Washington and Ottawa made extensive plans for the defence of the continent against possible attack.

From 1939 to 1941, Canada was more fully engaged in the transatlantic struggle against Germany than the United States. Initially, while neutral Washington sold arms to Ottawa, Canada directly contributed land, sea, and air forces to the fighting. Canadians fought in the 1941 Battle for Hong Kong, made enormous contributions to the Battle of the Atlantic, and served in the Royal Air Force after completing the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan in Canada. In joining the armed struggle, Canada's significant overseas contributions pre-emptively constructed US defensive power.

Although a secondary player overseas in World War II, Canada's contribution to US military defence, which had been earlier conceptualized by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King in the Kingston Dispensation, was institutionalized both materially and strategically, establishing the pattern that was to persist into the twenty-first century. Shortly before war broke out, President Roosevelt delivered a speech in Kingston, where he stated that "America would not 'stand idly by' were the physical security of Canada threatened."[8] Prime Minister King responded by pledging that "as a good and friendly neighbour, Canada has a responsibility to see that it did not become an avenue of attack against the United States."[9] The exchange was an acknowledgement of the new military relationship in North America. Rather than being a threatening extension of the British Empire, Canada had become a glacis for its neighbour. In serving its own interests, the United States would defend this territory. If Canada wanted to preserve some sovereignty over its own space, it had to defend itself against America's enemies.

By the summer of 1940, when few thought that Britain could survive, the defence of North America from both Nazi Germany and Japan became a pressing concern. That year, the two leaders held discussions at Ogdensburg, New York, which resulted in the creation of the Permanent Joint Board of Defence (PJBD) to address mutual problems of defence,[10] and in the

[8] Quoted in David Haglund. "North American Cooperation in an Era of Homeland Security," *Orbis* 47 (Autumn 2003), p. 684

[9] David G. Haglund, and Joel J. Sokolsky, eds., *The U.S.-Canada Security Relationship: The Politics, Strategy, and Technology of Defense* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), p. 2.

[10] J.L. Granatstein, *Towards a New World: Readings in the History of Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1992), p. 52.

President's words, to "help secure the continent for the future."[11] During its period of activity, the PJBD drew up plans to mobilize troops and material resources to defend North America in the event of an attack.[12]

An extension of the policy of material coordination came with the Hyde Park Declaration in April 1941. In addition to averting a shortage of United States dollars which threatened Canada's entire war effort, the Declaration organized the continental economy for war. Each country was to provide the other with the defence materials which it was "best able to produce and above all produce quickly."[13] Avoiding the duplication of defence production ensured that the economic facilities of both countries were put to the most effective use.

There was also a strategic dimension to the US-Canada defence cooperation. When negotiations to draft the Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defence Plan began in 1940, the United States sought strategic control of Canadian forces should Britain be defeated. Canada reluctantly agreed.[14] However, by the time the United States had joined the war in response to the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbour, the British had fended off Hitler's threat in Europe. The United States again sought strategic control, asking for the integration of Eastern Canada into its Northeast Defence Command and of British Columbia into its Northwest Defence Command.[15] King worried that these closer military ties might mean Canada's absorption into the American union and refused.

Notwithstanding this mild constraint on the exercise of US military power, Canada contributed more than any other country to augmenting US defensive capacity. Since both countries viewed Japan as a threat, the entire west coast of North America was thought to be vulnerable, leading Canada and the United States to coordinate the deployment of their forces

[11] Quoted in David G. Haglund, and Joel J. Sokolsky, eds., *The U.S.-Canada Security Relationship: The Politics, Strategy, and Technology of Defense* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), p. 19.
[12] Christopher Conliffe, "The Permanent Joint Board on Defense, 1940-1988," *The U.S.-Canada Security Relationship: The Politics, Strategy, and Technology of Defense*, eds., David G Haglund and Joel J. Sokolsky (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), pp. 150-1.
[13] Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond and John English, *Canada, 1900-194.*(Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 1990), p. 366.
[14] Norman Hillmer and J.L. Granatstein, *Empire to Umpire: Canada and the World into the Twenty-First Century* (Toronto: Thompson Nelson, 2008), p. 142.
[15] Ibid., p. 143.

there.[16] In addition, after Germany invaded the Soviet Union, Canada permitted the construction of an all-weather highway across its territory, so that the United States could establish an interior line of communication that would help defend Alaska in the event of its invasion by Japan. Thus, during World War II, Canada not only made enormous direct contributions to the war effort by helping to fight the Axis powers, but also began to act as a buffer against attacks from overseas enemies. By the end of the war, the United States had built airfields, an oil pipeline, weather stations, and a host of other installations on Canadian territory.[17] To maintain its autonomy, the Canadian government paid in full for all these installations at the end of the war.

While Canada was supportive but not essential to the United States' overseas engagements, it was crucial to its defence in North America. Without a secure homeland US power could not be fully projected abroad. By virtue of its geographical contiguity, Canada was in a position to contribute materially and significantly supplement the security of the northern half of the American continent. Yet, Canadian sovereign concerns limited the extent to which Washington could achieve its security goals in the north on its own and unilaterally – that is, until the Cold War, when its increasing military dependence on its neighbour caused Canada to integrate its air forces with the United States in a unified command.

Cold Warfare

After the defeat of Germany and Japan, an ideological-cum-political standoff developed between the United States and the Soviet Union. Driven by their nuclear arms race, this confrontation laid a new military paradigm over the previous one. In "cold" warfare, states deployed their nuclear resources in order to intimidate their opponents. As the United States and the Soviet Union could now threaten the other through air-borne strikes launched from anywhere on the planet,[18] each sought to deter the other from such attacks by building up forbiddingly strong nuclear arsenals.[19] The goal of the new strategic doctrine was to maintain a second strike capability, that was able to survive a nuclear attack and respond with a

[16] Christopher Conliffe, "The Permanent Joint Board on Defense, 1940-1988." in *The U.S.-Canada Security Relationship: The Politics, Strategy, and Technology of Defense*, eds., David G Haglund and Joel J. Sokolsky (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), p. 150.
[17] Norman Hillmer and J.L. Granatstein, *Empire to Umpire: Canada and the World into the Twenty-First Century* (Toronto: Thompson Nelson, 2008), p. 153.
[18] Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World* (London: Penguin, 2005), p. 181.
[19] Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003), p. 5-6.

devastating retaliatory strike, resulting in the condition of mutually assured destruction – fittingly known as "MAD."[20]

Offence in a Bipolar World

Canada's contribution to the United States overseas' efforts against the USSR was made strategically and materially through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Strategically, Ottawa played a leading role as a major player among the war-devastated industrial powers of the late 1940s in advocating the establishment of a peacetime collective defence organization to balance against the then serious threat that Moscow might attempt to expand its region of influence to subsume Europe. Once the NATO agreement was ratified and a formal military alliance was established under a US commander, Canada contributed army and air force bases in Europe and provided some naval assets for NATO's maritime forces.

The Canadian government's support of an anti-communist strategy helped solidify the United States' legitimacy as military leader of the 'free' world, but Ottawa's periodic questioning of the Pentagon's technological and tactical positions occasionally imposed some costs on Washington. Mere hours before US President John F. Kennedy's address to the nation on 22 October 1962, Prime Minister John Diefenbaker was informed of the US decision to implement a 'quarantine' on Soviet ships en route to Cuba. Incensed that he had not been consulted, Diefenbaker refused to put the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) on high alert.[21] The result was that the American Commander of the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD) was only able to put the US air defence forces on alert. It was not until October 24 (after the quarantine had gone into effect) that Diefenbaker agreed that the RCAF could be put on alert, and NORAD went to DEFCON 3 until the crisis was resolved.[22] Diefenbaker's brief refusal was interpreted by many as proof of Canadian autonomy, but the fact that Minister of National Defence Douglas Harkness put Canadian forces on alert in defiance of his political superiors demonstrated how directly they constituted not only a tool of national security, but also an actual extension of the United States' offensive capacity.[23]

Canada's role in American offensive operations varied as the Cold War progressed. In 1969, Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau's decision to withdraw half the troops stationed in

[20] Henry Kissinger, *Diplomac,.* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), p. 608
[21] Joseph T. Jockel, *Canada in NORAD, 1957-2007: A History,* (Montreal, QC and Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007), p. 55.
[22] Ibid., p. 59.
[23] Ibid., p. 55.

Europe reduced Canada's presence there, but in 1983 his approval of US cruise missile testing over Canadian soil supported the Pentagon's military equipment program.[24] During the cold war, Canada's participated as the Western bloc's representative on the International Control Commission to mediate in the Vietnam War. However, but its inability to balance the interests of its Polish and far from neutral Indian co-commissioners and its abstention from contributing to the United States' doomed efforts in Southeast Asia, meant that Ottawa's construction of the United States offensive power during the Cold War can be seen to have varied from moderate to small.[25] Not so its construction of the United States' continental defensive capacity.

Continental Missile Defence

Once Moscow developed long-range bombers, homeland defence became a central concern for the Pentagon. Given the seriousness with which the United States took the likelihood of a Soviet attack, Canada's contributions to Washington's homeland defence took on far greater importance due to both its material assets and its strategic location on the flight path between the USSR and the USA. Materially speaking, Canada's military arms capacity, largely in the form of US branch plant production, was added to the United States' own armaments industry through the Canada-US Defence Production Sharing Agreement of 1959. This had the further advantage of geographically dispersing US military production and complicating their targeting by the Kremlin.[26]

Strategically, the United States wanted to defend against an attack across the North Pole by intercepting Soviet bombers or missiles over Canada before they could reach American territory. To accomplish this, the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD) was established in 1957. While Canada's contributions to continental defence during World War II had been modest, here they were vital. From the beginning, NORAD was commanded by an American Commander and a Canadian Deputy Commander. In 1957, at the creation of NORAD, Canada extolled it as the "linchpin to what the diplomats hoped would be a consultative arrangement between the United States and Canada in the event of a severe

[24] Ibid., p. 118.
[25] Douglas Ross, *In the Interests of Peace: Canada and Vietnam, 1954-1973* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984).
[26] Douglas L. Bland. *Canada's National Defence: Defence Policy,* (Kingston, ON: Queen's University Press, 1997). p. 324.

international crisis."[27] While command of the forces remained with the national governments, "the establishment of NORAD [was] a decision for which there [was] no precedent in Canadian history in that it grant[ed] in peace-time to a foreign representative operational control of an element of Canadian forces *in Canada.*"[28]

Under the NORAD agreement, Soviet bombers would be detected and intercepted over Canada before they reached their targets in the United States, thereby increasing the likelihood of survivng an attack.[29] Detection was provided by radar stations, such as the Pinetree Line (operational in 1955), the McGill Line, and the Distant Early Warning line (operational in 1957).[30] Canada's contribution was concentrated in the area of detection, while interception was provided by the US Air Force's surface-to-air BOMARC missiles. This division of labour led some to accuse Canada of 'bird-watching' rather than participating in continental defence in a meaningful way.[31] When Canada acquired BOMARC missiles for its own air force, the question of whether to equip them with nuclear warheads became the subject of intense debate. The eventual solution was to arm them with nuclear warheads, but to store them in American custody at Canadian bases.[32] Canadian public opinion prevented Canada from being a full partner in implementing those measures which the United States considered requirements for the defence of North America.

Although having the United States take responsibility for the interception of Soviet bombers helped protect Canada, the arrangement had tremendous costs. Should a Soviet bomber be intercepted, it would probably be with a missile armed with a nuclear warhead and it would likely be over Canadian territory. The Canadian Army wrote that "[either] by accident or design, Canadian air defences contribute to the perimeter defence of the USA while using Canada as the killing area."[33] Because Ottawa deemed the Soviet Union to be as much of a threat to its existence as Washington did, it agreed to this arrangement. In essence, Canada went beyond functioning as a defence buffer for the United States to become its glacis, a geographical extension of the US military system and the immediate fallout area for any resulting nuclear

[27] Joseph T. Jockel, *Canada in NORAD, 1957-2007: A History* (Montreal, QC and Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007), p. 4.
[28] Quoted in Jockel, p. 4.
[29] Jockel, p. 10.
[30] Melvin Conant, *The Long Polar Watch: Canada and the Defense of North America* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1962), p. 39.
[31] Jockel, p. 53.
[32] Sean M. Maloney, *Learning to Love the Bomb: Canada's Nuclear Weapons During the Cold War,* (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2007), ch. 12-13.
[33] Quoted in Jockel, p. 10.

radiation. [34] In the process of defending its neighbour, however, Canada gained the umbrella of American support, thus contributing to the security of its own homeland.

The threat of attack by Soviet bombers faded by the 1960s, as the two superpowers perfected their capacity to launch intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), allowing them to deliver a nuclear strike anywhere on the globe with a high likelihood of success. This new threat prompted the US military to push for a ballistic missile defence (BMD) program, which introduced the possibility that deterrence against a nuclear missile attack could be achieved not only through a strong offensive force but also through strategic defence. Canada did not support this initiative, believing that it destabilized the preventive threat of mutually assured destruction by reducing the fear of nuclear retaliation.[35] Ottawa insisted on inserting a clause in the 1968 renewal of NORAD stipulating that it: "would not involve…a Canadian commitment to participate in active ballistic missile defence."[36] Because of Canadian opposition to BMD, the United States was unable to place interceptors in Canada, which reduced the degree to which Canada bolstered its defensive capacity. Canada and the United States agreed on the threat – communism – but disagreed about how best to defend against it. In choosing not to participate in an activity that it assessed as counter-productive to its interests, Ottawa constrained US security.

The issue seemed to be laid to rest in 1972 when the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, limiting each country's defences against missile-delivered nuclear weapons and affirming the need to maintain the nuclear balance of terror. Yet, in 1983, US President Ronald Regan launched the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) to design ground and space-based systems to protect the United States from attack by ballistic missiles. In 1985, he invited all NATO members to participate in the SDI research. Although it was not a party to it, Canada was committed to the principles of the ABM Treaty, leading the Mulroney government to announce that "[Canada's] own policies and priorities do not warrant a government-to-government effort in support of SDI research." [37] At the same time, however, "Canadian firms could participate and compete for contracts under existing bilateral defence development and production-sharing agreements."[38] Following the 1986 renewal of NORAD,

[34] Stephen Clarkson. 'Poor Prospects: "The Rest of Canada" under Continental Integration.'.in *Beyond Quebec,* ed. Kenneth McRoberts (Montreal, QC and Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993), p. 252.
[35] Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), p. 609.
[36] Jockel, p. 77.
[37] Ibid., p. 127.
[38] Elinor C. Sloan, *Security and Defence in the Terrorist Era: Canada and North America* (Montreal, QC and Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005), p. 102.

the United States announced the creation of the Air Defence Initiative which was intended to work side-by-side with SDI in modernizing continental defences. While acknowledging a certain degree of overlap with SDI, the Mulroney government nonetheless committed itself to participating as part of the modernization of its air defences and contributed financially to the initiative by pledging $47 million.[39] This Canadian inconsistency in its opposition to BMD was a limitation, albeit a minor one, on the Pentagon's defence planning.

While Canada's construction of the United States offensive power during the cold war varied from moderate to small, in the realm of continental defence, it was a critical partner. Yet, while Ottawa provided overwhelming support for American homeland defence in the early years of their ideological struggle with the Soviet bloc, this support waned as the confrontation progressed. Periodic questioning of US threat assessments led Canada to abstain from several important initiatives, thus reducing the extent to which it constructed US security.

The Post-Cold War World

Asymmetric Warfare: The War on Terror

After the end of the cold war, a major change took place in the global landscape. The new threats to international security came from non-state actors like international terrorist networks.[40] Unlike the previous paradigms, which involved only states – the sole entities capable of mobilizing sufficient resources – asymmetric warfare involves non-state actors fighting against states. While non-state actors are materially disadvantaged, victory is not determined by superior resources. Rather, non-state practitioners of this type of warfare "use all available networks – political, economic, social, and military – to convince the enemy's citizens or political decision makers that their goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit."[41] Asymmetric war is rooted in the precept that superior political and social will can defeat greater economic and military strength. States are thus forced to attempt to win "hearts and minds" since they cannot achieve victory through the might of their resources.

After the traumatic attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States explicitly identified the threat of terrorism as the greatest danger to the American homeland and, by extension, the

[39] Jockel, p. 136.
[40] Sloan, p. 31.
[41] T.X. Hammes. *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century* (New York: Zenith Imprint, 2006), p. 2.

continent. Recognizing that it could not provide complete security against this threat, the Bush administration's *National Security Strategy* stated that it would pre-emptively fight terrorists abroad so that they would not attack the United States itself.[42] Thus, continental defence became intertwined with pre-emptive war. Spurred by this new conception of security, the United States launched a war on Afghanistan to overthrow the Taliban government and to wipe out the al-Qaeda terrorist nodes it was sheltering. As a member of NATO which invoked Article V, declaring the attack on the United States to be an attack on all alliance members, Canada committed troops to supporting the American military operations in Afghanistan.[43]

Canada was the only country after Great Britain and the United States to define its mission in Afghanistan in terms of its national interests. Like Washington, Ottawa declared international terrorism to be a threat to its national security and volunteered its troops to serve in the war. The initial invasion, Operation Enduring Freedom, consisted of a bombing campaign in support of CIA and US Special Operations Forces (SOF) teams inside the country.[44] While primarily a US mission, Canada contributed a battalion of infantry, the 3rd Battalion of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, and a detachment of JTF-2, Canada's Special Forces, to serve with US SOF.[45] When the NATO took over responsibility for combat operations in 2003, the Canadian Forces moved to the capital city of Kabul where they assumed command of the newly formed International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and provided assistance to civilian infrastructure. In 2005, Canada increased its troop commitment and subsequently shifted its forces to the particularly dangerous Kandahar Province.[46] Due to the United States' ineffective nation-building, the Canadians had to contend with a resurgent Taliban. Adopting a "whole of government" approach, the Canadians took charge of the Provincial Reconstruction

[42] National Security Council, The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The White House, 2002) p. 6. Date of Access: 21 November 2008. http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html.

[43] Jenifer Welsh, *At Home in the World: Canada's Global Vision for the 21st Century* (New York: Harper Collins, 2004).

[44] Gary Berntsen, *Jawbreaker: The Attack on Bin Laden and Al Qaeda: A Personal Account by the CIA's Key Field Commander* (New York: Crown, 2005).

[45] Norman Hillmer and J.L. Granatstein, *Empire to Umpire: Canada and the World into the Twenty-First Century* (Toronto: Thompson Nelson, 2008). p. 328.

[46] Government of Canada. "Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team." Ottawa: 3 November 2008. Date of Access: 21 November 2008. http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/kandahar/kprt-eprk.aspx

Team (PTRs) NATO had established and took on the dual role of improving security and facilitating reconstruction and development efforts.[47]

As Afghanistan was an "economy of force" mission for the United States under the Bush administration, the Americans aimed to employ available combat power in the most effective way possible towards the primary objective and to allocate a minimum of power to any secondary efforts. In taking responsibility for Kandahar, Canada covered some of the material costs of the war, allowing US forces greater latitude in their operations. Moreover, Canada was one of the only NATO countries without caveats against the use of their troops in combat situations.[48] In forgoing such caveats, the Canadian Forces paid a heavy price – as of March 2008, Canada had suffered the third-highest casualties of all NATO countries in the war.[49] Yet, perceiving al-Qaeda terrorism as a threat to its national security, Canada committed itself to maintain a troop presence in Afghanistan until 2011.

Canada's material and moral contributions to the United States' other front in the War on Terror – Iraq – were less significant. In the lead-up to the invasion, Prime Minister Chrétien made it clear that Canada would require explicit authorization from the United Nations Security Council if it was to support military action and tried to use the UN-sponsored weapons inspectors to test the Bush administration's claim that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction (WMD).[50] In military circles, a significant Canadian troop presence in Iraq was a moot point after a meeting in Washington between Defence Minister John McCallum and Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld on 9 January 2003. Rumsfeld made it clear that he preferred Canada to focus on Afghanistan and was not seeking Canadian troops for Iraq. The White House, however, still sought Canadian public support and placed a high value on the political cover it would provide for the internationally-unpopular invasion.

Due to doubts about the strength of the United States' intelligence regarding Iraq's WMD program and the lack of support from the United Nations, Canada formally opted not to join the "Coalition of the willing." At the same time, however, Ottawa pledged more forces to Afghanistan, freeing up US troops for deployment to Iraq. In addition, one hundred Canadian

[47] Raj Rana, "Contemporary Challenges in the Civil-Military Relationship: Complementarity or Incompatibility?" *International Review of the Red Cross* 86:855 (2004), p. 10.
[48] Ahmed Rashid, *Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia* (New York: Viking, 2008), p. 371
[49] Ibid., p. 395.
[50] Donald Barry, "Chretien, Bush, and the War in Iraq," *American Review of Canadian Studies* (Summer 2005).

exchange officers still played technical support roles in Iraq and three frigates deployed to the area.[51] These indirect contributions to the American war effort in Iraq exceeded those of all but two formal members of the coalition, Great Britain and Australia.[52]

Regardless, Canada's decision to stand aside from the coalition constituted a constraint on the United States. It would have constructed US power more had Canada decided to send its troops to Iraq rather than Afghanistan, for this would have bolstered the legitimacy of the mission, albeit at the price of reducing Canadian credibility on the world stage. On 25 March, 2003, at a speech to the Economic Club of Toronto, US Ambassador Paul Cellucci criticized Canadian opposition to the invasion in Iraq. He argued that while the United States was waging war for its own security, it would "never hesitate" to support Canada if it faced a security threat.[53] In Ottawa's view, however, the circumstantial evidence suggesting an active WMD program in Iraq did not point to a threat so great as to justify war.

Continental Defence in the Twenty-First Century

Although the threat from the Soviet Union faded after the Cold War, homeland defence still retains a central place on the US agenda, concerned now with the dangers posed by the threat of rogue states and international terrorism.[54] In the 1990s, the authors of US defence policy began to recognize the importance of protecting against asymmetric threats, but the process was slow.[55] It would take until the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 for the severity of the threat to truly register with Americans. No one – not even NORAD – was prepared for the September 11 attacks. According to the *9/11 Commission Report*:

> [NORAD had] imagined the possible use of aircraft as weapons...and had developed exercises to counter such a threat—from planes coming to the United States from overseas...One idea, intended to test command and control plans and NORAD's readiness, postulated a hijacked airliner coming from overseas and

[51] Julian Beltrame. "Canada to Stay out of Iraq War," *Maclean's*, 31 March 2003. Access: 18 April 2009. http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/index.cfm?PgNm=TCE&Params=M1ARTM0012457
[52] Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, *The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar*, (Toronto ON: Viking Canada, 2007).
[53] "Americans disappointed with Canada: Celluci", *CTV News*, 25 March 2003. Date of Access: 14 February 2009. http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/1048603041834_119
[54] Sloan, p. 31.
[55] Ibid., ch. 3.

crashing into the Pentagon. The idea was put aside in the early planning of the exercise as too much of a distraction.[56]

Extensive changes were made to the homeland defence architecture of both the United States and Canada after the attacks. Border security was tightened with the Smart Border Declaration signed in December 2001, both countries passed anti-terror legislation (The Patriot Act in the United States, Bill C-36 in Canada), and a new US Command was established to coordinate the defence of the American homeland. Until 9/11, North America was the only region in the world for which the Pentagon did not have an integrated command structure. To correct this omission, in October 2002, the Pentagon established US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), which shared a commander-in-chief with NORAD and had an Area of Responsibility (AOR) that included air, land and sea approaches and encompassed the United States, Canada, Mexico, and the Caribbean. Its principal activities included: the homeland defence of the United States, collaboration with the Department of Homeland Security in the event of a terrorist attack, military coordination with Canada and Mexico, and the development of a ballistic missile defence system for North America.[57]

NORAD continued to exist alongside USNORTHCOM and retained the responsibility for warning and assessing attacks on the continent. However, its centrality to homeland defence had been drastically diminished, since it had removed missile defence from its mandate in 1968. NORAD continues to provide situational awareness through its bilateral aerospace warning functions, but any activation of US missile defence systems would take place under the unilateral authority of USNORTHCOM.

In addition to creating new command structures and expanding the roles of old ones, in 2002, Ottawa and Washington agreed to establish the Binational Planning Group (BPG), mandated to investigate specific ways to strengthen North America's defences.[58] Consisting of Canadian and American officers and civilians specializing in emergency management, the BPG was commissioned to harmonize maritime surveillance and intelligence, to prepare contingency

[56] National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *9/11 Commission Report*, Authorized Edition (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), p. 346.
[57] USNORTHCOM. "U.S. Northern Command: USNORTHCOM's Specific Mission," http://www.northcom.mil/
[58] Stephen Clarkson, *Does North America Exist? Governing the Continent After NAFTA and 9/11* (Toronto ON: University of Toronto Press, 2008).

plans to ensure a well-coordinated response to national requests for military assistance in the event of a threat, and to design and conduct joint training programs and exercises.[59]

The work of the BPG was well underway when the Canadian government announced, in 200,5 that it would create Canada Command to oversee "six regional headquarters across the country that integrate land, sea, and air elements."[60] Paralleling the structure and functions assigned to USNORTHCOM, Canada Command united domestic operations under one chief commander. Even though both are national-forces-only commands, their similar responsibilities for homeland military operations make them natural interlocutors and facilitate the coordination of American and Canadian military resources.[61]

Yet, there remained some disagreements between in Ottawa and Washington. In 2001, the issue of missile defence reared its head again. Worried about nuclear blackmail from so-called rogue states, the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty to pursue a missile defence program.[62] When Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin took office in 2004, all signs pointed to Canadian participation in the program. However, entangled in domestic concerns, Martin vetoed the possibilities that interceptors would be located in Canada or that Canada would participate in the weaponization of space, although he remained positive that there would be some form of Canadian participation.[63] Yet, in 2005, Foreign Affairs Minister Pierre Pettigrew confirmed that "Canada will not participate in the US ballistic missile defence system at this time."[64] Canada's involvement would be limited to its warning and assessment role with NORAD. While Ottawa's non-participation had little impact on the United States' pursuit of BMD – an indication that with the disappearance of the Soviet threat, Canadian significance either in constructing or constraining US defensive strength has drastically declined - its opposition certainly made it more difficult for the United States to "sell" it to its other allies, thereby imposing a systemic constraint on exercise of US power.

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[59] Biff Baker, "The Final Report of the Canada-United States Bi-National Planning Group" Ministry of National Defence, Ottawa ON (14 July 2008). http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo7/no2/views-vues-02-eng.asp

[60] Sloan, p. 74.

[61] General Victor Renuart. Commander, U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Command, Center for Strategic and International Studies. Interview by the author. Washington DC, 16 June 2009.

[62] Joel J. Sokolsky and Joseph T. Jockel. *Fifty Years of Canada-United States Defense Cooperation: The Road From Ogdensburg* (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1992), p. 230.

[63] Sloan, p. 173.

[64] Quoted in Sloan, p. 174.

Conclusion: Does Canada Construct or Constrain US Military Power?

When other states commit resources to and provide even rhetorical support for the United States' offensive military strategy, it can project its power more easily in far-flung theatres of war, while their defensive contributions secure its continent. Canada has consistently been among the contributors to US overseas operations, but its input has not been uncritical nor has it been unique. It is its intimate participation in continental defence, rather than its ability to contribute to American offensive capacity, that distinguishes Canada in its construction or constraint of US military power.

Congruent Canadian and American strategic doctrines and military practices have facilitated the smooth workings of their bilateral defence regime. From before World War II, Canada has committed itself to prevent the passage of enemy troops to the United States over its territory or through its airspace. In the cold war, Canada acted as a glacis providing a geographical platform for the US military to intercept a Soviet attack, a role it has continued to play since the Soviet threat faded. It served a similar function in asymmetric warfare, for when the United States shifted its focus to eliminating threats pre-emptively, Canada committed troops abroad. Thus, Canada is an essential ally for the United States, covering material costs and lending multilateral legitimacy to some of its overseas operations, while making critical contributions to its defensive capacity.

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