

Inexpensive Leadership
On Canada's Global Normative Position and Its Potentials

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Introduction

On the global stage, Canada holds a special status in many ways. This comes from a peculiar combination of Canada's geography, population and history on the one hand and its position vis-à-vis the rest of the world and especially the rest of the West on the other. It is the second largest country in the world and yet has a relatively low population of about 34 million based on the 2009 UN estimation.¹ This latter characteristic can be seen as one of Canada's main strategic challenges in the path of becoming a major player in global affairs. A country with significant reservoirs of natural resources, Canada has been trying to add to its pool of human resources by admitting over six million migrants based on United Nations (UN) 2006 estimations². Although there have been vigorous debates in the country about immigration and the notion of multiculturalism,³ Canada has been *relatively* more successful compared to most (if

¹ Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat. (2009). *World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision*, Retrieved August 31, 2010, from <http://esa.un.org/unpp/> and <http://esa.un.org/unpp/p2k0data.asp>. See also Canada's population clock, from Statistics Canada, Retrieved August 30, 2010, from <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/ig-gi/pop-ca-eng.htm>.

² Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat. (2006, March). *International Migration 2006*, Retrieved August 31, 2010, from http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/2006Migration_Chart/2006IttMig_chart.htm and http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/2006Migration_Chart/Migration2006.pdf.

³ See Elspeth Cameron, eds., *Multiculturalism and Immigration in Canada: An Introductory Reader*, (Toronto: Canadian Scholar's Press, 2004) for a multifaceted review of immigration in Canada. Chapter 21 (pp. 217-242) by Daniel Stoffman is of special relevance here. Also, for a more recent review of multiculturalism debate in Canada see J. Stein, D. Robertson, D. R. Cameron, J. Ibbitson, W. Kymlicka, J. Meisel, H.

not all) European countries in enriching its social tapestry through embracing more tolerant policies towards immigration. This has rendered Canada better-positioned to address inherent challenges in opening the doors to people of various cultures and ethnic backgrounds.⁴ Despite the lack of a major or urgent security threat, Canada is an integral part of NATO, one of the most enduring security organizations in recent history. Still, it has not come under fire, by and large, for being an arrogant power.⁵ It is an important part of global economy as according to the World Trade Organization: in 2007 Canada was the tenth largest exporter and the tenth largest importer of merchandise in the world. The same report estimates that excluding the intra-EU trade; yet, in the same year, Canada was the fifth largest exporter and the fifth largest importer of merchandise in the world.⁶ Despite this high profile in global trade, Canada's *external* image does not severely suffer from a record of colonialism (in contrast to Europe or Japan), neither has it been accused of neo-colonialism (in contrast to the United States or China.⁷

This paper considers the global normative position of Canada given the fact that few (if any) countries in the world enjoy the abovementioned combination of geographic, economic and political advantages. It argues that, due to the qualitatively different post-Cold War environment, nations may well follow non-conventional approaches to expand their power. Following a review of Canada's ill-fated bid for promotion of human security discourse and the underlying assumptions of middle-powerism, the paper puts forward two examples of such non-conventional approaches that strive to combine affectivity and practicality.

Siddiqui, and M. Valpy, *Uneasy Partners: Multiculturalism and Rights in Canada*, (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2007), especially the chapter by David Cameron (*An Evolutionary Story*, pp. 71-94).

⁴ See J. Biles, M. Burstein, and J. Frideres, eds., *Immigration and Integration in Canada in the Twenty-first Century*. (Montreal and Kensington: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2008) for a review of the integration of immigrants in Canada and suggestions as to how measure it as well as an assessment of the official policies and mainstream discourses of immigration in Canada. The book in general and Chapter 5 (pp. 139-186) by Biles and Conclusion (pp. 269-278) by Biles *et al.* in particular, demonstrate how Canadian immigration policies and discourses differ from such policies and discourses in Europe.

⁵ See Andrew J. Bacevich, *American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 226.

⁶ World Trade Organization. (2008, December). *International Trade Statistics 2008*, Retrieved August 31, 2010, from http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2008_e/its08_world_trade_dev_e.pdf and especially tables http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2008_e/section1_e/i08.xls and http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2008_e/section1_e/i09.xls

⁷ This assertion becomes less certain when one considers the internal image of Canada in regards to First Nations as well as the history and evolution of aboriginal rights in Canada. See Bacevich, 2002, pp. 225-244.; and Ross Terrill, *The New Chinese Empire: And What It Means For The United States*, (New York: Basic Books, 2004), pp. 253-278.

These non-conventional approaches aim at engaging Canada's *normative power*⁸ in a coherent and strategic way. In fact, Canada seems to be well-positioned to bring to the global stage an alternative voice in its foreign policy - a globally-oriented yet coherent foreign policy distinct from the foreign policies of other developed countries and especially that of the United States. To be sure, Canada's extensive economic and political ties with the United States will compromise from time to time its ability to conduct a thoroughly independent foreign policy. The economic ties, in particular, might undermine Canada's capacity to design and implement its foreign policy in a strategic manner. Yet it does not render Canada entirely incapable of following a visionary foreign policy; and given Canada's peculiar advantages, it is curious why the country has failed in constructing its own brand on the global stage. The fact that Canada has no immediate security issue allows it to occasionally move beyond the stringent restrictions of a Realist perception of the world and to avoid certain self-fulfilling prophecies and self-feeding dynamics of a Waltzian atmosphere in international politics.⁹ In the absence of any visible security threat, the significant engagement of Canada in the global economy means that Canada can have an easier transition from a "Hobbesian culture" of international relations to (at least) a "Lockean" one.¹⁰ The special status of Canada on the global stage as well as its active involvement in international organizations such as the United Nations¹¹ enable it to pass beyond an instrumentalist Lockean culture of international relations to what Wendt calls a "Kantian" approach towards world affairs.¹² Canada enjoys both resources and international social capital to put forward an alternative narrative of international relations. As such, it is capable of becoming the first major Constructivist power in the Onufean sense of the term,¹³ a power that can influence the world through the development of (distinctively Canadian) *strategic discourses* in its foreign policy. By empowering appropriate national and international institutions to globally promote and locally implement such discourses, Canada will be able to emerge as a normative great power, if so it chooses. This requires the emergence of a firm yet

⁸ The slightly better normative position of Canada compared to many other Western powers has to do as much with the actions of those other powers as it does with the international behavior of Canada.

⁹ Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), pp. 102-128.

¹⁰ Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organizations*, 46:2 (1992), pp. 391-425. See also Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 259 and p. 279.

¹¹ See, for instance, the conceptualization of the United Nations in "advancing Canadian policy positions" according to the Permanent Mission of Canada to The United Nations (http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/prmny-mponu/canada_un-canada_onu/index.aspx Retrieved August 30, 2010).

¹² Wendt, 1999, p. 297.

¹³ Nicholas G. Onuf, *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations*. (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), p. 52.

enlightened exceptionalism in Canadian foreign policy while avoiding the type of arrogance or hypocrisy sometimes attributed to American exceptionalism. The content of this exceptionalism, therefore, can have significant implications.

The “Human Security” Experience and Its Lessons

Canadian foreign policy, particularly in the post-Cold War era, has not been completely devoid of elements of exceptionalism. The serious campaign to project Canada as the champion of human security in the world is arguably one of the most significant instances of such exceptionalism. It was to develop a rather comprehensive and visionary framework for the conduct of foreign policy – the type of framework that, one might expect, is a hallmark of a global leader. Human security itself is, for the most part, a post-Cold War notion with yet-to-be-explored potentials. The idea was first popularized in the UNDP's 1994 Human Development Report and soon attracted much interest in the academia and beyond.¹⁴ As an ambitious and wide-ranging effort to re-define the notion of security, the human security discourse offered a much needed relief from the straitjacket of the Cold War conceptual edifice. Due to its comprehensiveness, however, human security proved to be a considerably challenging notion for the purpose of implementation. Despite the difficulties, however, Canada embarked on its own human security project with a global orientation during the 90s and, in a matter of a decade, became a strong voice for human security on the global stage. Along with Norway and Japan, Canada emerged as one of the few countries in the world to have officially adopted the language of human security.¹⁵ Expectedly, this decision was not a conclusive one and it did not remain uncontested. In a review of Canada's foreign policy push to promote human security, Bernard recognizes two phases.¹⁶ The first phase was between 1996 and 2000 during which Canadian promotion of human security was based on the “Axworthy doctrine” of international relations. The doctrine aspired for a rather radical departure from great power (or superpower) international politics towards a diverse world with flourishing (and increasingly more powerful) non-state actors. The doctrine admitted that “soft power” is becoming of greater consequence in a world in which state-centrism is in demise (or at least seriously challenged)

¹⁴ United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1994*, (1994). Retrieved August 31, 2010, from <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr1994/chapters/>

¹⁵ Neil MacFarlane and Yuen Foong-Khong, *Human Security and the UN: A Critical History*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), pp. 226-227.

¹⁶ Prosper Bernard, Jr., “Canada and Human Security: From the Axworthy Doctrine to Middle Power Internationalism,” *The American Review of Canadian Studies*, 36:2 (2006), pp. 233-261.

and a world in which non-state actors and non-state global interests are at rise.¹⁷ The second phase, according to Bernard, was between 2000 and 2003 when a somewhat realist turn took place in Canadian human security discourse. This turn manifested itself in Canada's "middle power internationalism" at the time. Three realist acknowledgments in this "middle-powerism," i.e. the necessity of great powers' engagement, the importance of hard power and, finally, the necessity of taking states' interests into consideration, curtailed the scope of the human security discourse in Canada's foreign policy.¹⁸

This shift in human-security-as-foreign-policy agenda was hardly unexpected, for one of the tensions inherent in the human security discourse has been the tension between its global (anti state-centric, anti status quo) ideals on the one hand and the reality of states' power on the other. Discussing this tension in her analysis of the history of the "failure" of human security, Neack argues that states' power has been strong enough to impede most of the actions to be taken on behalf of the global community or in the name of the interest of the mankind.¹⁹ This is particularly the case if such actions would have infringed upon states' power or their spheres of authority. Human security, more than a decade after its welcomed introduction to world affairs, seems to remain a concern only when and where states' interests allow it to be acted upon. Efforts to argue that long-term security of states is tied to provision of at least a minimum level of human security for their citizens have not yet been able to win over powerful global actors. Theoretically, it is possible to conceptualize human security as an integral part of national security rather than a competing alternative. This can be done, for instance, by employing Linklater's dichotomy between "men qua men" and men qua citizens.²⁰ Such a radically different conceptualization of national security needs, however, the introduction of intermediary middle concepts, e.g. citizen security, in between human security and state (or national) security to bridge the gap between the two. Nevertheless, beyond these theoretical possibilities lie serious practical difficulties in changing national security behaviors and habitual practices of states. Even if successful, such discursive change in perception and formulation of

¹⁷ Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), pp. 1-32.

¹⁸ For Axworthy's account of human security, see Robert G. McRae and Don Hubert, eds., *Human Security and the New Diplomacy: Protecting People, Promoting Peace*. (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001) and especially the Introduction (pp. 3-13) by Axworthy. The book's numerous case studies render it a valuable contribution to the human security literature as it tries to relate the broad and at times abstract discourse of human security to concrete situations. See also Bernard, 2006.

¹⁹ Laura Neack, *Elusive Security: States First, People Last*, (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007), pp. 213-218.

²⁰ Andrew Linklater, *Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations*, (London: Macmillan, 1990), p. 116.

national security would need a long time to take root and the post-2001 global environment indicates how far we are from a world in which human security is understood as a pillar of national security.

In addition to the abovementioned tension between human security and national security, a second challenge in adopting human security as a formal policy has been its comprehensiveness. The concept of human security covers nearly all the spheres of human life including economy, society, politics, environment, health, and food. Promotion of human security in its most inclusive sense is nothing less than general betterment of the lives of mankind on earth. As commendable as such an objective is, it remains extremely difficult to be translated into concrete and feasible projects. This overwhelming inclusiveness of human security can be recognized in the final report of *A Dialogue on Foreign Policy* published in 2003: [sic]

“The contributors [to the dialogue] stress that the defence of human security and rights should go beyond civil and political protections (peacekeeping forces, police, etc.) to address underlying socio-economic, cultural, environmental and other conditions associated with serious rights violations and violent instability in some regions of the world”.²¹

Uncomfortable with this conceptual broadness, some scholars have sought to narrow down the definition of human security in order to make the concept more practical. Bajpai, for instance, confines the scope of human security to “the bodily safety of individual; and his or her personal freedom”.²² Another solution has been the (re)classification of the concept of human security by King and Murray according to whom the essential elements of human security include poverty, health, education, political freedom and democracy for each of which one can develop a quantitative index.²³ Although most of the attempts to narrow the definition of human security

²¹ Bill Graham, *A Dialogue on Foreign Policy (The Final Report of the Minister of Foreign Affairs)*, (January 2003). Canada: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

²² Kanti Bajpai, “Human Security: Concept and Measurement”, *Kroc Institute Occasional Paper*, 19 (2000), p. 38. Retrieved on August 31, 2010, from http://www.hegoa.ehu.es/dossierra/seguridad/Human_security_concept_and_measurement.pdf.

²³ Gary King and Christopher J. L. Murray, Rethinking Human Security. *Political Science Quarterly*, 116:4 (2001-2, Winter), pp. 585-610. For similar efforts offering reductionist redefinition of human security see Jorge Nef, *Human Security and Global Vulnerability: The Global Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment*. Ottawa: International Development research Center (IDRC, 1999), pp. 23-26.; Astri Suhrke, “Human Security and the Interests of States,” *Security Dialogue*, 30:3 (1999), pp. 265-76.; Majid Tehranian, and David W. Chappell, eds., *Worlds Apart: Human Security and Global Governance*, (New York: I. B. Tauris, 1999), esp. pp. 178-204 by Tehranian.; , and , Caroline Thomas, and Peter Wilkin, eds.,

seem to rely on authors' preferences and intuitions, the efforts per se are an indication of the difficulties inherent in embracing human security as a policy. Not surprisingly then, the realist shift in Canada's foreign policy from Axworthy's post-Hobbesian world towards the mellow realism of the last years of Jean Chrétien's government accelerated by Paul Martin's reluctance to use the term. The abandonment of the notion of human security was finally completed in 2006 when the Conservative Party ascended to power.²⁴

The failure of human security as the thrust of Canada's global normative leadership provides two important insights. The first is that if Canada decides to tap into its material and non-material resources to emerge as a global normative leader, it needs to ensure the balance between two competing concerns: the first is the necessary degree of broadness of the chosen foreign policy principles (to make it globally appealing) and the second is the implementation difficulties inherent in the real world. Human security, at least in its current mainstream version, is too broad a concept to facilitate a coherent and consequential foreign policy. This means that branding an appropriate niche policy takes more than finding an inspiring idea such as human security.

A second insight comes from the correlation between the demise of human security in Canadian foreign policy on the one hand and the transitions in the Canadian government on the other. Insofar as the consensus does not exist within its political landscape on the subject, Canada is unable to draft and successfully implement a visionary foreign policy. The decision to become a global normative leader is a national one and it entails engagement of various political actors who share the belief that the emergence of Canada as a normative global leader is a chief and long-term national interest. This, in turn, relates to a larger question of why it is crucial for Canadians to rally behind the cause of becoming a global player. A part of the answer lies in the fact that, in the post-Cold War world, the gradual increase in the mobility of human and natural resources has caused a fierce competition to attract such resources. The more global a nation envisions and projects itself, the better it is positioned to take advantages of relatively blurring borders of our times. At the same time, added to this general trend of global competition is one of the strategic challenges Canada faces today, i.e. low population. From a "complex neo-

Globalization, Human Security, and the African Experience, (London: Lynne Rienner, 1999), esp. pp. 1-19 and pp. 179-184 by Thomas and pp. 23-40 by Wilkin.

²⁴ A useful collection of essays on human security in general as well as its evolution in Canadian foreign policy are gathered in S.J. Maclean, D.R. Black, and T.M. Shaw, eds., *A Decade of Human Security: Global Governance And New Multilateralisms*, (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2006). Chapter 6 (pp. 63-72) by G. A. MacLean and Chapter 7 (pp. 73-82) by H. A. Smith are particularly insightful.

realist”²⁵ theoretical perspective, indicators such as population might force Canada to concede to the status of a “principle power” instead of a great power.²⁶ Furthermore, neighboring the United States, Canada is constantly vulnerable to the type of brain drain that happened during the 1990s. A vast geography struggling to be adequately populated, Canada has become one of the immigrant destinations with relatively generous immigration and citizenship requirements. Yet, relaxed laws and regulations must be accompanied with updated marketing strategies in order to bear the expected results. Engaged in a universal competition to attract human resources and wealth as well as tackling its challenge of low population, Canada needs to, inter alia, create and market its “global brand” to attract quality population, and to keep them. Emerging as a serious global player in the form of a normative great power could be an essential part of such Canadian global brand. At the same time, achieving the status of a *normative* great power (compared to that of a great power) relies less on the Realist indexes of power such as high population, rendering the option an appropriate one for Canada.

Middle-Powerism, Realism and Constructivism

The last point above could be examined in relation to a rather long history of middle-powerism in Canada. In his analysis of the concept, Neufeld argues that this “limitationist” approach in Canadian foreign policy has functioned to balance exceptionalism due to Canada’s unique history on the one hand and the reality of Canada’s material power base on the other.²⁷ In fact, the concept became prominent in the context of the Cold War and the overwhelming realism the period carried into the conduct of foreign policy around the globe. The proponents of middle-powerism followed modest ambitions when articulating the underlying principles of Canada’s foreign policy at the time: Canada to present itself as a middle power respecting multilateralism and international organizations. In this context, multilateralism became one of the “progressive” keywords of Canadian foreign policy. The notion has been influential in partially shaping Canada’s foreign policy in certain episodes such as (arguably) the recent US war in Iraq.²⁸ Yet, the Cold War ended not only through the dynamics of the (im)balance of

²⁵ Complex neo-realism tries to add the nuances of complex interdependence theory to the insights of traditional realism when reflecting on the notion of power. See also John Kirton, *Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World*, (Toronto: Thompson-Nelson, 2007), p. 13.

²⁶ See David Dewitt, and John Kirton, *Canada as a Principal Power*, (Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, 1983).

²⁷ Mark Neufeld, “Hegemony and Foreign Policy Analysis: The Case of Canada as Middle Power,” *Studies in Political Economy*, 48 (1995, Autumn), p. 22.

²⁸ This does not mean that multilateralism (or progressivism for that matter) has been the most influential driving force behind Canada’s foreign policy. Unable to strike the strategic balance between its

material power between the two superpowers but also (and more importantly) due to a major discursive change among the Soviet political elite.²⁹ The passionate reformist in Moscow unleashed strong and ultimately uncontrollable forces primarily by articulating a drastically different narrative of the Soviet place and role in the world and especially vis-à-vis the West. Gorbachev's reform proved to be too little and too late to save the empire from crumbling down but the reform was a discursive change to begin with. Such unprecedented collapse of a superpower had not been predicted by realism and especially by the then-dominant reductionist version of it, neo-realism. This has to do with the fact that, unlike classical realists,³⁰ neo-realists were intellectually uncomfortable in taking the role of ideas (and, in this case, Soviet discursive shift) seriously. In any case, the end of the "Long Peace" led to a more assertive effort to theorize the role of ideas and discourses in shaping international affairs leading to the introduction of constructivism to international relations by Onuf.³¹ Consequently, the end of the Cold War marked a shift from realism towards constructivism in international relations as a discipline. This is not to say that realism is no longer relevant. It is indeed. The point is that a combination of ideational/discursive *and* material forces is at work in international relations. In other words, it is no longer a viable assumption to believe that the latter always overwhelms the former or that the former necessarily functions within the purview allowed by the latter. There are cases when material forces prevail, such as, arguably, the first Persian Gulf War and there are cases in which ideational or discursive forces gain the upper-hand, such as, arguably, the second Persian Gulf War.

Even though this shift in "IR" from realism to constructivism/realism called for revisiting the "middle power formula" in Canada's foreign policy, the formula continued to inform Canada's human security campaign leading to a "middle power internationalism" between 2000 and 2003.³² Some scholars have alluded to the positive side of this fusion. Behringer, for instance, argues that the combination of middle-powerism and human security has been productive due to the fact that middle powers could be more effective in the actual

projected ideals and the reality, Canada has often swayed in the general scheme of its foreign policy between progressivism and conservatism.

²⁹ Robert G. Herman, "Identity, Norms, and National Security: The Soviet Foreign Policy Revolution and the End of the Cold War," In Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 271-316.

³⁰ Classical Realism of the kind developed by, inter alia, Carr did acknowledge the role of non-material forces. E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*, (New York: Palgrave, 2001), esp pp. 135-157 and pp. 168-177.

³¹ Onuf, p. 35.

³² Bernard, 2006, pp. 233-235.

implementation of human security.³³ Here, the implicit premise is to view Canada's position as a junior partner of the United States. The fact that Canada has abandoned (or at least has toned down) its human security paradigm, however, is a testimony to the tension between a Cold-War realist conceptualization of "Canada as a middle power" and the post-Cold-War constructivist aspirations inherent in discourses such as human security. This conflict, as Neufeld³⁴ has also noted, is clear in the *Canada in the World* document published in 1995.³⁵ The document asserts the "position of leadership:"

"Canada occupies a position of leadership among the open, advanced societies..."³⁶

and clearly recognizes two important advantages that put Canada in a commanding lead among aspirants of global leadership. The first is multiculturalism that can be translated into a foreign policy:

"Canada's cultural heritage gives it privileged access to the anglophone and francophone worlds as well as to the homelands of Canadians drawn from every part of the globe who make up its multicultural personality."³⁷

The second advantage is the historically positive image of Canada as a western power among non-western countries:

"Canada's history as a non-colonizing power, champion of constructive multilateralism and effective international mediator, underpins an important and distinctive role among nations as they seek to build a new and better order."³⁸

Yet, following the long tradition of middle-powerism, the document also reminds the financial constraints of Canada as a middle power:

"While Canadians strongly support an active foreign policy, they also have a realistic view about the challenges ahead and the constraints - especially financial constraints - that we face. In particular, they understand that until we

³³ Ronald M. Behringer, "Middle Power Leadership on Human Security," Paper presented at the annual meeting of *Canadian Political Science Association*, Halifax, Nova Scotia, May 30-June 1, 2003.

³⁴ Neufeld, pp. 22-23.

³⁵ Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada. *Canada in the World: Canadian Foreign Policy Review 1995*, (1995). Retrieved August 31, 2010, from http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/cnd-world/menu-en.asp. Neufeld, p. 23.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ See, for instance, the Summary of the document at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/cnd-world/summary-en.asp (Retrieved August 31, 2010).

get our own financial house in order, we will be seriously limited in our ability to act abroad to further Canadian objectives [...] The Government, therefore, will continue to pursue the foreign policy objectives that Canadians demand, but will have to do so in a manner that reflects the need for even more financial prudence.”³⁹

A certain level of friction between realism and idealism is expected whenever a nation considers a bid for global engagement. The challenge is to find and keep the balance between the material power/demands (realism) and the ideational power/demands (constructivism). Unlike human security, which according to Newman can be “best explained with reference to ‘social constructivism’ thought”, the notion of middle power can be best understood within a realist mode of thought.⁴⁰ Therefore, one can argue that defining Canada solely or primarily as a middle power will no longer serve its national interest in the more complex constructivist-realist world of today. Such delimitation squanders significant new opportunities that have emerged on the global stage following the end of the Cold War and the globalization of information technology in the 1990s. During the Cold War, arguably it was not easy for Canada to become a great power, while being a material middle power, unless exhausting its material resources. Today, however, the assumption of such a role appears to be more economical given, inter alia, the existence of a global yet inexpensive information infrastructure. It needs visionary leadership and a discursive shift in defining Canada's place in the world instead of relying primarily on available material bases of power. It is reasonable to assume that, given the post-Cold War changes in the structure of international relations, a country that adheres to similar Cold-War principles in navigating its foreign affairs probably no longer serves its real national interests. Therefore, remaining the prisoner of middle-powerism might hurt more than it benefits Canadian national interests today; for Canada has more to offer than its special ties to the United States or its potential leverage with Americans.

Given the necessity of adopting a post-Cold War mode of thought in foreign affairs, in the following sections two strategic discourses are proposed as potential foundations based on which one can envisage a Canadian foreign policy aimed at making Canada a normative great power. These two are to become a global voice for *green lifestyle* and for *multiculturalism*. For each agenda, an argument will also be put forward to show how they can be implemented through concrete yet economical steps. Before reviewing the details, however, it is necessary to emphasize that both of these two discourses must be understood in a post-Cold War context.

³⁹ See the Introduction at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/cnd-world/chap1-en.asp (Retrieved August 31, 2010).

⁴⁰ Edward Newman, “Human Security and Constructivism. *International Studies Perspectives*,” 2:3 (2001), p. 239.

This means a different and less expensive role for states in certain areas due to the rising mobility and influence of communities of people. Today, states have the chance to pass on certain functions in specific issue areas to people while their bureaucratic apparatus appears as the facilitator/coordinator. At the same time and due to the revolution in information technology, there exists an expanding pool of creativity as many contributors engage in putting together collective solutions/initiatives. Smart states can economically tap into this pool, partially shape its orientation and facilitate the implementation of such collective solutions.

A Global Voice for a Green Lifestyle

It is evident that the environmental concerns are gradually becoming an integrated part of global public consciousness. We are probably at the early stages of a green curve in different sectors of the economy. This means that considerable shifts in people's lifestyles can be expected as new generations are introduced to "green knowledge" from the early years of their education. Despite this emerging green consciousness, however, economic factors have slowed the private sector to become extensively involved in this broad (and loosely termed) "green movement." On the other hand, this gap between public demand for knowledge and private interest has created a vacuum just suited for states to function. Here, the state's function is not defined as a leader in the traditional sense of the term. Instead, states have the option of acting as catalysts mainly providing an infrastructure for people interested in green networking. While a part of the efforts to protect the environment involves states and industries changing their policies and practices, the other part of the solution lies in people's adoption of greener lifestyles. In this latter part, the Canadian government can emerge as a global voice acting as a facilitator/promoter for people to exchange green knowledge, green experiences and green ideas. A concrete example would be helpful to better understand how this proposal differs from that of making Canadian government a green government itself. This example is directly related to the World Wide Web and its potentials. The Internet can be used as the network infrastructure for the implementation of a Canadian green initiative that is globally oriented.

The specific green lifestyle item proposed here is conservation. The issue is quickly moving to the center of attention as some scholars warn that the world is heading towards an age of "resource wars".⁴¹ Strategic resources are becoming increasingly scarce due to rapidly expanding consumerism and industrialism. This is especially disturbing when it comes to two vital resources, namely water and energy. It is expected that, in the next couple of decades,

⁴¹ , Michael Klare *Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict*, (New York: Metropolitan Press, 2002), pp. 1-26.

water will be a major source of tension among nations in different parts of the world. “Water wars” are also a reminder that environmental challenges, far from being a lofty concern of the wealthy and the secure, could become a traditional national security threat.⁴² A parallel scenario is expected to happen in the energy sector where, borrowing from Klare, the world is “shrinking” as the new great powers such as China, thirsty for energy resources to run their economic engines, are emerging.⁴³ The strategic threat of diminishing resources reminds the seriousness of the environmental problems the world is facing. If the lingering threat of Global warming and climate change has been dismissed or toned down by politicians resorting to the priority of the “real and immediate” national security issues, the emerging fierce competition over resources cannot be neglected even by those who share sympathies with the Realist understanding of national security.

In addressing the depleting resources around the globe, one phase is the traditional inter-state collaboration. Necessary as it is, the collaborative efforts by the states are usually half-hearted and the success is often slow and expensive. The second phase, however, is more geared towards changing people’s lifestyle. This is based on a bottom-up approach for which the post-Cold War environment is more hospitable. Engaging in the first intergovernmental phase might not suit Canada’s environmental profile, for Canada is a large country with a noticeably low population density. This causes a structural disadvantage for the Canadian government in becoming a global conservation practitioner/leader. Yet, *normative* leadership can still be achieved through the government’s involvement in the second phase described above. While it might not be easy for the Canadian government to practice conservation on a national level, due to geographical and structural impediments, it is possible for Canadians to become more consumption-conscious and to conserve more. To this end, the Canadian government can provide a platform for education and for raising public awareness, firstly on the national level and then on the global one.

It is important to notice that becoming a global voice for a green lifestyle or conservation of resources is not merely a symbolic gesture. It can be conceived of as a long-term national security strategy even if the term is to be understood in its narrowest possible sense. One can argue that in the following decades, the countries that have championed the new green

⁴² Vandana Shiva, *Water Wars: Privatization, Pollution and Profit*, (Cambridge: South End Press, 2002), pp. 1-18.

Some of the consequences of depleting water resources are discussed in Fred Pearce, *When the Rivers Run Dry: Water – the Defining Crisis of the Twenty-first Century*, (Boston: Beacon Press, 2006).

⁴³ Michael Klare, *Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: The New Geopolitics of Energy*, (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 2008), pp. 32-62.

paradigm will enjoy strategic advantages over others. The proper angle to lay claim to such paradigm, however, is of utmost importance for a successful global campaign.

Global warming, for instance, has failed to be a rallying cause on the global level. The lack of apparent urgency, inter alia, has been conducive to the failure of the discourse on different national political levels.⁴⁴ On the other hand, it is impossible for a single country to deal with a global challenge of the magnitude of climate change. It is a global threat to be met with coordinated efforts of many, if not all, nations. A single country fighting climate change in the absence of any global coordination is likely to end up in hollow rhetoric if not hypocrisy.

On the other hand, there are certain environmental agendas reducible to small, local and concrete projects with immediate effects. The issue of conservation discussed above, for instance, targets individuals' concerns and demands. As such, it is a micro-oriented approach. Unlike global warming, the threat of depleting resources can be easily perceived and felt on a personal level. As a result, depleting resources and certain similar green concerns are more provocative than macro challenges such as global warming. They can easily engage public awareness in a bottom-up fashion with only partial governmental involvement. Agendas such as promotion of conservation by individuals or providing incentives for the development of a green online platform can readily be translated to small projects. At the same time, these agendas can become a part of an effective strategic discourse of foreign policy for Canada. Precisely due to the universality of green challenges, various creative and economical ideas for a green lifestyle and resource consumption are being put forward everyday as thousands of people around the world strive to increase the sustainability of their lifestyles. In this environment, becoming a global voice of green lifestyle seems to be much cheaper than championing the climate change agenda. It is a matter of using the available information technology infrastructure to introduce *the* Green Network within the Network. The power inherent in today's diffused networks where thousands of individuals around the globe can creatively contribute to the same cause means that becoming a normative great power has never been more economical. At the same time, a country that champions the emerging green paradigm will be likely to enjoy a high level of soft power in the coming decades.

⁴⁴ See, Sheldon Ungar, "The Rise and (Relative) Decline of Global Warming as a Social Problem". *The Sociological Quarterly*, 33:4 (1992), pp. 483-501.; and Joni Hersch, and W. Kip Viscusi, "Allocating Responsibility for the Failure of Global Warming Policies", *155 U. PA. L. REV.* (2007), pp. 1657-1694. (from http://www.geofaculty.org:16080/figures/Rood_Climate_Change_AOSS480_Documents/UPennLawRev_2007/Hersch_Failure_Global_Policy_UPennLawRev_2007.pdf Retrieved August 31, 2010).

A Global Voice for Multiculturalism

As quoted above, multiculturalism has been mentioned in *Canada in the World* where Canada is praised as the “champion of constructive multiculturalism” (Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, 1995, Summary).⁴⁵ Nevertheless, Canada has not yet actively cashed its noticeable reservoir of international social capital arising from its domestic multinational makeup.⁴⁶

In fact, there are few powerful countries that can comfortably bring the way they treat their immigrant populations into their global image. European powers in general and the countries of Western Europe in particular have only added to their historical image as colonizers a new twist due to the existence of strong and, at times, mainstream anti-immigrant feelings.⁴⁷ The United States, on the other hand, has had to deal with the accusations of neo-colonialism from the Left due to its hegemonic status. In particular, as a result of its foreign policy, the United States has not been able to exploit its own multinational character to slow down what Putnam describes as “America’s Declining Social Capital.”⁴⁸ Given the limited social capital of other western powers in nurturing a tolerant global discourse, it is curious why Canada has not yet tapped into its own relatively successful experience in dealing with cultural diversity. Multiculturalism, whether it is seen as a neutral permissive environment that allows the flourishing of different cultures or whether it is understood as a host culture that welcomes minorities’ cultures to become a contributing element of the social and political fabric,⁴⁹ is indeed a relevant notion to international affairs as well. Loosely defined, multiculturalism can

⁴⁵ Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, *Canada in the World: Canadian Foreign Policy Review 1995*, (1995). Retrieved August 31, 2010, from http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/cnd-world/menu-en.asp

⁴⁶ For a conceptual review of the notion of social capital, see Alejandro Portes, “Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology,” *Annual Review of Sociology*, 24:1 (1998), pp. 1-24. . The author provides a well-thought and thorough categorization of different types of social capital based on their origins. Within Portes’ categorization of the sources of social capital, “value introjection” (p. 8) is particularly relevant to international social capital as it enforces “norm observance” (Ibid.) within the weak, yet emerging international society. See Martin Wight, *International Theory: The Three Traditions*, (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1991).; and Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977).

⁴⁷ See for instance Lauren M. McLaren, “Anti-Immigrant Prejudice in Europe: Contact, Threat Perception, and Preferences for the Exclusion of Migrants,” *Social Forces*, 81:3 (2003), pp. 909-936.

⁴⁸ Robert D. Putnam, “Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital,” *Journal of Democracy*, 6:1 (1995), pp. 65-78.

⁴⁹ For an analytic review of the two versions see Charles Taylor, *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

be seen as an integral part of liberalism as Kymlicka has argued.⁵⁰ It is a potentially powerful discourse around which a more peaceful yet diverse world can be envisaged. It can be a supplemental discourse to the idea of *Dialogue among Civilizations* that was first put forward by Iran's former president, reformist Mohammad Khatami, as a response to Huntington's *Clash of Civilization*.⁵¹ Turkey is now championing the basic premises of dialogue among civilizations under the banner of *Alliance of Civilizations*⁵² and uses its own multicultural history to become a credible voice on the global stage for peace and mutual understanding. In the same manner, it is possible for Canada to bring into the strategic core of its foreign policy a new theme for today's world of indispensable cultural diversity: a normative leadership towards peace and tolerance based on the actual record of (relative) success within the borders of one of the most internationalized countries in the world.

It is crucial to remember that becoming a global voice for multiculturalism does not mean to "export" Canadian multiculturalism to other parts of the world. Nor does it mean to assume that there are universal one-size-fits-all recipes to seemingly similar social challenges around the world. Again, the notion must be understood in the post-Cold War context of diffused ingenuity of innovative and increasingly informed populations around the world. It is in this context that communicating Canadian experience to the rest of the world could effectively inspire voices of tolerance around the world to devise local strategies to promote multiculturalism.

A specific example could be of benefit here in showing how a Canadian discourse of global multiculturalism relates to concrete concerns. This example addresses both short-term and long-term interests of the West in dealing with the Muslim world. In fact, if the growing communities of Muslims in Europe and in North America are included, the West and the Muslim world are no longer exclusive but overlapping worlds. Despite the overlaps, however, western Muslims have generally failed to inform foreign policy decisions of their countries of residence. As a result, in dealing with the problem of violent extremism, the most assertive undertaking has been the "War on Terror" by the Bush administration.

Not surprisingly, this response has proven to be unsuccessful if not counterproductive. Many scholars of the subject have criticized the underlying premises of the "War on Terror"

⁵⁰ Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

⁵¹ Fred R. Dallmayr, *Dialogue Among Civilizations: Some Exemplary Voices*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p. ix.; and Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?", *Foreign Affairs*, 72:3 (1993), pp. 22-49.

⁵² See <http://www.unaoc.org/> and in particular <http://www.unaoc.org/repository/turkeyplan.pdf> (Retrieved September 22, 2010).

and some have pointed out the necessity of long-term solutions such as building the necessary social foundations for an enduring democracy including, above all, civil society.⁵³ At the same time, one widely proposed counter-strategy to defeat violent extremism in the Muslim World has been to strengthen alternative voices of Muslims. This does not necessarily entail the direct engagement of western countries in the internal debates within the Muslim countries -an engagement that could prove to be detrimental to moderates in such countries who are already dealing with the accusations of being westernizers. The more effective yet economical course of action for Western countries is to engage their own Muslim populations to develop alternative understandings of Islam *in the West*. To the extent that Muslim diasporas in the West are a part of the larger Muslim world, their versions of Islam become one of alternative voices of Islam by definition. Echoing the analysis of many Muslim scholars and many scholars of Islam, Tariq Ramadan has argued for the development of “European Islam” in which fundamental values of Islam as a religion and fundamental values of Western civilization join each other not as contradicting forces but as supporting normative systems.⁵⁴

Ramadan's call for European Islam fell on deaf ears for two reasons. The first has been the inhospitable socio-political environment in Europe for the accommodation of Muslim immigrants (as well as European Muslims) as an integral part of European societies.⁵⁵ The second reason has to do with the fact that Muslim communities in Western Europe have their origins in low-skilled or unskilled male immigrants who migrated to Europe in search for jobs some four decades ago. While their stay was to be temporary, it led to the emergence of sizable yet unwanted Muslim communities in Europe. As a result of this peculiar trajectory, the Muslim diasporas in Europe were not particularly resourceful communities to begin with and, thus, have been unable to competently meet the usual challenges that an immigrant community faces. Unlike the Muslim communities in Europe, however, Canadian Muslims enjoy a higher level of education and income that, in turn, enables them to become a more productive immigrant community.⁵⁶ So if Ramadan's urging for the emergence of European Islam has been in vain, it is quite possible to envision a Canadian Islam (or, more properly, Canadian Islams). Emergence of

⁵³ Benjamin R. Barber, *Fear's Empire: War, Terrorism, and Democracy*, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004), pp. 218-232.

⁵⁴ Tariq Ramadan, *To be a European Muslim*, (Leicester: Islamic Foundation, 1999), p. 250.; and Tariq Ramadan, *Western Muslims and the Future of Islam*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 235.

⁵⁵ See Nezzar Al Sayyad, and Manuel Castells, eds., *Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam: Politics, Culture and Citizenship in the Age of Globalization*, (New York: Lexington Books, 2002), esp. pp. 9-30 by Al Sayyad and pp. 69-90 by Lubeck.

⁵⁶ Derek Janhevich, and Humera Ibrahim, “Muslims in Canada: An Illustrative and Demographic Profile,” *Our Diverse Cities / Nos Diverses Cités*, 1, (2004, Spring), pp. 54-5.

such Islams, at the same time, alleviates Canada's short-term security concerns regarding possible homegrown radicalism. In other words, it immediately benefits Canada's national security, in the narrow sense of the term, in a more economical way in comparison to the expensive solutions followed by the United States. With a strong, peaceful and productive Canadian Muslim minority at home, Canada will be able to offer a distinct alternative to the Bush administration's narrative of Islam and the West.⁵⁷ It also strengthens the position of moderate Muslims in the Muslim countries as they refer to and learn from the experience of the western side of the Muslim world in their articulation of the religion. Canada, in other words, can effectively help such Muslims in the Muslim countries by providing them with *success stories* of "liberal" Islams. This approach will be even more consequential when one considers that Muslims comprise about a quarter of the world population.⁵⁸

As the above argument illustrates, multiculturalism as a potential strategic vision behind foreign policy opens up the possibility for Canada to take a different path on the global stage, a path that is not as readily available to other western powers and therefore, a path that will handily put Canada in the position of normative leadership (as opposed to traditional leadership). It is, indeed, a restraining assumption to believe that the only possible frameworks for the conduct of foreign policy are assertive "moralism" of the United States and aloof "moralism" of Canada today. Between the two lies a large spectrum of active moralism that offers a high degree of flexibility in terms of the choice of strategic moral objectives/principles: a country can choose the moral thrust of its foreign policy based on its historical, geographical, material, and demographic composition. Active moralism entails selecting few strategic normative guidelines and persistently pursuing them in concrete foreign policy actions. Multiculturalism is potentially such a guideline.

Conclusion

This paper argues that given the geographical, historical and socioeconomic profile of Canada, the country is well-positioned to emerge as a normative great power. This is possible due to the qualitatively different environment that emerged following the end of the Cold War.

⁵⁷ For the outlines of this narrative, see Bernard Lewis, *Islam and The West*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).; _Lewis, *What Went Wrong?: The Clash Between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).; and Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror*, (New York: Random House, 2003).

⁵⁸ Pew Research Center, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World's Muslim Population*, (2009). Retrieved August 31, 2010, from <http://pewforum.org/newassets/images/reports/Muslimpopulation/Muslimpopulation.pdf>

Macro projects such as promotion of human security or prevention of global warming, however, fail to take advantage of this new post-Cold War environment. The content of a successful yet economical strategic discourse for Canada's foreign policy should follow a bottom-up approach. Green lifestyle and multiculturalism have been proposed here as two candidates for such Canadian global discourse. Indeed further discussion of the issue is necessary to decide on what Canada strategically (and at the same time concretely) *stands for* in the world. The green paradigm and multiculturalism are just two promising candidates among possible many. The point here is to argue for the necessity of envisioning Canada as a world leader. The underlying assumption is that Canada is both normatively and materially capable to lead the international community in certain (not all) areas: it has both the credibility (international social capital) and the (minimum) necessary material resources. It is a matter of self-perception and political paradigm whether the country chooses to do so or not. Given the demographic challenge Canada faces today, international branding of Canada as a motivated global leader with an articulated message is a matter of national interest. It simply attracts more human resources for a country already rich in natural resources.

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