

Military Strategy in War and Peace

In recent years, there have been many analyses of warfare from the perspective of the battlefield, a trend initiated by John Keegan in 1976 with his book, *The Face of Battle*. These studies have focused on the tactical level, with the soldier. However, the tactical approach alone is not enough to explain the results of war. This symposium was designed to remind both academic military historians and military analysts that strategy is the most important factor in determining the success or failure in war and operations other than war.

It is important to understand the past if we are to understand the present and to predict the future. The determination of national interests and values and the strategies to achieve these interests and to protect these values are fundamental questions in contemporary security and defence issues. What types of tasks can we hope to accomplish by military means? This question is at the heart of the workshop discussions.

Strategy, operational art and tactics constitute interdependent links. Weaknesses anywhere could be disastrous, but the requirements for sound strategy are paramount because of the consequences. The workshop is designed to examine the impact of strategy on tactics over the years. The presentations offered examine the fundamentals of strategy; how it is formulated; how strategy transforms the military and how the military transforms it; who the decision makers were/are; how different threats affected strategy; and how it affects and how it is affected by economics, politics, diplomacy and military policy of the state and the international environment.

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