


STUDENT AWARD OF EXCELLENCE 2022
SECOND PRIZE

*Accidental Humanitarians: The Mission of Dunsterforce in
Eastern Anatolia, Iran, and the Caucasus, January to September
1918*

Austin Wild¹

¹ Acknowledgments: To my professors Ariel Salzman and Alan English and my colleague Tim Olinski for all their editing aid, as well as guidance on my topics.

Map of Dunsterforce & Movements, January – September 1918



Introduction

The Middle Eastern theatres and their operations during the First World War were a vital component of the British war effort. With its strategic relationship to both southern Iran (then under the British sphere of influence) and the Indian Ocean, as well as the fuel resources (oil in Southern Iran and Mosul) for the Royal Navy, this was a region of significant importance to the British. For example, the wartime expenses of the Mesopotamia Front in Iraq alone cost some 350 Million British Pounds, with a total of 890,000 imperial soldiers who had served there throughout the conflict (95,000 of whom would become casualties).²

It was after 1917 that one of the most ambitious and audacious missions of the First World War unfolded in this region. After Russia withdrew from the Entente during the Russian Civil War, critical oil resources in the Caucasus region were exposed to be potentially exploited by either German or Ottoman forces. Titled *Dunsterforce* by

²F.J. Moberly, *The Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914-1918* (London UK: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1923), p. 331.

the War Office, this operation was led by General Lionel C. Dunsterville who, with no more than a thousand or so men, advanced through Iraq, Iran, and Azerbaijan in order to deny the Central Powers access to these resources. By foot, mule train, and motorcar, they covered thousands of kilometres of territory. This group had traversed extreme conditions, with temperatures reaching between negative 40° C along the Zagros Mountains and positive 40° C through the harsh deserts of Northwestern Persia. Moreover, they witnessed the dire famine, disease, and sectarian violence of the area, and the damaging effects these factors had on the civilian population. It is important to note how many soldiers had never experienced these particular realities on the Western Front.

This essay examines the original mission of Dunsterville's force between its beginnings in December 1917, its deployment toward the northwestern areas of Persia and Iraq, and the operation's eventual end in Azerbaijan with the Fall of Baku in September 1918. Using primary sources, the essay seeks to analyse the soldiers and their mission in the areas they were stationed. Due to the ever-changing nature of their objectives and the systemic issues plaguing Qajar Persia at the time, these soldiers became *accidental* humanitarians when they enacted efforts to challenge the famine, disease, and lawlessness in the communities they were stationed within. Efforts such as food kitchens, police patrols, and field hospitals were balanced by their primary military objectives of combatting the pro-Ottoman and pro-German presence in Iran and Azerbaijan. The essay itself will be divided into several sections with an expansive appendix. The sections will elaborate upon the extremely complicated contextual history of the region in which the Dunsterforce operated, the military force's objectives, and the actual aid dispensed by the unit. Finally, it will conclude by stating how these accidental humanitarians were endangered by the broader operational choices of General Dunsterville himself. Despite his diplomatic skill and charisma, his ego and short-sighted decision-making ultimately endangered the delicate gains the Dunsterforce made in Persia by over-focusing all his forces on Baku.

By September 1918, the Dunsterforce had failed its original military objectives given to them by the British War Office. What is often overlooked however was the prominent humanitarian role fulfilled by these soldiers in order to secure their original military objectives. Although this was by no means part of their original *official* mission,

the aid was necessary to attempt to restore order in the war-torn areas the group was stationed in. This involved providing aid to tens of thousands of people, regardless of race, religion, or culture, in isolated locations where strife amongst these groups was frequent and endemic. Regardless of their military record, the men who served in the unit left a legacy of successfully providing humanitarian efforts in the region with only minimal resources and manpower.

The Great War in the Middle East

In December of 1917, Lionel C. Dunsterville was stationed in India when he was approached by the British War Office. He was tasked to undertake a delicate and dangerous mission in the Caucasus. His orders were to:

...organize, train and eventually lead the Armenians, Georgians and Tartars... for the prevention of the spreading of German propaganda to Afghanistan and thence to India... the protection of the BAKU (Azerbaijan) oil fields... the prevention of the Cotton crop stored at KRASNOVODSK (Turkmenistan) getting into German hands... to provide an additional force to operate against the Turks (Ottomans) from the East, and to hold the BATOUM – TIFLIS – BAKU – KRASNOVOSK rail line to Afghanistan.³

These extensive orders need elaboration, for they were raised in response to the collapse of the Imperial Russian army's front in the Caucasus, as well as the total collapse of the Imperial Russian Government. The Russian Civil War between the Whites and the Bolsheviks in late 1917 caused widespread panic for the Entente powers. Aside from the practical fears of immediately demobilizing between 100,000 to 200,000 Tsarist soldiers on the Caucasus Front,⁴ the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on 3 March 1918 by the Bolshevik government had also renounced the previous Imperial Russian occupation of Eastern Anatolia, and its sphere of influence in Northwestern Persia.

³ LAC RG24, Vol. 1840, File GAQ 10-28: The Dunsterforce (Baghdad Mission). Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force, 1918.

⁴ Timothy C. Winegard, "Dunsterforce: A Case Study of Coalition Warfare in the Middle East, 1918-1919," *Canadian Army Journal* 8, 3 (Fall 2005): p. 98.

Article VII of the Treaty of Brest-Livtosk outlines how the previous Tsarist policies and privileges contrary to the sovereignty of Persia would be nullified, stating the Bolshevik government would respect "...the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of these states (Persia & Afghanistan)." Moreover, Article IV outlined how regions such as Erdehan, Kars, and Batum would be cleared of Russian garrisons and left to reorganization by the Ottomans (a fact proposed as early as 12 January 1918 by "unofficial" Soviet representatives such as Karl Bravin, and practically implemented by June 1918).⁵ The immediate concerns resulting from the signing of this treaty were how nearly a million German soldiers would be transferred to the Western Front after the collapse of the Eastern Front & the Caucasus Front. Aside from the primary concern of roughly forty fresh German Divisions being transferred westwards for their 1918 Spring Offensives in France,⁶ an important secondary concern highlighted the increasing German influence and desire for raw materials in the Caucasian & Qajar Persian regions.

For years leading up to 1918, various German operators and officers were not only training and arming military units in the Ottoman Empire, but also irregular groups in neutral territories such as Qajar Persia. Many members of the Persian elite viewed Germany as an intellectual centre both before and during the First World War⁷ and were sympathetic to the German war effort against the Entente. Agents such as Wilhelm Wassmus, known as The Wassmuss of Persia, actively trained and recruited irregular units across Persia to attack and interrupt the British Empire's global resource hubs and supply lines.

Although far away from the Western Front in France, gaining control of, or acquiring trade with, these regions would have been invaluable to the Central Powers' war effort. For example, Germany's cotton supply by October 1917 had declined by 90 percent and caused extreme clothing shortages due to the Entente's blockade (which had effectively cut off the continent from international trade since October 1914). The possible rewards for investing soldiers into the Caucasus and Caspian regions could

⁵ Homa Katouzian, "The Campaign Against the Anglo-Iranian Agreement of 1919," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 25, 1 (May 1998): pp. 12-13.

⁶ Winegard, "Dunsterforce: A Case Study," p. 95.

⁷ Peter Avery, *Nations of the Modern World: Modern Iran* (London, UK: Ernest Benn Limited Publishing, 1965), p. 185.

have nullified this blockade, causing the British War Office to not the threat of these German operations until the end of September 1918.⁸

By late 1917, aside from the German desire for more raw material, the British War Office was concerned by the threat of effective German propaganda. After Germany's success at knocking the Imperial Russians out of the war by supporting Lenin, there was now a very real possibility the Kaiser could send another diplomatic mission to British India with similar objectives and impacts as the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia.⁹ These concerns were well warranted: Situated further east, Oskar Ritter von Niedermayer and Werner Otto von Hentig's *Kabul Mission* arrived in Afghanistan in 1915 and were actively negotiating with the Afghans to declare war on the British. Although the conflict did not materialize before the Armistice in 1918, it was a fear which manifested itself a year later, when Emir Habibullah Khan was assassinated by his son, Amanullah Khan, and initiated the Third Afghan War of 1919.¹⁰

This military and political context demonstrate how Dunsterville's orders of denying the "spread of effective German propaganda" were considered of equal importance to the access and security of the Caucasus' natural resources.¹¹ It was an unprecedented dilemma, for, before the collapse of Tsarist Russia in 1917, the British never had to actively consider if secure control of the Empire or the balance of power in Europe took precedence.¹²

In order to fulfill these aims, as well as frustrate the Ottoman's Pan-Turanian policies... and immediate military incursions into the rich mineral and oil areas of Transcaucasia,¹³ the British needed to send an immediate response force to quickly stabilize the former Imperial Russian Caucasus' Front.

⁸ Sean Kelly, "How Far West?: Lord Curzon's Transcaucasian (Mis)Adventure and the Defence of British India, 1918-1923," *The International History Review* 35, 2 (April 2013): pp. 275-276.

⁹ Timothy C. Winegard, *The First World Oil War* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016), p. 23.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 78; See Frederick Roe, "2nd Battalion 5th Gurkha Rifles at Ahnai Tangi, North-West Frontier, India, 14 January 1920."

¹¹ Winegard, *The First World Oil War*, p. 73.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 277.

¹³ W.E.D. Allen & Paul Muratoff, "The Turkish Invasion of Transcaucasia" in *Caucasian Battlefields: A History of the Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border, 1828-1921* (Nashville, Tennessee: The Battery Press, 1918), pp. 467-468.

The British plan was improvised and temporary. The goal was to develop an informal militia body in the Caucasus regions to delay the Ottoman elements until the main body of the Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force (MEF) could push north towards Mosul. Such a mission into the Caucasus might have met with successes in a similar vein to T.E. Lawrence's involvement with the Arab Revolt.¹⁴ However, in comparison to Lawrence's experience with the Arabs, Dunsterville would operate in even more strategically isolated terrain; with fewer resources, more factions, less infrastructure, and more time-sensitive objectives in a neutral yet hostile territory.

Once officially tapped to lead this operation, the British War Office outfitted Dunsterville with the latest equipment. This war material included a convoy of Rolls Royce armored cars and Ford trucks, reliable supplies of petrol for refuelling, wireless telegraph stations, and a large sum of gold and silver. Dunsterville was also assigned a cohort of highly trained Indian drivers (who according to the soldiers of Dunsterforce, drove them "to perfection"),¹⁵ as well as a unit of veteran soldiers and officers recruited from the Western Front. This group from Europe, given the nickname of the "Hush Hush Army" due to their mission's secrecy, was composed of approximately three hundred officers and NCOs of British, Canadian, Australian, New Zealand, Indian, Russian and Persian extraction. These soldiers were both trained for combat, and to educate and train the local militia. According to dispatches, these were all men of "...Strong Character, adventurous spirit, especially good stamina, capable of organizing, training and eventually leading, irregular troops."¹⁶ This "Hush Hush Army," most of whom were veterans of the trenches on the Western Front, departed England on 29 January 1918.¹⁷ However, by the time of their arrival in the region, their military objectives had already changed, and considerable personnel problems within the unit had surfaced.

¹⁴ Winegard, *The First World Oil War*, p. 51.

¹⁵ S.G. Savige, *Diary, 2 January 1918-27 January 1919*. Diary. Series MLMSS 3036/Item 1, p. 40, Mitchell Library, State Library of New South Wales.

¹⁶ G.W.L. Nicholson, *Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919. Official History of the Canadian Army in the First World War* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1962), p. 494.

¹⁷ Savige, *Diary, 2 January 1918-27 January 1919*, p. 13.

Dunsterforce's Beginnings

In order to discuss Dunsterforce's mission, it is important to discuss Dunsterville himself, as well as outline his original objectives. Major General Lionel Charles Dunsterville was a contemporary celebrity figure straight out of fiction. As a young boy, he attended United Services College with childhood friend Rudyard Kipling, who wrote the book *Stalky and Co.* relating their embellished adolescent adventures.¹⁸ Although Dunsterville went on to have a thirty-year career in India and China before the First World War began, his service record was not very remarkable. During the opening stages of the First World War, he was relegated to duties beneath his rank as a railway logistics officer on the Western Front before he was recalled back to India. According to Dunsterville, his position in India was, evidently, a boring job in relative obscurity. Indeed, had his friend Rudyard Kipling not lobbied extensively to ensure Dunsterville would have a higher command post,¹⁹ it may have been a role he would have remained in until retirement.

The British War Office however saw Dunsterville's potential in leading this mission into Qajar Persia. His record specialized in irregular frontier activities on the Indian Northwestern Frontier (modern-day Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa), and he was connected to members within Russian embassies. He also apparently possessed remarkable linguistic skills, personally claiming to be able to speak English, German, French, Chinese, Urdu, Punjabi, Pashtu, and, most importantly for the Dunsterforce mission, Persian and Russian.²⁰

Despite Dunsterville's capabilities, the rushed nature of the mission was, to put it politely, a logistical nightmare. Although many of the men selected and sent from the Western Front were decorated combat veterans who had been in the trenches for many months, many more were not. Despite the high bar for criteria placed on the candidates, the selection process was rushed, and as a result, many of the men chosen did not have experience managing troops as the mission criteria demanded.²¹ Those chosen for the operation were not already commissioned or non-commissioned officers when selected,

¹⁸ Dunsterville was the inspiration for "Stalky," with Reggie Beetle being Kipling himself.

¹⁹ Lionel C. Dunsterville, *Stalky's Reminiscences* (London U.K.: J. Cape Publishers, 1928), p. 245.

²⁰ Dunsterville, *Stalky's Reminiscences*, p. 178.

²¹ Winegard, *The First World Oil War*, p. 87.

but rather enlisted men given *acting ranks* (i.e., short-term promotions: all lower ranks were given the rank of sergeant, and all officers were given the ranks of captains). These promotions were given in order to confer personal authority to soldiers to train and command local militias. Although many of these men were experienced soldiers, many struggled with discipline and likely would not have been selected for their jobs under normal circumstances. In the words of Canadian Lt. Col. John Weightman Warden, they were generally not “the kind of men necessary to accomplish this task,”²² and this was a reality considered by even the highest-ranking officers in the British and Dominion forces. Australian Corps Commander Lt. General Sir William Birdwood, Canadian Corps Commander Lt. General Sir Arthur Currie, and South African General Jan Smuts all received the same letter from the Eastern Committee of the War Office:

We realize how difficult it is for you to spare good officers, and especially the kind of officers we want...but you will realize what a big question is involved— nothing more or less than the defence of India and the security of our whole position in the East. If we only stem the rot in the Caucasus and on the Persian frontier and interpose a barrier against the vast German-Turkish propaganda of their Pan-Turanian scheme, which threatens to enflame the whole of Central Asia including Afghanistan, our minds will be at rest as regards Mesopotamia and India, the latter of which is practically bled white of Indian troops.²³

Regardless of the calibre of manpower, the time-sensitive nature of the mission and its distance prevented the troops from being properly prepared or fully consolidated. The men of this *Hush-Hush Army* were still en-route from England when Dunsterville arrived in Baghdad to meet with the Commander of the Mesopotamian Front, General William Marshall.

General Marshall bluntly viewed the Dunsterforce operation as a pointless sideshow that risked the successes gained on the Mesopotamian front.²⁴ He knew of failure quite well, for, after the disaster of Kut-el-Amara in April of 1916, a stigma was

²² John W. Warden, *The Diary of Lieutenant Colonel John Weightman Warden*, MG30 E192 LT. Col J.W. Warden File, Diary 1918-1919 Public Archives of Canada, p. 12.

²³ Winegard, “Dunsterforce: A Case Study,” p. 100.

²⁴ Bean, “Appendix 5: Australians in Mesopotamia,” pp. 731-737.

formed by the British War Office regarding the Indian Army's apparent poor leadership (as seen by the racist and counterproductive attitudes held by the early India commanders, such as General Beauchamp Duff).²⁵

Marshall was slowly but surely rebuilding the Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force (MEF)'s reputation through careful planning and maneuvering against Ottoman forces and the indigenous populations allied to them. Even with the new incremental success of the MEF, which included the capture of Baghdad in March 1917,²⁶ the region was still not under British control a year later. In fact, a short-lived but potentially threatening Arab revolt by Jam'iya al-Nahda al-Islamiya erupted in Najaf, which was only crushed by a protracted siege lasting until May 1918. Against this backdrop, the idea of Major General Dunsterville engaging in an extremely complicated and poorly planned endeavour, while taking orders directly from the War Office and keeping the MEF commander *out of the loop* categorically contradicted Marshall's strategic approach. He was very nervous about how the actions of Dunsterforce would obstruct his modestly successful (yet uncertain) gains made thus far within the Mesopotamian theatre. To Marshall, the "Persian Situation" did not concern the MEF, evidenced by how the only role Marshall undertook was to guard the road at Khanikan to secure the road through the Zagros Mountains.²⁷

Nevertheless, the War Office determined that Dunsterville's mission was urgent. Rather than waiting for the rest of his soldiers, Dunsterville set out from Baghdad shortly after his arrival on 27 January for the Persia frontier, with a motor convoy of fifty men driving forty-one Ford trucks and Rolls Royce armored cars. Their objective was to take the road east through Kermanshah, Hamadan, Kazvin, and Enzeli (in the province of Gilan), take a ship to Baku, and push on to Tiflis in Georgia. However, the route they embarked upon was gruelling. Navigating the extremely rough winter roads of the Zagros mountains was arduous,²⁸ with intense snow conditions and elevations reaching as high as the 7,600ft Asadabad Pass.²⁹ From there, the drive to Enzeli would

²⁵ Michael Benedict, *Canada at War: From the Archives of MacLean's* (Toronto, Ontario: Viking Publishers, 1997), p. 32.

²⁶ Winegard, *The First World Oil War*, p. 1.

²⁷ Bean, "Appendix 5: Australians in Mesopotamia," pp. 731-737.

²⁸ Winegard, "Dunsterforce: A Case Study," p. 103.

²⁹ See Appendix regarding the Dunsterforce travelling over the mountain passes.

be punishing, for ahead lay 650km of very poorly maintained roads, with weather conditions ranging from negative forty degrees Celsius in the mountains to positive forty degrees Celsius in the hot desert climates.³⁰

This topographical introduction to Qajar Persia also exposed the Dunsterforce to the vast destruction of both the land and the people, suffering from the severe famine in the region. The diaries of the soldiers record seeing people walking “like human skeletons” on the highway, with dead bodies lining the road with people who “gave up” from starvation.³¹ Dunsterville himself noted how there seemed to be little relief effort from the Qajar Persian government, arrogantly stating that “...the State (Qajar Government) makes no effort (in famine efforts),” and the British soldiers were engaged in an environment where “...private charity was regarded as lunacy.”³² Although the actual explanation regarding the significant strife caused by the Great Persian Famine of 1917-1919 is far more complicated, the initial bias of these soldiers arriving in the area assumed the people were severely mismanaged and were enduring harsh conditions without immediate aid.

It was at this time that Dunsterville met with two allied organizations that would be of great assistance to him and his mission: the American Missionaries (which will be discussed later in the paper), and remnants of the Imperial Russian forces under General Baratov. Because most of Baratov’s units were in the process of disbanding when Dunsterforce met with him (with many Russian deserters found walking on the roads), Baratov happily sold most of his disintegrating army’s equipment and weaponry to Dunsterville for personal use or to arm sympathetic militia. While this provided an unexpected source of war material, entities hostile to the Entente were also purchasing military gear from the same former Tsarist soldiers (who were, after all, not picky about their customers). However, this Russian equipment was bolstered with the 1,200-man Cossack host under Ossetian Colonel Lazar F. Bicherakov, who agreed to join

³⁰ Due to the extreme temperature ranges year-round in Persia, the soldiers of Dunsterforce were asked to pack a *two-year supply* kit with both *summer and arctic outfits*, though many were not informed as to why this was necessary until they were in the Mediterranean.

³¹ Lionel C. Dunsterville, *Adventures of Dunsterforce* (London, UK: Edward Arnold Press, 1920), p. 20.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 102.

Dunsterville. Though they came at a high maintenance cost,³³ these well-trained and experienced Cossacks would prove pivotal to the Dunsterforce's limited manpower.

It was at this time that Dunsterville, finally arriving in the Province of Gilan, realized the area was virtually independent of Qajar rule. The province, under the leadership of Mirza Kuchik Khan and his *Jangali* (Jungle) movement, were staunch anti-imperialist, left-leaning nationalists who viewed the current Qajar Shah's government as nothing more than imperialist puppets. Although Mirza Kutchik Khan would later battle Dunsterforce by attempting to deny him access to Enzeli at Resht,³⁴ the Menjli Bridge on the Sefid Rud, and in the forests of Gilan months later (12 June 1918),³⁵ at the moment he provided access to the convoy for them to meet their present objectives in the Caucasus regions. While in Gilan, Dunsterville discovered that the political situation in Enzeli was firmly communist. The city was being ruled by a Bolshevik Committee via the freshly created Baku Soviet, under the leadership of a notable Bolshevik revolutionary and early colleague of Josef Stalin, Stepan Shaumian.

Dunsterville had begun negotiating passage from Enzeli to Baku in order to meet with Lt. Col G.D. Pike in Tiflis, even sending Major G.M. Goldsmith to Baku to negotiate safe passage.³⁶ However, he ended up turning the convoy back for fear of being compromised in isolated territory. Despite explicit telegram invitations from local political organizations,³⁷ the threat of being compromised, captured, or killed within extremely isolated and politically turbulent territory with several valuable resources was a very real possibility. But by March 1918, the snows blocked the mountain passes back to Baghdad, so he and his handful of men set up their basecamp at Hamadan.

Despite the numerous advantages and resources, Dunsterville was provided by the British War Office to reach the Caucasus and accomplish his eight objectives, it was abundantly clear it would prove extremely difficult to succeed in just one of these tasks. The political, logistical, infrastructural, and military issues which plagued the region were all punctuated by a population that was largely hostile to British forces.

³³ Dunsterville, *Adventures of Dunsterforce*, p. 161.

³⁴ See Appendix P, Mirza Kutchik Khan.

³⁵ Dunsterville, *Adventures of Dunsterforce*, p. 194.

³⁶ Artin H. Arslanian "Dunsterville's Adventures: A Reappraisal," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 12, 2 (September 1980): p. 202.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 203.

Dunsterville himself, although a skilled negotiator, never had to tackle challenges of such scale. As seen months later, his short-sighted emphasis on the Caucasus regions instead of maintaining his focus within Qajar Persia would put the civilians under his protection, and the soldiers he dedicated to famine relief efforts, in danger. This would be a fact that came back to haunt him when he retreated from Baku in September 1918.³⁸

Despite being a neutral country, it was clear to Dunsterville's soldiers in 1918 that Persia was an active zone of conflict affected by significant famine and disease. Although the humanitarian efforts of the Dunsterforce would become a vital aspect of the unit's success, in order to fully appreciate these factors (as well as the negative British sentiment by the Persian people), it is important to provide a short context of the "strangling of Persia" by Russia and Britain before the beginning of the First World War.

Pre-War Russian & British Influence & Turmoil in Qajar Persia

In order to maintain his power during the adoption of the Constitution of Qajar Persia (*Qanun-e Asasi-ye Mishirutâh*) and its revolution in 1906,³⁹ Prince Mohammed Ali Shah Qajar made large concessions to both the British and the Russians to suppress the constitutionalists. Unfortunately, the revolution exposed the inability of the Qajar government to offer any effective military security⁴⁰ and resulted in both empires regularly intervening in Persian affairs. The resulting Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 had effectively split Qajar Persia into three spheres of influence: with a neutral zone in its centre for the Qajar government, northwestern Iran was granted to Tsarist Russia and the southeastern areas (i.e., Persian Gulf) to the British. These spheres granted nearly total economic and political control over the regions managed.

The British interest was primarily economic. Given the British Navy's recent conversion to oil, complete control of Iran's oil industry was viewed as vital to the empire's security. Companies such as the Anglo-Persia Oil Company (A.P.O.C., later

³⁸ Arslanian "Dunsterville's Adventures: A Reappraisal," p. 212.

³⁹ Winegard, *The First World Oil War*, p. 34.

⁴⁰ Stephanie Cronin, "An Experiment in Military Modernization: Constitutionalism, Political Reform and the Iranian Gendarmerie, 1910-1921," *Middle Eastern Studies* 32, 3 (July 1996): p. 133.

B.P.) were given considerable political authority, as evidenced by how this company would eventually gain the exclusive right to drill across all of Persia.⁴¹ Instead of companies like the APOC, Tsarist Russia focused on direct administration via extremely wealthy personal networks and concessions.⁴² These personal networks were maintained through regional Russian authorities (i.e. Consulates) that controlled the wealth and tax administration under their purview.⁴³ Taxes of wealthy nobles in regions under their sphere of influence (i.e. Persian Azerbaijan, Savaj Bulagh, Qaraja Dagh, Ahar, Garm Rud, Urumiah and Khoy) would be paid directly to the Russian Consulate instead of the Qajar government.⁴⁴ This wealth generation was protected with extreme suppression tactics through the Persian Cossack Brigade,⁴⁵ who under Prince Mohammed Ali's authority,⁴⁶ violently repressed riots and protests.⁴⁷ The unit occupied large cities (i.e., Tabriz), bombed and plundered the *Majles* (Parliament), and executed various constitutional leaders under "suspicious circumstances" (i.e., Prime Minister Mirza Nasrullah Khan, and Minister of Finance Sanju'd-Daulah).⁴⁸ This conflict, along with the onset of famines and war-time atrocities, developed an intense cycle that negatively affected the civilians of Iran, and would only intensify by the events of the First World War.⁴⁹

Despite the size and potential wealth of Persia, there were challenging issues with transportation and communication. This reality was demonstrated by a lack of proper telegraph or railroad systems across Persia, despite pre-war Russian and British

⁴¹ Stephen Kinzer, *All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror* (Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons Publishing, 2003), p. 48.

⁴² Stephen Martynovich Lianazoff established an administrative system for caviar fisheries within Qajar Persia's Caspian coastline. This system allowed him to both lease and purchase the land he operated upon from indigenous Persians. This allowed his business interests to expand beyond fishing interests, diversifying into industries totally unrelated to fishing (as stipulated by the grant).

⁴³ Vanessa Martin & Marteza Nouraei, "Foreign Land Holdings in Iran, 1828 to 1911," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 21, 2 (April 2011): p. 141.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 142-143.

⁴⁵ Sandra Mackey, *The Iranians: Persia, Islam and the Soul of a Nation* (New York: Dutton, 1996), pp. 150-55.

⁴⁶ Stephanie Cronin, *The Army and Creation of the Pahlavi State in Iran, 1921-1926* (London: I.B.Tauris, 2007), p. 61.

⁴⁷ In an article in the *Los Angeles Herald* in December 1911, the Cossacks were described as responding to a series of riots by "slaughtering 2,500 in Tabriz (and) soldiers prevented the National Council Meeting, 1,500 are killed in three days at Resht, hundreds are butchered at Anazili (Enzeli)."

⁴⁸ Avery, *Nations of the Modern World*, p. 142.

⁴⁹ Avery, *Nations of the Modern World*, p. 185.

plans to build a Trans-Iranian Railway.⁵⁰ Many networks, such as census and standard tax records, were either inconsistent or non-existent. Thus, in an effort to maintain Qajar political, bureaucratic, and fiscal independence from the British or Russians,⁵¹ American advisor William Morgan Shuster recruited Swedish officers to train a new police force. Tasked with collecting taxes and protecting the roads, this pro-Qajar “Gendarmerie” grew to some 36 Swedish advisors and 6,000 officers by 1913.⁵² Unfortunately, pro-Russian Bakhtiyari ministers (such as Minister of War Sardar-i Muhtasham) obstructed and actively conflicted with this new Gendarmerie.⁵³ Moreover, this new police force was enormously expensive, costing roughly half the net revenue of the Qajar Government for a force of only some 12,000 troops.⁵⁴ Although Shuster did his best with what he was given, he noted how “...the British and the Russians were determined not to let us succeed.”⁵⁵ He had no choice but to flee in January 1912 after his life was threatened by the Russian Cossacks. Mohammed Ali Shah was deposed and replaced by his eleven-year-old son, Ahmad Shah Qajar. Consequently, the Qajar government became fiscally reliant upon the Russians and the British. Lord Lamington, future Commissioner of the British Relief Unit in Syria come 1919,⁵⁶ said in a 1912 interview:

...Persia has not had a chance. She is hampered and thwarted in her regeneration; and, adding insult to injury, leader-writers in the press have attributed the present chaos to her own mistakes... on the one or two occasions when she appeared to be extricating herself from her difficulties, Russia has interposed...⁵⁷

What the basis of this short history demonstrates is that, though Qajar Persia was officially neutral during the First World War, Russian and British imperialism effectively subsumed the area into the Entente’s wartime base of operations, and caused many Persians sympathetic to German operations against the Entente. Future

⁵⁰ Ibid., pp. 170-172.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 167.

⁵² Cronin, “An Experiment in Military Modernization,” p. 109.

⁵³ Conflict between these two factions escalated to such an extent that by August 1913 street fighting occurred between the Bakhtaryi’s and the Swedish Gendarmes.

⁵⁴ Cronin, “An Experiment in Military Modernization,” p. 116.

⁵⁵ William Morgan Shuster, *The Strangling of Persia; a Record of European Diplomacy and Oriental Intrigue* (London, UK: T.F. Unwin Publishing, 1912), p. 85.

⁵⁶ “Obituary,” *The Times* (London), 18 September 1940, p. 7.

⁵⁷ Avery, *Nations of the Modern World*, p. 168.

Dunsterforce base locations such as Kermanshah, Hamadan, Qazvin, and Tabriz saw the WWI conflict spill over from the neighbouring Caucasus Front between Russian garrisons and Ottoman troops in what was termed The Persian Campaign.

The Persian Campaign of the First World War had developed in response to the recent defeats of the Ottomans by the Russians on the Caucasus Front, including the Russian destruction of the Ottoman Third Army at the Battle of Sarikamish in the Winter of 1914/1915.⁵⁸ Unfortunately, the Sublime Porte's poor logistics caused thousands of more soldiers to die from malnutrition⁵⁹ and forced the Ottomans into being on the defensive for the rest of the war. Despite the empire's large size and population,⁶⁰ after the Battle of Sarrikamish the Armenians were intentionally demonized by Enver Pasha's Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) for alleged pro-Russian sentiments.⁶¹ These reactionary sentiments quickly escalated into the Armenian Genocide due to the CUP's attitudes towards possible "rebellious" populations against the war effort.

Between 1909 and 1913 the CUP had developed nationalistic policies specifically aimed at interchanging the term "Osmanli" with being a "Turk."⁶² What this did was place an emphasis on "Turkey for the Turks," which advocated for the enforcement of an informal, yet state-pressured, hierarchy of ethnonationalist conformity across all the Ottoman Empire's populations.⁶³ This noticeable group of the Young Turks, termed the

⁵⁸ Edward J. Erickson, *Ordered to Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001), p. 57. Approximately 33,000 men died in combat, another 10,000 died in hospital, another 10,000 were wounded, 7,000 were captured, and a staggering 25,000 men froze to death.

⁵⁹ Henry Morgenthau, *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story: A Personal Account of The Armenian Genocide*. (New York City, New York. Doubleday, Page & Company, 1918), p. 48

⁶⁰ The approximate population was roughly 24 million overall, subdivided into approximately 12 million Turks, 6 million Arabs, 2 million Kurds, 1.8 million Greeks (largely in the western provinces), 1.68 million Armenians (largely in the eastern provinces), and 187,000 Jews.

⁶¹ Morgenthau, *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story*, p. 168

⁶² Rafael de Nogales, *Four Years Beneath the Crescent* (London, UK: Taderon Press, 2003), p. 16.

⁶³ Ryan Gingeras, *Sorrowful Shores: Violence, Ethnicity and the End of the Ottoman Empire, 1912-1923* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 38.

“Three Pashas,” led a *coup d’état* on 26 January 1913 with significant German spending and aid.⁶⁴

In the opinion of the Three Pasha’s, the final solution to possibly “disloyal” populations was very calculated and deliberate.⁶⁵ Talaat Pasha’s “10% rule” mandated every single *vilayet* (province) have certain populations, such as the Armenians, to never exceed more than 10 percent of the region’s total population. This was due to how these populations were considered to be notable threats in geographically strategic locations.⁶⁶ Regardless if any of these populations made up a given majority in a region, such as in eastern *vilayets* like Van, these “surplus” people had to be expelled to other areas.⁶⁷ This expulsion of people via state-backed policies was interpreted differently by government functionaries,⁶⁸ and provided an opportunity for personal enrichment via irregular violence. For example, Mehmet Reshid (“The Butcher of Diyarbakir”) gave explicit orders to Kurdish tribes for these transient groups to be killed on the road, robbed of valuables, and have the evidence destroyed.⁶⁹ Entire villages were emptied of their Armenian inhabitants and, if not killed outright, were abandoned in the locations they were forced to go to.⁷⁰ The CUP had adopted “a crystallized policy of empire-wide killing and death-by-attrition,” which was so extreme the Ottoman government’s religious figurehead, the Sheik al-Islam, resigned from the Sultan’s Cabinet after protesting “the extermination of the [Ottoman] Christian elements.”⁷¹ These violent policies would come back to haunt the Sublime Porte’s war aims as these policies indirectly caused a war on two fronts with the Persia Campaign.

⁶⁴ Morgenthau, *Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story*, pp. 15, 87. This reliance upon Central Powers support eventually would lead to the Germans pressuring the Ottomans to declare war on the Russians and join the Central Powers in October 1914.

⁶⁵ As evidenced by the extensive data poling the Sublime Porte had to *keep tabs* on said populations, demonstrated by APPENDIX C.

⁶⁶ Gingeras, *Sorrowful Shore*, p. 93.

⁶⁷ Taner Akçam, *The Young Turks’ Crime Against Humanity* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2011), p. 249.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 199.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 212.

⁷⁰ Keith David Watenpugh, “The League of Nations’ Rescue of Armenian Genocide Survivors and the Making of Modern Humanitarianism, 1920-1927,” *The American Historical Review* 115, No. 5 (December 2010): p. 1323.

⁷¹ Hannibal Travis, “Native Christians Massacred: The Ottoman Genocide of the Assyrians During World War I,” *Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal* 1, 3 (2006): p. 343.

Ottoman War Objectives in Persia, and the Dunsterforce's Situation

Many of the irrational policies of the Young Turks heavily detracted from their objectives for the First World War. The primary objective of the Ottoman military joining the war was to regain the former territories of Batum and Kars Oblasts and Artvin and Ardahan provinces, which had been taken by Tsarist Russia in aftermath of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878.⁷² Aside from regaining lost territory, a tactical victory in these former regions would force the Tsarist Russians to reroute troops south to the Caucasus regions, and allow for further German advancement into Eastern Europe.

Unfortunately, the Battle of Sarrikamish (as previously mentioned, two months after the Ottoman entry into the Great War) was a major defeat, with thousands left dying in the cold conditions. In an effort to draw attention away from the Russians pushing southwards towards Anatolia, the Ottomans sought to divert them by moving eastwards to attack Russian positions stationed in Persian cities like Tabriz. Though Qajar Persia was a neutral country, the sectarian violence of the Ottoman empire was effectively exported to Persian regions as disloyal transient populations were found in the communities they occupied. For example, Ottoman General A. Ihsan Sabis of the XIII Corps, who took the previously Tsarist Russian-held city of Hamadan in 1916, stated countless times to his German advisors how he would not allow "a single Armenian to stay alive" in his command zone, often bragging how he would "...kill Armenians with his own hands."⁷³ This was confirmed when he and his army re-entered Tabriz at the end of June 1918, confessing to have massacred numerous Armenians in Khoy and Maku regardless of age or sex. He bluntly stated to Armenian Catholic priest Monseigneur Nerses during negotiations that "...I had half a million of your coreligionists killed. I can offer you a cup of tea."⁷⁴

⁷² W.E.D. Allen & Paul Muratoff, "The Turkish Invasion of Transcaucasia," p. 240.

⁷³ Taner Akçam, *A Shameful Act*, p. 86. See APPENDIX E regarding the German Archives and Persian Campaign.

⁷⁴ Raymond H. Kévorkian, *Le Génocide des Arméniens* (Translated) (Paris: Jacob Publishing, 2006), pp. 870–1.

Ultimately, these Ottoman advances failed to stop the Russian offensive. Though the Ottomans had pushed as far as Hamadan and Kermanshah by 1915, the Tsarist column dispatched from the Caucasus Front under General Nikolai Baratov undid many of the gains made by this force.⁷⁵ Ironically, the violent policies of the CUP had become one of the largest detractors for the Ottoman war effort, for it effectively pushed Armenian and other affected populations to side with the Entente. This allowed for Ottoman *vilayets* that resisted the policies at the Persian border to receive new defenders, such as the pro-Russian Armenian troops in the Defense of Van.⁷⁶ These numbers grew to significant proportions, with Chairman of the Armenian National Movement, Boghos Nubar, stating in 1919 at Versailles how there were some 150,000 Armenians in Imperial Russian units, and a further 40,000 *feddayi* (militia/ volunteer irregular units), on the Caucasus Front before its collapse.⁷⁷ Moreover, they were led by Imperial Russian-trained Armenian generals such as Andranik Ozanian and Jaques Bagratuni.⁷⁸

The consequence of these successes meant the Imperial Russian forces consistently pushed the Ottomans back into Eastern Anatolia, reaching far as Trebizond, Erzerum, Bitlis and Van by 1917.⁷⁹ Indeed, their advance was only halted by the Bolshevik Revolution which destroyed the morale and cohesion of the Russian soldiers.⁸⁰ The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk of 3 March 1918 demonstrates this rapid shift in attitude, for the Bolshevik government agreed to withdraw from previous Ottoman territory. In the Treaty, they agree for the areas of Ardahan, Kars and Batum to be cleared of all Russian troops, and to no longer interfere in any Ottoman affairs in these regions.⁸¹

⁷⁵ Kévorkian, *Le Génocide des Arméniens*, p. 374.

⁷⁶ de Nogales, *Four Years Beneath the Crescent*, p. 81.

⁷⁷ Joan George, *Merchants in Exile: The Armenians of Manchester, England, 1835–1935* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Gomidas Institute Press, 2002), p. 184.

⁷⁸ See APPENDIX Q.

⁷⁹ W.E.D. Allen & Paul Muratoff, "The Turkish Invasion of Transcaucasia," p. 457.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 458.

⁸¹ Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Article IV, 3 March 1918. This had been the prime motivation for the Ottoman Empire and remained so for years after the First World War ended. This can be exemplified by the Treaty of Kars on 13 October 1921, where in Articles III and IV it is outlined how all territories acquired in the 1877-1878 War by Russia were ceded back to the Ottomans and are still a part of the Republic of Turkey today.

As a result, the Dunsterforce was not operating in neutral territory, but rather entering into an active conflict zone accentuated by years of irregular transnational violence inspired by Ottoman and Russian policy. Moreover, political activism by anti-government Nationalists and Soviet Bolsheviks in reaction to apparent Qajar absence of action rose in response to the extreme poverty and famine across the country. These challenges had developed and entrenched systemic issues which the Dunsterforce was not prepared to tackle in any effective capacity. For the Persian people, the Dunsterforce was just another group of foreign soldiers invading their territory and disrespecting their neutrality.⁸² Though Major General Dunsterville established Hamadan as his primary base of operations in Persia by February 1918, his memoir, *Adventures of Dunsterforce*, captures the political and military complexity of the region:

...There are so many situations here, that it is difficult to give a full appreciation of each. There is the local situation, the all-Persia situation, the Jangali situation, the Persian-Russian situation, the Turkish-advance-on-Tabriz situation, the question of liquidating Russian debts, the Baku situation, the South Caucasus' situation, the North Caucasus' situation, the Bolshevik situation and the Russian situation as a whole. And each of these subdivides into smaller and acuter situations...⁸³

Regardless of how complicated the scenario he was in, by March 1918 Dunsterville, as mentioned previously, knew his unit was in no shape to accomplish any of their original objectives. With the signing of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, the Bolshevik-backed Baku Soviet refused to allow the British force to transit through their territory.⁸⁴ The force's route to the Caucasus was now blocked. The original objective of training Georgians, Armenians and Azeri Turks largely dematerialized due to the March Days of Baku, where numerous Azeri Turks were massacred by Armenian militias with the Baku Soviets' support.⁸⁵ This event made the Azeri Turks in the Caucasus actively hostile to the Armenian population, and made any kind of collaboration between these groups (and thus, instruction by the Dunsterforce) extremely difficult, if not outright impossible.

⁸² Avery, *Nations of the Modern World*, p. 200.

⁸³ Dunsterville, *Adventures of Dunsterforce*, p. 183.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 204.

⁸⁵ W.E.D. Allen & Paul Muratoff, "The Turkish Invasion of Transcaucasia," p. 462.

Aside from political limitations, another problem was the lack of immediate manpower under Dunsterville's control. At this point in March/ April of 1918, the unit in Hamadan was reliably comprised of a few mobile wireless stations in the No. 9 Wagon Unit, (an ANZAC unit that maintained wireless telegraph stations for communications who, for a week in March, were the only British troops in Kermanshah),⁸⁶ his armored convoy of trucks & armored cars (nicknamed the *DUNCARS*), and a few Persian and Russian militia units, including Lazar Bicherakov's 1,200 Ossetian Cossacks. In order to maintain a strategic military presence, Dunsterville made sure that Bicherkov's Cossacks were stationed in Kazvin while his main force was stationed in Hamadan waiting for the reinforcements from Europe.⁸⁷ Despite Dunsterville's optimism, the War Office realized the scenarios in the Caucasus were too unstable to involve the limited Dunsterforce. From the outset, the Dunsterforce's "secret mission" was so ill-planned that it was already an open secret to the German backed militias in Persia.⁸⁸ As a result, the War Office changed the force's objectives. Dunsterville was now ordered to keep his men in Persia, stabilize the region, train the local male populace as militia, and become a defence force against any possible push by the Ottomans into Persian territory.⁸⁹

As for the men on their way from Western Front to reinforce Dunsterville in Hamadan, their primary experience when they arrived in Iraq was culture shock as they learnt new skills that would be invaluable in Persia.⁹⁰ This included learning whatever Russian and Farsi they could, being trained on machine guns, and learning how to traverse desert logistics with pack animals with, in the words of Australian Captain Savage, "relative success."⁹¹ Though for some of the soldiers this was viewed as a welcome adventure compared to the muddy conditions of the Western Front,⁹² the

⁸⁶ Keast Burke, *With Horse and Morse in Mesopotamia: The Stories of the Anzacs in Asia* (Sydney, NSW: Arthur McQuitty & Co. 1927), p. 90. See APPENDIX O, Regarding the "Stead Family."

⁸⁷ Dunsterville, *Adventures of Dunsterforce*, p. 68.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

⁸⁹ 1 General Staff, War Office, "Memorandum Regarding the [British] Support to the Armenians," April 1918, F. O. 371/3284.

⁹⁰ Benedict, *Canada at War*, p. 26.

⁹¹ Savage, *Diary, 2 January 1918-27 January 1919*, p. 35.

⁹² Some officers like Canadian J.W. Warden, were even able to attend a royal wedding: The Sheikh of Mommerah, Khaz'al Ibn Jabir, was presenting his son to a bride so many officers were invited to an event full of fireworks and other spectacles.

experience was not entirely positive. The heat and disease was unbearable. It was a common occurrence for indigenous populations, whether they be Arab or otherwise, to steal whatever they could from the soldiers. One Canadian medical officer in Baghdad noted how in a single night, thieves took their mules and harnesses, as well as cut swathes of cloth out of their tent while they slept.⁹³ Over the course of their journey from Iraq towards Iran, many of the men were confronted by desperate people who, in the soldier's opinion, were generally "wasted under Ottoman rulership."⁹⁴ Though Australian Captain Savige of the Dunsterforce noted how the indigenous agricultural systems were "primitive but useful,"⁹⁵ this was viewed by many soldiers as evidence of inefficient governance. A Canadian officer stated in an interview for *Maclean's Magazine*:

...Under Turkish misrule and the indolence of the inhabitants, Mesopotamia has become a country of parched land and desert stretches... A decade of progressive rule, British Rule, will suffice to establish again a tropical Eden all the way from Baghdad to the sea.⁹⁶

This patronizing attitude to the locals was shared by all the British forces in the region. Both sanitation and environmental issues were extreme, with Captain Savige noting how "the smells and flies (in Baghdad) were terrible, sanitation being unknown."⁹⁷ Aside from the sanitation and the heat, the sandflies were so intense that oil had to be poured into the neighbouring low-lying lands to stop the spread of disease.⁹⁸ Characteristic of these issues, 90 percent of all casualty cases were medical based (with cholera, dysentery and heatstroke being the most common cases), meaning disease and the weather were more deadlier enemies than the Ottoman soldiers in Mesopotamia.⁹⁹ These were truths that the Dunsterforce found also applied to Persia as they marched from their camp in Ruz in April and May of 1918. Though they marched relying on a combination of mule train and motor transport, they found there were not enough animals to ensure a proper supply could properly deliver the convoy to Hamadan. Canadian Lt. Col. Warden stated that "we cannot get off the ground without

⁹³ Benedict, *Canada at War*, p. 28.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

⁹⁵ Savige, *Diary, 2 January 1918-27 January 1919*, p. 33.

⁹⁶ Benedict, *Canada at War*, p. 33.

⁹⁷ Savige, *Diary, 2 January 1918-27 January 1919*, p. 35.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

the animals” in order to bring all the supplies they needed into Persia.¹⁰⁰ However, everything leading up to this point would not prepare the men for the extreme challenges they would encounter in Qajar Persia.

The Humanitarian Efforts of Dunsterforce

Australian Captain Stanley Savige’s diary from Kermanshah records his initial impression of the Great Persian Famine in 1918:

...Had a look over Kermanshah today & at present feel sick at the sights one saw... the first sights of the poverty of the people, for batches of them were out in the fields actually eating grass. Their bodies were nothing more than skin & bone, yet their stomachs were swollen to an awful extent... the worst cases were either laying in the streets dead or dying. It was heartbreaking to see a mother, almost too weak to stand, clinging to a dead child or ~~dead~~ children wailing over the bodies of their dead parents. Many were so weak that a push would fell them to the ground from which they could not rise without assistance... at least one fourth of the population is dying of starvation.¹⁰¹

When Dunsterville first arrived in Persia in February 1918, he met with the American Presbyterian missionary families in Kermanshah and Hamadan, the Stedd and the Funk families.¹⁰² These missionaries, who had been in the area providing aid to the population for decades, informed Major General Dunsterville of the extremely bleak situation. According to Dunsterville, out of the roughly 50,000 people in his main city base of Hamadan, roughly 30 percent of the population was in “acute distress” from starvation.¹⁰³ He realized how humanitarian efforts in the areas he operated within were necessary to have access to a steady pool of healthy manpower for a militia, and in general develop goodwill in territory hostile to British imperial influence. When Dunsterville first met with these missionaries, he initially found he could do little to help given his limited supplies. Large numbers of civilians died from hunger, and

¹⁰⁰ Warden, *Diary 1918-1919*, p. 11.

¹⁰¹ Savige, *Diary, 2 January 1918-27 January 1919*, pp. 51-52.

¹⁰² The village of Estadabad in Kermanshah county is named after Francis Morley (F.M.) Stead, see Appendix.

¹⁰³ Dunsterville, *Adventures of Dunsterforce*, pp. 103-104.

though the missionaries did their best to feed orphaned children under their care, many died.¹⁰⁴ But by March 1918, given how his objectives had changed, Dunsterville felt morally and strategically compelled to help, and decided to commit his force to humanitarian efforts.

From March onwards, the Dunsterforce established famine relief centres at Hamadan's Imperial Bank of Persia and at the American Mission.¹⁰⁵ Dunsterville had a significant amount of capital to draw upon for food supplies, as well as a general employment model to follow from fellow British officials in Persia. British Consul of Kermanshah, Lt. Colonel Roger Lloyd Kennion, had been employing individuals in road work and other civil projects, albeit at a smaller scale.^{106, 107} Despite these resources, Dunsterville acknowledged nothing was planned or premeditated when it came to the famine relief work, but rather "learnt day by day from sad experience."¹⁰⁸ Yet through trial and error, a consistent routine was established and the British garnered respect from the populace. Captain Savige noted in Hamadan how "...Stalky (Dunsterville) has people on the job of famine relief. One meal a day is given to the people on road work & the surplus distributed to the people."¹⁰⁹

According to Dunsterville there was enough local grain to feed everyone, but there was hoarding and price gouging which prohibited universal access. Grain speculators refused to provide this food as there was "...not enough money to pay for it,"¹¹⁰ and no price control. Persian communities at this time suffered both a breakdown of the transport and communication systems, effectively hamstrung by military requisitioning of pack animals during the Great War. This worsened the transport of food, if there were any to be found, as well as the collective knowledge of how much goods would cost from town to town. For example, by November 1915 the price of one

¹⁰⁴ Mary Lewis Shedd, *The Measure of a Man: William A. Shedd of Persia, A Biography* (New York City, New York: George H. Doran Company, 1922), p. 160.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 103-104.

¹⁰⁶ "No. 29119," *The London Gazette*, 6 April 1915, p. 3332.

¹⁰⁷ Dunsterville, *Adventures of Dunsterforce*, p. 20.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 104.

¹⁰⁹ Savige, *Diary, 2 January 1918-27 January 1919*, p. 58.

¹¹⁰ Dunsterville, *Adventures of Dunsterforce*, p. 103.

khavar (650 pound) shipment of wheat increased from 20 tomans (a sum of roughly \$33.33 USD in 1918 dollars), to roughly 120 tomans (\$200 USD) per *khavar* by 1918.¹¹¹

This fluctuation of cost and purchasing power meant it was impossible for an average Persian to afford cereal grains. As a result of both market forces and local governments' self-interest in the profits, market prices were simply beyond the reach of starving civilians and were a direct cause of their impoverishment. In order to challenge what were essentially grain cartels by local governments, the British sought to flood the market with cheap grain and actively advertise it. For example, on 15 April 1918, Colonel Kennion announced in Kermanshah that, due to an extremely successful Mesopotamian harvest, the British were not going to purchase any of their grain from local communities. Instead, they would bring everything they needed from Baghdad, and give extra food to the people. This had an immediate effect on local merchants. After the announcement, the price of one *khavar* immediately dropped from 120 tomans to 80 tomans and continued to decline.¹¹² Due to the lack of reliable communication networks, in every large town or city the Dunsterforce had a presence in this process of challenging the price gouging had to be repeated and renegotiated between Dunsterforce officers and local authorities. This became a tedious and time-consuming process which impeded more efficient aide, and detracted valuable time from the Dunsterforce's military objectives. This is evidenced by how after Kermanshah, Dunsterville noticed the merchants were selling a *khavar* of grain in Hamadan for nearly 230 Tomans when the cost would have been 12 Tomans in Kermanshah.¹¹³

It is important to note how the Persian Famine of 1917-1919 took millions of lives.¹¹⁴ Some scholars such as Professor Mohammed Ghola Majd of Princeton University argue the death toll could have been as high as half of the contemporary population (roughly nine to ten million people).¹¹⁵ He attributes the famine to British machinations, calling it a "British-manufactured genocide" due to the denial of vital

¹¹¹ Ibid., p. 95.

¹¹² Mohammed Ghola Majd, *The Great Famine and Genocide in Persia, 1917-1919* (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 2003), p. 95.

¹¹³ Dunsterville, *Adventures of Dunsterforce*, p. 124.

¹¹⁴ Hormoz Ebrahimnejad, *Medicine in Iran: Profession, Practice and Politics, 1800-1925* (New York City, New York: Springer Press, 2013), p. 182.

¹¹⁵ Majd, *The Great Famine and Genocide in Persia*, p. 73.

food imports.¹¹⁶ Initial Western historiographers such as Peter Avery characterize how these conditions were caused by "...the power of foreigners, the bad example of greedy leaders, the breakdown of the religious institution (and the morality it should have upheld), the scope given to an innate tendency to despondency by the apparent hopelessness of Iran's situation... were all conducive to a decline in public morality which assumed extreme proportions."¹¹⁷ However, the impacts of the British blockade of Persia during the First World War made the impact of the Persian Famine of 1917-1919 worse by denying said food imports. Professor Majd goes on to say how these effects were confirmed by the contemporary accounts, where "...According to the American Charge d'Affaires, Wallace Smith Murray, this famine had claimed one-third of Iran's population. A famine that even according to British sources as General Dunsterforce, Major Donohoe (attached to Dunsterforce) and General Sykes had claimed vast numbers of Iranians."¹¹⁸

These extreme conditions, which had developed for years before the First World War began and worsened as the war continued, were at least partially maintained and engineered by British desires to weaken centralized Persian authority. The inextricable linkage of humanitarian efforts to military organizations highlights this desire and intent. Although, by the beginning of the First World War in 1914, the International Red Cross & Red Crescent (IRCRC) held some forty-five national relief societies worldwide, many of these were nationalized and attached to military medical services.¹¹⁹ Large-scale medical organizations focused on providing relief *only* if it was justified by a military force, as evidenced by the Dunsterforce itself. This benefitted the military and diplomatic strategy of European powers by fostering the concept of "humanitarian intervention."¹²⁰ Although the establishment of the Development of the League of Red Cross Societies (DLRCS) allowed for relief in response to non-armed conflict emergencies such as natural disasters by 5 May 1919,¹²¹ these changes did not come in

¹¹⁶ Ibid., p. 82.

¹¹⁷ Avery, *Nations of the Modern World*, p. 167.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., p. 72.

¹¹⁹ John F. Hutchinson, *Champions of Charity. War and the Rise of the Red Cross* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996), p. 150.

¹²⁰ Watenpaugh, "The League of Nations' Rescue of Armenian Genocide Survivors," p. 1319.

¹²¹ Shai Dromi, *Above the Fray: The Red Cross and the Making of the Humanitarian NGO Sector* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2020), p. 119.

time to provide practical aid to Qajar Persia in 1918. While it is unlikely every member of the British forces was aware of how their presence represented British imperialism at the cost of Persian agency, it is undeniable the British War Office sought to break Qajar Persian authority and profit from the discord. This is evidenced by the blatant attempts by Lord Curzon post-war to incorporate Persia into Britain's "informal" empire.¹²²

Unfortunately, years of plundering by foreign armies, hoarding by speculative landlords, dealers and officials, and lack of nutritional value all contributed to Persia's famine, which impacted the population's vulnerability to diseases such as influenza and cholera.¹²³ As such, the apparent lack of reforms and immediate action by the Qajar government heavily impacted its popularity. Although the *Majles* had not been idle regarding the famine relief, with Prime Minister Mokhber al-Saltaneh developing the Ministry of Alimentation and developed a committee to create government subsidies for bread in 1918,¹²⁴ years of weak Qajar authority and a lack of protection for its people resulted in the members of the *Majles* being viewed as a corrupt "...collection of men to whom a ministry meant an opportunity for personal enrichment and favouritism."¹²⁵ In large city centres such as Tehran, violent confrontations between the police and hungry citizens occurred in reaction to the severe short-selling of goods by bakers and the lack of regulation regarding quality.¹²⁶ Such distractions meant local authorities in isolated areas were largely left to their own devices with little Qajar government aid. In response to this inaction, considerable reform movements mobilized in Gilan, Kazandaran and Azerbaijan, with local leaders such as Mirza Kuchik Khan establishing their own relief efforts. Often, they also acted alone against the efforts of the British, who viewed their activities as buying influence for imperialist projects.

These local leaders however were perceived by the British soldiers as having a lack of empathy regarding the starving populace. Men such as Captain Savige did not

¹²² Homa Katouzian, "The Campaign Against the Anglo-Iranian Agreement," pp. 5-6. Whether this was a firm fact known by the soldiers operating in the area, or an objective fully understood by General Dunsterville himself, is difficult to determine.

¹²³ Nikki R. Keddie and Yann Richard, *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution* (Yale: Yale University Press, 2006), p. 75.

¹²⁴ Willem Floor, "The Creation of the Food Administration in Iran," *Studies on the Economic and Social History of Iran in the Nineteenth Century* 16, 3-4 (Summer-Autumn, 1983): p. 222.

¹²⁵ Avery, *Nations of the Modern World*, p. 178

¹²⁶ Floor, "The Creation of the Food Administration in Iran," p. 78.

care for local politics regarding the civilians under British care, noting how in Hamadan "... a particular party calling themselves 'Democrats' are right up against us on a/c of saving the rabble, as they term these people, from starvation."¹²⁷ The Dunsterforce's feuding with unreliable authorities varied significantly and often made the difference between negotiating with local governments to taking total control of a location. This particular event occurred in Hamadan in Spring, 1918, when telegram messages reporting their numbers to the Ottoman forces were intercepted by the ANZAC wireless networks.¹²⁸ Being an obvious security risk due to how only roughly 70 or so British soldiers were stationed there,¹²⁹ it became necessary for the Governor and Ferid-Ud-Dowleh, the leader of the Extreme Democrats, "to be removed elsewhere."¹³⁰ They were both arrested by a party of soldiers led by Canadian Captain Gordon Scott Hopkins and imprisoned in the Imperial Bank of Persia.¹³¹ After an attempted jailbreak by some of his followers,¹³² "all troubles in Hamadan ceased" with their departure.¹³³

The expunging of the local leadership had allowed the British more control in their military and humanitarian endeavours. Under South African General JJ Byron (recently promoted from Colonel), and Canadian Colonel J.W. Warden, who together were in charge of the camp and its famine relief,¹³⁴ hundreds of people were now fed every day free of charge. Much needed efforts were being made to rebuild the local economy, including consistent food quality, payment in rations and cash, and employment in projects.¹³⁵ Word rapidly spread of the British aid efforts, and by May the population of Hamadan swelled from 50,000 inhabitants to 80,000 of all races and sects. Though their efforts were working, the environment was so tense that "one dare

¹²⁷ Savage, *Diary, 2 January 1918-27 January 1919*, p. 58.

¹²⁸ Dunsterville, *Adventures of Dunsterforce*, p. 148.

¹²⁹ Savage, *Diary, 2 January 1918-27 January 1919*, p. 57.

¹³⁰ Dunsterville, *Adventures of Dunsterforce*, p. 177.

¹³¹ He served as the main supply officer of the Dunsterforce, requisitioning supplies from both the Hamadan and Caspian regions. He made deals with both Lianazhoff's Fisheries and Mirza Kuchik Khan. Appendix J, Gordon Scott Hopkins and Journal, Baku (Gibson, BC Archives. #A921).

¹³² Dunsterville, *Adventures of Dunsterforce*, p. 177.

¹³³ W.W. Murray, "Canadians in Dunsterforce," pp. 209-210

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 62

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 110

not go out without a revolver.”¹³⁶ Though Dunsterville spoke highly of him, Warden noted how “poorly” Byron looked from the stressful job given to him.¹³⁷

Though the extra manpower had arrived from Iraq, the conditions in Iran were still extremely isolated and were stress-inducing for all ranks. In a letter dated 12 June 1918, Canadian rancher Sgt. Alfred Prat Gattey of Consort Alberta wrote to his future wife, Ms. Sue Boulton, how the days were very long, there were very few amenities in the area, and mail took over four months to arrive in Hamadan:

“...I have just read yours of Feb 21st so I got it all right and considering the distance it has had to come it has done pretty well I think !!!! ...I only stayed at Baghdad about two days and then got sent out on an advance party,¹³⁸ so I saw very little of the Great city of the east which we have heard so much about. We did about a 600 mile (march) to where we are now and took about 25 days, so it was quite a tramp and through very wild and mountainous country. Our only means of transportation was pack mules as we had pack baggage, rations etc. We used to have quite a business loading and unloading the mules every day and pitching camp for the night... What we are doing of course I cannot say,¹³⁹ but we are handling a rum lot of people and have some very queer experiences, but they will have to keep till I get back to good old Canada... If you think of it, a few Players Cigs would go fine as we can't get any decent cigs here, only Persian ones and they are very poor... we are worse off for news... we know very little of what is going on outside... I have to be up at 5AM, so will close now with best wishes & please excuse the scrawl.

Yours Very Sincerely, Alfred Gattey (A.P.G.)”¹⁴⁰

Despite their successes, many negative outcomes still persisted. These conditions and numbers meant the Dunsterforce was constantly running out of supplies to feed both the soldiers and the refugees they served. Death from starvation and disease was still a common occurrence. Many workers, already in a weak state, literally worked

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Warden, *Diary 1918-1919*, p. 18.

¹³⁸ See APPENDIX R.

¹³⁹ This is due to wartime censorship by the British War Office regarding front line soldiers sending domestic mail.

¹⁴⁰ Used With Permission, Gattey Family Private Archives & Collection, Cross Bar Ranch Consort Alberta.

themselves to death on the road projects. Some of the men who were chosen to be police officers were just bandits turned out to be bandits looking for an excuse to rob refugees of their remaining wealth.¹⁴¹ Cannibalism was common, with one soldier reporting that “a woman was stoned to death after she killed one child to feed her other one.”¹⁴² Dunsterville himself notes in his memoir how desperate refugees would eat the grass on the hills “like sheep” after the snows had melted.¹⁴³ Due to this extreme demand, the facilities in Hamadan quickly became too small to deal with the thousands of people in extreme need. Hamadan eventually became a transfer point for continued travel to Iraq. Once they were well enough to travel, refugees would be forced to march south again to the Baqubah Refugee Camp near Baghdad. Under Brigadier General H.H. Austin, this facility was equipped to house and care for nearly 50,000 refugees.¹⁴⁴ Tragically, the distance was too great for many civilians, and even more died of malnutrition en-route to this location.

Famine itself sadly was only one aspect of this complicated situation: Opium consumption, anaemia, and malaria were also notable challenges.¹⁴⁵ Many of these deaths were hastened by conditions and diseases which the Dunsterforce was ill-prepared to tackle. Influenza alone (known to the Persians as *bad-e nazleh*), rapidly spread from Baghdad to Kermanshah via British and Indian soldiers stationed in port cities. The effects on the populations in these locations were devastating. In Tehran alone, some 50,000 people were reported to have died in the first three months of cases reported. Deaths caused by lack of medical aid were statistically worse in rural areas than in city centres. Ashair and Ghashghai tribes people had casualty figures as high as 30 percent, particularly of their young and healthy men. Total case death estimates vary from 902,400 to 2,431,000, though the real figure was most likely between those two extremes due to inconsistent records.¹⁴⁶ This disparity is evident in how Kermanshah, influenza deaths were reported at 1 percent whereas in some villages the death toll

¹⁴¹ Dunsterville, *Adventures of Dunsterforce*, p. 121.

¹⁴² S.G. Savige, *Stalky's Forlorn Hope* (Melbourne, Victoria: Alexander McCubbin Publishing, 1920), p. 129.

¹⁴³ Dunsterville, *Adventures of Dunsterforce*, p. 150.

¹⁴⁴ H. H. Austin, *The Baqubah Refugee Camp: An Account of Work on Behalf of the Persecuted Assyrian Christians* (Piscataway, New Jersey: Georgia Press, 2006), p. 30.

¹⁴⁵ Mohammad Hossein Azizi MD, Ghanbar Ali Raees Jalali MD, & Farzaneh Azizi, “A History of the 1918 Spanish Influenza Pandemic and its Impact on Iran,” *History of Contemporary Medicine in Iran* 13, 3, (May 2010): pp. 263-264.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 265.

could be as high as 20 percent or more.¹⁴⁷ ¹⁴⁸ By the end of the war, the three killers of famine, cholera and influenza had spread through the country. In Shiraz alone, 10 percent of the approximate 50,000 population died. Contemporary writer Mohammad Ali Jamalzadeh described how "...corpses were seen everywhere in the city...There was no doctor, no nurse, and no drug(s)."¹⁴⁹

According to Captain Savige, the unit only received their first "medico" in June,¹⁵⁰ and could not get two more doctors sent up from Baghdad until August.¹⁵¹ Poor education concerning sanitation was the primary killer of civilians and Dunsterforce soldiers in the region. Many soldiers died from cholera, with the men reporting how the refugees would drink and wash their clothes in the same areas in which they would defecate and urinate.¹⁵² For example, when Canadian Captain Walter Chambers patrolled the Hamadan-Kazvin road with his 120-man Persian militia company, 32 of his men died from cholera alone.¹⁵³

The Dunsterforce, although low on virtually all supplies, was heavily documented with photographs and film. Famed American cinematographer and war photographer, Ariel Lowe Vargas, was by 1917 a captain with the British Military Intelligence Department. Although many of his pictures and films were "missing or needed further research," ¹⁵⁴ various pictures and films of the Dunsterforce during their time in Bijar, Hamadan and Baku are accredited to him in the United Kingdom's Imperial War Museum.¹⁵⁵ As such, the humanitarian work of the Dunsterforce survives in memoirs, film and photographic collections to this day.¹⁵⁶

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 264.

¹⁴⁸ Rudi Matthee, "Review: Studies in the History of Medicine in Iran by Willem Floor," *Iranian Studies* (2019): p. 183.

¹⁴⁹ MD Azizi, Jalali MD, & F. Azizi, "A History of the 1918 Spanish Influenza Pandemic and its Impact on Iran," p. 262.

¹⁵⁰ Savige, *Diary, 2 January 1918-27 January 1919*, p. 66.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., p. 117.

¹⁵² S.G. Savige, *Stalky's Forlorn Hope* (Melbourne: Alexander McCubbin Publishing, 1920), p. 78.

¹⁵³ W.W. Murray, "Canadians in Dunsterforce," p. 92.

¹⁵⁴ James W. Castellan, *American Cinematographers in the Great War, 1914-1918* (New Barnet, UK: John Libbey Publishing, 2015), pp. 210-211.

¹⁵⁵ Imperial War Museum (IWM), Q 25091. See APPENDIX D.

¹⁵⁶ Ariel L. Vargas, *Baku- The Occupation by "Dunsterforce" 17th August to 14th September 1918* (Ministry of Information & International Film Service), 22 mins 30 secs.

The Expansion of Humanitarian Efforts and The Perception of Strength

As discussed above, the Dunsterforce soldiers simply did not have the manpower or supply to tackle the breadth of the medical and famine issues in the region. Yet despite these incredible stressors, the men were still able to enact relief efforts as well as police the violence between ethnic groups in the area. For example, Canadian Sgt. McWhirter of Shoal Lake Manitoba, while patrolling the Asadabad Pass with a squad of Gurkhas, arrested the Persian headman in Butajabad. Surprisingly, the headman agreed, and although he had brought an escort of about a dozen bodyguards, was reportedly arrested without issue.¹⁵⁷ This kind of unbelievable success is tempered by more realistic stories: on another occasion and only two days out of Hamadan, McWhirter came across a Kurdish tribe raiding the Persian village of Kultapa. Although his rifle section intervened to save the civilians, the Persians suffered three casualties and lost twenty sheep to the robbers.¹⁵⁸

Although there were mixed results, these kinds of stories demonstrated the greatest asset of the Dunsterforce: The perception of strength. Although in reality they had roughly only a thousand men across some six hundred miles,¹⁵⁹ they were able to maintain the façade of being a much larger force. This unit was able to demoralize and defeat much larger groups sympathetic to the Ottoman or German cause, such as the punitive expedition against the Sinjabis near the Persian road at Qasr-i-Shirin in April, 1918.¹⁶⁰ Successes such as these inspired reconnaissance groups to be sent out in various directions to establish outposts in remote areas, even as pro-Ottoman groups refused to aid the British.¹⁶¹ According to Dunsterville, they were very diverse in their efforts:

...Major Wagstaff would tell of the Zinjan-Mianeh venture among the Shah-Savans, Major Starnes of the dealings round Bijar with the Kurdish tribes, Major Macarthy of the Persian Levies, Colonel Matthews of the fighting

<https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/1060008178>

¹⁵⁷ W.W. Murray, "Canadians in Dunsterforce," p. 95.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 380.

¹⁵⁹ W.W. Murray, "Canadians in Dunsterforce," p. 384.

¹⁶⁰ Bean, "Appendix 5: Australians in Mesopotamia," p. 740.

¹⁶¹ Cronin, "An Experiment in Military Modernization," p. 120.

round Resht, Colonel Keyworth of the Baku fighting, and Colonel Stokes of Staff work in the Revolutionary army.¹⁶²

Ironically, many of the Dunsterforce's issues regarding lack of medical aid would be solved with the spread northwestwards by connecting the force with the Lake Urmia refugees and the French hospital missions. There were significant orientation and language barriers in these regions for these soldiers. What little map information these reconnaissance patrols had available to them dated back to 1842.¹⁶³ In these northwestern regions, Turkish was spoken more than Persian,¹⁶⁴ though these soldiers had rudimentary knowledge in Persian and none at all in Turkish. For reliable information, the unit had no choice but to completely rely on local guides contracted from local villages for assistance.¹⁶⁵ Although potential security risks, guides such as Abu'l-Ḥasan Ebtehāj and his brother, Ġolām-Ḥosayn allowed for the soldiers to coordinate more effectively with the local populace in controlled areas like Hamadan and Kermanshah as well as distant locations such as Zinjian and Bijar. This relationship allowed for Dunsterforce soldiers to extract vital intelligence, such as when several captured Ottoman soldiers "down from Baku" were found wandering for months on hardly "a handful of grain a day."¹⁶⁶ These soldiers, when fed, revealed valuable information such as how convoys of Turkish rifles and ammunition were passing through the area destined for anti-British leaders like Mirza Kutchik Khan.¹⁶⁷

Many of the practices the Dunsterforce developed in Kermanshah and Hamadan were replicated in Zenjian and Bijar. When Captain Savige's reconnaissance column arrived at Bijar, they once again found a population dying "like flies" owing to famine and cholera.¹⁶⁸ Dire poverty was also rampant, for much of the local populace was traumatized by the Tsarist (now White) Russians during their Persian Campaign. Captain Savige noted how when he visited a potential local billet, their first knock "...brought a woman who squealed & then ran. The old man came after a lot of persuasion & let us in. He first of all cleared all the women & absolutely shook with fear

¹⁶² Dunsterville, *Adventures of Dunsterforce*, p. v.

¹⁶³ Bean, "Appendix 5: Australians in Mesopotamia," p. 741.

¹⁶⁴ Savige, *Diary, 2 January 1918-27 January 1919*, p. 68.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 70.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 69.

¹⁶⁷ Savige, *Diary, 2 January 1918-27 January 1919*, p. 72.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

until we gave him some cigs. He then gave us tea. Evidently the Russians gave these people a pretty bad time, for he told us that we were 'so different from the Russian Officers' and apparently felt quite safe before we left."¹⁶⁹ Further trauma was indicated by the destruction of local commerce, with the town's bazaar being partially burnt to the ground when the Russians withdrew.¹⁷⁰ This *scorched earth* practice by Russian forces was not uncommon. For example, the men of the Persian Cossack Brigade under Starosselski were often underpaid due to superior officers pocketing the funds, forcing soldiers to survive by plundering and looting the villages around their post (often with the encouragement of their commanding officers).¹⁷¹

This damage to the local population prompted Savige and the rest of his cohort to begin developing food supply networks in Bijar and Zinjian the same way they had been established in Hamadan and Kermanshah. At Bijar, Savige stated they hoped to feed at least 750 people every day, free of charge.¹⁷² Although the local government was skeptical of the intentions by Savige's column (with many members feuding with one another yet decidedly anti-British), he and the other officers ingratiated themselves with the local officials by presenting a feast with gifts:

...The Gov., Sirdarh, Com. of Police, Com of Postal Services, Com of Telegraph Service & others came along to dinner... Chaildecott made a speech outlying our policy of famine relief work, road construction & levy raising. The Gov & Sirdah responded... we hope for something as an outcome from the dinner as Starnes is finding it mighty difficult especially as the Gov & Sirdah are enemies, but tonight they promised to bury the hatchet & work with us.¹⁷³

Despite the relative success of initial negotiations and discussions, some customs of the British Commonwealth soldiers were not welcomed by the indigenous authorities. Savige, for example, adopted an orphaned girl, fed her and bought her clothes. In his journal he stated how he was almost killed by a mob for doing this:

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 74.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Homa Katouzian, "The Campaign Against the Anglo-Iranian Agreement," p. 25.

¹⁷² Savige, *Diary, 2 January 1918-27 January 1919*, p. 77.

¹⁷³ Savige, *Diary, 2 January 1918-27 January 1919*, pp. 82-84.

...Took my little lady to the Bazaar this afternoon in order to buy her some shoes... was just making out when a mob of Persians with the Commissioner of Police at their head rushed along and surrounded me... I had unwittingly committed an awful crime in taking a woman of Persia (aged 12) through the bazaar in broad daylight & bought presents for her... after a lot of arguing, he saw my motive & that I was innocent of any law or religion breaking but he would not let the kid take any of the stuff & told me how lucky I was that he happened to be walking through the Bazaar as the crowd were gathering enough men to out me. Such is life.¹⁷⁴

Minor conflicts such as these demonstrated the cultural gap between the soldiers and the locals, which only intensified as conflict became even more granular. According to the American missionaries, the local famine's effects were accelerated by how local refugee pastoralists would ignorantly feed their animals on recently planted crops and cut down fruit trees and vines for wood. The destruction of local economies in these communities heated inter-communal tensions between the local and transient populations, especially between different ethno-religious groups.¹⁷⁵ This was exemplified by the conflict surrounding Lake Urmia.

By 1918, the famine relief efforts in Urmia had been managed by Dr. Ambrose Shedd (of the West Persia Presbyterian Mission around Urmia and Tabriz) and the French hospital mission chartered by the French Colonel Chardigny, (Commander of the French Detachment of the Caucasus). When operations were at their height in July 1917, the four doctors under Dr. Paul Caujole were treating "100 Muslims, Christians or Jews every day for free" with the help of the Daughters of Charity and the Lazarist missionaries in Urmia.¹⁷⁶ Although the area had been affected by the war for years, when Tsarist Russian soldiers pulled out of the area in Winter 1918 massacres between the Kurdish, Assyrian, Turkish and Armenian populations intensified in the city. By 22 February 1918, Monseigneur Sontag and Caujole had a bounty put on their heads of 2500 Tomans (25,000 Francs), and were forced to witness "shops ransacked, corpses

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., pp. 78-79

¹⁷⁵ W.S. Vanneman, Tabriz, to Scott, New York, 16 Aug. 1915, PHS, RG 91-4-18; F.G. Coan, Urmia, to Robert Speer, New York, 11 July 1916, PHS, RG 91-5-19; Shedd, *Measure*, 205; c.f., Kasravi, *Eighteen Year History*, Chapter XII.

¹⁷⁶ Emile Gilbrin, "Le Docteur Paul Caujole: L'hôpital français d'Ourmiah (septembre 1917 - avril 1918)," *Société Française d'Histoire de la Médecine* 12, 2 (1980): p. 157 (Translated).

piled up, skulls smashed, (and) blood squirted on the walls” from the sectarian violence conducted on civilians.¹⁷⁷

Despite their efforts to protect the sick and wounded, with Dr. Caujole explicitly interfering to stop the violence, they could do little as Kurds, Turks, Arabs, Assyrians, and Armenians all fought for control of the area. This conflict came to a head when the Assyrian Patriarch Mar Schoumoun of the Assyrian Church was assassinated in an ambush by the pro-Ottoman Kurdish leader Shimko Shikak,¹⁷⁸ who previously took part in the massacres of the Assyrians at Khoi while attached to Ishan Bey’s XIII Army.¹⁷⁹ Though Dr. Caujole was able to evacuate the area and get in contact with the British via RAF Lt. K.M. Pennington (where they established mobile hospitals in Qazvin then Hamadan),¹⁸⁰ many of those who partook in the humanitarian efforts, like the Lazarists, were not so lucky. Monseigneur Jacques-Emile Sontag, the leader of the Lazarist mission, actively attempted to protect those under his care. He, along with several other French priests, were killed along with some 10,000 civilians who they attempted to protect.¹⁸¹ The remaining population under their care scattered to the roads. A local doctor from Urmia who aided the refugees related to the men of Dunsterforce how the Armenian and Jelu militia had abandoned their defensive lines in Urmia and allowed Ottoman allied groups to take Urmia. The new Assyrian Patriarch Agha Petros had nearly all the remaining troops with him to fight against this Ottoman offensive, so Dr. Shedd and his wife had no choice but to evacuate the refugees from Urmia with “the Turks & Kurds” in pursuit.¹⁸²

Although steady progress was made by the British in isolated outposts such as Bijar, upon hearing of the plight at Lake Urmia the Dunsterforce immediately dispatched Captain Savige’s unit under Colonel Wagstaff to connect with the Assyrians of Urmia under the command of Agha Petros. They were ordered to ride out with “

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 160.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 161.

¹⁷⁹ John Joseph, *The Modern Assyrians of the Middle East: Encounters with Western Christian Missions, Archaeologists, and Colonial Power* (Leiden, Netherlands: BRILL Publishing, 2000), p. 147.

¹⁸⁰ Gilbrin, Emile, “Le docteur Paul Caujole,” p. 162. See APPENDIX K of picture of a French Captain with Australian, Canadian and New Zealand Dunsterforce Officers near Bijar.

¹⁸¹ Ibid., p. 163. See APPENDIX H regarding Monseigneur Sontag.

¹⁸² Savige, *Diary, 2 January 1918-27 January 1919*, pp. 103-104.

£45,000 of gold, 100,000 rounds of ammunition & 12 Lewis guns,"¹⁸³ connect with the column of some 40,000 refugees under Dr. William Ambrose Shedd, and police the area against further violence.

Along the road, Captain Savige observed the extreme suffering of the people as well as the blatant absence of humanity. In his memoir, *Stalky's Forlorn Hope*, he noted how "the Kurds were slaughtering and scattering the refugees to the hills and were taking young girls as slaves for their harems."¹⁸⁴ However, the victims themselves were perpetrators of atrocities similarly to those persecuting them. Moreover, Savige's column bypassed various burned Persian villages which were ransacked by the disorganized group of 40,000 civilians. Savige noted that: "...The villages en-route were all destroyed by Christians & in flames... many murdered Persians, both male & female, in all these places."¹⁸⁵ Although several armed and able-bodied men presented themselves in the refugee line, the soldiers were shocked by how they would often leave the old, sick and weak on the roadside instead of placing them on horses and taking up arms in Dr. Shedd's defensive rear guard. On a few occasions, Savige and his men physically pulled men off their horses to replace them with weaker refugees, but this did not stop them from engaging in what he called "Caucasus selfishness."¹⁸⁶ When he and his men questioned Dr. Shedd about why the retreating men were not staying with the rearguard to defend the convoy, he simply replied "...they are Armenians and Syrians."¹⁸⁷

Essentially, Captain Savige and his squad were alone with their automatic weapons as they covered the refugees' retreat. They did this for days against irregular forces Ottoman-Kurdish forces, suffering only one casualty, New Zealand Captain Robert Nicol. For this action on the road between Sain Kelen and Tikkaa Tappah, several men in Savige's squad were awarded medals, with Savige himself awarded the Distinguished Service Order.¹⁸⁸ Out of approximately 80,645 people representing 13,335

¹⁸³ Ibid., p. 87.

¹⁸⁴ Savige, *Stalky's Forlorn Hope*, p. 120.

¹⁸⁵ Savige, *Diary*, 2 January 1918-27 January 1919, p. 106.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 107.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ "No. 3158," *The London Gazette (Supplement)*, 4 October 1919, p. 12234. DSO citation.

families,¹⁸⁹ tens of thousands of these civilians were either killed or died from the extreme conditions in the area. Dr. Shedd unfortunately died from dysentery, and his wife, a “proper Heroine.” helped with the Dunsterforce’s humanitarian efforts after her husband had passed.¹⁹⁰ Despite the significant humanitarian work conducted by the soldiers of the Dunsterforce, and the threat posed by enemy forces in Northwestern Iran, by the Summer of 1918 these humanitarian efforts were diminished significantly as the Dunsterforce prepared all their resources for the upcoming operations around the Caspian Sea and Baku.

Diminishment of Humanitarian Legacy and The Battle of Baku

Due to the number of people saved as well as the influence the British were able to obtain from their actions, the progress of the Dunsterforce regarding humanitarian efforts had been both steady and relatively successful. However, to Dunsterville, the primary focus had always been the Caucasus region. When June came, Dunsterville was finally rewarded with significant reinforcements: The 39th Infantry Brigade (composed of various improvised battalions from other British Units), a naval attaché for commandeering ships on the Caspian, and a few airplanes from Baghdad. This group, supplemented by his armored cars, Cossacks, and other men, enabled Dunsterville to finally have a considerable force. This was very important, for over the past few months of 1918, the German successes in France had made many Persian militia groups (who were previously hesitant to commit their forces) finally to publicly side with the German and Ottoman cause. The Jangali’s under Mirza Kuchik Khan, as previously alluded to, had been receiving arms and training from German officers and decided to advance on the British positions near Resht on 20 July. This force was quickly beaten back with over “200 Jungaliense dead” in the raid,¹⁹¹ and Dunsterville pushed his forces onwards to Enzeli after defeating more of Kuchik Khan’s forces at

¹⁸⁹ William A. Shedd, “The Syrians of Persia and Eastern Turkey,” *Bulletin of the American Geography Society*, 35, 1 (1903): p. 7.

¹⁹⁰ See APPENDIX I regarding “Famine Relief in Bijar.”

¹⁹¹ Warden, *Diary 1918-1919*, p. 24.

Menjil Bridge. There, Dunsterville took Kutchik Khan (and several German and Austrian advisors), prisoner,¹⁹² and ceasing hostilities with the Jungali's by 12 August.

This breakthrough gave Dunsterville access to the Caspian Sea, where he tried to exert complete British control. Ironically, Mirza Kutchik Khan's Jangali's became one of Dunsterville's best agents for supplies after he was defeated, with Dunsterville coordinating grain shipments (i.e. rice) from Gilan to poorly supplied regions under the Dunsterforce's control.¹⁹³ His naval attaché, Commodore Norris, requisitioned various steamships and, strapping artillery to them, made surprisingly formidable makeshift battleships. This man was an extremely effective commander given the resources he had, for a year later on 21 May 1919, out of an advance party of two officers, 23 men, one 4-inch and two 12-pounder guns,¹⁹⁴ Norris used six converted merchant vessels to attack thirty Bolshevik vessels at the Soviet Naval Base on Chechen Island. He destroyed fourteen vessels, and suffered no losses.¹⁹⁵

Dunsterville had achieved notable success by reaching the Caspian Sea, yet unfortunately he still wanted to continue pushing onwards to Baku. As of July 1918, the city was considered the final stronghold in the Caucasus not under the control of the Central Powers. By this point, the Germans had promised the Georgians protectorate status. This frustrated the Ottomans who, breaking the Treaty of Batoum, had pushed through Armenia with the Caucasus "Army of Islam" under Nuri Pasha. Dunsterville, wishing to achieve both his earlier objectives and glory, sought to take control of the political situation in Baku and secure Azerbaijan's oil reserves.¹⁹⁶ Unfortunately, Dunsterville's concentration of all his forces in Baku had made the humanitarian efforts that he had established in his bases, along with all the positive hard-won results, extremely vulnerable. Men such as Captain Savige were eventually impacted by the harsh conditions in their isolated areas. As a result, many wounded and ill soldiers would need to be evacuated to Baghdad for medical treatment.¹⁹⁷ Due to the shortage of manpower, their positions were unable to be maintained as there were few soldiers

¹⁹² Dunsterville, *Adventures of Dunsterforce*, p. 203.

¹⁹³ Bean, "Appendix 5: Australians in Mesopotamia," p. 744.

¹⁹⁴ Percy Sykes, "The British Flag on the Caspian: A Side-Show of the Great War," *Foreign Affairs* 2, 2 (15 December 1923): pp. 283-289.

¹⁹⁵ Letter from Brigadier-General Sir Percy Sykes, *The Times*, 22 July 1937.

¹⁹⁶ Savige, *Stalky's Forlorn Hope*, p. 170.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 118.

available to replace them. By isolating and withdrawing key support for the soldiers stationed outside of Hamadan, Dunsterville endangered his mission, the gains he made in Persia, and the people he originally sought to protect.

Although the Dunsterforce was only in Baku between 26 August and 15 September, the impact of the Dunsterforce was notable in the contemporary Azerbaijani consciousness. In Kurban Said's *Ali & Nino*, he wrote how the "...English occupation troops appeared from beyond the Island of Nargin. The General had blue eyes, a clipped moustache and strong broad hands. New Zealanders, Canadians and Australians flooded our town. The Union Jack fluttered over our country next to our flag..."¹⁹⁸ Despite the desire of many of the city's inhabitants to protect their city and the valuable oil reserves there, Dunsterville's gamble did not pay off. Despite having several thousand men at their disposal, most of the allied Armenian militia placed advised by the Dunsterforce had little understanding of military discipline. Many men, viewing valuable weapons such as entrenched machine guns as their personal property, would often walk off the front lines with them.¹⁹⁹ There were numerous episodes of men laughing at orders, making fun of officers, and in general showing no desire to fight. This was not helped by the chaotic political situation, where a council of Five Dictators of the Centro Caspian Dictatorship allowed every single man an opportunity to speak and share his views. Although there were Russian and Armenian commanders present in Baku, they were not the kind of men who were able to capitalize on such a chaotic situation: Russian General Dokuchayev was not used to revolutionary volunteers, and Armenian Colonel Bagratuni, though an efficient organizer, was severely wounded and largely helpless as the disorder continued to grow.²⁰⁰ Canadian Lt. Colonel Warden, fed up with the situation, wrote in his diary how the Armenians under his command "...will not fight nor defend their women folks or children (who are very pretty). They are cowards but they will get control (sic) & fleece one & all out of every cent one has, even while the Turks are drawing their knives at the door to cut their throats."²⁰¹

¹⁹⁸ Kurban Said, *Ali & Nino*, trans. Jenia Graham (London, UK., Hutchinson Publishers., 1970), p. 214.

¹⁹⁹ Warden, *Diary 1918-1919*, p. 26.

²⁰⁰ W.E.D. Allen & Paul Muratoff, "The Turkish Invasion of Transcaucasia," p. 492.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

The system demonstrated how destabilized it was when Dunsterville and his officer staff, as well as the officer staff of other military leaders in the city, met with the city assembly. The political system, run by the Five Dictators of the Centro Caspian Dictatorship from 26 July,²⁰² gave everyone a voice. This was problematic, for lower rank soldiers openly questioned generals of their orders which resulted in arguments lasting several hours with little constructive action. Dunsterville noted how he left one of these meetings at one o'clock in the morning, with the assembly still engaged in what were relatively "futile discussions."²⁰³ The city's disorganization prevented any effective defence being mounted against the Ottomans and their irregulars, and forced many of the British forces to do the bulk of the fighting. When the Ossetian Cossacks under Bicherakov left to participate in the Russian Revolution, and several battles led to the British suffering 200 casualties, Dunsterville realized the futility of his position and chose to evacuate his men from Baku. He ordered the armored cars to be smashed up on the docks and the city arsenal to be raided so it could not be used by the Ottomans at a later time. When two of the Dictators arrived at the docks and threatened to shell the British vessels leaving the city with soldiers and refugees, he replied "I hope not."

Dunsterville blamed most of his problems on General Marshall of the Mesopotamia Front and the War Office for not giving him prior support. Although he claimed the British venture into the Caucasus cost them nothing, in reality, the lengths Dunsterville went to in order to facilitate the actions at Baku had cost Dunsterville his job and his reputation.²⁰⁴ After the men and refugees safely reached Enzeli from Baku, Dunsterville received word that his force was disbanded. The Dunsterforce officially dissolved in September 1918, with the elements absorbed into other military units.

Conclusion

Dunsterforce's original mission of arriving in the Caucasus to develop militias can be considered a complete failure, a fact previously foreseen by the War Office in April 1918. The resulting Fall of Baku to combined Ottoman-Azerbaijani forces on 15

²⁰² They were elected when the 26 Commissars of Stepan Shaumian were outvoted in the Baku Soviet (259 to 238).

²⁰³ Dunsterville, *Adventures of Dunsterforce*, p. 278.

²⁰⁴ Winegard, *The First World Oil War*, p. 208.

September 1918 not only ended the British involvement in Transcaucasia during the First World War, but also resulted in the death of thousands of Armenian civilians in the “September Days” of Baku.²⁰⁵ After the British departure, the Azeri Turkish irregulars and the local Muslims plundered the Christian quarters of the city and killed thousands of Armenians, some 15,000 of all sexes in retaliation for the Moslems in March. It was not until a day later on 16 September that regular Ottoman troops entered the city to stop the bloodshed.²⁰⁶

Ironically, hardly a month after they had *won* the Battle of Baku, the Ottomans surrendered Baku in Treaty of Mudros in October 1918. As for Dunsterville himself, he returned to his original post in India before retiring from the military in 1920. For the remaining men of Dunsterforce, very few stayed in Persia. Some were absorbed into other irregular elements like the North Persian Rifles (Norperforce), but most veterans of this mission elected to re-enlist with their old units in France. Despite the fearsome reputation of the Western Front, most preferred the trenches to the famine-ridden towns of Persia. Others would go off to fight the Soviets in Siberia. Very few stayed behind to aid those who were suffering, but those who did stay participated with irregular Assyrian Contingents or were stationed in Kurdistan until the Armistice of November 1918. Although this was a military mission, the only concrete success achieved was, aside from a British military presence in Persia, the humanitarian relief it provided the civilians there. Although the best this force could do militarily was to delay the Ottomans from acquiring Baku’s oil for six weeks, they also succeeded in saving tens of thousands of refugees from starvation and sectarian violence. “The refugees were cared for by the British authorities: rationed and encamped in various localities, the strong men being formed into levies and labour corps and the others, together with the women and the cattle, settled in an encampment in Mesopotamia. They are now (as of 1920) being repatriated.”²⁰⁷ Evidently, the efforts of the Dunsterforce had not gone unnoticed, with even Randall Davidson, the Archbishop of Canterbury, being interested in the well-being of the people under their care.²⁰⁸

²⁰⁵ Arslanian, “Dunsterville’s Adventures: A Reappraisal,” p. 199.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 212.

²⁰⁷ Dunsterville, *Adventures of Dunsterforce*, p. 183.

²⁰⁸ Bean, “Appendix 5: Australians in Mesopotamia,” p. 754.

For many of the Dunsterforce soldiers, the objective had morphed from training soldiers to keeping civilians alive regardless of ethnicity or religion, resulting in what this paper has termed “accidental humanitarianism.” Whether soldier or officer, the men were personally transformed by this shift in focus. Captain Savige noted in *Stalky’s Forlorn Hope* that he threatened to kill a man for hoarding meal tickets.²⁰⁹ Colonel Warden, in his personal journal “despised the character” of Armenians who left their women and children behind.²¹⁰ What was once a military objective became a mission of moral action, though it was often characterized by morally grey scenarios for the men of the Dunsterforce. For example, of the 40,000 or so refugees shepherded to Hamadan from Urmia, roughly 6,000 military-aged males were pressganged into “Assyrian Contingents” with the aid of Agha Petros. This was in order to both have manpower in case of a possible push by Ottoman forces into Persia, but also to ensure that the refugees would not kill civilians as in Captain Savige’s accounts. In light of what had previously happened on the road from Urmia, this forced conscription was not optional. Lt. Colonel McCarthy, who was in charge of his “Macarthy’s Irregulars” along with Agha Petros, ordered soldiers to round up military-aged males, who often had to forcefully separate them from their families at bayonet point.²¹¹ If they were to get “out of line,” he declared that he would stop any resistance “even if I have to use machine guns to do it.”

Dunsterville’s unfortunate decision to focus on Baku rather than reconsolidating his forces in Iran on the Caspian Sea may have resulted in his men being driven out of Qajar Persia if the Armistice of Mudros had not been signed at the end of October. In July and August 1918, Colonel Wagstaff reported a push coming north from the Ottomans via Tabriz (as mentioned earlier by the XIII Army Corps),²¹² which due to Dunsterville’s push to Baku threatened the entire British position in Persia. Fortunately, the push was isolated to a few skirmishes rather than a full offensive, with the 11th Caucasian Division of the Army of Islam being “astonishingly passive” despite the very minimal British presence in the area.²¹³ These actions demonstrate how Dunsterville’s

²⁰⁹ Savige, *Stalky’s Forlorn Hope*, p. 112.

²¹⁰ Warden, *Diary 1918-1919*, p. 85.

²¹¹ Bean, “Appendix 5: Australians in Mesopotamia,” p. 753.

²¹² Homa Katouzian, “The Campaign Against the Anglo-Iranian Agreement,” p. 37.

²¹³ W.E.D. Allen and Paul Muratoff, “The Turkish Invasion of Transcaucasia,” p. 496.

ego had placed his entire operation in jeopardy in order to interrupt the Turkish access to Baku oil. Even though oil was an important resource, the fact that Dunsterville was willing to sacrifice what his men had already accomplished in this delicate and complex theatre of war demonstrated his unrealistic priorities as an officer while simultaneously highlighting the calibre of the soldiers under his command. Though the Dunsterforce itself was disbanded in September 1918, the North Persia Force under General W.M. Thomson eventually took over the projects, infrastructure and manpower Dunsterville established.

Despite the Dunsterforce being a brief and unique episode in First World War historiography, the operation characterizes how the conflict affected neutral countries and created casualties outside of combat. The spread of disease, famine and war during this era of Qajar history are all strong memories within the inter-generational consciousness and memories of Iranian people today. Despite coming across their role unintentionally, the accidental humanitarians of Dunsterforce aided in the saving of tens of thousands of starving and disenfranchised people who had little aid from other governing or political forces. Though it may have been due to questionable wartime decisions, these soldiers provided hope to many when none existed, resulting in a silver lining for those affected in Persia during the First World War.

APPENDIX A-I: Timeline of Related Events in the Region & WW1, 1914-1918

- | | | |
|------|----------|---|
| 1915 | October | • Mirza Kuchik Khan forms Jangali Constitutionalist Movement in Gilan Province (effectively breaking away from direct Qajar Persia's rule). |
| 1917 | March | • Mountainous Republic of the Northern Caucasus' (MRNC, or the Republic of the Mountaineers) formed. Composed of the unification of Chechens, Circassians, Ingush, Ossetians, and Dagestanis. (6 March 1917. Officially independent 11 May 1918. Lasts until 1922). |
| | November | • October Revolution (7 November 1917. 25 October O.S.) Lenin & Bolsheviks assume complete control over new Soviet Russian state. Establishment of the independent Transcaucasian Commissariat (11 November 1917). |

-
- Battle of Passchendaele ends on the Western Front (10 November 1917).
- December
- British Capture of Jerusalem from Ottoman Forces (9 December 1917).
 - Russia Signs Armistice with Germany, (15 December 1917).
 - Transcaucasian Commissariat signs Armistice of Erzincan with the Ottomans. Fighting would not resume until 12 February 1918 (18 December 1917).
- 1918
- January
- Shamkor Massacre. Death of hundreds of Russian soldiers on a train in the Caucasus' by Azerbaijani Paramilitary groups.
- February
- Ottomans invade Commissariat. Germans capture Minsk, Zhytomyr, Tallinn, Pskov, and Kiev from the Soviets.
- March
- Treaty of Brest-Litovsk signed between the Central Powers & the Soviet Government (3 March 1918).
 - March Days, Azerbaijan (Massacres), 30 March - 2 April.
 - Spring Offensive, 21 March – 5 April.
- April
- Establishment of the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic (TDFR)... (22 April 1918).
 - Establishment of the Communist Baku Commune of Stepan Shaumian and the 26 Commissars (13 April - 25 July).
- May
- The Peace Conference was opened at Batoum between the Ottomans & the independent republics of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan. The MRNC (Northern Caucasus') was officially proclaimed independent. (11 May 1918). Due to stalls in talks, Armenia is invaded by the Ottomans (21 May 1918)
 - Battle of Sararapat (21 May - 29 May). Armenian Victory
 - Battle of Kara Killisse (24 May – 28 May). Armenian Victory
 - Battle of Bash Abaran (21 May – 24 May). Armenian Victory
 - Official dissolution of the TDFR (28 May 1918)
- June
- Treaty of Batum signed between the Ottoman Empire and the newly independent Republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.
 - Ottomans re-enter Tabriz, (8 June).

- Action of Arsuf (8 June).
 - Ottomans occupy Dilman, Khou and Urmia (15 – 30 June) .
 - Germany attempts to interfere in the Caucasus'. Pledge protectorate status to Georgia
- July
- Tsar Nicholas II and family are executed.
 - Aisne /Marne Offensive on the Western Front (18 July – 6 August).
 - Establishment of the Centro-Caspian Dictatorship.
- August
- Battle of Baku (26 August – 14 September).
- September
- September Days Massacre, Baku.
 - Battle of Megiddo (19 - 25 September)... British Conquer Palestine.
 - British Enter Damascus (26 September – 1 October).
- October
- Battle of Sharqat, (23 - 30 October)
 - Battle of Aleppo (25 October)

APPENDIX A-II: Dunsterforce Timeline, December 1917 to September 1918

- | | | |
|------|----------|--|
| 1917 | December | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dunsterville notified of his mission to the Caucasus' by the British War Office (Late December, 1917). |
| 1918 | January | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establishment and assembling of the Dunsterforce's "Hush Hush" Army from Officers & NCO's from the Western Front; would not cast off until late January. They would not arrive to Mesopotamia until early March 1918. • Dunsterville arrived in Iraq, assembled his armored convoy, and set out for Persia. |
| | February | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dunsterville travelled through Persia with motor convoy. Turned back and established main base at Hamadan. • Met Tsarist Russians (contracting the Cossack force of Lazar Bicherakov). • Purchase of equipment from Tsarist General Nikolai Baratov. • Met with the American missionary families • Established contact with Baku Soviet under Stepan Shaumian and leader of the Jangali's of Gilan, Mirza Kuchik Khan. |
| | March | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dunsterville retreated from Enzeli to Hamadan. • Change of orders for Dunsterforce to reconsolidate in Persia. • Hush-Hush Army arrived in Iraq. Began training and began plans to march out to Hamadan. • Establishment of the first relief stations at Hamadan & initial development of indigenous militias. |
| | April | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establishment of steady food supplies from Mesopotamia to Kermanshah and Hamadan. • Flooding of grain market to break up local grain cartels. • Punitive expedition against the Sinjabis on the Persian road at Qasr-i-Shirin. |
| | May | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bulk of Hush Hush Army arrived at Hamadan. • Further development of road projects and famine relief. • Local government crackdown. After arresting several pro-Ottoman officials, the British were now in complete control of Hamadan. |

- | | |
|-----------|--|
| June | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Column of expeditions out to Zinjian & Bija.• Defeat of Mirza Kuchik Khan's forces at Resht and Menjil Bridge. |
| July | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Dunsterforce involvement at the Urmia Crisis. Engagements as far northwest as Takan Tepe. 40,000 refugees shepherded to Dunsterforce camps, then on towards the Baqubah concentration camp.• Ottoman regular forces arrived at Urmia• The 26 Commissars of Baku are removed from power.• Landing of Bicherakov's forces at Alyat near Baku. |
| August | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Cessation of hostilities with the Jangalis and opening up of trade.• Battle of Baku.• Death of American Missionary Dr. Shedd.• Ottoman "advance" from Tabriz, fighting on the Tabriz-Kasvin road. |
| September | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Battle of Baku (26 August - 14 September)• Evacuation of the force from the city• Official disbandment of the Dunsterforce at Enzeli• Continued shepherding of refugees to Baqubah camp. Establishment of the Assyrian Contingents.• Assimilation of elements of Dunsterforce into the Norperforce under General Thomson. |

APPENDIX B: Known Members of Dunsterforce's "Hush Hush Army"

Australians (AIF)

1. HITCHCOCK, Allan Pither (Captain)
2. CARSON, William Edwin (Sgt)
3. LAY, Percy (Capt)
4. FRASER, William Arthur (Captian)
5. DOHERTY Charles (Sgt)
6. KERR, Leo Arthur (Sgt)

7. LEHMANN, Cecil Oliver (Sgt).
8. CAMERON Ewen Colclough Beauchamp (Captain)
9. CARNEGIE Robert Miller (Sgt)
10. BARNETT John (Sgt).
11. ASHMORE Lewis Walter (Sgt)
12. DAVIS Wilfred (Sgt)... died of Cholera buried Hamadan Military Cemetery Iraq
13. LORD Francis William (Captain)
14. BULLEN Arthur Littleton (Sgt).
15. DEERY John (Sgt)
16. BELL Percy Robert (Sgt)
17. ABOTOMEY Walter (Sgt)... died TB buried West Terrace Cemetery Adelaide
18. BATTESE Victor (Sgt)
19. HOOPER Richard Henry (Captain)
20. ARTHUR George (Sgt)
21. JUDGE Cecil Guildford Kimmorley (Captain)
22. LATCHFORD Ernest (Captain)
23. McGORM Alexander Harold (Sgt).
24. McIVER William Francis (Sgt).
25. McKANE Joseph (Pte).
26. McVILLY Cecil Leventhorpe (Captain)
27. MILLER William Hamblett (Sgt)
28. MILLS Clarence Frank (Captain)
29. MURPHY Bernard Francis (Sgt).
30. O'BRIEN John Murdoch (Sgt).
31. OLSON Charles (Sgt.)... died malaria at Military Hosp Hamadan buried Hamadan War Cemetery Iraq
32. PARKER George (Sgt)... died as the result of a gun accident suicide buried Strathalbyn Cemetery SA
33. SAVIGE Stanley George (Captain) ... author "Stalky's Forlorn Hope"
34. SCHULTZ William (Sgt).
35. SCOTT-OLSEN Eric George (Sgt.)
36. SEARY Earle Norbury (Captain)
37. SHOLL Guy Trevarton (Major)... Part of Cdr O. Locker-Lampsons RNAS Armoured Cars in Armenia, Roumania and Persia.
38. SMITH Henry John (Sgt)
39. SORRELL John Harold Ashley (Captain)
40. STACKELBERG Frederick Molmer (Captain)
41. STEWART Robert Joseph (Captain)
42. SUTOR Harold Bruce (Major)
43. TAIT Thomas (Sgt).
44. TURNER Oswald William (Capt)
45. WALLACE Colin Thomas (Sgt)

46. WHALLEY Charles (Sgt)... died at Darlington NSW
47. WILLIAMS Francis Edgar (Captain)
 - a. Born Feb. 9th, 1893, Died May 12th, 1943, Owen Stanley Range Papua. Became a Government Anthropologist
48. WITHERS Roy Barrett (Captain)

New Zealanders

1. AGNEW, George (Sergeant, 10748)
2. BARRELL, Raymond Mark (Sergeant, 11/971)
3. BATHGATE, Charles McLelland (Captain, 22520)
4. BLYTH, Andrew Jackson (Sergeant 12/303), Died of disease
5. BROPHY, Frank (Sergeant, 12/3949)
6. BROWN, Joseph (Sergeant, 12/1162)
7. CLARKE, Robert Boyce (Sergeant, 20098)
8. DUNCAN, Gordon (Sergeant, 9/1415)
9. GRANT, James (Sergeant, 9/144)
10. HAY, Arthur Cyril Purves (Captain, 10721)
11. KINGSCOTE, Geoffrey Ernest Fitzhardinge (Captain, 12336)
12. MIDLEEDEN, Robert Gordon (Sergeant, 8/66)
13. MACKENZIE, Alister (Sergeant, 10858)
14. MISSEN, John Henry (Sergeant, 8/3359)
15. NICOL, Robert Kenneth (Captain, 10/2499MC), Killed in Action
16. NIMMO, Alexander (Sergeant, 34906) DCM
17. O'CONNOR, William (Sergeant, 32373)
18. RUTHERFORD, Thomas Wyrille Leonard (Captain, 6/718) MC, Died of disease
19. RYBURN, William Morton (Sergeant, 24058)
20. SCOULAR, Spencer Gray (Captain, 25/9) MID (2)
21. SEDDON, Samuel Thomas (Captain, 13/455)
22. MCSMITH, Thomas Bruce (Sergeant, 15983)
23. STARNES, Frederick (Major, 6/359) DSO, OBE
24. MIDSTRAWBRIDGE, Herbert Alfred (Sergeant, 6/3172)
25. SWINBANKS, John Henry (Sergeant, 23/1837)
26. TOLLAN, Henry George (Sergeant, 33158)
27. TRACY, William Francis (Captain, 8/496), MC
28. MIDTURNBULL, Owen Percy (Sergeant, 41050)
29. WELD, John Edward (Sergeant, 10134), Died of disease
30. WELLS, Edwin Royden (Captain, 9/1381)
31. MCWILKINS, Alfred Napoleon (Sergeant, 54627)

Canadians


1. BEDAT Leon, Sergeant, 207973
2. BROPHY, William Thomas, Sergeant, 642141
3. BURBIDGE, Geoffrey C., Captain
4. CAMPBELL, Clifford George, Sergeant, 54027 (54007)
5. CASEY, Roy, Sergeant, 75341
6. CHAMBERS, Walter, Captain
7. CLARK, Robert, Sergeant, 5068
8. CUMMMINGS, Wilfred Elmer, Sergeant, 5175
9. ESTABROOKS, Raymond, Sergeant, 69257
10. FISHER, J.M., Captain
11. GATTEY, Alfred Prat, Sergeant, 922428
 - a. Rancher, Crossbar Ranch Alberta (1910)
12. GILMOUR, Adam Harrison, Captain
13. HAMILTON, Samuel, Sergeant, 79130
14. HARRISON, Robert, Captain
 - a. Professional player for Northampton Saints Rugby (1910s)
15. HODGSON, Thomas, Captain
16. HOPKINS, Gordon Scott, Captain
17. JACKMAN, William Tooley, Sergeant, 210619
18. LAWRENCE, John, Sergeant, 187362
19. LEEDS, John, Sergeant, 439749
20. LEWIS, Cecil John, Captain
21. LONGHURST, Frank, Sergeant, 198310
22. MAHAR, Ambrose James, Sergeant, A44193
23. McCUE, William Donaldson, Sergeant, 28649
24. MacDONALD, Donald John, Sergeant, 435026
25. McLEAN, J.H., Captain
26. McWHIRTER, David Ferguson, Sergeant, 907032
27. MURDOCK (MURDOCH?), William John, Sergeant, 477622
28. MURRAY, James ("Jimmmy"), Sergeant, 117035
29. MURRAY, Peter S., Captain
30. NEWCOMBE, Harold Kenzie, Major
31. PARSONS, Frederick Carey, Sergeant, 311931
32. PEGG, Thomas Henry, Sergeant, 107475
33. PETRIE, William L., Captain
34. RAMSEY, Alex Miller, Sergeant, 102194
35. RIDGEWAY, Tom, Sergeant, 219
36. ROBERTS, Guy Burland, Captain
37. SWANWICK, Alfred, Sergeant, 414761
38. TREVOR, William Edward, Sergeant, 791221

39. VANDEN BERG, John William Henry (Gerritt Hopman), major
40. WARDEN, John Weightman, lieutenant-colonel
41. WEIDMARK, Lorne Festus, sergeant, 132824


South Africans

1. BOUSTEAD, J.E.H., Captain
2. BROWNE, C.M., T/Maj
3. BYRON, J.J.
4. McCARTHY, J.J., Captain. "McCarthy's Irregulars"
5. GWATKIN, R.D.S., T/Captain.
6. HEYDENRYCH, L.R., Lieutenant (Navy)
7. KINKAID, S.M., Flight Lieutenant
8. LUNN, W.S., Captain

APPENDIX C: Contemporary Ottoman Population Statistics, c. 1890 & 1914



Documents. 2021. "Documents |." Turks and Armenians - Turkish-Armenian Relations throughout History | a Project by Marmara University, 2021. <https://turksandarmanians.marmara.edu.tr/en/gallery/documents/>.



Source: Osmanlı Nüfus Sayımları ve Ermeniler. 2014. "Osmanlı Nüfus Sayımları ve Ermeniler I." Türkler ve Ermeniler - Tarih Boyunca Türk-Ermeni İlişkileri | Marmara Üniversitesi Projesi. 2014. <https://turksandarmenians.marmara.edu.tr/tr/osmanli-nufus-sayimlari-ve-ermeniler/>

Table 1. Number of Deported Armenians

Names of Provinces and Provincial Subdivisions	Population Transferred
Province of Ankara	47,224
Province of Erzurum	128,657
Province of Adana	46,031
Province of Bitlis	109,521
Province of Aleppo	34,451
Province of Bursa ^a	66,413
Province of Diyarbakır	61,002
Province of Sivas	141,592
Province of Trabzon	34,500
Province of Elazığ ^b	74,206
Provincial Subdivision of İzmit	54,370
Provincial Subdivision of Samsun ^c	26,374
Provincial Subdivision of Balıkesir	8,290
Provincial Subdivision of Karahisar	7,327
Provincial Subdivision of Kayseri	47,617
Provincial Subdivision of Maraş	27,101
Provincial Subdivision of Niğde	5,101
Province of Konya	4,381
Total Sum	924,158

Source: Murat Bardakçı, Talat Paşa'nın Evrak-i Metrukesi: Sadrazam Talat Paşa'nın özel arşivinde bulunan Ermeni tehciri konusundaki belgeler ve hususi yazışmalar [The Abandoned Documents of Talat Pasha: The Records and Private Correspondence on the Armenian Deportation Found in the Private Archive of Vizier Talat Pasha] (Istanbul: Everest Publications, 2008).

APPENDIX D: Road Work by Ariel Varges (IWM)



Building the New Road Across Kerind Valley. Ariel Varges. (IWM, UK)

<https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205091233>

APPENDIX E: Ahmet Izzet Pasha & The XIII Corps with German Advisors. Hamadan, Persia (1915-1916)



Oberst Ali Ichsan Bey, der Kommandierende
des 13. Ott. A.-K. in Hamadan, Persien



Izzet Pascha, der türkische Oberstkommandierende an der Kaukasusfront
Phot. Kriegs-Pressquartier

APPENDIX F: Lazar F. Bicherakov (Peace Time)



APPENDIX G: Extreme Weather on the Asadabad Pass with bogged down “Duncars”
(NAM. 1983-12-71-73 & NAM. 1983-12-71-76)




APPENDIX H: Lazarist Monseigneur Jacque-Emile Sontag



APPENDIX I: Famine Relief in Bijar



APPENDIX J: Gordon Scott Hopkins & Journal, Baku (Gibson, BC Archives. #A921)



APPENDIX K: Dunsterforce Officers In Bijar (Left to Right: Major Fred Starnes, Captain S.T. Seddon, M. Gasfield (attached to Paul Caujole's French Hospital Mission), Lt. R.H. Hooper, Major Chaldecott, & Captain J.M. Fisher, #J01273)



AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL

J01273


APPENDIX L: Agha Petros (Portrait & Picture Of Military Command Near Urmia)



GÉNÉRAL AGHA PETROS,
*Grand Comte, St. Greg, magni, Légion d'Honneur, Croix de Guerre, etc.,
Commandant en Chef des Troupes Assyro-Chaldéennes;
Président du Comité Exécutif National.*



APPENDIX M: Commodore Norris & General Dunsterville on the Deck of the Kruger on the Caspian Sea (AWM, #H12236)




AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL

H1 2236

APPENDIX N: Baqubah Camp, 1919



APPENDIX O: Stead Family at Kermanshah with No.9 Wireless Wagon. AWM #P00562.125



Kermanshah, Mesopotamia. 1918-05. Australian relief members of No. 9 (New Zealand) Station, 1st Wireless Signal Squadron, Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force, being entertained at afternoon tea in her garden by American medical missionary, Doctor Blanche Stead. She is serving the tea and food on a cloth on the ground while the soldiers sit nearby. Oval insert in the photograph is a head and shoulders

portrait of Mrs. Stead, who with her husband, Reverend F. M. Stead, had been a missionary at Kermanshah since 1902. (Donor E. Keast Burke) <https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/P00562.125>

APPENDIX P: Mirza Kutchik Khan, Leader of the Jangali's of Gilan. c. 1915 & 1920



APPENDIX Q: Armenian Generals, Prince Jaques Bagratuni & Andranik Ozanian, c. 1910s



APPENDIX R: Baghdad, April 1918. Group Portrait(s) of Officers & NCO's of the 5th Party of the Dunsterforce. Capt. C. McVilly, MC, Collection. AWM #A01577 & AWM #A01578.



AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL

A01577



AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL

A01578

Bibliography

- General Staff, War Office. "Memorandum Regarding the [British] Support to the Armenians." April 1918, F. O. 371/3284.
- Akçam, Taner. *A Shameful Act: The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility*. New York, NY: Metropolitan Books, Holt, 2007.
- Allen W.E.D. and Paul Muratoff. *Caucasian Battlefields: A History of the Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border, 1828-1921*. Nashville, Tennessee: The Battery Press, pp. 457-496.
- Arslanian, Artin H., "Dunsterville's Adventures: A Reappraisal." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 12, 2 (September 1980): p. 202.
- Austin, H. H. *The Baqubah Refugee Camp: An Account of Work on Behalf of the Persecuted Assyrian Christians*. Piscataway, New Jersey. Georgias Press, 2006.
- Avery, Peter. *Nations of the Modern World: Modern Iran*. London, UK: Ernest Benn Limited Publishing, 1965.
- Bean, C.E.W. "Appendix 5: Australians in Mesopotamia." *The A. I. F. in France: December 1917 – May 1918*. Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918. V (8th, Ed.) Sydney, NSW: Angus & Robinson Publishing, 1937.
- Benedict, Michael. *Canada at War: From the Archives of MacLean's*. Toronto, Ontario: Viking Publishers, 1997.
- Burke, Keast. *With Horse and Morse in Mesopotamia: The Stories of the Anzacs in Asia*. Sydney, NSW: Arthur McQuitty & Co., 1927.
- Castellan, James W. *American Cinematographers in the Great War, 1914-1918*. New Barnet, England. John Libbey Publishing, 2015.
- Cronin, Stephanie. "An Experiment in Military Modernization: Constitutionalism, Political Reform and the Iranian Gendarmerie, 1910-1921." *Middle Eastern Studies* 32, No. 3 (July 1996): pp. 106-138.
- Cronin, Stephanie. *The Army and Creation of the Pahlavi State in Iran, 1921-1926*. London: I.B.Tauris, 2007.
- de Nogales, Rafael. *Four Years Beneath the Crescent*. London, UK: Taderon Press, 2003.
- Dromi, Shai. *Above the Fray: The Red Cross and the Making of the Humanitarian NGO Sector*. Chicago, USA: University of Chicago Press, 2020.
- Dunsterville, Lionel C. *Adventures of Dunsterforce*. London, UK: Edward Arnold Press, 1920.
- Dunsterville, Lionel C. *Stalky's Reminiscences*. London, UK: J. Cape Publishers, 1928.

- Ebrahimnejad, Hormoz. *Medicine in Iran: Profession, Practice and Politics, 1800-1925*. New York City, New York: Springer Press, 2013.
- Erickson, Edward J. *Ordered to Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001.
- Floor, Willem. "The Creation of the Food Administration in Iran." *Studies on the Economic and Social History of Iran in the Nineteenth Century* 16, 3-4 (Summer-Autumn 1983).
- Gilbrin, Emile. "Le Docteur Paul Caujole: L'hôpital français d'Ourmiah (septembre 1917 - avril 1918)." *Société Française d'Histoire de la Médecine* 12, 2 (1980).
- Hutchinson, John F. *Champions of Charity. War and the Rise of the Red Cross*. Boulder Colorado: Westview Press, 1996.
- Joseph, John. *The Modern Assyrians of the Middle East: Encounters with Western Christian Missions, Archaeologists, and Colonial Power*. Leiden, Netherlands: BRILL Publishing, 2000.
- Katouzian, Homa. "The Campaign against the Anglo-Iranian Agreement of 1919." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 25, 1 (May 1998): pp. 5-46.
- Keddie, Nikki R., Richard Yann. *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*. London, UK: Yale University Press, 2006.
- Kelly, Sean. "How Far West?: Lord Curzon's Transcaucasian (Mis)Adventure and the Defence of British India, 1918-1923." *The International History Review* 35, 2 (April 2013): pp. 274-293.
- Kévorkian, Raymond H. *Le génocide des Arméniens* (Translated). Paris: Jacob Press, 2006.
- Kinzer, Stephen. *All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror*. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons Publishing, 2003.
- LAC RG24, Vol. 1840, File GAQ 10-28: The Dunsterforce (Baghdad Mission). Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force, 1918.
- Los Angeles Herald*, 26 December 1911.
- Letter from Brigadier-General Sir Percy Sykes, *The Times*, 22 July 1937.
- Mackey, Sandra. *The Iranians: Persia, Islam and the Soul of a Nation*. New York: Dutton, 1996.
- Majd, Mohammed Ghola. *The Great Famine and Genocide in Persia, 1917-1919*. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 2003.
- Martin, Vanessa and Nouraei, Marteza. "Foreign Land Holdings in Iran 1828 to 1911." *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 21, 2 (April 2011): pp. 131-145.
- Moberly, F.J. *The Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914-1918*. London UK: H.M. Stationary Office, 1923.

- Mohammad Hossein Azizi, MD, Ghanbar Ali Raees Jalali MD, and Farzaneh Azizi. "A History of the 1918 Spanish Influenza Pandemic and its Impact on Iran." *History of Contemporary Medicine in Iran* 13, 3 (May 2010).
- Morgenthau, Henry. *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story: A Personal Account of The Armenian Genocide*. New York City, New York: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1918.
- Murray, W.W. "Canadians in Dunsterforce." *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, 1931.
- Nicholson, G.W.L. *Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919: Official History of the Canadian Army in the First World War*. Ottawa: Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1962.
- "No. 29119." *The London Gazette*, 6 April 1915.
- "No. 3158." *The London Gazette (Supplement)*, 4 October 1919, p. 12234. DSO citation.
- Rosenthal, Lynne M. "Boy Society in Rudyard Kipling's *Stalky & Co.*" *The Lion and the Unicorn* 2, No. 2 (1978).
- Said, Kurban. *Ali & Nino*. Translated by Jenia Graham. London, UK: Hutchinson Publishers, 1970.
- Savige, S.G. *Stalky's Forlorn Hope*. Melbourne, Victoria: Alexander McCubbin Publishing, 1920.
- Savige, S.G. *Diary, 2 January 1918-27 January 1919*. Diary. Series MLMSS 3036/Item 1, Mitchell Library, State Library of New South Wales.
- Shedd., Mary Lewis. *The Measure of a Man: William A. Shedd of Persia, A Biography*. New York: George H. Doran Company, 1922.
- Shedd., William A., "The Syrians of Persia and Eastern Turkey." *Bulletin of the American Geography Society* 35, 1 (1903): pp. 1-7.
- Shuster, William Morgan. *The Strangling of Persia; a Record of European Diplomacy and Oriental Intrigue*. London, UK: T.F. Unwin Publishing, 1912.
- Sykes, Percy. "The British Flag on the Caspian: A Side-Show of the Great War." *Foreign Affairs* 2, 2 (15 December 1923): pp. 282-294.
- Travis, Hannibal. "Native Christians Massacred: The Ottoman Genocide of the Assyrians During World War I." *Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal* 1, 3 (2006): pp. 327-371.
- Varges, Ariel L. Director. *Baku- The Occupation by "Dunsterforce" 17th August to 14th September 1918*. Ministry of Information & International Film Service, 22 mins 30 secs. <https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/1060008178>

Watenpaugh, Keith David. "The League of Nations' Rescue of Armenian Genocide Survivors and the Making of Modern Humanitarianism, 1920-1927." *The American Historical Review* 115, 5 (December 2010): pp. 1315-1339.

Warden, J.W. *The Diary of Lieutenant Colonel John Weightman Warden*, MG30 E192 LT. Col J.W. Warden File, Diary 1918-1919, Public Archives of Canada.

Winegard, Timothy C. *The First World Oil War*. Toronto, Ontario: University of Toronto Press, 2016.

Winegard, Timothy C. "Dunsterforce: A Case Study of Coalition Warfare in the Middle East, 1918-1919." *Canadian Army Journal* 8, 3 (Fall 2005): pp. 93-109.

W.S. Vanneman, Tabriz, to Scott, New York, 16 August 1915, PHS, RG 91-4-18; F.G. Coan, Urmia, to Robert Speer, New York, 11 July 1916, PHS, RG 91-5-19; Shedd, Measure, 205; c.f., Kasravi, Eighteen Year History, chapter XII.