Conceptual Relativity and Understanding

Abstract

It is a commonplace observation that our ordinary language provides the resources for a variety of true descriptions of any object, event, or state of affairs. There is no fundamental object - language whereby objects, events, or states of affairs can be described with non - contextually determinate "objectivity": whatsoever descriptions are offered in any context are judged by criteria of contextual appropriateness rather than by some putatively non - contextual or omni - contextual "objectivity". Our having access to such a varied range of descriptions with respect to any object, event, or state of affairs, is a mark of the extent to which we have mastered the intelligent use of our natural language. It is also a reflection (in some way I do not propose to analyse) of our conceptual capacities - the intellectual flexibility we have acquired in exploring the resources of our language, and the skills we have developed in coming to adopt different conceptual perspectives with respect to the "same" objects, events, or states of affairs. By "same" I do not wish to suggest, contrary to my thesis, that there is an objective of reality of which we have direct knowledge independently of our conceptualisations.