Values and the Ideal of Objectivity

Abstract

This paper starts with the acknowledgement that the making of value judgements is unavoidable in the teaching of traditional disciplines. The expression "The Ideal of Objectivity" is introduced in general terms for the requirement that in some respects the making and expressing of value judgements in education ought to be limited. An effort is then made out to set this ideal in the context of a general commitment to rationality. The relation between values and rationality is explored in terms of a moral obligation to be rational -- moral phenomena are shown to be essentially related to rationality. Objectivity and rationality are then presented as involving methodological norms. Finally, it is argued that the principal way in which values may enter legitimately into the teaching of u-aditiona1 disciplines is in terms of methodological norms rather than in terms of particular substantive value judgements, and that the teaching of such norms is in fact central to the teaching of a discipline.