Manifestations of the Egyptian Army’s Actions in the US Army’s 1976 Edition of FM 100-5 Operations

Abstract

Many studies emphasize the contributions of the lessons gleaned from the IDF actions in the Yom Kippur War in shaping the 1976 edition. This paper adds another aspect to these claims. The 1976 edition clearly reveals that the doctrine sanctified defense over offense and firepower over maneuvering. This was not how the IDF operated; even in strategic-level defensive battles (especially in the Golan Heights); it adhered to tactical and micro-tactical offenses. Furthermore, on October 8 the IDF set out on two multi-divisionary counterattacks, the first of which (Sinai) failed while the second (Golan Heights) succeeded. With this in mind, this paper will claim that it was in fact the Egyptian model that set a better example from which to learn and implement in the Central European arena. The analysis of the Egyptian model in contrast with the characteristics of the 1976 edition will stand at the core of this paper. In other words, we shall analyze how the Egyptian war plans (up to October 14) execution had manifested in American doctrine.