Airpower in the Battle of the Bulge: A Case for Effects-Based Operations?

Authors

  • Harold R. Winton School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Air University

Abstract

This article assesses the efficacy of Effects-Based Operation by examining the Battle of the Bulge by relating the course and consequences of that campaign to an ongoing doctrinal debate in the American armed forces over a concept known as EBO to determine the extent to which the evidence of using airpower in the Bulge confirms, qualifies, or refutes the tenets of EBO.

Author Biography

  • Harold R. Winton, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Air University

    Harold R. Winton is a professor of military history and theory at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Air University. Among his many publications are To Change an Army: General Sir John Burnett-Stuart and British Military Reform, 1927–1938 (1988), co-editor of The Challenge of Change: Military Institutions and New Realities, 1918–1941 (2003) and Corps Commanders of the Bulge: Six American Generals and Victory in the Ardennes (2007).

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Published

2012-05-11

Issue

Vol. 14 No. 1 (2011): Fall 2011

Section

Seventy Years On: New Perspectives on the Second World War